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Abstract
This thesis makes a contribution to the critique of Orientalism, thiough a theoretical 
analysis and enqiirical obseivation of the construction of Muslim identities in the United 
Kingdom and France. It examines Western stereotypes of Islam, particularly of Muslims 
in the West, and ways in which they have responded, thr ough the construction of Muslim 
identities, to these stereotypes. The central contribution lies in joining these issues, 
estabhshing a dialectic of Orientahsm and Muslim identities. The thesis focuses on the 
stereotype of Islam as homogeneous, the sociological reahty that Islam and Muslim 
identities are diverse, and posits the same dialectical relationship between these 
phenomena.
Part I examines Western representations of Islam, and begins with a theoretical and 
historical view of Orientahsm, starting from Edward Said’s work. It also insists on the 
diversity of Orientahst and Muslim perspectives, emphasises the mutual constitution of 
Islam and the West, and analyses their active participation in a process of polarisation. 
The thesis goes on to analyse the concept of Islamophobia, and argues it encapsulates an 
aspect of current reahty, though it refers to diverse phenomena. Other representations of 
Islam, particularly in the media, are examined in the foUowing chapter, which discusses 
stereotypes of exoticism, fanaticism, delinquency, and an emergent critique of 
Islamophobia.
 ^ Part II focuses on Mushm identities in the United Kingdom and France, and 
examines ways in which Muslims, thiough the construction of Mushm identities.
jiicoiporate or reject Western representations of Islam. It begins by discussing theories 
of identity, and develops a sociological framework for understanding Muslim identities. 
It goes on to show, and this is a central contribution of the thesis, that Muslim identities 
are diverse, and this diversity represents different responses to the stereotype of Islam as 
homogeneous. It describes and analyses different meanings and articulations of Islam, 
diverse sources of Muslim identities, and the combination of Muslim identities with other 
identities.
The following chapters identify arenas in which Islam and the West actually meet, 
and thus examines the dialectic of Orientalism and Muslim identities more closely. 
Chapter 7 considers theoretical and empirical relationships between Muslim identities and 
national identities. Chapter 8 examines the educational sphere in a British-French 
comparative perspective, and focuses particularly on the cultural meanings of the hijab 
(Islamic headscarf). Finally, Chapter 9 describes, and analyses the significance of, 
Muslim-Christian dialogue, an arena in which Islam meets the "Christian West’, and in 
which a diversity of Muslim identities is developed. The conclusion corroborates the 
dialectic of Orientahsm and Muslim identities, emphasises comparisons between the 
United Kingdom and France, and suggests directions for future research.
Ill
... knowledge of Islam and Islamic peoples has generally proceeded not only from 
dominance and confrontation but also from cultural antipathy. Today Islam is defined 
negatively as that with which the West is radically at odds, and this tension establishes a 
fr amework radically limiting knowledge of Islam (Said 1997b; 163).
... ce que tu as à l’intérieur, c’est l’islam... (inteiviewee cited in Kepel 1991; 31).
O mankind! We created you fr om a single (pah) of a male and a female and made you 
into nations and tribes that ye may know each other (The Qm’an, Al Hujurat^ 49:13).
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1. Introduction
1.1. A sociological reflection on the diversity of Islam
This thesis is about Western perceptions of Islam, particularly of Muslims in the 
West, and the ways m which these perceptions contribute to the construction of Muslim 
identities in the West. Within the West, the thesis focuses on a comparison between the 
United Kingdom and France. It examines the relationship between, on the one hand, an 
identity which is theologically based, and, on the other hand, a set of Western 
stereotypes which are contingent on the historical antagonism between Islam and the 
West, and the material conditions of Muslim migration to Western Europe in the second 
half of the twentieth century. The specific stereotype which constitutes the focus for this 
thesis is that of Islam as homogeneous and unchanging, which, as we shall see, is central 
to the Orientalist perception of Islam In reality, however, Islam and Muslim identities 
are diverse, and there are connections between the homogeneous perception and the 
diverse reality.
Ibn al-‘Arabi, the great Muslim theologian and Sufi master of the late twelfth and 
early thirteenth centuries, addressed some of the same issues in a theological way, and it 
is worth beginning with his argument in order to estabhsh a context for this thesis. 
Having done so, this introduction outlines and discusses: (i) the rationales for the thesis, 
fand for the British-French comparison which is integral to it; (ii) the questions and 
hypotheses which are addressed; (hi) the stmcture of the thesis; (iv) the methodology of
the study; (v) the contributions which are made; and (vi) the relevant academic hterature, 
which is a continuation of the discussion about the contributions.
Ibn al-‘Aiabi argued that God was the source of all diversity, including diversity of 
beliefs about God. He wrote:
God Himself is the fir st problem of diversity that has become manifest in the 
cosmos. The fir st thing that each existent thing looks upon is the cause of its 
own existence, hr itself each thing knows that it was not, and that it then came 
to be through temporal origination. However, in this coming to be, the 
dispositions of the existent things are diverse. Hence they have diverse 
opinions about the identity of the cause that brought them into existence. 
Therefore the Real is the first problem of diversity m the cosmos (cited in 
Chittick 1994: 4).
Ibn al""Ai*abi expounds this tliinking in a commentary on ‘the chcle of reUgious 
diversity’, which argues that the revealed religions are diverse because of the diversity of 
the divine relationships, or divine names, wliich encapsulate God’s ways of deahng with 
the diversity of the cosmos. This is because the diverse parts of the cosmos have 
différent needs (‘the diversity of the states’), so relate to the divine creator in different 
ways. These states are diverse because of then tendency to fluctuate according to time, 
which itself is diverse because of the movement of the celestial bodies. These 
movements are diverse because God gives to each of them a specific divine attentiveness, 
that is, considers them and causes them to operate m different ways, which God does 
because of a diversity of goals, or intentions for each of these objects. These goals are 
diverse to facihtate a diversity of divme self-revelations, which are themselves diverse
because of the diversity of the revealed religions, and this closes the chcle (Chittick 
1994: 157-60).
Now, there is a certahi medieval charm to this manner of philosophising, which, to 
the Western reader, may seem reminiscent of the works of Thomas Aquinas or Anselm 
of Canterbury. Despite its medieval character, it has a definite place in the foundations 
of Muslim thought. The Qur’an says: "O mankind! We created you from a single (pah) 
of a male and a female and made you into different nations and tribes that ye may know 
each other’ (The Qur’an, Al Hujurat, 49:13). Clearly, the thinking here is that diversity 
does not necessaiily entail division or conflict, but is an effective way of understanding 
our own diversity as human beings, hi Western Christian philosophy, it has been 
possible to take this further due to the emphasis on divine diversity, encapsulated most 
clearly in the doctirne of the Tiinity, and this has contemporaiy secular equivalents in the 
emphasis on diversity which can be found in existentialist or postmodern thought. This 
is precluded in Islam by the doctiine of tawhid, divine unicity.
Of course, Muslim theological discourse is contingent on a number of assumptions, 
without which it would (arguably) not be Muslim, nor would it have developed in the 
way which it has. Centrally, there is a behef in the existence of God, the veracity of the 
fir st shahada— ^ashadu ana la illaha ilia allah\ which translates as "I bear witness that 
there is no god but God’, or, more pertinently, T am (as an existential statement about 
my Being) beaiing witness that there is no god but The God’. There is also a behef in 
divine revelation, in the Qur’an and elsewhere (principally the Torah, the Psalms and th.e 
Injil, or Gospel). Because there is revelation in more than one place, there is aheady a 
seed of rehgious diversity m the very core of Islam. However, for the sociologist, there 
Us an important problem with this foim of thought, which is the fir st reason why it needs 
to be transcended before we can even begin this thesis. The form of thought which 1
have described starts from the premise of methodological theism, and this is as 
inconsistent with sociological discourse as it is axiomatic to much theological discomse.
Sociological inteipretations of rehgion tend to start from the premise of either 
methodological atheism, assuming that God does not exist and that rehgion is a human 
and social project, or methodological agnosticism, assuming that we must suspend 
judgement on the existence or non-existence of God for the purposes of sociological 
enquiry. These have been the most common methodological premises in sociological 
discomse, but they are not the only ones which are available. It seems to me that a 
‘methodological existentiahsm’, which recognises the existence of God as an existential 
reahty for the behever, is legitimate, or even a ‘methodological Pascahanism’, which 
regards it as necessary to ‘wager’ on the existence or non-existence of God, and proceed 
as i f  this were certain. My own approach is probably a combination of methodological 
agnosticism and methodological existentiahsm.
There is another important difference between the sort of theological discourse 
represented above by Ibn al-‘Aiabi and sociological discomse, which, as wUl become 
apparent, is particularly important to this thesis. A theological approach would define 
Mushms according to an aheady existing conception of Islam, that is, as those who 
beheve and practice Islam, whereas a sociological approach would define Islam as the 
behefs and practices of Mushms, or of those who define themselves as Mushms and are 
generahy recognised as such by (other) Mushms. This means that Islam is diverse by 
definition, but we cannot estabhsh the diversity of Islam simply by definition, nor can we 
account for it solely theoreticahy. We must take a longer approach.
Let us begin by asking three questions, which must be clearly distinguished fiom 
each other: what is rehgion; what is a rehgion; and what is a confession?^ Since its
 ^By a confession, I mean any religious sect, denomination, maslak (distinctive school of thouglit within 
Islam which has some form of central organisation), or distinctive sub-grouping within a religion.
inception, the sociology of rehgion has been bogged down with the first of these 
questions. Durkheim (1915: 23-47, especiahy 47) famously defined rehgion as a 
separation of the sacred and the profane which gathered people together in rehgious 
communities, but this is not always the case. Consider hernhts who purposely separate 
themselves fiom all community, or pohtical theologies (fiom hberation theology at one 
end of the spectrnm to theocracy at the other) which attempt to subsume the profane 
under the sacred. Weber, perhaps more wisely, began his Sociology o f Religion with the 
dictum: ‘To define “rehgion”, to say what it is, is not possible at the start of a 
presentation such as this. Definition can be attempted, if at ah, ordy at the conclusion of 
the study’ (Weber 1993: 1). However, the reader who searches tlirough this work of 
Weber in the hope of finding such a definition whl be disappointed.
Perhaps the lesson to be drawn is that sociologists are mistaken in trying to define 
rehgion too precisely. I propose a definition of rehgion which combines the seemingly 
contrasting definitions of two sociologists, Peter Berger and Alain Tour aine. Berger 
(1973: 37) defines rehgion as ‘the audacious attempt to conceive of the enthe universe as 
humanly significant’, which imphes a consciousness of an anthropocentric sacred 
cosmos, while Tour aine (1974: 213-4) says that rehgion is ‘the apprehension of human 
destiny, existence, and death’, that is, an awareness of human limitations. While Berger 
emphasises the high place for human beings in rehgion, and Tomaine emphasises our 
place on the periphery, these are both necessary characteristics of rehgion. hi the case of 
Islam, the Islamic understanding of the anthr opocentric sacred cosmos and of human 
hmitations is what defines the Islamic understanding of rehgion.
Fohowing fiom this, I would define a rehgion (as opposed to rehgion qua 
f something generic) as an ensemble of questions arising fiom the sacred cosmos and 
human hmitations, and from a specific understanding of, or attempt to understand, the
sacred cosmos and human limitations. Wilfred Cantwell Smith addresses the same 
problem by analysing the Arabic word din, usually translated ‘rehgion’. It is worth 
taking a moment to consider this in detah. Smith (1978: 81) writes that:
... the Arabic language has, and has had since the appearance of Islam and 
indeed from shortly before, a term and concept that seem to be quite closely 
equivalent to the Western ‘rehgion’. Indeed this word—namely, din—is used 
in ah the various senses of its Western cormterpart. It carried the sense of 
personal rehgion: the classical dictionaries give wara \  ‘piety’ as an equivalent, 
a word that never has a systematic or community meanhrg and that cannot have 
a plural. It carries also, however, the sense of a particular rehgious system, one 
‘rehgion’ as distinct from another. In this sense it has a plural {adyan). Tliis 
pliual is not in the Qm’an, but is traditional. Furthermore, the word in its 
systematic sense can be used both ideahy and objectively, of one’s own rehgion 
and of other people’s, the true rehgion and false ones.
So there is a tension between the conception of din as rehgion and as a rehgion, but 
there is an early consciousness of a coUectwe term which denotes one’s own rehgion and 
the rehgion of ‘outsiders’. In contrast, such a coUective use of the Latin religio only 
came about in Europe after the Renaissance and Reformation, prior to which other 
rehgions were regarded as ‘sects’ or ‘heresies’ (Smith 1978: 83). It should be noted, 
however, that, while religio came to imply a distinction between a secular and a rehgious 
sphere, din did not have this connotation (Smith 1978: 92). In fact, din had three 
^meanings m the Arabian peninsula of the seventh centuiy: the concept of systematic 
rehgion; the act of ‘judging’ or ‘passing sentence’, and, by extension, ‘judgement’ or
‘verdict’; and the verbal noun of the verb ‘to conduct oneself, to behave, to observe 
certain practices, to follow traditional usage, to conform’, and therefore ‘conformity, 
propriety, obedience’ and ‘usages, customs, standard behaviour’, a noun which could 
only exist in the singular form (Smith 1978; 101-2). These meanings combine what 
contemporaiy Westerners woidd regard as religious and secular concepts, though they 
do not necessarily mean that Islam is incompatible with the concept of the secular, as 
many writers have suggested.
When the word islam is used in the Qur’an, it does not have the reified meaning 
which Islam has today. Once more I cite Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1978: 110):
If we look carefully at the Qur’an, we find, first of ah, that the term islam there 
is relatively much less used than are other related but more dynamic and 
personal tenus; and secondly, that when it is used it can be, and on many 
grounds almost must be, interpreted not as the name of a religious system but 
as the designation of a decisive personal act.
So when islam is an essentiaUy personal act, it is inevitably diverse. But what about 
Islam, the reified rehgious system? To begin to answer this, we can ask the thhd 
question ahuded to above: what is a confession? Or, to put that differently, what are the 
conditions and expressions of rehgious diversity? Let us say fii stly that a confession is a 
set of responses, and a fr amework for responding, to the questions raised by a rehgion, 
that defining a rehgion as an ensemble of questions leads us to suppose that there whl be 
different answers to these questions, that is, rehgious diversity, and that the tension in 
^our understanding between the sacred cosmos and human hmitation is a cause of 
rehgious diversity.
The religious diversity which exists in Islam must be represented with a multi­
dimensional model. We can cite the differences between masalik (distinctive schools of 
thought within Islam which have some form of central organisation), madhahib (schools 
of Islamic jurisprudence and interpretation of Islamic law), tariqa (usually, though not 
exclusively, used to refer to Sufi orders). There are differences between the Sufis and 
‘orthodox’ Muslims (or, to use more value-neutral terminology, between those who take 
an esoteric and those who take an exoteric view of the Qur’an), there are different 
interpretations of the five pillars (for example, some Sufis have imderstood the first 
shahada in a way which has overtones of pantheism, Ismaili Muslims pray three times 
daily and do not fast during Ramadhan since they see fasting m more symbolic terms as 
avoiding what is considered to be wrong), and there are different understandings and 
practices of Islam based on a rural/urban dichotomy, which has been analysed by a 
number of scholars fiom Ibn Khaldun (1958; originally draJded in 1377) to Ernest Gellner 
(1969, 1981).^ AH the diversities listed above can be caused by linguistic, cultural, 
pohtical, economic, social and historical factors, as weU as by factors of identity, and in 
turn have an influence on language, culture, pofitics, economies, societies, history and 
identities. Rehgious diversity in Islam must be understood sociologicaUy in circular 
terms.
To conceptuahse this differently, rehgion is diverse because society is diverse. This 
kind of thinldng wiU be famhiar to anybody with a knowledge of hberation theology, 
particularly its use of the hermeneutic chcle. This is defined by Juan Luis Segundo 
(1991: 9) as ‘the continuing change in our interpretation of the Bible which is dictated by 
the continuing changes in om present-day reahty, both individual and societal’. In the 
case of Islam, we can read the Qur’an in place of the Bible. The hermeneutic circle
 ^ This can be compared with Ali M ili’s (n.d.) doctoral thesis, which shows that Tunisian migrants to 
France have had very different experiences based on their urban or rural background, since the latter 
have undergone a ‘double migration’ (rural to urban and Tunisia to France).
begins with questions and suspicion about one’s real situation (which, in classical 
liberation theology, comes from an experience of poverty), which produces a political 
hberative praxis, which in turn leads to a new inteipretation of scripture, and this foims 
the basis of a theology of hberation. A theology of hberation can provide a fr amework 
for questions and suspicion about one’s real situation, which ‘closes’ the hermeneutic 
chcle (or, rather, enables it to continue). So theology can undergo ‘paradigm shifts’ in 
response to social and intellectual changes (compare Küng 1992, 1995), or a subversive 
theology can emerge, which subverts the rehgion ‘from within’ (see Cupitt 1986), a 
principle which whl be famhiar from Adorno’s (1973: 365) dictum: ‘If negative dialectics 
cahs for the self-reflection of thinking, the tangible imphcation is that if tliinking is to be 
tme—if it is to be tme today, in any case—it must also be a thinking against itself’ 
There is a power stmctme within the ummah, the worldwide ‘community’ of Mushms, 
but this can be chaUenged using the tools of Islam, and the power of Mushm identities. 
Where these Mushm identities exist, diversity whl also exist.
1.2. Rationales
This brings us to a point where we can outline the questions and hypotheses which 
this thesis addresses. Before doing so, however, I want to outhne some of the rationales 
behind writing a thesis on this subject. There are, of course, personal motivations, but 
the sociological rationales are pressing, so I shah focus on three of them: the importance 
of Islam in contemporary media, pohtical and popular discourses; the importance of 
rehgious identities in the modem world, and for contemporaiy sociological theoiy; and 
The importance of a critique of Orientahsm to contemporary sociological thought.
The first of these rationales is that Islam is an important subject in contemporaiy 
media discourse, which has shaped political and popular consciousness about the 
‘problems’ and ‘conflicts’ of the post-cold-war world. Indeed, Samuel Huntington’s 
thesis about a ‘clash of civilisations’, particularly between Islam and the West, mns the 
risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. When Washington believes that this is going 
to happen, the whole of the Muslim world, which is perceived as homogeneous, is 
perceived to be the enemy. Thus, a Saudi Aiabian exile, living in Afghanistan, is accused 
of being behind the bombing of United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 
‘measmed’, ‘rational’ response is to bomb a medicine factoiy in Khartoum. 
Unsurprisingly, this is resented by Muslims, which is seen to confirm the ‘clash of 
civilisations’ thesis.
The second rationale indicates that the interaction between national and rehgious 
identities is particularly important in the modem world, and in contemporary sociological 
theory. Belonging to a nation means that we identify omselves with some people, and 
exclude others, and that this process of inclusion and exclusion defines the nation, 
defines who we are, and defines what comes to seem like the very natur e of human 
society. Nations and national identities are not natural, but they are so central to our 
modes of understanding ourselves and experiencing the world that it is almost impossible 
to conceive of then absence. It is a tenet of commonsense understanding that every 
human being belongs to a nation. Yet, for the rehgious person, the rehgious identity can 
be even stronger. When somebody belongs to a rehgious group, the world of human 
beings can be divided into the ‘behevers’ and the ‘unbehevers’. I could have looked at 
this dynamic by studymg any rehgious identity. By looking at Islam, and Muslim 
^identities, this thesis focuses on something which is of particular pohtical importance, 
and I am reminded that identity is more than the way in which Self is constructed. It is
10
also the way in which the Other is constmcted, and in which that construction is 
internalised.
Thirdly, these are issues which are central to a great deal of contemporary 
sociological thought, and the importance of Orientalism—as a concept in comparative 
hterature, postcolonial studies and the social sciences—indicates that there is a 
connection between social theory and social reality at this point. The importance of 
identity in contemporary theory, particularly postmodern theory and cultural studies, 
means that this thesis is beiug situated close to a very fashionable subject area. My own 
perspective is not so fashionable, though I attempt to take postmodern and related 
theories seriously. The combined analysis of existential and theological perspectives on 
identity, the critique of Orientalism, the diversity of Islam, conceptualisations of 
Islamophobia in relation to racism, and empirical data from the United Kingdom and 
France, constitutes an important part of the contribution of this thesis, and an important 
contribution to the field. I discuss the contributions of this thesis in section 1.6, below.
The focus on the construction of Muslim identities in the United Kingdom and 
France is an integral aspect of this thesis. There are a number of reasons for 
concentrating on the United Kingdom and France, even though the West as a whole 
constitutes part of the historical context. Fir stly, it is in order to focus the study more 
effectively. To study the whole of Western Europe would inevitably lead to 
generalisations, whereas a comparative study of two countries facilitates the 
identification of similarities and differences. This in tmn enables us to distinguish 
universal characteristics, of Western perceptions of Islam and the construction of Muslim 
identities in the West, from particular phenomena which can be found hi any one country 
or natron state. Secondly, the United Kingdom and France have quite different models 
of the nation, including theories of integration, which constitute ideal types and are
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therefore amenable to comparison. The model of the United Kingdom is of a multi­
national state, with a multicultural ethos, while the model of France is of a unitary nation 
state, with an assimilatiouist ethos. Thirdly, the two countries have different histories of 
interaction with Islam thr ough coloniahsm and migration. This enables us to identify the 
specific relationship between history and present-day reahties, and to control for the 
differences in coimtry of origin which can be foimd in the Muslim communities on both 
sides of the Channel. Fourthly, my familiarity with the majority languages and cultures 
of these two countries has facilitated research, because it has enabled me to conduct 
interviews with Muslims and other people, and to situate data in the wider contexts of 
national life and mentalités.
1.3. Hypotheses and questions
The central objective, which follows fiom my reflection on the diversity of Islam, 
and fi'om the rationales of the thesis, is to test the following three hypotheses; that Islam 
and Muslim identities are perceived as homogeneous; that they are in fact diverse; and 
that there is a relationship between these two reahties. These hypotheses are addressed, 
theoretically and empirically, in three ways. Fhstly, the thesis examines some 
representations of Islam which exist, in Orientahst discourse, Islamophobia, and the 
media, and demonstrates that they portray Islam as homogeneous. This is not as simple 
a proposition as it may appear, because, although Islam is represented as homogeneous, 
it is represented as homogeneous in different ways, and this diversity is another 
important theme of this thesis. Secondly, a sociological model of identity, based on an 
adaptation of some aspects of existentiahst thought, is constructed and apphed to an 
empirical examination of the diversity of Muslim identities. Thirdly, this thesis considers
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the theoretical and empiiical hnks between representations of Islam and Muslim 
identities, inter alia in the experiences of interviewees, in the emergent critique of 
Islamophobia, in the tensions between Muslim identities and national identities, and in 
dialogue between Muslims and Chiistians.
Another way of explaining the way in which the hypotheses are addr essed is to turn 
them into a series of questions, conceived in terms of a theoretical reflection which was 
crucial in the way this project was pmsued. There are four central questions, which 
constitute the most important themes of the thesis, and which can be summarised as 
follows:
(i) What perceptions exist of a West-Islam dualism, homogeneity of Islam, and
homogeneity of the West?
(ii) How are they expressed?
(in) What are then causes and effects?
(iv) What dissenting voices exist, how are they expressed, and what are then
causes and effects?
Section 1.1 identified the significance of the fourth question, and provided some 
answers, based on an understanding of the hermeneutic chcle and negative dialectics, for 
example, or the difference between the concepts of rehgion, a rehgion, and a confession. 
Chapter 2, on the critique of Orientahsm, is essentially a discussion of the theoretical 
reflection which lay behhid these questions, and an attempt to provide some answers. As 
I was reflecting on this subject, and preparing the chapter, it became clear that there was 
ra tension between the affrmation of Muslim identities in the West and an effective 
critique of Orientahsm. This is what these questions attempt to address.
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Let us consider the first two questions. Orientahsm, as the tenu is used in this 
thesis, refers to a body of knowledge or a system of thought which perceives the 
existence of a West-Islam duahsm, in which Islam is perceived as homogeneous. 
Responses to such stereotypes may imply that the West, not Islam, is homogeneous, but 
this does not provide an effective critique of the central stereotype, which is that Islam 
and the West are essentiaUy different. Nevertheless, an effective critique of ah these 
stereotypes involves asking what they are, where they come from, how they are 
expressed, and why.
In the context of this thesis, the question of identity is central to the thh d question. 
A Muslim identity, where it leads to a separatist mentahty, can be a cause of the 
perception that Islam and the West are incompatible, and in this way Muslim identities 
can be as negative as Western Orientahst stereotypes. Furthermore, the West may be 
perceived as homogeneous, as being the historical ‘Crusader’ against Islam, or as being 
in peipetual darkness, and some of these stereotypes are identified at various points of 
the thesis, for example in section 2.4. However, my piimaiy concern hes elsewhere. 
Where Islam and the West are perceived as incompatible in Western or Orientahst 
discourses, other stereotypes emerge, and this has an effect on the construction of 
Muslim identities. Muslims may react against the stereotypes, or they may incoiporate 
them into then own identities. Tliis thesis focuses on the diversity of reactions which 
may emerge.
Because of tliis diversity, the fomth question is particularly important. Whhe Islam 
and the West may be perceived as incompatible and/or homogeneous, and this perception 
is present in the thinking of some Westerners and Muslims, including Western Mushms, 
fthere are dissenting voices. In Chapter 4, I show that there is a media critique of 
Islamophobia, and this is a dissenting voice in the context of the homogenising discourse
14
about Islam which is predominant in Western media. Also, there are some scholars who 
insist that Islam is a part of the West (see, for example, Arkoun 1994: 65), or that Islam 
and the West have shown themselves to be capable of mutual emichment (for example, 
Corbin 1986), and this type of thinking has had an influence on many ordinary Muslims, 
some of whom were inteiviewed for this thesis (much of this data is presented hi chapter 
6). Because of these dissenting voices, it is possible to assert that there is a diversity of 
Muslim identities.
1.4. Structure
Shice this thesis considers the dialectical constmction of Muslim identities, with 
reference to Orientahsm, and emphasises diversity, decisions about the structure must 
reflect these themes. To begin with, the thesis considers the interactions between Islam 
and the West, and the processes by which they constitute each other. Then, as the thesis 
continues, it places more emphasis on the diversity of Islam and of Muslim identities, 
showing that this diversity is central to understanding Islam and its interaction with the 
West, and that it is hi part brought about by a negative dialectic. By this I mean that the 
meeting between Islam and the West creates greater diversity within Islam, as well as 
within the West, and it can be a factor which increases polarisation.
In order to address the questions and hypotheses wliich have been outlined, and to 
make the contributions which are expounded below, the thesis is divided hito two main 
sections. Part I, entitled ‘Western representations of Islam’, begins, in Chapter 2, with a 
theoretical and historical view of Orientahsm which extiounds and addresses the four 
/central questions of the thesis which are outlined above. It uses Edward Said’s work as 
a starting pohit, then moves beyond Said’s fiamework by taking more account of the
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complexity and diversity of Orientalist discomses, and of Muslim discourses about the 
West. Rather than presenting Islam as a passive victim of Orientalism, I argue for a 
theoiy of interaction between Islam and the West, and between Orientahsm and 
Occidentahsm (ah of which are heterogeneous categories), by which they are influenced 
and constituted, positively and negatively, thiough this interaction. This coiTects Said’s 
lack of emphasis on the mutual constitution of Islam and the West, and emphasises that 
they are both active participants in a process which creates a polarisation of Islam and 
the West.
Chapter 3 addresses the third central question of this thesis (‘What are their causes 
and effects?’) by isolating an effect of the perception of a West-Islam duahsm, 
homogeneity of Islam and homogeneity of the West, which is referred to as 
Islamophobia. In order to isolate the specificity of Islamophobia as an effect of these 
perceptions, I examine its conceptual distinctions and overlaps with racism, consider 
definitions of both concepts, and propose a possible comparison with antisemitism 
Although antisemitism qua racism has largely succeeded antisemitism qua rehgious 
hatred, I suggest that Islamophobia is increasingly articulated in rehgious terms, but that 
the category ‘Muslim’ is still being raciahsed. Due in part to these obseivations, and also 
because many Mushms perceive themselves to be a transnational, multi-ethnic 
community (ummah), I argue that it is necessaiy to make an analytical distinction 
between racism and Islamophobia, reflecting a distraction between a raciahsed ethnie and 
a rehgious group which may become raciahsed, but whose aheged differences are not 
primarily biological or somatic. This chapter also examines allegations of cultural and 
ideological incompatibihty between Western values and those of Islam, which sometimes 
f combine differential racist and Islamophobic discourses, to the extent that these 
discourses are barely distinguishable.
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Chapter 4, on media representations of Islam, addresses empnically the question of 
how Muslims are perceived and represented ia the West. This is addressed with 
reference to the media because of its accessibility, because it is particularly mfluential, 
and because it occupies a ‘middle ground’ between popular, ‘commonsense’ ideas, and 
pohtical or academic discourses. This chapter focuses on the movement which there has 
been, in Orientahst discomse in general, from a perception of Islam as exotic to one of 
Islam as fanatical. It shows that there are different perceptions of a West-Islam duahsm 
and homogeneity of Islam, and that these perceptions are expressed in these different 
ways. It thus addresses the first and second central questions of this thesis (‘What 
perceptions exist of a West-Islam duahsm, homogeneity of Islam, and homogeneity of 
the West?’; and: ‘How are they expressed?’). Examples of these discourses are 
identified, leading to a consideration of discourses about teitorism and delinquency. Tliis 
is followed by a brief consideration of the possibihty that a new critique of Islamophobia 
is emergmg as an alternative, albeit marginal, media discourse, which, as I have stated, is 
a dissenting voice in terms of the fomth central question (‘What dissentmg voices exist, 
how are they expressed, and what are their causes and effects?’). The diverse 
representations of Islam which are identified m this chapter demonstrate a point which 
has aheady been made, that, although Islam is represented as homogeneous, it is 
represented as homogeneous hi different ways, and this adds a further level of 
complexity to this thesis.
Chapter 5, which opens Part II (entitled Muslim identities in the United Kingdom 
and France), looks at the idea of identity in general, and Muslim identities hi particular, 
and asks to what extent this enables us to address the tension which exists between the 
f critique of Orientahsm and the ajffhmation of Mushm identities. It begins with Aziz Al- 
Azmeh’s (1996) critique of the notion of Mushm identities, made on the basis that
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identity implies a homogeneous, a priori social essence. I argue against Al-Azmeh on 
this point, without denying that identity is a theme which requhes careful reflection. 
Nevertheless, an investigation of Muslim identities can proceed if it takes account of the 
need for a critique of Orientahsm, and a sociological analysis must proceed on the basis 
(in Sartrean teims) of the existence of Mushms preceding the essence of Islam or of 
Mushm identities. FoUowing on from these principles, this chapter examines some 
philosophical and psychological concepts of identity, considers national identities as a 
‘prototype’ for other group identities, particularly the Mushm identity which is expressed 
in the concept of the ummah, and compares some contemporary themes, such as the 
fluidity of identities, with Sartre’s existentiahsm. It ends with a summary of prelimhrary 
answers to ah four of the central questions, and argues that we can understand them in a 
more concrete way when we look at empirical case studies.
This emphical data is presented in Chapter 6, which is an attempt to capture and 
portray the diversity of Mushm identities. It looks at the diverse ways in which Islam is 
perceived by Mushms, or what it means to them to be Muslims, the diverse sources of 
Mushm identities which, perhaps inevitably, bring about this diversity, and the 
combination of Muslim identities with other identities. Because different identities are 
mtemahsed in individuals, they camiot be neatly separated, and so they affect each other 
strongly, even to the point of constituting each other. Also, because there is such a 
diversity of identities on offer, their combination with Mushm identities is another 
important factor hi the creation of a diversity of Muslim identities.
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 foim a distinct entity within Part II, because they ah look at 
arenas in which Islam and the West meet and confront each other, so to speak. 
/Conceptuahy, these chapters ah follow on from Chapter 6, rather than progressing in a 
linear order—ideahy, it would be possible to insert these three chapters at the same point
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ill the thesis. Chapter 7 addresses the subject of national identities, looks at their 
interaction and tension with Islam and Muslim identities, and considers one of the major 
differences between the United Kingdom and France, which is the pohtical model, or 
philosophy, of integration (as mentioned in section 1.2, where I outlined the rationales 
for the British-French comparison). I am critical of integiation as a concept, for reasons 
which are outlined, but it sthl has pohtical weight, and is understood differently in both 
countries. The United Kingdom has proceeded on the basis of a theoiy of 
multiculturahsm, undeiphined by a discourse of race relations, and France has proceeded 
on the basis of a theory of assimilation, undeipinned by a discom se of intégration. In 
part, this is because the United Kingdom has known a de facto multiculturahsm for 
centuries, due to its model of the nation state, compared with France’s attempt to impose 
uniformity for the puiposes of post-1789 nation building. However, this chapter argues 
that the practice of the pohtics of hitegi ation is broadly similar, and that there is diversity 
within each countiy, as some of my inteiview material demonstrates. It demonstrates 
that the phenomena of national identities and the pohtics of integiation play a very 
important part in the construction of Mushm identities in the West, because they 
constitute an arena in which Islam and the West can meet and, so to speak, confr ont each 
other.
Chapter 8 continues the discussion of representations of Islam hi the educational 
sphere, which begins m Chapter 4, and compares the issues in question in the United 
Kingdom and France. As such, it focuses on a specifrc example of the diversity and 
complexity entailed in an apparent area of confr ontation between Islam and the West. In 
the United Kingdom, there have been debates and disagieements on the subjects of state- 
funded Mushm schools, rehgious education for Mushm pupils, mixed classes for physical 
education and sport, the content of the sex education cuiriculum, and the provision of
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halal food in school canteens. In France, on the other hand, one issue has predominated, 
and that is the debate about the wearing of the hijab in state schools. This debate has 
been premised on the hijab having a single meaning, with an assumption of a simple 
conflict between the French seculai' repubhc and the values of Islam. In contrast, this 
chapter highlights some complexities. It shows that opposition to the hijab can be 
associated with xenophobia and exclusion, while, on the other hand, the Qui’anic 
injunction on women to veil themselves does not necessarily have to be taken hterally. 
Furtheimore, some Muslim women and schoolgirls see the hijab as liberating and 
afiBnnative of their identity, while dissenting voices exist (in answer to the fom th central 
question), leading others to refuse to wear the hijab, or to wear it reluctantly.
Chapter 9, which is the final chapter of Part II, and which precedes the conclusion, 
is about Muslim-Chiistian relations. This chapter takes account of the radical antipathy 
between Islam and the West which, since the eleventh centmy, has often existed between 
the religiously defined Muslim world and the Chiistian West. It examines dialogue 
between Muslims and Christians m the United Kingdom and France, using ethnographic 
and interview material to show what such dialogue means to participants, looking at the 
theological basis for dialogue, and considering its sociological significance. It argues 
that the existence of such dialogue demonstrates the existence of a certam social 
ambience. This in turn demonstrates that relations between Islam and the West have 
changed radically fi^ om the days of radical mutual antipathy, and this undeimines the 
Orientahst perception of Islam as homogeneous, unchanging, and essentially different 
fi om the West. Dialogue can itself be a dissenting voice.
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1.5. Methodology
The research methodology which was used to prepare this thesis is most simply 
described as comparative participant observation, including mteiviews and the analysis of 
newspaper sources. The British-French comparative aspect is discussed below. Fhst, I 
wish to discuss the use of participant obseivation, intemews and content analysis. 
Participant obseivation, or ethnography, is defined by Hammersley and Atkinson (1983: 
2) as follows:
Tlie ethnographer participates, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily fives for an 
extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, 
asking questions; in fact collecting whatever data are available to thiow fight on 
the issues with which he or she is concerned.
The social sciences have fi equently been plagued by a kind of open warfare between 
advocates of participant obseivation and other qualitative methods, and advocates of 
quantitative method. This may not be the case any more, and it may even be possible to 
deconstmct the gap between these different methods, as Hammersley (1992: 1, 159ff) 
has suggested. Nevertheless, claims are still made about the distinct advantages and 
disadvantages of participant obseivation. For example, participant observation enables 
the researcher to pursue questions in greater depth than other methodologies, develop a 
Verstehen or empathy with the subjects, make use of actors’ subjective understandings, 
prioritise the understanding of social action and interaction over the explanation of 
f social facts, and take account of the distinctiveness of the social world vis-à-vis the 
natural world. On the other hand, it is believed that there are problems with the
2 1
geîieralisability of ethnographie accounts, that this undermines the validity of their 
findings, that there is a temptation to assume that researchers’ preconceived 
understandings do not influence then results (though postmodern approaches to 
anthropology have compelled researchers to be aware of this), and that the relationship 
to practice is at best tenuous (see Hammersley 1992: 2; corupare Buhner 1984: 210-11).
I do not beheve strongly that only one methodology is inherently superior to any 
other, and the reason for using participant observation in this study is that it was the 
most appropriate method to answer the questions and test the hypotheses which are 
discussed above, in section 1.3. It entailed meeting Muslims in different areas of then 
social lives, speaking to them in an everyday context which avoided the formahty of the 
interview (though, in some cases, I used more formal semi-stmctured mteiviews), finding 
out where they hved and what they did, and collecting a wide variety of different types of 
information. The Mushms who I was able to meet had a wide diversity of attitudes to 
their faith and to the societies in which they lived, which is why the participant 
observation method was an important means of addressing the questions and hypotheses 
about diversity.
An example of this can be taken fiom the earhest participant observation which I 
carried out for this thesis, fir Glasgow, where my United Kingdom fieldwork was 
concentrated (I explain why below), I began attending an EngUsh-speaking Mushm study 
group (the Halaqah chcle) in November 1995. Participants were all male, but there was 
an enormous diversity of occupations (including a surgeon, a university lecturer, an 
engineer, a shopkeeper, an artist, an architect and a community worker), ages (fiom 
primary-school age to retired), and countries of origin (including Pakistan, India, Egypt, 
^Mauritius, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, France, the United Kingdom, and even Poland). The 
Halaqah circle met most Friday evenings, and would read a section of the Qur’an,
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followed by tafseer (an exposition of the text by one participant) and discussion. 
Sometimes it would be inten*upted for the maghrib (evening) or ‘isha (night) prayer, and 
there were usually some refieshments, which provided a good opportunity for informal 
discussion.
I earned out participant observation in many other places, including the Glasgow 
Central Mosque, an inter-rehgious group in Glasgow, the Regents Park Mosque and 
Haqqani Sufi priory in London, and districts of Glasgow, London and Bradford where a 
significant number of Muslims live, fir the Woodlands district of Glasgow, I mapped the 
locations of mosques, halal butchers, other Muslim-owned businesses, and what I 
referred to as the ‘Muslim culture industry’, that is, businesses which provide cultmal 
products associated with mainly Muslim coimtries, for example Pakistani food, to the 
‘non-Muslim’ as well as Muslim population. This is discussed in section 6.4 of the 
thesis. In France, I began my participant observation m the district of Wazemmes, where 
I was hving, and carried out the same type o f ‘mapping’ study. I also had a contact fiom 
a Muslim-Christian group {Groupe Islamo-Chrétien du Hautmont-Mouvaux), who put 
me in touch with a number of mosques and individuals who I was able to meet, and, in 
some cases, interview. The Groupe Islamo-Chrétien was itself an important source of 
ethnographic data, as it met regularly. I attended a number of mosques in the Ldle area, 
particularly the Lille Sud mosque, and also m Paris. I visited North Afiican tea rooms, 
an outdoor market, Islamic bookshops, and the banlieues (peripheral urban housing 
estates) where a large number of Muslims in France are concentrated. This range of 
focal points for participant observation was an appropriate method to capture the 
diversity of Islam and Muslim identities hr the United Kingdom and France, thus 
j addressing the questions and hypotheses which were developed.
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The use of interviews was part of my participant observation. Initially, I had 
intended to use iuterviews as the basis for the methodology, but this gave way to a use of 
interviews in the context of participant observation. Part of the reason for this is that it 
was often difficidt to persuade people to agree to be interviewed. Only a few refused, 
but others kept asking me to call back later, or failed to arrive at the agreed time. Most 
problematically, the people who were eventually interviewed tended to fit a particular 
profile. They were male, practising Muslims, who articulated a behef that Muslims had a 
responsibihty to ‘mtegrate’ more effectively in Western society (whether as an end in 
itself or for the pmpose of dccwa, ‘invitation’ to Islam), a belief which, for various 
reasons, is not universally shared. This would have left me with a severe vahdity 
problem. On the other hand, the fact that this correlation occurred was in itself a 
significant finding, and is referr ed to in section 6.2 of the thesis.
Interviews were often taped and transcribed, but not always. In some cases, this 
depended on the interviewee’s consent, which was sometimes withheld, and in other 
cases it was my judgement that taping the interview would affect its quahty by 
significantly restricting the openness of the subject. Furthermore, I was sometimes able 
to speak to the same people informally, either before or after having interviewed them, 
and I felt that the most interesting data came firom these iirformal conversations. This 
also shows that the interviews were becoming a part of the participant observation, and 
that it was appropriate to view them as such. So, as the research progressed, there was a 
movement fi’om formal, taped, transcribed interviews, to untaped interviews, or lengthy 
informal conversations. In all, there were 59 such subjects, 30 in France (fisted in Table 
1.1) and 29 in the United Kingdom (fisted in Table 1.2). Of these, 16 agreed to a taped 
rinterview (11 in France, 5 in the United Kingdom), 13 to an untaped interview (9 in 
France, 4 in the United Kingdom), there were 26 people with whom I only had informal
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conversations (8 in France, 18 in the United Kingdom), there was one fomal audience, 
with Sheikh Nazim in London, and there are three subjects who are cited, but who only 
participated in a group discussion. The above figures reflect the fact that most of the 
French fieldwork was earned out before most of the United Kingdom fieldwork. There 
are three other things which should be noted: firstly, I have not cited every informal 
conversation which I had between 1995 and 1999; secondly, there were some people 
with whom I had more than one in-depth conversation, including some who also agreed 
to an interview; and thirdly, the distinction between imtaped interviews and significant 
informal conversations can be quite fluid. On this basis, we could say that there were 39 
imtaped interviews/informai conversations, of which 17 were in France and 22 in the 
United Kingdom.
I would not wish this discussion of methodology, particularly when it relates to 
interactions with real people, to be too abstract. It would be deshable to give more 
biographical information about subjects than is given in Tables 1,1 and 1.2. However, 
some were clearly reluctant to give biographical information, and many subjects, 
particularly those who agreed to a formal interview, were given guarantees of 
confidentiahty. It would be unethical to break these guarantees, which is why I have 
given respondents pseudonyms (with the exception of a few who are in prominent 
positions, or whose views are a matter of pubhc record). However, it is possible to 
concretise this discussion, and bring some characters more to life (so to speak), by 
providing some examples fiom my participant observation, fir Appendix 3, I cite some 
fieldwork notes fiom the Halaqah chcle in Glasgow and the Groupe Islamo-Chrétien 
near Lille, which show how people interacted with each other, how their backgrounds 
F and attitudes influenced those iuteractions, and how the diversity of Islam and Muslim
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1. Abdallah, law student, president o f JMF Tourcoing, born in France, of Algerian origin, lives in Tourcoing, 
male (taped interview).
2. Abdul, bookshop owner in Vieux Lille, male (Librairie Orientale) (informal conversations).
3. Almied, doctoral student, born in Morocco, oriented towards Sufi Islam, male (taped interview and 
informal conversation).
4. Aisha, works for association concerned with integration issues. President of Association Bammate, born in 
Algeria, lives in Roubaix, female (taped interview and informal conversations).
5. Alain, social worker, ‘français de souche’. Baptist, involved in Muslim-Christian dialogue, male (untaped 
interview and informal conversations).
6. Ainar Lasfar*, rector of Lille Sud mosque, president of Ligue Islamique du Nord and former member of 
CORIF, born in Morocco, now French citizen, male (taped interview and informal conversation).
7. Amina, works for Espace Intégration, female (taped interview).
8. Amo Ferhati*, director of Espace Integration, born in France, o f Moroccan origin, ‘non-practising’, male 
(two taped interviews).
9. Bmno, Catholic priest, ‘français de souche’, male (informal conversations).
10. Charlotte, English language assistant, born in Britain, living in Villeneuve d’Ascq, Anglican, female 
(informal conversations).
11. Edgar, Catholic priest, ‘français de souche’, male (untaped interview and informal conversations).
12. Farid, Amar Lasfar’s secretary, born in Morocco, in Lille for 15 years, male (informal conversations).
13. Fatima, nurse, born in France, o f Algerian origin, lives in Moulins district of Lille, ‘non-practising’, 
female (two untaped interviews).
14. Gilles, residential social worker (éducateur spécialisé), ‘français de souche’. Catholic, male (informal 
conversations).
15. Guy Lepoutre*, Catholic priest, ‘français de souche’, lives in Mouvaux, male (untaped interview and 
informal conversations).
16. Hassan, science teacher, born in Algeria, lives in Villeneuve d’Ascq, vice-president of Ligue Islamique du 
Nord, male (taped interview).
17. Henri, works in clothes shop, French convert to Islam, male (untaped interview).
18. Ibraliim, teacher in mosque, born in France, o f Algerian origin, lives in Fives district o f Lille, member of 
Naqshbandi Sufi order, male (two taped interviews).
19. Ismael, tea room proprietor, born in Morocco, lives in Fives, male (untaped interview).
20. Jacques, Catholic priest, ‘français de souche’, male (untaped interview).
21. Jean, unemployed, born in Morocco, has taken French name, lives in Lille Sud district, ‘non-practising’, 
male (two taped interviews).
22. Kahina, student, born in France, o f Kabyle origin, lives in Roubaix, has also lived in Glasgow, ‘non­
practising’, female (informal conversations).
23. Karim, male (participant in Groupe Islamo-Chrétien discussion).
24. Leila, nurse, born in Algeria, of Kabyle origin, regards herself as non-practising, female (taped interview 
and informal conversations).
25. Naim, social worker, born in France, o f Algerian origin, lives in Roubaix, ‘non-practising’, male (untaped 
interview).
26. Pierre, involved with Médi@tions, French convert to Islam, lives in Dunkerque, male (informal 
conversation).
27. Rachid, student, born in France, lives in Mons-en-Barceul, has also lived in Glasgow, male (untaped 
interview and informal conversations).
28. Smd, Imam, also studying sciences religieuses at university in Lille, born in Algeria, male (taped  ^
inteiwiew).
29. Sopliie, ‘française de souche’. Catholic, married to Muslim (Ahmed), female (informal conversations).
30. Zaynab, female (participant in Groupe Islamo-Chrétien discussion).
Table 1.1; respondents in France (NB all names are pseudonyms, except for those asterisked)
26
1. Abbas, Ph.D. student, born in Iraq, living in Glasgow, male (taped inteiview).
2. Abdulmalik, English, has taken Muslim name, lives in London, member of Naqshbandi Sufi order, father 
of Omar, male (informal conversation).
3. Abdulrahman, works for the Ethnic Minorities Enterprise Centre in Glasgow, born in Scotland, of 
Pakistani origin, lives in Glasgow, male (taped interview).
4. Akbar, Imam, born in Egypt, lives in Cumbernauld, male (informal conversations).
5. Ali, university lecturer, leading figure within Glasgow’s Muslim community, born in Egypt, lives in East 
Kilbride, male (informal conversations).
6. Alija, Bosnian refugee in Glasgow, male (participant in group discussion)
7. Andrew, works for Parks Department of Glasgow City Council, Scottish convert to Islam, lives in 
Glasgow, male (informal conversation)
8. Asif, medical student, born in Scotland, of Pakistani origin, lives in Glasgow, male (informal 
conversations)
9. Aziz, surgeon, born in Egypt, married to Irish woman (who has converted to Islam), lives in Dumfries, 
male (informal conversations)
10. Daoud, Ph.D. student, born in Egypt, living in Glasgow, male (taped interview and informal 
conversations).
11. Edward, retired, Scottish convert to Islam, lives in Glasgow, male (informal conversations)
12. Farida, Ph.D. student, born in Turkey, living in Glasgow, female (taped interview and informal 
conversations).
13.Fouad, aicliitect, born in Egypt, lives in Glasgow, male (informal conversations and participant in group 
discussions).
14. Hussein, Greek, has taken Muslim name, lives in London, member of Naqshbandi Sufi order, male 
(informal conversation).
15. Malik, mechanic, born in Scotland, o f Pakistani origin, lives in Glasgow, male (informal conversations)
16. Michael, Catholic priest, born in Scotland, lived in England for 30-40 years, lives in Glasgow, male 
(untaped interview).
17. Mustapha, engineer, born in Mauritius, living in Glasgow, male (untaped interview and informal 
conversations).
18. Nairna, works in a counselling centre for black and ethnic minority women, Ismaili Muslim, has taught 
Islamic and Ismaili studies, lives in Edinburgh, female (untaped interview).
19. Omar, English, has taken Muslim name, lives in London, member of Naqshbandi Sufi order, male 
(informal conversation).
20. Patricia, curator of Islamic Art at the Burrell Collection in Glasgow, German, married to ‘an Arab’, 
religious affiliation unknown, lives in Glasgow, female (untaped interview).
21. Peter, architect, of Irislr/Kashmiri origin, Clu-istian, male (informal conversations)
22. Philip, Scottish convert to Islam, participant in inter-religious dialogue, male (informal conversations)
23. Robert, director of the Inter-Faith Network for the United Kingdom, English, lives in London, Anglican, 
male (taped interview).
24. Selwyn, artist by training, works in electrical shop, Scottish convert to Islam, lives in Glasgow, male 
(informal conversations)
25. Sharif, born in Scotland, of Pakistani origin, male (informal conversations)
26. Sheikh Nazim*, Sheikli of one branch of the Naqshbandi Sufi order, lives in Turkish Cyprus, male (formal 
audience)
27.Tariq, administrator in voluntary sector, born in Egypt, lives in Glasgow, male (informal conversations)
28. Wasim, retired, born in India (before independence), lives in Glasgow, male (informal conversations)
29. Yusuf, born in Pakistan, lives in Glasgow, male (informal conversations)
Table 1.2: respondents in the United Kingdom 
(NB all names are pseudonyms, except for the one asterisked)
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identities became tangible in individuals and in gioup interactions. They also show that 
the fieldwork process enabled my own understanding to develop.
There is another side to the methodology which is concerned with rmderstanding 
ideas and stereotypes rather than people. I refer mainly to the analysis of newspaper 
articles, which I also call content analysis. I gathered approximately four thousand 
articles (many available on CD-ROM) fi'om a variety of newspapers, including The 
Guardian, The Times, The Independent, The Independent on Sunday, the Glasgow 
Herald, Le Monde, Libération, France-Soir, Le Nouvel Observateur, La Voix du Nord, 
Nord-Matin and Nord-Eclair. I did not use tabloids, for reasons which are outlined at 
the beginnhig of Chapter 4. Although content analysis ofi;en refers to a quantitative or 
qua si-quantitative approach to the text, the purpose of using content analysis in this 
thesis is to demonstrate that there is a diversity of written representations of Islam, but 
that Islam and Mushm identities are generally represented as homogeneous. For these 
purposes, a quahtative content analysis is more appropriate. Such an approach seeks to 
gather evidence of diversity by citmg different examples of discourses about Islam, so it 
is only those articles which are usefirl for the identification of a distinctive stereotype are 
cited in this thesis, mahily in Chapters 3 and 4, and this is a small jGraction of the total 
gathered. The question of whether one discourse is quantitatively dominant is not 
particidarly important in this context, though I do surmise that some discourses are more 
important than others, and that then relative importance changes over time.
The final point I wish to make about the methodology of this thesis, and possibly the 
most important, is that it is comparative. The comparison has been between the United 
Kingdom and France, for reasons which have aheady been outlined, and, more 
specifically, between Glasgow and Ldle. There are a number of reasons why Glasgow 
and Lille were chosen. Fhstly, both cities were practically amenable, since I five m
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Glasgow and had contacts in Lille before beginning this thesis. Secondly, Glasgow and 
Ldle have a great deal in common. I had already noticed that they had a similar ‘feel’, 
and, more objectively, they are both regional capitals with a distmctwe culture m the 
context of the nation states in which they are situated. Glasgow is the largest city in 
Scotland, which has a distinctive identity and status witlm the United Kmgdom, while 
Lille is the capital of the Nord—Pas-de-Calais region, and has a distmctwe Flemish 
culture. Also, they have a common tradition of working-class left-wing politics, and 
their recent economic history has been remarkably srmdar (having been dominated by 
heavy industry and textdes, which have declined, there has been high rmemployment and 
attempts at ‘urban regeneration’).
The thhd reason for comparing Glasgow and Lille is that then Muslim populations 
are typical of the United Kingdom and France respectively. By that I mean that there are 
between one mdhon and 1.5 million Muslims in the United Kingdom, about two per cent 
of the total population, of whom approximately 20,000 Hve m Glasgow, which is 
between two and three per cent of the city’s population, hi France, there are probably 
between three million and five million Muslims, which constitutes between five and eight 
per cent of the population, which is similar to the Muslim percentage of Lille’s 
population.^
There is one theoretical problem which emerges here. In fact, there are a number of 
problems with comparative methodology, such as ‘the non-equivalence of concepts’, the 
issue of vahdation, and ‘a world which has grown into an interdependent and mteiiinked
 ^ It is difficult to be sure about the statistics pertaining to the United Kingdom and France. United 
^Kingdom estimates range from about 700,000 to over two million, while French estimates range from 
under tliree million to over five million. However, where one set o f figures is given at any one time, it is 
often for a specific reason, whether to marginalise the significance o f Islam, to argue that Muslims 
should be listened to more than they are, or to claim that there is a threat of Tsiamic invasion’. As a 
result, it is probably wise to assume that the real figure is somewhere in the middle, i.e., about 1.3 
million in the United Kingdom and four million in France. For a discussion of this subject in the United 
Kingdom, see Anwar (1993).
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global system’ (0yen 1990; 5, 12). My main concern is with the latter, and the issue of 
whether or not there is a dependency or interdependency between Orientalist discouises 
in the United Kingdom and in France, or between Muslim identities in these countries. If 
so, according to Gabon’s theorem, the quasi-scientific logic of strict comparison cannot 
apply (Bertaux 1990: 154). Erwin Scheuch explains that: ‘“Gabon’s problem” is the 
issue whether a given culture can be thought of as “causing” something, or whether the 
something is instead the result of diffusion across cultures’ (Scheuch 1990: 28). 
According to this logic, my study is not strictly comparative, because the United 
Kingdom and France do influence each other m their attitudes towards Islam, and the 
construction of Muslim identities is a process which takes place across national 
boundaries.
On a practical level, however, this thesis does make comparisons between the 
United Kingdom and France, with a view to distinguishing universal and particular 
features of Western representations of Islam and the diversity of Muslim identities, and 
also with a view to identifying similarities and differences within each countiy. These 
similarities and differences are iofluenced by cross-cultural diffusion, so it is appropriate 
to describe this thesis as a direct comparison, even if it stretches the boundaries set by 
Gabon’s theorem. Indeed, that is one of the contributions which this thesis makes, and I 
discuss this and the other contributions now.
1.6. Contributions
This thesis makes a contribution to the critique of Orientahsm, thi ough a theoretical 
{analysis and emphical obseivation of the constmction of Muslim identities in the United 
Kingdom and France. As this introduction has made clear, the thesis examines Western
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stereotypes of Islam, particularly of Muslims living in the West, and ways in which 
Muslims in the West have responded to these stereotypes by constructing then own 
Muslim identities. The central contribution of the thesis hes in joining these issues, 
estabhshing a dialectic of Orientahsm and Mushm identities. It focuses on the stereotype 
of Islam as homogeneous, the sociological reahty that Islam and Mushm identities are 
diverse, and posits the same dialectical relationship between these phenomena. 
Systematically, the thesis makes the following nine contributions to academic knowledge, 
the first five of which are made by the thesis as a whole, while the final four are made by 
its constituent parts:
(i) It analyses the dialectical relationship between Orientahsm and Mushm 
identities.
(h) It identifies some important piinciples for a critique of Orientahsm.
(hi) It furthers our understanding of the diversity of Islam.
(iv) It analyses the relationship between this diversity and the Orientahst 
stereotype of homogeneity.
(v) It does so in the context of a dhect British-French comparison.
(vi) It provides an analysis of Islamophobia, and an evaluation of an emergent 
critique of Islamophobia.
(vh) It furthers our understanding of the social significance of Mushm-Christian 
dialogue, and its significance to the constmction of Mushm identities.
(vih) It provides some critical reflections on cunent debates about 
‘integration’, ‘assimilation’ and ‘multiculturahsm’.
(ix) It presents original emphical data.
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There are two mqiortant points, which I wish to discuss now, which demonstrate 
the importance of these contributions. The first is that it is necessary to understand the 
diversity of Islam and the relevance of Muslim identities in order to understand 
contemporary Islam fiom a sociological perspective, and this in turn is necessary if we 
are to appreciate the firll significance of Islam in the modem world, and indeed the 
modem world itself. This is because a sociological fiamework cannot be based on a 
putative a priori Islamic essence which enables us to understand the diversity of Muslim 
experiences and identities. Rather, within a sociological fiamework, it is necessary to 
address the diversity of Muslim experiences and identities before we can ask what is 
Islam, and how does Islam relate to the modem world. This thesis, through the 
contributions it makes, identifies one approach by which this can be achieved.
The second point which demonstrates the importance of these contributions is that 
the thesis identifies principles for a critique of Orientahsm which does not reduce Islam 
to the role of passive victim. As I argue in the hterature review (section 1.7, below) and 
in Chapter 2, much critical work about Orientahsm and Western stereotypes of Islam, 
including some of Edward Said’s work, has regarded the West as the source of active 
constmction of these stereotypes, and Mushms as the passive recipients, or victims. This 
is profoundly unhelpful, because it neglects the active role of Mushms in the constmction 
of their own identities. This thesis is a contribution to correcting this approach, and it 
does so thi ough a theory of interaction between Islam and the West, and between their 
stereotypes of each other, by which they influence, and indeed constitute, each other.
The substance of the above contributions has aheady been raised in this 
introduction, whether in the discussion of the central questions and hypotheses, in the 
^methodology, or in the outlining of the stmcture. For example, the third and fourth of 
the above contributions are reflected in the hypotheses that Islam is perceived as
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homogeneous, that it is in fact diverse, and that there is a relationship between the 
homogeneous perception and the diverse reahty. The fifth and ninth contributions are 
reflected in the methodology section, where I insisted on the value of a dhect 
comparison between the United Kingdom and France, and discussed the ways in which I 
gathered original emphical data, and why. The others are all discussed in section 1.4, 
where I look at the structur e of the thesis. However, to really understand why these are 
distinctive contributions to academic knowledge, it is necessary to look at the aheady 
existing hterature, assess some of its strengths and weaknesses, and show that there is a 
gap which is fihed by this thesis.
1.7. Review of literatmx
Fhstly, I make some comments about the contextual hterature. Having done so, I 
discuss the hterature which is relevant to the above contributions, discussing them in the 
same order in which the contributions are hsted. This thesis is situated at a point of 
overlap between the sociology of rehgion and the sociology of migration. These two 
sub-disciplines come together in a number of ways, as do rehgion and migration 
themselves. There is a consciousness which is fiequently found in rehgion, that the 
rehgious life is a land of sphitual journey, that our true home is elsewhere, and that we 
are ‘pilgrims’ and ‘migrants’ on earth. More concretely, numerous rehgious have spread, 
or experienced a shift in their centre of gravity, because of migration. In the case of 
Islam, this began with the migration {hijra) fiom Mecca {Makkah) to Medina 
(Madinah), fiom which the Islamic calendar is dated (24 September 622), and later 
I migrations fiom the Ai abian peninsula.
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The sociology of rehgion is perhaps the oldest sub-disciphne within sociology, and 
was a central concern of Weber (1930, 1993) and Dnrkheim (1915, 1970). However, 
the sociology of rehgion does not appear to have progressed as much as other areas of 
sociology, something which is common to the study of rehgion in other social sciences. 
This view is corroborated by Clifford Geeitz (1993: 170), writing about the 
anthr opology of rehgion, who suggests that the problem is a lack of acknowledgement of 
rehgious change, and by John Milbank (1990: 140), who suggests that the sociology of 
rehgion is a fundamentahy flawed project because of ‘the specificaUy modem 
confinement and protection of “the rehgious sphere’” and ‘the pecuharity and specificity 
of rehgious practice and logic’. Mhbank may be right, but I think he is overstating the 
case. It is my behef that the sociology of rehgion needs to be combined with other 
disciplinary approaches to rehgion, and other areas of sociology. For example, it can be 
combined with the anthropology of rehgion, theology and rehgious studies, the sociology 
of knowledge, social movements, or migration. Furthermore, it is essential that the 
‘objective’ or ‘scientific’ approach should take account of perspectives which recognise 
the subjective reahties of rehgion. The approach of this thesis has been to combine the 
sociology of rehgion with the sociology of migration, while drawmg on antliropological 
approaches to the study of rehgion, and works of theology and rehgious studies which 
highlight the diversity of Islam.
The sociology of migration is an area in which one’s own approach and perspective 
is betrayed by naming it the sociology of migration. Others would write about ‘race 
relations’, ‘integration’ or ‘ethnicity’, for example, and these approaches are often of 
value. Yet, when I situate my wiitmg within the sociology of migration, I imply an 
emphasis on the phenomena of migration and racism, and a critical attitude to emphases 
on ‘race relations’ or ‘integration’. It is undoubtedly due to the influence of Robert
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Miles (for example 1987, 1989, 1993) that I have taken this approach, and that I have 
recognised the importance of certain conceptual frameworks, particularly of a ‘world 
system’ which affects and effects economic, political and ideological patterns of 
domination. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, the analysis in this thesis has 
been canied out, at least in part, in terms of a dialectic of Orientahsm and Muslim 
identities, and this minors some aspects of Miles’s implicit dialectic of racism and 
migration (see especially Miles 1993; 111-18). Similarly, I agree with the emphasis on 
the phenomena of migration and racism, to the extent that I reject the integration 
problematic (the question of how best to accomplish the ‘integration’ o f ‘immigrants’ or 
‘ethnic minorities’ into Western societies).
On the other haird, my approach to the study of racism would emphasise its 
diversity, and, by extension of this approach, I emphasise the diversity of Orientalist 
representations of Islam. Writers such as Robert Miles and Michel Wieviorka place a 
legitimate emphasis on the unity of racism (Miles 1989: 41-68, 77-84; Wieviorka 1995: 
119-23), which does not of course mean that they deny its diversity (see, for example, 
MUes 1993: 12-13, 149; Wieviorka 1995: 36-7). Orr this issue, I have been more drawn 
to Tagmeffs approach, which makes a distinction betweerr ideal types such as racisme 
inégalitaire and racisme différentialiste^ and, perhaps more pertinently, between a 
racisme hétérophobe and a racisme hétérophile (Taguieff 1987: 14-15, 163ff, 409-10 et 
passim). The latter distinction is reflected in some critiques of Orientahsm, and can be 
encapsulated in Aziz Al-Azmeh’s (1996: 28) argument which holds that Westeru 
discour ses about ‘the Orient’ or ‘Islam’, be they xenophobic or xenophile, are part o f ‘an 
objective comphcity between exoticism and the rhetoric of identity and authenticity’.
In the context of a Uterature review, this enables us to begirr expormding the fir st 
contribution, that the thesis analyses the dialectical relationship between Orientahsm and
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Muslim identities. The above discussion of Miles and Taguieff demonstrates that there is 
an ‘elective afiSnity’ between concepts in the sociology of migration and the dialectical 
relationship between Orientalism and Muslim identities which is discussed in this thesis. 
However, Al-Azmeh seems to argue that the critique of Orientahsm, which I discuss 
below and in Chapter 2, necessitates a rejection of the language of identity. This thesis 
shows that the critique of Orientahsm cannot take place without a recognition and 
valorisation of Muslim identities, and so it does fih a gap which is left by Al-Azmeh.
Other works which deal with Muslim identities are very relevant background 
material to this thesis, but there is stiU a gap, insofar as they do not engage in a critique 
of Orientahsm, nor do they seriously consider the extent to which identity is constructed 
from outside, by which I mean that one’s own identity is influenced by other people’s 
perceptions of oneself. I wish to discuss four such works, ah of which are doctoral 
theses which make then own contributiorrs. More general works on the subject of 
identity are discussed in Chapter 5.
Firstly, Claudine Yoimes-Matton’s psychology thesis examines the cormection 
between the concept of identity and the question of whether or not, or to what extent, 
Algerian migrants to France have a ‘project’ to return to Algeria. Her methodology 
consists of semi-directive interviews, an adaptation of the TST (Twenty Statements Test, 
which is considered in the chapter on identity), the IMIS {Investigateur Multistade de 
l ’Identité Sociale) test, and questionnaires. She looks at some theories of identity as 
applied to Islam, and recognises that identity can be influenced by other people, and 
indeed that identity cannot be ‘actualised’ {s’actualiser) without other people. However, 
identity is conceived as coming flom ‘within’ the individual, who then seeks the social 
I recognition of that identity, though the Other may also constitute a threat to one’s 
identity (Younes-Matton 1987; 13, 16, 49). There is no consideration of how one’s own
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identity in the eyes of the Other might be internalised, an issue which is addr essed in this 
thesis. She then considers the ‘first generation’ and ‘second generation’ o f ‘Algerians’ in 
France, and concludes that the main issue facing the ‘fir st generation’ has been the wish 
to return, though they everrtually adjust to a "provisoire durable\ but that the ‘second 
generation’ have a more complex identity, dependent on natiorrahty, which carr 
complicate their parents’ intention to return (Yormes-Matton 1987; 168, 179).
Louis Pita’s thesis, on the other hand, emphasises the spiritual and social dimensions 
of Muslim identity, which emerge in answer to the questions of how to be a Muslim in a 
‘non-Muslim’ country which is influenced by Christiarrity, and what a Muslim can do in a 
‘non-Muslim’ country to preserve his or her identity. The sphitual dimension, defined 
with reference to the shahada^ is summarised as witness, contemplation, and (symbohc) 
martyr dom, because it imphes a total commitment to Islam and being one of the ummah 
(Pita 1988; 35). The social dimension imphes ‘studying the historical and social 
structures of the various components of the Islamic community’ (Pita 1988; abstr act in 
Enghsh), rather than the surtoundhig society, which is emphasised in my thesis.
A third approach is taken by Mounia Bennani-Chraibi, whose thesis argues that 
young Moroccans view the West in a manner which combines fascination and 
démonisation {diabolisation). Fascination centres arormd the exoticism of the West—its 
cold climate, snow, beauty of certain regions, monuments, architectrue and "distractions’ 
in Spain or Las Vegas—and Western consunq)tion, particularly the behef that it is 
possible to find anything. An example of démonisation is Western fidms about sex, which 
is contrasted with the allegedly ‘Islamic’ notion of purdah (B ermani- Chraibi 1993; 110, 
118). Bennani-Chraibi’s thesis is particularly original and interesting because it considers 
the reverse side of the question of Orientahsm and Muslim identities, by looking at how 
people from a predominantly Muslim country view the West, and it is important to note
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that this contributes to the construction of those young Moroccans’ identities. However, 
my thesis focuses on the mutual constmction of Muslim and Western identities, 
recognising that Islam and the West are constitutive of each other, that Mushm 
perceptions of the West have an influence on the perceived essence of Western identities, 
and vice versa.
Fourthly, some of my thinking in Chapter 6 of this thesis, about the diversity of 
Muslim identities, was inspired by Sophie Gilliat’s (1994: 205-32) catalogue o f ‘identity- 
forming institutions’ in the United Kingdom. These are refened to as family, mosques, 
schools and madrassahs, youth organisations, language, publishing houses, Muslim 
media, retail industry, women’s groups, ideational institutions, Muslim leadership and 
institutions, international connections, and the articulation of community demands. Tliis 
list is valuable because the diversity of such institutions is one reason for the diversity of 
Muslim identities, a topic to which I return in this hteratme review, and in Chapter 6. 
However, a dialectical model of the relationship between Muslim identities and 
Orientalist perspectives demands the recognition of other identity-forming institutions, 
which are in tension with those identified by Gilliat. These include churches, state 
schools, the national and local media, poHtical leadership and institutions, and the 
articulation of other communities’ demands.
The second contribution which is made by this thesis is that it identifies some 
important principles for a critique of Orientahsm, and in doing so it strengthens the 
emphasis on the dialectical relationship between Orientahsm and Mushm identities. The 
academic critique of Orientahsm is dominated by the figur e of Edward Said, even though 
other contributions show a greater philosophical sophistication. Said has contributed to 
Uhree main areas of academic thought: the critique of Orientahsm (for example Said 
1982, 1985, 1993, 1995, 1997b), hteraiy theory (for example Said 1986b, 1994, 1997a)
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and the Palestinian question (for example Said 1979, 1986a, 1990, 1992), for which his 
works have been banned by the Palestinian authorities. His writing, which is always 
intensely political, has been critical of Western involvement in the Middle East, which he 
sees as having exacerbated the situation of the Palestinians. He situates this involvement 
within the context of Western perceptions of the Orient, and of Islam, which he examines 
in Orientalism^ as well as Culture and Imperialism^ and Covering Islam. His hypothesis 
in these three books can be summarised as follows:
... knowledge of Islam and Islamic peoples has generally proceeded not only 
fiom dommance and confiontation but also from cultural antipathy. Today 
Islam is defined negatively as that with which the West is radically at odds, and 
this tension establishes a fi’amework radically limiting knowledge of Islam (Said 
1997b: 163).
hi Orientalism, Said develops the notion that the Orient is a Western creation 
against (or in opposition to) which the West has defined itself. He limits his study to 
what we now call the Middle East and Egypt, and his focus could be conceptualised as a 
geographical quadrilateral, the boundaries of which run firom Cairo to Damascus to 
Tehran to Mecca. He identifies three types of Orientahsm: a popular discourse; an 
academic discom se, and a system of colonial institutions. What they had in common was 
that they presented the Orient as fiindamentaUy different fiom, and ioferior to, the West, 
and regarded the Orient as homogeneous and unchanging. In spite of the stereotype of 
homogeneity and stasis, this thesis argues that Said points to a paradigm shift firom an 
^Orientalism which was based on a sensual stereotype of the Orient, to one based on a 
stereotype of fanaticism, as evidenced, for example, by discomse on the danger of
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Islamic fiuidameutalism. This thesis makes a contribution by clarifying this paradigm 
shift, expounding its relevance to contemporary perceptions of Islam, and by breaking 
away fiom Said’s emphasis on nineteenth-century fictional texts.
Another criticism of Said is that he appears, at times, to confuse the critique of 
Orientahsm with the personal criticism of Orientahst scholars, and it is primarily for this 
reason that his work lacks the philosophical sophistication which is found, for example, 
in the work of Aziz Al-Azmeh, who is cited above, and Abdallah Laroui. Laroui (1990) 
takes a historical look at some philosophical interactions between European and Arabo- 
Islamic thought, at how the notions of Emope and the Arab world have evolved and 
been contrasted with each other, and at how this contrast has been supported by 
Orientahsm, within a colonial fiamework. This is expounded in some depth in the 
chapter of this thesis on Orientalism, particularly the notion of complimentarity, by which 
Laroui means that Islam and the West have defined themselves in opposition to each 
other, so that they would increasingly become the compliment of each other (that is, each 
becomes what the other is not). In the hterature on the critique of Orientalism, Laroui’s 
concept of complimentarity is the closest to my concept of the dialectical relationship 
between Orientahsm and Muslim identities. The main difference is that my thesis 
operationahses the concept by applying it to the emphical study of Muslims in 
contemporary Western Europe.
The third contribution, which has aheady been ahuded to in the discussion of Grlhat 
(1994), is that this thesis furthers our understanding of the diversity of Islam. In 1974, 
Jacques Berque was able to write;
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Nul n’a encore étudié avec la précision désirable la façon dont l’invariance 
coranique se compose avec les variations de la vie individuelle et collective.../
Sujet vierge, en vérité! (cited in Ferchiou, éd., 1996: back cover)
A quarter of a century later, it seems to me, this subject is at the centre of studies of 
Islam, and is rapidly growing. The collection edited by Ferchiou (1996) attempts to JBU 
the gap identified by Berque, and does so with reference to North Africa. It identifies a 
range of different ways hr which Islam is diverse—in terms of its epistemological system, 
pohtical reference, cultural code, theology, ritual practices, and attitudes to the popular 
cult of saints—an awareness which underpins this thesis. The study of the diversity of 
Islam hr the West has tended to focus on the diversity of Islamic institutions, or schools 
of thought, and has not yet given firll recognition to the ‘diversity of diversity’ which is 
emphasised in Ferchiou’s collection, or to the ways in which Islam becomes diverse 
within a wider social context. However, it is my impression that this is being corrected 
by cmTent work in progress (only time can corroborate this impression), and by recent 
work on conversion to Islam (see, for example, Kose 1996; Bourque 1998; and, less 
recently, Telhine 1991).
That is not to say that works on the diversity of Islamic institutions and schools of 
thought are worthless. Indeed, such works (for example Robinson 1988; Andrews 
1993a, 1993b; King 1994; Geaves 1996) have been particularly important in the 
preparation of this thesis, and have demonstrably illuminated a highly significant and 
influential phenomenon. In view of cuiTent political concerns about Islam, Etienne’s 
(1987; 218-19) typology of different ‘Islamist’ groups and associations is salutary. 
,Firstly, he identifies the classic groups {groupes ou associations de maintenance
‘Nobody has yet studied, with the precision which miglit be desired, the way in which Qur’anic 
invariability comes to terms with the variations of individual and collective life.... Truly a virgin 
subject! ’
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classique), such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which are primai% concerned with 
people’s souls, guarding the faith, and gatheiing the faithful for prayer and worship. 
Secondly, there are a number of conversionist groups {associations conversionnistes) 
whose effort is directed principally at lukewarm Muslims. These are exemplified by the 
worldwide Tablighi Jama’at, which originated in the sub-continent, and the Tunisian- 
based MTI {Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique).^ Thhdly, the activist groups 
{associations plus activistes) combine a missionary function with a pohtical programme. 
He argues that it is only the activist groups which merit the label Tslamist’, and this 
conscious attempt to demythologise the hysteria surrounding Islam is common to his 
work, an essential aspect of the critique of Orientahsm, and inspnational to this thesis.
The fourth contribution of this thesis is that it analyses the relationship between this 
diversity and the Orientahst stereotype of homogeneity, something which is missing from 
ah of the hterature reviewed in this introduction (though Al-Azmeh aUudes to it), and 
which I regard as the single most original contribution of this thesis. The discussion of 
the first three contributions demonstrates where this one can be situated with reference 
to the existing hterature, and the gaps which are fihed by this thesis. As has been shown, 
others have pointed out that there is a stereotype of homogeneity, and that there is in fact 
diversity, but here the relationship between the two is conceived in terms of the 
dialectical relationship between Orientahsm and Mushm identities.
The fifth contribution, and the last which pertains to the thesis as a whole, is that the 
other contributions are made in the context of a direct British-French comparison. There 
are so many works which discuss Mushms in the United Kingdom or in France that it 
would be impossible to review them ah, though some are cited towards the end of this
 ^The MTI (Mouvement de la Tendence Islamique) is an Tslamist’ movement based in Tunisia, a cousin 
of the better known Algerian-based FIS (Front Islamique du Salut). The Tabliglii Jama’at is the subject 
of a number of other works, for example Haq (1972), Dassetto (1988), Metcalf (1993), Diop (1994), 
King (1994) and Terrel (1994).
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literature review/ but they do provide a great deal of source material which is of use in 
making a direct comparison. Other works which are, in a sense, comparative, are often 
written on a coimtry by country basis, so there is a danger of their approach becoming 
somewhat mechanical, and of generahsing rather than attempting to make genuine 
comparisons, which this thesis does. Jorgen Nielsen (1995b) covers the history and 
contemporary situations of Muslims in France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Belgium, Scandinavia and Southern Europe, and, in keeping with the 
point which I make above, he readily admits that the material on each country will appear 
brief and even superficial to anyone with a thorough knowledge of that country. 
However, he states his intention that ‘the chapters on other countries will be a useful 
beginning for comparative purposes’ (Nielsen 1995b: ix), and it is my opirrion and 
experience that he has succeeded hr this intention. He also addresses some issues on a 
Europe-wide basis, such as family, law, culture, Muslim organisations and European 
integration, and makes a pertinent comparison between the United Kingdom and France, 
by suggesting that the Rushdie affair and the affaire du foulard (which I discuss in 
Chapter 8) revealed a common conflict, between the right of parents to educate then 
children according to their own values, and the principle of education into a national 
culture. His work has also been helpful to my reflections on Muslim identities (Nielsen 
1987), and on relationships between the religious and pohtical spheres of Western 
societies (Nielsen 1995 a).
Another approach is taken by Gerholm and Lithman (eds) (1988), who also take.,a 
country by country approach, but address specific issues rather than give a quasi- 
encyclopaedic account. A hst of some of the subjects which are covered in various
 ^ Readers who are looking for a foothold in the relevant literature can be directed initially to 
bibliographies by Joly and Nielsen (1985) and Vertovec (1993) for the United Kingdom, and the 
‘classic’ works by Kepel (1991), in spite of his occasional sensationalism, and Etienne (1989) for 
France,
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chapters gives an indication of the book’s diversity: there are chapters on the Tablighi 
Jama ’at and Sufi organisations in Belgium, on migrant Muslim women and the children 
of Muslim migrants in France, on Muslims in Birmingham (examined fiom an 
ethnographic perspective and firom the perspective of the urban sociology of religion), 
and on local authority responses to Muslims in Britain. I read this work when I was 
starting to prepare this thesis, and it contributed to my early understanding of the 
relevant Issues. However, this is not an attempt at direct comparison.
There are, however, some French works which address issues of comparison 
between the United Kingdom and France, but they focus on specific issues, principally 
the philosophies of ‘integration’ and the nation state which are represented by both 
countries (a subject which is addressed later in this hteratme review).^ Didier 
Lapeyronnie’s (1993) study, although it never focuses exphcitly on Muslims, contains 
comparative and in-depth analyses of these issues, which are in the backgr ound of this 
thesis and almost any study of Muslims in Western Emope. The collection edited by 
Michel Wieviorka (1997) addresses the same issues, and includes a chapter on Islam 
(Khosrokhavar 1997). Its main focus is the debate about multicirlturahsm hr France, and 
the French perception of multicultmahsm as an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ ethos means that there is 
a comparative dimension to the whole book, which is most explicit in the chapter by 
Lapeyronnie (1997). These works must count as essential reading for anyone interested 
in a dnect comparison between these two countries, but their focus on issues 
surrounding ‘integration’ and the nation state means that they are of more interest to a 
French readership than to anyone else, and they neglect the diversity of issues wliich are 
of concern to Muslims in Western Emope. Nevertheless, Christopher Husbands (1995) 
(has addressed pohtical discomses about ‘Muslim assimdabihty’ in the United Kingdom,
 ^ For a comparative article on Islamic schools in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which is 
relevant to Chapter 8 of this thesis, see Dwyer and Meyer (1995).
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France and The Netherlands, showing that comparable issues can produce ‘moral panics’ 
in countries other than France. Kepel’s (1994, 1997) comparison is broader hr its scope, 
and includes the United States as a third pole of comparison, but its sensationalism has 
been criticised, and it does not meet the requirements of a critique of Orientahsm.
The other contributions have been identified as contributions which are made by 
individual parts of this thesis, rather than by the thesis as a whole, so I propose to discuss 
them more briefly. The first of these, the sixth contribution, is that the thesis provides an 
analysis of Islamophobia, and an evaluation of an emergent critique of Islamophobia. 
The only systematic treatment of the subject of Islamophobia which has so far been 
pubhshed is the Ruunymede Trust report (Commission on British Muslims and 
Islamophobia 1997b), though it is also discussed by Christopher Husbands (1995). I am 
particularly enthusiastic about the Runnymede Trust document, as it has provided a great 
deal of source material which I have used. However, it is written from a pohcy angle, 
and does not attempt an analysis of Islamophobia—its origins, expressions in the context 
of different nation states, and its relationship with racism—which is made in this thesis. 
The relevant chapter of this thesis (Chapter 3) is based on a paper which is due to be 
pubhshed elsewhere (Brown, forthcoming), though here I place a stronger emphasis on 
the relationship with Orientalism, as well as racism.
The seventh contribution of this thesis is that it furthers om understanding of the 
social significance of Muslim-Christian dialogue, and its significance to the construction 
of Mushm identities. There is a large hterature on the subject of Mushm-Christian 
dialogue, mostly written fi’om a theological (for example, Breiner 1991; Carey 1996; 
Sachedina 1997; Smith 1997) or historical (for example Haddad and Haddad, eds, 1995; 
(Khalaf 1997; Watt 1991) perspective, and even those which have a sociological 
dimension (for example Michel 1997; Waardenburg 1997) tend to see the significance of
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dialogue iu tenus of peace and reconciliation. Of course, this is a worthy objective, but it 
does not show that dialogue is significant on a wider social or societal scale, an issue 
which I do address in Chapter 9 of this thesis. Some other issues which are discussed in 
this thesis are discussed in the context of Muslim-Christian relations. For example, the 
wearing of the hijab in French state schools is discussed by the Groupe de Recherche 
Islamo-Chrétien (1996), the place of Christianity and Islam in a ‘secular’ United 
Kingdom is discussed by Newbigirr, Saimeh and Taylor (1998), but these tend to see 
dialogue in terms of a religious challenge to secularisation. This challenge is central to 
my analysis, but I also argue that dialogue says something about the social ambience in 
which it takes place, and it is necessary to recognise this if we are to further our 
sociological rmderstanding of the subject.
Questions about the hijab and secularisation are cormected with the penultimate 
contribution, which is that the thesis provides some critical reflections on current debates 
about ‘integration’, ‘assimilation’ and ‘multiculturaUsm’. Some relevant works have 
aheady been cited in this literature review, for example Lapeyronnie (1993), Wieviorka 
(ed.) (1997) and Kepel (1994, 1997), all of whom take these issues as a point of 
comparison between the Urrited Kingdom and France. Also of significance is Alec 
Hargreaves’s (1995) work, which discusses processes of migration to and settlement in 
France, socio-economic condition of the emergent communities of migrant origm, the 
emergence of new ethnic, rehgious and territorial identities, and effects which this has 
had on French discourses about the French nation, with concomitant effects on state 
pohcies of integr ation. Elsewhere, he relates these issues to the creative hterature of 
‘Beur’ writers (that is, writers of North African origin who have been bom in France), 
(and to the paradox of young people of North African origin rejectmg Islamic behefs and
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moral values, but at the same time emphasising a Muslim identity (Hargreaves 1997; 
Hargreaves and Stenhouse 1991).
‘Integration’, ‘assimilation’ and ‘multicultmahsm’ are issues of particular concern in 
the French hterature which is relevant to this thesis, and much of it is reviewed by John 
Crowley (1992). He beheves that the ‘apparently complacent adherence, even among 
social scientists, to the virtues of the traditional French model of integration ... is steadily 
if slowly being corrected’ (Crowley 1992: 165). It is slow, as is evidenced by works (for 
example Todd 1994; Roman 1995) which persist in extolling the virtues of assimilation 
over multiculturahsm, and the exaggerated significance which is attributed to cultural 
symbols such as French or ‘foreign’ food (see Tribalat 1995: 128-9, 134-5). However, 
my main concern hes elsewhere. It is that there is an unwarranted assumption, in much 
of the above hterature, that the United Kingdom and France reahy do represent different 
models of integration (that is, multiculturahsm and assimilation respectively), and this 
assumption is criticised hr Chapter 7 of this thesis, particularly section 7.4. There, I 
argue that the philosophy is different, but the practice is very similar.
The final contribution is that the thesis presents original emphical data, something 
which must be true of ah doctoral theses hi the social sciences. However, I make this 
point to demonstrate that my emphical data is distinct fi*om that presented in other 
books, articles and theses. It is geographically distinct because it focuses on Glasgow 
and Lihe, and it is conceptuahy distinct because it emphasises diversity.
Phihp Lewis’s (1994b) book has the vhtue of looking at the diversity of Islamic 
institutions in South Asia and in the United Kingdom, focusing on their reproduction 
through the migration process, and at questions of Mushm leadership, authority and 
(representation. However, it concentrates heavily on Bradford, which does have one of 
the largest and most important Muslim communities in the United Kingdom, but is also
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in some ways atypical, because of its size, economic situation (through the textile 
industry and its decline), political importance (through the Bradford Council of 
Mosques), and because of the numbers of Muslims of Kashmiri origin and Sufi Muslims 
of the Barelwi tradition. Other works have focused, for example, on Mushms in Bristol 
(Jeffery 1976), Birmingham (Joly 1988) or Manchester (Scantlebury 1995), but there are 
few which focus on Mushms hr Glasgow (for ‘ethnic minorities’ hr Glasgow, see, for 
example, Bowes, McCluskey and Sim 1990a, 1990b, 1990c; Bowes and Domokos 1993; 
McFarland 1994; McFarland, Dalton and Walsh 1989). Other works which focus on 
Bradford and West Yorkshire discuss specific issues, such as rehgious behefs and 
practices (Wilkinson 1988), rehgious and ethnic identities (Knott and Khokher 1993), 
gender roles (Afshar 1989; Muza 1989), or the Rushdie affair (Samad 1992), but they do 
not emphasise the diversity which is emphasised in the emphical data of this thesis.
The same can be said of French studies, which fiequently concentrate on Paris (for 
example Kepel 1991; Telhine 1991; Teixel 1994). Other important local, 
microsociological studies of Mushms elsewhere in France focus on particular issues, such 
as young people’s groups hi the north of France (Babes 1995). Jocelyne Cesari (1994) 
does hisist on the diversity of Islam, but focuses on Marseihes, which has many of the 
same difficulties as Bradford when it comes to understanding the whole country. This 
thesis fills a gap, in that its empirical data is taken fiom the Lihe area, and it emphasises 
diversity. Thus, it also fiUs a gap which is left by Khelifi Boualem’s (1982) local 
historical study of people of North Afircan origin in Lihe, particularly the district of 
Wazemmes (which is where my French fieldwork was concentrated), fiom the late 1940s 
to the 1960s, and Phihppe Aziz’s (1996) much criticised work on Roubaix, which takes 
^sensationahsm to such a level that it not only neglects a critique of Orientahsm, but 
becomes one of those works which the critique of Orientahsm must criticise.
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Part I
Western representations of Islam
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2» On the critique of Orientalism
2.1. Introduction
The central questions which are being examined and addressed in this thesis were 
summarised, hr the introduction to the thesis, as follows:
1. What perceptions exist of a West-Islam duahsm, homogeneity of Islam, and
homogeneity of the West?
2. How are they expressed?
3. What are their causes and effects?
4. What dissenting voices exist, how are they expressed, and what are their
causes and effects?
These questions have been developed as a result of reflection about the critique of 
Orientahsm, the perception that Islam and the West stand in duahstic opposition to each 
other, and the epistemological consequences of such a reflection. Tliis chapter is an 
attempt to present this reflection, and to outline its significance. We can say that the 
above questions are purposely directed towards a critique of Orientahst discourse, 
particularly the perception of Islam as homogeneous and radically distinct from the West. 
'As I studied Mushm identities in the West, it became clear that there was a tension 
between the affirmation of these identities and an effective critique of Orientahsm.
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Discourse about Muslim identities in tire West would involve asking bow the West 
perceives Muslims, and bow Muslims respond to this perception, that is, how it affects 
theii way of seeing themselves and the West. The problem is that Islam and the West are 
represented here in subject-object terms, thus creating a dualism which iindetmines the 
critique of Orientalism. Although the existence of a Muslim identity in the West 
demonstrates that the West-Islam duahsm is, to some extent, perceived and hved by 
Mushms themselves, the related theoretical, epistemological and historical assunqrtions 
are mistaken. As we argue below, such a duahsm involves reification of the categories, it 
imphes that Islam and the West are homogeneous, and it ignores the ways in which these 
categories have constituted each other. So we have a tension which must be addressed.
fir this chapter, we shah look at Orientahsm, and the critique of Orientahsm, starting 
fiom the work of Edward Said, then attempting to move beyond his fiamework and take 
more accormt of the complexity and heterogeneity of Orientahst discourse, fir order to 
do this, I attempt to move away fiom ‘Occidentahst’ theories—which, I shaft argue, 
maintain the subject-object relationship between the West and Islam in reducing Islam to 
the role of a passive victim of Orientahsm—towards a theory of interaction between 
Islam and the West, and between Orientahsm and Occidentahsm, by which they are 
influenced and constituted, positively and negatively, through this interaction, fir later 
chapters, we shaft look at the idea of identity in general, and Mushm identities in 
particiflar, and see to what extent this enables us to address this tension.
2.2. Edward Saidas critique of Orientalism
 ^ To express things simply, the thesis of Said’s Orientalism (subtitled Western 
conceptions o f the Orient), is that the Orient was a Western conception, a Western
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creation and a tool of Western hegemony. When we refer to the Orient, we refer to 
somewhere that is East. However, this is East from a particular point, which is Emope. 
hi other words, the Orient is a Emocentric notion, not one which would be relevant to 
the actors (the so-called ‘Orientals’) themselves, until they enter into a relationship with 
Orientalist discomse or colonial domination. Geographically, Said limits his study to the 
area now constituting Egypt, the Arabian peninsula, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, 
Israel/Palestine and Jordan. He argues that a duahsm of Orient and Occident has been 
constructed through Western hteratme, pohtics and popular discourse since at least the 
eleventh century, though again he limits his focus to the colonial period. As I stated in 
the introduction to this thesis, Said identifies thr ee types of Orientahsm: a comprehensive 
Western discomse (popular, hterary, joumahstic, academic); an academic discipline; and 
a system of colonial institutions. What they had in common was that they presented the 
Orient as fimdamentahy different fiom the West, essentiahy inferior to the West, and as 
homogeneous and unchanging.
The Oriental/Occidental duahsm is particularly important to the first type of 
Orientahsm, which Said examines m detail in Orientalism, Culture and Imperialism, and 
Covering Islam. Because the West considers the Orient to be fimdamentahy different 
fiom itself, it produces an image of the Orient which does not need to be vahdated 
outside its own system. One example was the Asiatic mode of production in the work of 
Marx and Engels. Since, according to the Communist Manifesto, aft history was the 
history of class struggle, the conclusion drawn fiom the absence of evidence of class 
struggle in India was that ‘Indian society has no history at ah, at least no known history’ 
(Marx and Engels 1968: 81). Hence, the Asiatic mode of production had no internal 
class conflict and was therefore static, that is, history-less (see Said 1995: 153-7; Turner 
1978: 26-7).
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The second type of Orientalism is an academic discipline. On one level, this is 
merely the academic study of the Orient. However, since this Orient has been defined 
into existence by the West, and perceived as inferior, homogeneous and unchanging, 
academic Orientalism has studied this perception and contributed to its perpetuation. 
The extensive use of the Qm’an (written in the seventh century) for studying the 
contemporary Muslim world is cited as an example. More importantly, this kind of 
academic discourse provided the legitimation for coloniaHsm. So the third type of 
Orientahsm is defined by Said (1995: 3) as ‘the corporate institution for dealing with the 
Orient—deahng with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing 
it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientahsm as a Western style for 
dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’. In short, Orientahsm is 
a form of what Foucault cahed power/knowledge. In the colorrial period, the central 
stereotype of the Orient was related to its sensuahty (Arabian nights, behy dancers, 
sultans, harems). Turner (1994: 98) writes:
Because the Orient in Western imagination is often perceived as the fantastic, it 
is associated with sexual fantasies. Apart fi'om conventional themes of secret 
harems, the Orient was populated by androgynes, slave traders, lost princesses 
and the degenerate patriarch. The Orient was a world of excess.^
This assertion can be illustrated by a quotation fiom Edward Wilham Lane’s An 
account o f the manners and customs o f the modern Egyptians, which almost has the 
ftavour- of an eyewitness accormt, but which we can conclude is rather imaginative, if 
^only on the groimds of what is medically possible:
® Turner continues: Tn his comparative sociology of religion, Weber developed a global theoiy of 
asceticism in which the sensuality of Islam was contrasted with the denial o f luxury and the ascetic 
demands of Protestant spirituality’ (Turner 1994: 98).
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When the seyyid ‘Omar, the Nakeeb el-Ashraf (or chief of the descendants of 
the Prophet) ... married a daughter, about forty-five years since, there walked 
before the procession a young man who had made an incision in his abdomen, 
and drawn out a large portion of his intestines, which he carried before him on 
a silver tray. After the procession, he restored them to their proper place, and 
remained in bed many days before he recovered firom the effects of this foohsh 
and disgusting act (cited in Said 1995: 111).
This emphasis on excess, or, in other contexts, sensuality, affected the whole way in 
which the Orient was perceived, fir French Orientalism, this sensuality was associated 
with an irrationafity of the senses, what could almost be called a Freudian domination of 
sexual symbols over the whole of Oriental society. British Orientalism was much more 
concerned with cause and effect: there was something idle about the Orient, this was 
explained by its sensuality, and the sensuahty was itself explained by chmate and 
rehgion.^ fir addition, because of the duahsm of Orient and Occident, for the West to be 
perceived as progressive, the Orient had to be seen as static. For the West to be mature, 
the Orient had to be childish. The West was rational and virtuous, the Orient irrational 
and degenerate. The West was temperate, so the Orient was sensual. According to 
Said, Gérard de Nerval, a French writer and traveher, saw the Orient as a kind of 
dreamworld, """le pays des rêves et de l ’illusion”, which, hke the veils he sees 
everywhere in Cano, conceal a deep, rich fimd of femiirine sexuahty’. Said also notes 
that this discovery brought out complex responses, even frightening self-discoveries, hr 
fthe Orientahsts (Said 1995: 40, 182, 188),
® This distinction may also reflect a tendency of people in the United Kingdom to view the French as 
sexually permissive.
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In his paper, ‘Orientalism reconsidered’, Said suggests that there was a 
‘conespondence between suppressed Victorian sexuality at home, its fantasies abroad, 
and the tightening hold on the male late nineteenth century imagination of imperialist 
ideology’ (Said 1985; 23-4). hi Orientalism, he uses Gustave Flaubert as an example. 
Of Flaubert’s mistress Kuchuk Hanem, an Egyptian dancer and courtesan. Said writes: 
‘She was surely the prototype of several of his novels’ female characters in her learned 
sensuahty, dehcacy, and (according to Flaubert) mindless coarseness. What he especially 
liked about her was that she seemed to place no demands on him...’ (Said 1995: 186-7). 
There seems to be an echo of Foucault here (recognised by Said as a major influence on 
his own work), in that the discourse of Orientahsm is seen as an instrument of conflict 
between power and desire; the private sexuahty (and scientia sexualis) of the Victorian 
West is contrasted with the pubhc sensuahty (ars erotica) of the Orient. By placing no 
demands on him, Kuchuk Hanem brought out the hterary and sexual power in Flaubert; 
in the same way, the Orient brought out the pohtical power in the West, including the 
power to define the Orient, and to shape the Orient. The Orient was not normal, but we 
were. Therefore, it was om mission to purify the Orient (the Orient did place demands 
on us), but the Orient could never purify us. This idea was at the origin of a number of 
nineteenth-century chchés, for example the vocation supérieure, mission civilisatrice, 
and the white man’s burden.
While Orientahsm has involved a conception of the Orient as homogeneous and 
unchanging, the critique of Orientahsm must not fah into the converse trap of perceivmg 
Orientahst discourse as unchanging. The durabihty of Orientahsm depends on its being 
responsive to changing circumstances. There are a number of historical events and 
(processes which Said identifies as having been important sources of change in Orientahst 
discomse. The building of the Suez canal in the 1880s marked the crowning
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achievement of Orientalism—the West had succeeded, not only in shaping ideas about 
the Orient, but literally shaping its geogr aphy. However, the building of the Suez canal 
also reduced the distance of the Orient and in so doing destroyed its whole exoticism. 
The Orient was no longer another world, but had become an administrative unit ia the 
whole schema of colonialism (see Said 1995: 88-92). hi the twentieth century, the 
emergence, difiusion and partial success of anti-colonial movements demonstrated that 
the Orient was neither homogeneous nor imchanging. It had changed from the days of 
overt hegemonic coloiriahsm, and it was beginning to fragment into nation states, 
sometimes in corrflict with each other.
What remained constant at the heart of Orientalist discomse was that the West 
considered itself iatellectually superior to the Orient. As the Orient has become less 
exotic, the sensual stereotype seems to have become less important, as it has been 
replaced with a discourse of Islamic frmdamentahsm, fanaticism (tenorism, cutting off 
people’s hands, frenzied crowds shouting Arabic slogans), and oppression of women. 
The formation of the state of Israel, the oil crisis of the 1970s, and the Ir anian revolution 
are events which have contributed to this paradigm shift within Orientalism, which has 
remforced a perception that ‘we’ are more intellectually advanced than ‘they’ are, so we 
have to make then decisions for them. Ultimately, it legitimates a discourse of 
protecting ‘our’ oil, even though it Hes underneath ‘their’ countries (see Said 1997b). 
Although colonialism, as a world system, has come to an end in its classic form, it 
continues in other ways, through the United Nations for example. These postcolonial 
institutions have served as tools of legitimation in, for example, the Gulf War, which was 
fought to protect ‘our’ oft supplies, and they seek international co-operation in ‘the fight 
^against terrorism’—though not all terrorism, as the term is selectively defined in order to 
preserve Western domination.
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2.3. Moving beyond Said
Said’s critique of Orientalism has itself been subject to a great deal of criticism. 
Many of these criticisms are hsted by Turner (1994: 5-7): Said’s argument in 
Orientalism was not really original; while his critique of French Orientalism was strong, 
he was weaker on British Orientahsm, and neglected German and Russian/Soviet 
Orientahsms;^^ he concentrates on textuahty and textuahsm, without looking at how 
fictional texts relate to the period under consideration; there seems to be a gap between 
this textual epistemology in Orientalism, his reahsm in Covering Islam, and his pohtical 
commitments related to Palestine, that is, his work lacks praxis; he is tainted by a chain 
of influences which relates him to Foucault, Foucault to Heidegger, and Heidegger to 
fascism. In some cases, this seems to be a case of Orientahsts reacting to a perceived 
threat fiom Said, or to his angry rhetorical tone (for example Lewis 1982a, 1982b; see 
also the reply in Said 1982, 1995: 342-7). In these cases, it does seem that Said 
personahses the debate to the extent that he confuses the critique of Orientahsm with the 
condemnation of specific Orientahsts. In order to reply to Said, ah that is needed is to 
show that an Orientahst is an honest and thorough scholar in order to rehabihtate 
Orientahsm. But the rehabihtation of the Orientahst and the rehabhitation of Orientahsm 
are not the same thing.
On the other hand, the style in which Said ex^rresses his argument does not 
fundamentally alter its substance, and the criticisms outlined by Turner do not undermine 
the cerrtral argument of Orientalism. There is a need to clarify the parameters of the 
.debate, which Akhbar Ahmed (1992: 185) attempts to do in the foUowing terms:
Since the empirical content of this thesis consists o f a comparison between the United Kingdom and 
France, I too have (intentionally) neglected other Orientalisms. Excellent discussions of German 
Orientalism, however, can be found in articles by Ulrich Haarmann (1994) and Baber Johansen (1994).
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The heat and fury Edward Said generated by arguing that the West can know 
Islam only in a demeaning and exploitative manner has obscured a central 
question raised by him: can the West ever hope to understand, objectively and 
sympathetically, the other, that is, foreign cultmes, ahen peoples...? In an 
important sense he has led us into an intellectual cul-de-sac. In attempting to 
transcend the idea of the orientalist system we end up by replacing one system 
with another. There remains the real danger of simplifying the complex 
problem of studying the other or the foreign. Said has left us at the end of the 
trail with what he set out to denounce: stereotypes, images devoid of 
substance. Orientalism is now an empty cliché, the orient a geographical 
location only hi om imagination.
Bryan Turner (1994: 7) makes a similar point, though it is expressed in a shghtly 
different way:
Another consequence of the debate about orientalism was an equally pernicious 
occidentalism, that is, a rejection of everything to do with the West and an 
implicit rejection of the legacy of modernization. This anti-modernist 
dimension of critical theory may explain some of the attraction of Heidegger’s 
cultmal ehtism....
What both of these quotations point to is that Said’s critique of Orientalism did not 
fprovide an effective basis for a rejection, or even critique, of the West-Islam duahsm. 
Certainly, there was an effective deconstrnction of binary opposites like
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progressive/static, mature/cliildisli, rational/irrational, virtuous/ degenerate and
temperate/sensual. In addition, Said had argued and, in my judgement, clearly 
demonstrated, ‘that “the Orient” is itself a constituted entity, and that the notion that 
there are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically “different” inhabitants who can 
be defined on the basis of some religion, cidture or racial essence proper to that 
geographical sphere is equally a highly debatable idea’ (Said 1995: 322). However, there 
was stftl a sense in which the West was perceived (even defined) as the active subject in 
the construction of this dualism, and the Orient as the passive object (or victim). 
Eventually, this leads to a new duahsm of the authentic and traditional against the 
imported and ahen. Turner (1994: 7) cites the example of ‘the endless attempts to 
demonstrate that Ibn Khaldmi was hr fact the founding father of ah social sciences 
against the claims of Marx, Weber and Durkheim’, and his repeated references to 
Heidegger culminate in an analysis of niunerous social philosophers and theorists 
(particrdarly Adorno and Bom dieu), showing that the authentic has been identified with 
ehte culture, the imported with simulation and popular culture (Turner 1994: 117-31).
The apparently ehtist elements in the work of Adorno, Bourdieu, or Said, may not 
constitute a major problem, and it may be that the distinction between authentic and 
imported is a usefiil one if it does not become reified m a duahsm. In order to move 
beyond Said, we need to recognise that the West-Islam duahsm continues to exist, and 
resolve to criticise and deconstmct this duahsm. We also need to be careful that cultmal 
ehtism or ‘authenticism’, which is present in Said’s work, does not obscme the constant 
mixing of cultures, and the epistemolo gical/methodological consequences which this 
entails. Said (1985: 25) notes three preconditions for the critique of Orientahsm, which 
{may be lacking in his own work, but which provide a foundation for a more effective 
critique: an awareness of the diversity of the critic’s potential subjects and audiences; a
59
praxis which is secular and/or pluial, and in opposition to the authoritarian tendencies of 
mainstream Orientahsm; and an openness to all sources of knowledge which are 'against 
the grain, deconstmctive, utopian'.
Said compares the latter piinciple with Adorno’s negative dialectics, and there does 
seem to be a kind of negative dialectic of Orientalist representations of Muslims and 
Muslim responses to Orientalism (representations of Orientahsm, representations of the 
West, representations of themselves). This can be explained as follows. Discourses of 
Western intellectual superiority become particularly marked when we apply the model of 
the critique of Orientahsm to representations of Muslim communities in Western Em ope. 
It can be argued that the end of classic coloniahsm marked the beginning of large-scale 
migration from the foimer colonies to the West, and that this migration was part of a 
process by which the West maintained its power over the Orient (no longer defined 
geographicaUy, but as a group of people, a society, a culture, a system of values). 
Muslims in the West have a number of options in responding to this internal Orientahsm 
(to adapt the notion of internal coloniahsm from the work of Hechter, 1975, and 
Habeimas, 1987), which could be summarised in three ideal types: assimilation; 
withdrawal from Western society; and a combined Muslim-Western identity. However, 
whichever option is chosen, Orientahst stereotypes are likely to be reinforced rather than 
effectively chaUenged. A decision to assimilate can be understood as accepting the 
superiority of Western culture and values, a decision to withdraw can reinforce a 
perception of Islam as radicahy incompatible with Western, ‘civihsed’ values, and a 
combined identity will be seen as contradictoiy and irrational, or it wih be supposed that 
there is something behind this combination, be it a barrier against the West (a negative 
(interpretation of GrUes Kepel’s citadelle intérieure—-Kepéi 1991: 25-60), or an attempt 
to infiltrate the West. Thus, in some ways, the interaction between Islam and the West
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pushes the two further apart, creating a negative rather than positive dialectic. This 
process is examined more empirically in later parts of tliis thesis, particularly in Chapter 
8 .
There is a problem with this analysis, wliich is that the relationsliip between Islam 
and the West is stiU being analysed in subject-object terms. On one level, this is 
unavoidable, because Islam and the West are two distinct categories of analysis. On 
other levels, however, it must be avoided, for thr ee reasons. Fir stly, if we see Islam or 
the West as a subject, we reify these categories. Secondly, by reifying these categories, 
we assume that Islam and the West are both homogeneous, something which contradicts, 
or is contradicted by, the emphical evidence and the poHtical imperatives of a critique of 
Orientalism. Thirdly, such a subject-object duahsm obscures the fact that Islam and the 
West have been and remain constitutive of each other (see the discussion of Laroui, 
below), and this process is stronger than a mutual interaction.
2.4. The heterogeneity of Muslim perspectives
The earher quotation from Turner (1994: 7), criticising the Occidentalism^^ in Said’s 
work, points to the fact that analyses of the West and Islam in subject-object terms are 
not cariied out solely by Westerners. Take the following citation from a Muslim 
apologist;
My constant endeavour has been to speak straight from tire heart, without
mincing words, and to offer some sincere suggestions to the Muslim brothers 
f and sisters who have settled in the West, particularly in America. As for the
The classic work on Occidentalism, albeit recent, is the volume edited by James Carrier (1995).
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Western civilisation, it has been viewed from a height which Islam confers upon 
its followers and from which both the Old and the New Worlds seem narr ow 
and empty, and their ghtter false and unreal The credit for this particular way 
of looking at things does not belong to me but to the Guidance and Message 
which imparts a new vision to man and causes the scales to faU fr om his eyes 
(Nadwi 1983: 20).
Nadwi makes an unambiguous distinction between Islam and the West, and his 
contention that Islam is superior is equally clear. Although he recognises a limited 
heterogeneity within Western civilisation—the distinction between the Old and New 
Worlds—his imderstanding of Islam is thoroughly essentialist. As one would expect 
from a theologian or apologist, Muslims are defined with respect to Islam (‘the Guidance 
and Message’), rather than Islam being defined with reference to Muslims (which is more 
characteristic of a historical or social scientific approach), and this excludes a conception 
of Islam itself as plural and heterogeneous, llrere are, nevertheless, some dissenting 
voices among Muslim writers. Some, like Abdallah Laroui and Aziz Al-Azmeh have 
sought to interpret Islam in modernist teims; others, like Farid Esack (drawing on Fazlur 
Rahman and Mohammed Aikoun) have sought to reinteipret some Qur’anic concepts in 
order to develop a more ‘progressive’ and ‘inclusive’ Islam, which connects with issues 
of Muslim participation in intenehgious dialogue. This demonstrates that Mushm 
discourses about the West are also heterogeneous.
Esack’s (1997) critical discussion of Rahman and Aikoun provides the starting point 
for his Qur’anic hermeneutic of hberation and pluralism, in the context of a struggle 
^against apartheid in South Africa which demanded a deepening of mterrehgious 
sohdarity. Having insisted that ‘the process of revelation itself was never independent of
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the commumty’s context but consisted of a dynamic interaction between the two’ (Esack 
1997; 16), he argues for a Qm’anic hermeneutics which differs from traditional Qur’anic 
studies ( ‘ulum al-Qur ’an) and interpretation {tafsir) in thr ee ways:
1. The necessity o f context: ‘the insistence of heimeneutics on contexts and 
human contingency in the recovery of meaning implies that the Qur’an does not 
“mean” something outside socio-historical contexts but “is always possessed of 
Deutungsbedurftigheit ... a text in need of interpretation”.^  ^ In other words, 
without a context a text is worthless’.
2 . A plurality, or relativism, o f meanings: ‘the stress on human agency in 
producing meaning is really opposed to the idea that God can supply people 
with watertight “correct” understandings..., ‘to write large the significance of 
human agency is to see that meaning is itself a contest within power relations; 
divinity lies within the working of that contest and cannot be predicated 
transcendentaUy outside the contest as the guarantor of a finally achievable 
meaning’” .
3. Meaning emerges through interpretation and reception: ‘traditional Islamic 
scholarship has made a neat and seemingly unbridgeable distinction between the 
production of scripture, on the one hand, and its interpretation and reception 
on the other. This distinction is the crucial factor in the shaping of qur’anic 
hermeneutics, for it implies that the only hermeneutics Islam can presently cope - 
with is that pertaining to interpretation and reception’ (Esack 1997: 62-3).
Martin (1982: 367). 
Aitken (1991: 4).
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Esack cites Rahman and Arkoim as being among a small minority of scholars who 
have addressed the issues of Qur’anic hermeneutics. Rahman maintained the uniqueness 
of Islam and the Qm ’anic revelation, while argumg that it was the word of Muhammad, 
thus contingent on historical context and human interpretation, as well as the Word of 
God. His methodology can be summarised in the following steps: (i) understanding the 
Qur’an as a whole; (Ü) studying the present historical situation and developing an 
imderstanding of it in terms of ethical principles; (iii) then developing an understanding 
of the Qur’an in the light o f this situation and understanding; (iv) re-applying this 
understanding to the general ethical and social principles and objectives; (v) applying 
these general objectives to the present social and historical situation (praxis).
While Rahman’s approach grounds the reception of the Qur’an hr concrete social 
and historical cir cumstances, he remained committed to the possibility of gaining access 
to the absolute truth and objective interpretation of the Qur’an. Arkoun, however, goes 
further:
The discomse on revelation and historicity led by Arkoun is decidedly more 
radical and critical than that of any other contemporary Mushm scholar.... 
Arkoun argues that the present crisis of legitimacy for rehgion compels 
scholars to ‘only speak of hemistic ways of thinking’. While he insists on a 
historical-sociological-anthropological approach, he does not deny the 
importance of the theological and the philosophical. Instead, he says that he 
wishes ‘to emich them by the inclusion of the concrete historical and social 
conditions hr which Islam always has been practised’ (Esack 1997: 68-9).^^
14 Arkoun (1987: 10).
Arkoun (1987: 3).
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Arkoun’s approach to hermeneutics is what could be described as a deconstruction 
of the Qm ’an. Although Esack is critical of the distance between deconstmction and 
practical stmggle for social justice, he argues that it provides a basis for a pluiahstic 
conception of tmth (religious, ideological and intellectual). On the other hand, he is 
critical of Rahman’s commitment to absolute tmth and a single ‘correct’ mterpretation of 
the Qur’an, but supports his contention that such interpretation must take place in a 
social, pohtical and historical context. Thus, Esack’s grounded plmahsm provides an 
epistemological and theological basis for interrehgious dialogue and for a recognition 
that different rehgions and ideologies can have the same objectives. On a theoretical 
level at least, it rmdermines the West-Islam duahsm hr Mushm thought, and in the 
thought of other rehgions.
Laroui (1990) emphasises the historical interactions between Western and Arabo- 
Islanhc thought, and shows that, although they have a great deal in common at various 
pohits in history, these interactions have led each culture to be more and more clearly 
defined vis-à-vis the other—a root of the West-Islam duahsm which we have considered. 
He writes:
Europe, arabité {Urupa, ’Uruba); chaque mot réfère ici à une tradition 
culturehe dans la formation de laqueUe ont concouru la géographie, 
l’économie, la psychologie, l’orgarrisation étatique, la langue, la rehgion, sans 
que jamais un de ces éléments ait été le seul déterminant.... Dans l’un et l’autre 
cas, il s’agit d’une tradition culturehe élaborée à travers des siècles par l’action 
conjuguée de données relativement constantes et d’événements qui imposent 
l des choix inéversibles. Siècle après siècle se combinent stmctures constantes
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et événements contingents inéversibles pour foimer deux traditions bien 
individualisées (Laroui 1990: 155)/^
The confrontation between Western and Arabo-Islamic cultures had four important 
effects, identified by Laroui as complementarity {complémentarité)^ identification 
{identification), solidarity {solidarité) and ambiguity {ambiguïté). The dynamic of 
complementarity emerges when two antagonistic societies are faced with the same 
problem Where solutions a and b are available, and one society chooses a, the other 
must ‘choose’ b (unless it chooses not to find a solution at all);
... le fait de compHmentarité a présidé aux choix qu’ont fait au cours d’un 
millénahe Arabes et Européens dans des domaines aussi variés que la théologie 
(trinitarisme contre unitarisme), la métaphysique (immanence contre 
transcendence), l’esthétique (figmation contre abstraction), l’ait mihtaire 
(infanterie contre cavalerie), l’architecture (maison ouverte contre maison 
feimée), urbanisme (mes orthogonales contre mes concentriques); je ne cite 
pas le costume, la toilette, la cuisme, la maintien que chacun peut encore 
détecter du premier coup d’œil (Laroui 1990: 156).^^
‘Europe, Aiabness (Urupa, ’Uruba); each word refers here to a cultural tradition, in whose formation 
geography, economics, psychology, state organisation, language and religion have concurred, without 
any one of these elements ever having been the sole determinant.... In each case, it is a question of a 
cultural tradition being developed over centuries tlirough a combination of relatively constant facts and 
events which impose irreversible choices. Century after century constant stmctures and fortuitous, 
^irreversible events have combined to form two highly individualised traditions.’
the dynamic of complementarity has presided over the choices which Arabs and Europeans have 
made for the past millennium, in domains as varied as theology (trinitarianism versus unitarianism), 
metaphysics (immanence versus transcendence), aesthetics (figuration versus abstraction), military 
strategies (infantiy versus cavaliy), architecture (the open house versus the closed house), urban 
planning (orthogonal streets versus concentric streets); I have not cited clothing, washing, or food, 
which everyone can detect immediately.’
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This in turn produced the effect of identification, that is, Europeans and Arabs 
identifying themselves with these meta-civilisations:
Grecs contre Perses, Romains contre Carthaginois, Byzantins contre Arabes, 
Francs contre Sanazins, Slaves contre Tatars, Castillans contre Andalous, 
Espagnols contre Ottomans.... Qu’un Celte écossais puisse se croire le fils 
spirituel de la Rome impériale et un Berbère nord-africain l’heiitier du 
Hannibal, voüà la preuve de l’efficacité des identifications mythiques (Laroui 
1990: 157).^^
Although positivist history has done something to combat these assumptions, there 
has emerged a pohtical, economic and commercial sohdarity (Laroui’s third effect) 
between the countries of the ‘West’/‘Noith’, and these same relations of sohdarity hnk 
Arab, other Mushm and non-ahgned countries. WliUe Laroui recognises it would be 
naive to argue that this is caused by cultmal afiSnities, there is, he argues, a correlation 
(Laroui 1990: 158).
Finahy, there is the effect of ambiguity. Identification vis-à-vis the Other means that 
the identity of Self is not defined; it is sufficient to define the Other. We know that 
Arabs are not ah Mushm, Oriental, nomadic Saracens—but the need is stih there to put 
someone else in the role of Other. Thus emerges the homogeneous view of Muslim 
cultm e, which is :
‘Greeks against Persians, Romans against Carthaginians, Byzantines against Arabs, Francs against 
Saracens, Slavs against Tartars, Castilians against Andalusia, Spaniards against Ottomans.... That a 
Scottish Celt could believe himself to be the spiritual son of imperial Rome, and a North African Berber 
the heir of Hannibal, is proof of the strength of mythical identifications.’
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... \m a priori qui fait partie de la conscience culturelle européenne. Si Fait 
occidental est évolution, développement, diversification. Fart musulman, par 
contraste méthodologique, doit être stabilité, répétition, monotonie (Laroui 
1990: 160).^"
Thus, Laroui seems to arrive at the Orientalist paradigm, whereby Islam and the 
West are defined as dualistic opposites, albeit by a different route fiom Said. However, 
he does express his critique in more interactive terms—while the West and Islam are 
perceived as interacting in subject-object terms, there is not a representation of one as 
active and the other passive. He also hints at a number of solutions:
Dans une situation de complémentarité, F autre est ambigu précisément pour 
que le soi puisse être nettement défini; dès que l’autre est connu en lui-même et 
pour' lui-même, c’est le soi qui devient problématique.... Si ce dilemme mquiète 
peu les Européens, il est, à tort ou à raison, au premier plan des préoccupations 
d’une certaine intelhgentsia arabe; et ce qu’on appelle la renaissance islamique 
n’en est que la manifestation la plus bruyante.
Doit-on se définir toujours à travers l’autre? La question n’a de sens, me 
semble-t-il, que dans le cadre d’un métaphysique substantiahste. Dans rme 
philosophie du devenir, la définition du soi peut être positive sans passer 
forcément par la négation de l’autre. On y retrouve la même dialectique, mais > 
au lieu d’opposer le soi à autrui, on y conifonte le moi présent au moi passé ou 
futur (Laroui 1990: 165).^^
f
‘... an a priori wliich is a part of European cultural consciousness. If Western art is evolution, 
development, diversification, Muslim art, by methodological contrast, must be stability, repetition, 
monotony.’
Tn a situation of complementarity, the Other is ambiguous precisely so that the Self can be clearly 
defined; from the moment when the Other is known in and for herself, it is the Self which becomes
This particular insight will be important for our understanding of identity. As we 
shall see in Chapter 5, the contrast between the moi présent and the moi passé ou futur is 
fimdamental to an existentiahst understanding of identity—it is something wliich 
changes, as we have the freedom to define who we are, not having to be what we were.
Al-Azmeh (1996) addresses themes similar to those of Laroui, though he insists on 
the heterogeneity of Islam, the West, and modernity. For him, the central issue in 
Orientahst discourse is the assumption that Islam is homogeneous, but he takes this 
further in arguing that this is a mhior image of neo-Afghanist thought. Tliis concept 
situates contemporaiy ‘Muslim radicahsm’ or ‘fimdamentahsm’ in a revival of the 
thought of Jamal al-din al-Afghani (1839-97). I would avoid applying the teim 
‘fundamentahsm’ to Islam, but Al-Azmeh, having noted the American Protestant origin 
of the word, defines it as ‘that moment in all rehgions wliich gives pihnitivism and 
primevahsm precedence over histoiy, which seeks to eliminate histoiy and regard it as, at 
best, an ihegitimate accretion onto the pristine beginning, and as such regard the present 
condition and its immediate precedents as coiinpt, or at best as conuptions of an abiding 
beginning’ (Al-Azmeh 1996: 135). The thrust of his argument is that this perception of 
Islam is based on the same homogeneous and essentiahst stereotypes which are present 
in Orientahst discomses, and that it promotes these stereotypes.
This argument is closely related to my own, since it is centred on a critique of the 
idea that Islam is homogeneous. Like Said, Al-Azmeh concentrates on the cultural
problematic.... If this dilemma hardly worries the Europeans, it is, rightly or wrongly, among the 
^greatest preoccupations of a certain Arab intelligentsia; and what we call the Islamic resurgence is only 
the hottest manifestation of this.
‘Do we always need to define ourselves with reference to the Other? It seems to me that the question 
only has meaning in the context of a substantialist metaphysics. In a philosophy of becoming, the 
definition of the Self can be positive without necessarily entailing the negation of the Other. We find 
the same dialectic there, but instead of opposing Self and Other, we confront the present ego with the 
past or future ego.’
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location of the stereotype of homogeneity, an argument wliich is encapsulated in the 
following quotation:
... the median discourse on Islam in Britain as iu Europe is not predominantly 
or always overtly racist or quasi-racist. Wliat we have is a culturahst 
differentiahsm;^^ we are presented with supposed differences o f ‘culture’ within 
a discourse which can be either xenophile or xenophobic: both are based on 
hreducible and impermeable difference.... Like racism, culturahst 
differentiahsm is an essentiahst perspective system based on a notion of a 
pregiven ‘culture’ which, like race, has no sociological definition. Culture is 
here an obscure term coined to schematize without precision an indeterminate 
reahty. Indeed, it is the enormous advantage of this notion that it is put 
forward to indicate sheer difference, for hr this sense it cannot be disproved 
because it is tautological: chicken tandooii is not roast chicken; a black 
headscarf is not a fashion accessory; Muslim prayer is not a High Church 
Christmas mass, fir all, tokens of a banal nature are taken up and affirmed as 
tokens—or stigmata—of difference, and differences elevated to Difference 
based in an absolutization of heritage which, although cultural, is attributed to a 
state of nature in which cultures subsist, according to this discomse (Al-Azmeh 
1996: 4, 6).
Al-Azmeh insists that this cultural differentiahsm has been constmcted both in 
Western Orientahst discourses and by some Mushms themselves. Wliile Orientahst 
? discomses assert the existence of a Mushm culture which is homogeneous, incompatible
The concept of differentiahsm is here borrowed from Taguieff (1987).
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with Western culture, and capable of being analysed in subject-object teims from the 
West, Muslim proponents of cultmal differentiahsm (‘Muslim advocates of cultmahst 
Islamism’—Al-Azmeh 1996: 6 ) have sought to identify an authentic Mushm culture 
which unites rehgions, cultmal, ethnic and pohtical identities into ‘a fetishism of the 
collective self as a socio-pohtical imperative’ (Al-Azmeh 1996: 7).
If I may retmn to the Muslim apologist cited above, it is possible to see how this 
authenticist discom se, linking rehgion and culture, is produced m practice:
You are Mushms. I would therefore start by impressing upon you not to be 
overwhelmed by Western civihsation. You are the fruit of the tree of 
Prophethood. Live here, but keep away from slavish imitation of the West. 
Derive as much benefit as you can from yom stay, but do not be swayed by 
crude and vulgar materiahsm. Remember the message of Islam and be on 
guard against the dissolution of your personahty. Do not be ashamed of your 
faith and culture. Do not imagine that you are the beasts and they are men.
No; you are the men, only if you are truly Mushms. This land [America] 
ghtters with electric hghts; even the night here is bright as day; but it is devoid 
of true efiulgence, of blessedness and divine guidance (Nadwi 1983: 110).
Al-Azmeh argues that such cultural differentiahsm has important consequences for 
om* theorising of identities. More strongly, there is ‘an objective comphcity between 
exoticism and the rhetoric of identity and authenticity’ (Al-Azmeh 1996: 28), which has 
important pohtical repercussions:
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The question of identity is thus very complex. An individual—or a society— 
does not have a smgle, exclusive, permanent and unalterable identity that 
perpetuates itself without internal differentiations. The assertion that a society 
has an exclusive single identity is not a description of its nature; it is a pohtical 
move aimed at taking control of the society and dominating it in crushmg 
fashion in the name of this aUeged identity (Al-Azmeh 1996: 54).
There seems to be a hnk, if not synonymy, between the concepts of identity and 
homogeneity, which raises problems as we attempt to address the tension between the 
critique of the perception that Islam is homogeneous, and the recognition of Mushm 
identities. But this is a subject of Chapter 5, so we shall return to it then.
2.5. Heterogeneous Orientalisms
Before concluding with some observations about the theoretical and methodological 
consequences of this chapter, I look m more depth at the heterogeneity of Orientahst 
discourse, which I do through a comparison of French and British Orientahsms. Not 
only does this allow us to transcend the limitations of ‘Occidentahst’ thought, but it also 
provides a basis for the British-French comparison which is undertaken later in tliis 
thesis, and it enables us to continue the discussion of internal Orientahsm which was 
begun above.
As was asserted above, Oriental sensuahty was associated in French Orientahsm 
with an irrationality of the senses, or a Freudian dommation of sexual symbols over the 
^whole of Oriental society, whereas British Orientahsm was concerned with causes and 
effects: the idleness of the Orient was explained by its sensuahty, and this sensuahty was
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explained by climate and religion. There is some hony in this, for it was in France that 
the discipline of islamologie was developed, and this discipline has had as its raison 
d ’être the study of Islam qua rehgion. Nevertheless, it is possible to explain, at least 
partiahy, the French underemphasis on rehgion. The principle of laïcité has had an 
impact on empirical research, so that official researchers are unable to ask respondents to 
state then rehgious affihation, and even non-official researchers have to tread carefuhy 
on this issue. Also, the French sociology of rehgion, following the Durkheimian 
tradition, has tended to avoid reference to Islam and the other Abrahamic faiths in favour 
of the ‘elementary forms’ of ‘primitive’ rehgion (Coloima 1995: 237 et passim; this 
contrasts with, for example, Weber’s emphasis on the ‘rationahsation’ of rehgion). Said 
observes that ‘in contemporary French Islamology ... there has grown up a tradition of 
identifying with “the vital forces” informing “Eastern cultme’” , a tradition whose 
emergence he attributes to Louis Massignon, and which gave rise to ‘extraordinary 
achievements’ from Islamologists such as Jacques Berque, Maxime Rodinson, Yves 
Lacoste and Roger Amaldez (Said 1995: 265-6).
This does seem to be connected with the different colonial histories and rationales of 
Britain and France. Said (1995: 169) expresses it as fohows:
What was the Orient for the individual traveUer in the nineteenth century? 
Consider first the differences between an Enghsh speaker and a French speaker.
For the former the Orient was India, of course, an actual British possession; to 
pass through the Orient was therefore to pass en route to a major colony. 
Already, then, the room available for imaginative play was limited by the 
I reahties of administration, tenitoiial legahty, and executive power. .. In 
contrast, the French pilgrim was imbued with a sense of acute loss in the
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Orient. He came there to a place in which France, unlike Britain, had no 
sovereign presence. The MediteiTanean echoed with the sounds of French 
defeats, from the Cmsades to Napoleon, What was to become known as 'la 
mission civilisatrice'’ began in the nineteenth centmy as a pohtical second-best 
to Britain’s presence.
hi other words, France had cultmal capital, so, in order to magnify what power they 
had, French Orientahsts represented the difference between Orient and Occident in 
cultmal tenns. The British had pohtical power which, in Mushm history, had been 
associated with the cahphate, which in turn derived legitimacy fr om its claim to descent 
from the Prophet. Thus, they perceived then pohtical power as power within and over 
Islam itselfi and the British Orientahsts’ emphasis on rehgion reinforced this perception 
of pohtico-rehgious power. To put this at its simplest: the French used culture to e?q)lain 
rehgion, while the British used rehgion to explain cultme; the French sent generals and 
men of letters to accultm ate the Orient, while the British sent missionaries. Again, the 
French emphasis on sexual symbohsm focused on the display of sensuahty—a cultural 
phenomenon—while the British emphasis on climate and rehgion accentuated Britain’s 
geographical power (represented by chchés like the Cape to Cairo, Britannia rule the 
waves, the sun never sets on the British empire), as weU as the perception of pohtico- 
rehgious power.
Patterns of colonial control have certainly changed since the nineteenth century, but 
this analysis is sthl relevant. Earher in this chapter, we considered the possibihty that the 
model of the critique of Orientahsm can be apphed to representations of Mushm 
communities m Western Emope, what we have caUed internal Orientahsm. To put it 
systematicahy, internal Orientahsm has the fohowing characteristics: it exists in a
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postcoloûial context, in which colonial control has been prolonged through the process 
of post-war labour migration to Western Europe; the quasi-autonomy which the Orient 
once had by virtue of its distance has been destroyed; the Orient is no longer understood 
geographically, that is, instead of distant teriitories being colonised, the lifeworld of ‘the 
Orient’, or of ‘migrant communities’ is colonised (compare Habermas 1987: 318ff et 
passim); the form of the colonisation is based on cultural practises and symbols, where 
there is a perception of incompatibility between Western values and those of the Other 
within; and, concomitantly, it may involve an element of differential racism (see Taguieff 
1987).
Examples of mtemal Orientalism in practice include some Western reactions to the 
Rushdie affair and the affaire du foulard in France. Said imphes that the Rushdie affah 
can be analysed in this way, as an example of his contention that the West has been 
capable of knowing Islam only in a demeaning way: ‘The space between the bashing of 
other religions or cultures and deeply conservative self-praise has not been filled with 
edifying analysis or discussion. In the reams of print about Salman Rushdie’s The 
Satanic Verses, only a tiny proportion discussed the book itself (Said 1993: 397). Keith 
and Pile’s account is a part of this thiy proportion—they show that the genesis and 
progression of the Rushdie affah reflected the novel itself, the characters’ search for their 
roots in London reflecting Muslims’ search for spatial identity in Britain and ‘the West’ 
(Keith and Pile 1993b: 22-3). Central to what became known as the Rushdie affair was 
an imagined polarisation between the West and Islam, very Hke the West-Islam duahsm, 
except that the Islam which is stih Other is no longer perceived as being at a safe 
distance. Inevitably, the question arises of how the West should respond to this 
^perceived danger. The Rushdie affair and the affaire du foulard have highlighted the 
possibihty that this response may not always display the tolerant credentials on which the
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West has prided itself. It is tme that intolerance was displayed on both sides, but 
criticism of some Muslims (which became criticism of all Mushms) for bmning copies of 
The Satanic Verses imphed that the act of book burning had a single, homogeneous, 
universal cultural significance.
Jorgen Nielsen (1995b: 158) draws some parallels between the two ‘affairs’, 
focusing on the perceived incompatibihties between Islamic values and Western 
secularism, and between the rights of parents to determine the education of their children 
according to their own cultural or rehgious values and the principle of education into a 
national culture. Yet again, much of the discourse about the affaire du foulard has been 
premised on a homogeneous view of Islam and of Mushms. Some, for example Guy 
Coq (1996) and Camille Lacoste-Dujardin (1995), have associated the hijab with 
contemporary Islamist ideology. While Lacoste-Dujardin’s argument is more 
sophisticated, based on an analysis of Ar abic language and culture, less sophisticated 
analyses (such as Coq’s) imply that behind every schoolgirl wearing a hijab is a fanatical 
warrior bent on terrorising France into becoming an Islamic Repubhc.
This can be seen as an example of my earher assertion, that any response of Mushms 
to internal Orientahsm will be seen as confirming its presuppositions, hr these cases, 
there has been a certain withdrawal from Western values, which is seen as negating these 
values, and even civihsation itself. Where Mushm women have dechned to wear the 
hijab, for example, they are valued according to what they are perceived to have in 
common with the West, rather than the cultural diversity which can enrich the West. At 
the same time, the attenqrt to form a combined Muslim-Western identity is seen as hiding 
something, either a barrier against the West or an attempt to infiltrate the West. As 
Jean-François Monnet (1990: 54) puts it: 'derrière les jeunes füles au foulard se cache
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la stratégie des islamistes’ What is important here, however, is that internal 
Orientahsm is expressed in a diversity of chcumstances, and in a diversity of ways.
2.6. Conclusion
hi tliis chapter, we have seen that Islam and the West both exist, and that they are 
not the same thing. However, it is important to be clear about then ontology. They 
certainly do not possess necessary existence. They have come into existence historically 
and materiaUy, but without clearly deJBned boundaries, and exist as categories or ideas 
with which people identify themselves. Indeed, then existence is contingent on people 
identifying themselves with these categories, and on the existence of a vis-à-vis to be 
deJSned against. We have looked at how this process of polarisation has taken place in 
different ways; through popular discourse, academic Orientalism and colonial 
institutions; through a perception of the Orient as sensual, then fanatical; through 
‘authenticist’ discomses of critics of Orientahsm, Mushm apologists, and others; through 
historical interactions between the West and Islam; through internal Orientahst 
discom ses about the Rushdie affair, the affaire du foulard; and so on.
Having identified these processes of polarisation, this chapter has also insisted on 
the heterogeneity of Islam, of the West, and of Orientahst discomses. However, the 
critique of Orientahsm, based on textual analyses, is one thing; studying Mushm 
identities without falling into the same traps as the Orientahsts is quite another, fliere is 
an epistemological problem here, which Said identifies, in a quotation which has aheady 
been cited in this thesis:
behind the young girls in headscarves hides the strategy of the Islamists’.
77
... knowledge of Islam and of Islamic peoples has generally proceeded not only 
from dominance and confrontation but also from cultural antipathy. Today 
Islam is defined negatively as that with which the West is radically at odds, and 
this tension estabhshes a framework radically limiting knowledge of Islam (Said 
1997b: 163).
How is it possible for Westerners, such as myself to write anything about Islam, or 
Muslim identities, which is not undermined by this framework? In an important sense, it 
is easy to criticise Orientalism, but is it possible to do any better than the Orientahsts 
themselves? Said’s preconditions for a critique of Orientahsm, cited above, are helpful in 
this respect, so we shah examine them in turn.
The first of these was an awareness of the diversity of the critic’s potential subjects 
and audiences. This chapter has insisted on the heterogeneity of Islam and Mushm 
identities, of the West, of Orientahsm and Occidentahsm, in ways which represent 
theoretical reflection and emphical data. The emphical pohrt is emphasised in later 
chapters of this thesis, where I show that Islam is articulated in different ways, and has 
different meanings.
The second of Said’s preconditions was a praxis which is secular and/or plural. It is 
worth noting that secular and plural may not be identical, or even compatible, and that 
this may be an issue of contrast between the United Kingdom and France. We shah 
consider this issue in Chapter 9 when we look at laïcité hr France, and the possibihty that 
rehgious plurahsm is actually a response to the secularism (or secularity) of the French 
state. Here, we can note that Mushm identities in the West are often constructed vis-à- 
^vis the West, and that the West is itself heterogeneous. The West has histoiicaUy been 
defined partly in terms of Christianity, partly in terms of the secular. So we must look at
7 8
how Muslims interact with the structures of Christianity and secularity in the 
contemporary West, without losing sight of Arkoun’s important point that ‘the West 
must be defined to include Islam’ (Arkoun 1994: 65)/^ I do this in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.
Said’s third precondition was an openness to all somces of knowledge which are 
'against idiTQ grain, deconstmctive, utopian’ (Said 1985: 25). This has more to do with 
the motivation for a critique of Orientalism, or a study of Mushm identities, than with 
any specific methodological points. Not that it is a question of whether or not the 
researcher is attracted to Islam—we have insisted that Islam is heterogeneous, and there 
are power relations withm Islam as well as between Mushms and Western power 
stmctures. The role of the researcher, then, must be to captm e this variety, attempting 
to relate the stories of ordinary Muslims and the Muslim ehte, the mtellectuals and the 
imams, the secular and the devout.
This chapter has outlined a theoretical context for such an enterprise, but it is also 
necessary to take into account some specific discourses about Islam which exist in the 
West, hr order to examine the dialectic of Orientahsm and Muslim identities in greater 
detail. However, Mushm identities are not the only product of Orientahst 
representations. A fear, dishke or resentment of Islam can also emerge in the West, and 
this can influence the social interactions which take place between Muslims in the West 
and then ‘non-Muslim’ neighbours. Sometimes, this can lead to conflict, or 
Islamophobia, which is the subject of the next chapter.
Î
Arkoun argues this on the basis that religions of the book are based on dogma, unlike ‘Eastern 
religions’, such as Buddhism, which preach liberty from dogma. Although this sliifts the boundary of 
Orient and Occident further to the East, creating a new version of the same dualism, it is a useful 
insiglit.
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3. Orientalism, racism and Islamophobia
3.1. Introduction
Wliile Islamophobia can be seen as a form of interaction or prejudice which emerges 
from Orientahsm, it can also be considered in relation to racism. This chapter provides 
an analysis of Islamophobia (the sixth contribution of the thesis, as outlined iu section 
1.6), examines its conceptual distinctions and overlaps with racism, and situates 
Islamophobia in a historical context, of which Orientahsm is a key part. Although this 
chapter starts from the United Khigdom experience (in contrast to Chapter 8, which 
starts from the French experience), it does identify some comparisons, and some issues 
to be taken into account for further comparative research. Within the comparative 
framework of the thesis, this is important, because I draw an important distinction 
between Islamophobia in the United Kingdom and an 'Islamalgame’ in France. This 
distinction is significant in terms of the central questions of this thesis which refer to the 
expressions and effects of perceptions of a West-Islam duahsm, and the fifth 
contribution, that the thesis makes a dhect British-French comparison.
Tlie thr ee main sections of this chapter address different reasons for asserting that 
this is an important topic. In the first of these sections, entitled ‘Islamophobia, 
Orientahsm and rehgious prejudice’, I continue the discussion from Chapter 2, by 
looking at the historical significance of Islamophobia in the dual context of Orientahst
f
representations of Islam, which date back centmies, and the contemporary significance of
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Islam in international politics. When we look at the areas of overlap between 
Islamophobia and racism, we notice that the category ‘Muslim’ is still being raciahsed, 
and this identification of ‘Muslim’ with ‘Arab’ or ‘Pakistani’ is part of a neo-Orientahst 
homogenising discour se which creates an amalgam of Mushms, Arabs, fundamentahsts, 
extremists and tenorists. By raciahsation is meant ‘those instances where social relations 
between people have been stmctmed by the signification of human biological 
characteristics in such a way as to define and construct differentiated social 
cohectivities’, and ‘a process of categorisation, a representational process of defining an 
Other (usually, but not exclusively) somatically’ (Miles 1989: 75). In recent European 
history, the raciahsation of Bosnian Mushms, or at least their definition as an ethnic 
group (cf. Gellner 1983: 72), was a pretext for ‘ethnic cleansing’, and it was claimed that 
this was necessary to prevent the estabhshment of an Islamic fundamentalist state which 
would become a base for the Islamisation of Europe.
I also analyse, evaluate and utihse the comparison between Islamophobia and 
antisemitism, as both are based on some form of opposition to a group which is defined 
in rehgious and ethnic terns, hi addition, there have been, in both cases, historical 
variations in the relative hrportance accorded to perceptions of rehgious and ethnic 
difference. Antisemitism qua racism has largely succeeded antisemitism qua rehgious 
hatred, but Islamophobia is still articulated in rehgious tenns, perhaps increasingly so. 
Indeed, the medieval image of the ‘Moor’ or ‘Saracen’ was arguably rnore raciahsed than 
the contemporary image of the Islamic fundamentahst, or terrorist, who is both ‘out 
there’ and uncomfortably ‘close to home’, hke an ‘enemy within’.
hi the second main section, I look at some examples of Islamophobia discourse, and 
diaw attention to another important reason for making the conceptual distinction 
between Islamophobia and racism, namely the danger of conceptual inflation.
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Phenomena such as the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Bosnian Muslims necessitate a 
conceptualisation of Islamophobia which goes beyond the racism paradigm (see Miles 
1993: 6-9; Banton 1991; 117-18). Islamophobia should be seen as a (passive) fear or 
(active) hatred of Muslims, rather than an ideology as such, though it does find 
ideological expressions. As many Muslims perceive themselves to be a transnational, 
multi-ethnic community (ummah), and this perception can be objectively veiified, it is 
necessaiy to make an analytical distinction between racism and Islamophobia, reflecting a 
distinction between a racialised ethnie and a rehgious group which may become 
raciahsed, but whose aUeged differences are not piimarily biological or somatic. It is in 
making this analytical distinction that the conceptuahsation of racism and Islamophobia 
needs to be developed and clarified.
One way in which this can be done is indicated in the third main section. We can 
examine Islamophobia and racism in a comparative perspective, and this is important 
because it points to the differing contexts in which Islamophobia is articulated (or some 
of the effects of cultural differences across Europe), and the common relationship 
between Islamophobia, state education and the pohtics of integr ation or multiculturahsm. 
When we consider the relationship between Islamophobia and cultural or differential 
racism, we can observe that some reactions to the Rushdie affah in Britain, and the 
affaire du foulard (headscarf affah) in France, alleged a cultural and ideological 
ircompatibihty between Western values and those of Islam, sometimes to the extent of 
characterising Islam as inferior and archaic, fir these cases, differential racist and 
Islamophobic discourses were mixed, and sometimes barely distinguishable, even though, 
as I have argued, the analytical distinction must be made.
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3.2. Islamophobia. Orientalism and religious ureiudice
The term Islamophobia was coined in the late 1980s, and first used in print in 1991, 
in the American journal Insight, which stated: ‘Islamophobia also accounts for 
Moscow’s reluctance to relinquish its position in Afghanistan, despite the estimated $300 
million a month it takes to keep the Kabul regime going’ While there is a prominent 
fear of Islam in the international pohtical arena, and this is by no means confined to 
Moscow, the relationship with domestic Islamophobia has contributed to the gradual 
(and stih very partial) acceptance of the term in British media discourse. This has come 
about mainly through articles by academics such as Akbar Ahmed,Yasmin Ahbhai- 
Brown,^^ and Tariq Modood (who had used the term Muslim-phobia in the 1980s),^  ^ and 
letters by some activists. The first reference to Islamophobia which I have foimd in a 
British newspaper was in June 1994, in a letter to The Times from the Bangladeshi High 
Commissioner in London. He wrote:
I suspect that Islamophobia, under the guise of fundamentahst scaremongering, 
is being dehberately promoted in the overseas media, in order either to divert 
attention from socio-economic umest in their own countries or to search for an 
‘enemy’ following the collapse of commuirism.^®
Shortly afi:erwards, the term started to be apphed to Muslims in Britain. 
Responding to an article by Suzarme Moore, a letter in The Guardian, from Saba 
Risaluddin and Richard Stone, argued:
Insight, 4.2.91, p.37.
The Guardian, 9.8.94, p. 18.
The Independent, 13.6.95, pp. 1-3. 
The Guardian, 17.6.95, p.23.
The Times, 28.6.94, p.21.
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If Suzanne Moore had written ‘All rehgions are not the same. People khi each 
other over these behefs. Let’s not pretend that Judaism is a cosy httle belief 
system...’ there would have been an immediate, and whohy justified, outcry 
fiom the Jewish commimrty. Antisemitism, though regrettably far from dead, is 
at least no longer acceptable in Britain. But in fact she wr ote it of Islam. And 
Islamophobia is ahve and well. Prejudiced talk about Mushms and Islam is 
widespread, not just fi om the far right but also fiom mainstream pohticians and 
commentators of both right and left, including secular hberals such as Ms. 
Moore.
Although the term Islamophobia has been used in academic joumahsm, it has also 
been used by Mushms to describe then own situation, and this has fed graduaUy into 
wider media discourse. An example is the Glasgow Herald’s report of a speech by the 
late Kalim Siddiqui, leader of the Mushm parhament, in which he was reported as saying 
that ‘a wave of Islamophobia was sweeping the country’.^ ® However, the identification 
and critique of Islamophobia stih seems to be a marginal discourse in the British media.
The term Islamophobia is stih part of a marginal discourse, it does not (as far as I 
am aware) exist hr another European language, and the term is relatively recent, but it 
nevertheless expresses something which is not only significant at the level of 
contemporary pohtics (national and international), but which also is deeply ingrained in 
European history. In this sense, Islamophobia is an adaptation of Orientahsm, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, and as it has emerged historicaUy. Although negative discourses 
 ^about the barbarian Other fiom the East can be identified in the Gr eco-Roman period.
The Guardian, 27.9.94, p.21.
Glasgow Herald, 1.4.96, p. 10.
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and a perception of Islam as heretical or scliismatic is almost as old as Islam itself , the 
real Oriental-Occidental duahsm was established with the crusades. At this time, Europe 
was still in the afteimath of the Great Schism between the Western (‘Cathohc’) and 
Eastern (‘Orthodox’) churches, and a common enemy made it possible to preserve the 
unity of Christendom, at least hr the collective imagination. This is perhaps the beginnhig 
of the entrenchment of Islamophobia in Western cultm e and doxa.
The most obvious conceptualisation of Islamophobia, then, is as a form of religious 
prejudice (though its tangible expressions go beyond mere prejudice, which is in itself 
somewhat elusive and hidden). Rehgious prejudice is older than racism, but the two can 
be compared, and they do overlap, as the example of antisemitism demonstrates. 
Antisemitism, or something like antisemitism (often refened to as anti-Judaism), has also 
existed in Europe for centuries. The medieval legend of the wandering Jew, condemned 
to wander the earth forever for strikmg Christ as he carried the cross, was crnel reality 
for the Jewish people. Thomas Aqumas wrote that ‘they are subject to perpetual 
servitude and then goods are at the disposition of the ruler’, and the fourteenth-century 
flagellants blamed the Jews for plague, calling for them to be Idlled as an act pleasing to 
God (Southern 1970: 17, 308). This rehgious persecution is movingly and instructively 
recounted by the Cathohc theologian Hans Riing (1978: 168):
In the Imperial Constantinian Church what had been pre-Christian, pagan anti- 
Judaism was given a ‘Christian’ stamp ... [T]he situation of the Jews became 
even more difficult, particularly after the high middle ages. Jews were 
slaughtered in Western Europe during the first tliree crusades and Jews in 
Palestine were exterminated. Three hundred Jewish communities were
Here, I am assuming that Islam began with the Prophet Muhammad (570-632), though Muslims 
would insist that he was the last of the Prophets, and that Islam is as old as humanity itself.
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destroyed in the German empire fiom 1348 to 1349; Jews were expelled from 
England (1290), France (1394), Spain (1492) and Portugal (1497). Later came 
the hoiTifyingly virulent anti-Jewish speeches of the elderly Luther.
Per secution of Jews continued after the Reformation, there were pogr oms in 
Eastern Emope, and so on. It must be admitted that, during these periods, the 
Church probably slew more martyrs than it produced. AH of which is 
incomprehensible to the modern Christian.
There are three points which can be made from this. Firstly, the form of ‘anti- 
Judaism’ changed from pre-Christian to Constantiuiau Christian—in both cases it was 
part of an overall state doctrine. Secondly, there is a link between anti-Judaism and the 
proto-Islamophobia of the crusades. Thir dly, there is a religious dynamic to earher anti- 
Judaism which is ‘incomprehensible’ within a contemporary religious framework. This is 
because, as pre-Christian anti-Judaism gave way to Constantinian anti-Judaism, so 
rehgious anti-Judaism gave way to a secular antisemitism. Leon Pohakov reaches this 
conclusion: that the rehgious form of anti-Judaism gave way—due to the secularisation 
associated with the French revolution—to an antisemitism which was articulated in terms 
of racial conflict. However, ah that had changed was the justifrcation for hatred, not the 
hatred itself. As Pohakov (1975: 458-9) asserts: ‘The conflict was regarded as racial, 
but if contemporaries formed an imaginary image of a Jewish race, they did so because a 
theoiogicahy condemned caste aheady existed. ’
Thus, there was a raciahsation of ‘Jewishness’. But does a paraUel raciahsation 
occur' with Muslims? Certainly, the categor-y ‘Muslim’ is often racialised. In 
contemporary Britain and France, Muslims are often stereotyped as ‘Pakistani’ or 
'maghrébin', ter-ms which may connote an ineconcilable ‘racial’ difference based on a
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perception of somatic features, such as skin colour*. However, the medieval image of the 
‘Moor’ or ‘Saracen’ was also apparently racialised. The Jews have been seen as ‘a 
people’; can we say the same about Muslims? The concept of the ummah, which has 
already been cited m this thesis, implies a transnational, multi-ethnic community. In 
other words, it implies that Islam is worldwide, and not the property of a particular 
ethnic group. But it also emphasises the community of Muslims, or imagined community 
of people who perceive themselves as having something in common, and a responsibility 
to one another. Thus, the idea of the ummah and that of the nation are remarkably 
similar.
As I have argued, the term Islamophobia is new, but it expresses something which is 
much older. It is this link between the origins and contemporary expressions of 
Islamophobia which have given rise to the term, as a result of a consciousness of the 
rehgiously- defrned Other, and a growing awareness of the reahty of Islamophobia, 
whether or not this is the term which is used. According to the Runnymede Trust’s 
report on the subject, Islamophobia, like Orientahsm, involves a perception of Muslim 
culture as inferior to Western culture, and this perception is expressed in the following 
ways:
1. That Muslim cultures mistreat women, but that other religions and cultures 
have outgrown patriarchy and sexism.
2. That Muslims co-opt religious observance and beliefs to justify political and 
militaiy projects, but that such fiisiag of sphitual and temporal power is not 
pursued m societies influenced by other reUgions.
z 3. That they do not distinguish between universal religious tenets on the one 
hand and local cultural mores (for example, those of rural Pakistan) on the
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other, but that a similar failure to distinguish between universal faith and local 
culture does not occur* in other religions.
4. That they are literahst in then interpretation of scriptures, but that analogous 
literahsm is found only on the fringes of other faiths.
5. That they have difficulties hr sending representatives to meet external bodies, 
but that issues of political representation and legitimacy are unproblematic in 
other rehgions.
6. That they are compliant and unreflective, but that other rehgions and 
societies have their healthy internal debates and diversity (Commission on 
British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997b: 7).
The juxtaposition of Muslims with other rehgions, cultures and societies clearly 
underlines and undermines the stereotypes involved. However, the perceptions of 
Muslim culture as inferior to Western cultur e are rarely, if ever, expressed in the form 
indicated. Certainly, it is often asserted that Muslims mistreat women, use rehgion to 
justify pohtical and mihtary projects, confuse rehgion and cultme, inteipret the Qur’an 
hterahy, face problems of pohtical representation and legitimacy, and are comphant and 
unreflective. However, the reverse is not usuahy exphcitly asserted regarding the West. 
The imphcation is either forgotten, or it is toned down to somethiug hke: ‘Women are 
mistreated in the West, but not as much as in Muslim cultmes’. Nevei*theless, the 
juxtapositions do indicate some characteristics of Islamophobia, which are expressed 
systematically as eight main features of what are caUed ‘closed views of Islam’:
■ 1. Islam seen as a single monohthic bloc, static and unresponsive to new
reahties.
2. Islam seen as separate and other—(a) not having any aims or values in
common with other cultmes (b) not affected by them (c) not influencing
them.
3. Islam seen as inferior to the West—barbaric, mational, piimitive, sexist.
4. Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism,
engaged in a ‘clash of civilisations’.
5. Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or mihtary advantage.
6. Criticisms made by Islam o f ‘the West’ rejected out of hand.
7. Hostrhty towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices towards
Muslims and exclusion of Muslims fi om mainstream society.
8. Anti-Mushm hostihty accepted as natural and ‘normal’ (Commission on
British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997b: 5).
These are mtended to distinguish Islamophobia from legitimate debate, 
disagreement and criticism of Islam. Disagreement with the theological principles of 
Islam does not in itself constitute Islamophobia, nor does criticism of what some 
Mushms perceive to be the cultural and pohtical consequences of Islam. This is an 
important point as it distinguishes Islamophobia from racism—the concept of legitimate 
debate with a raciahsed group hardly makes sense (though disagreement with the 
dynamic of raciahsation does).
It should be noted that some features of this ‘closed view of Islam’ are also 
characteristic of what Aziz Al-Azmeh (1996) cahs ‘neo-Afgharrism’, a Muslim discourse 
which is exphcitly linked to ‘Islamic ftmdamentahsm’. For example, in such discourse, 
Islam is perceived to be monohthic, static, unresponsive and separate, and any deviation 
from this is regarded as bid’a (hterahy ‘iunovation’, with connotations of heresy), hr
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other words, it is concerned with a ‘pure’ and ‘authentic’ Islam. Criticisms of this 
‘closed view of Islam’ are not necessarily Islamophohic. Indeed, they are often made by 
other Muslims, Al-Azmeh among them.
Nevertheless, it is profitable to conceptuahse Islamophobia in terms of internal 
Orientalism, as defined in section 2.3. While, as was argued, some Muslims in the West 
are valued according to what they have in common with the West, others, who decide to 
withdraw, are perceived as negating Western values, and even civilisation itself. They 
are seen as fundamentalist, a label which coiuiects the wearing of the hijab to Western 
images of Islam-inspired fanaticism and terrorism. Thus, the perception of Islam as 
being radically incompatible with Western, ‘crvihsed’ values is reinforced. When 
classical Orientalism alleged an incompatibility between Islam and the West, Muslims 
were seerr as a somewhat exotic people, this perception forming part of the sensual 
stereotype referxed to above. But where this view is seen in a context of internal 
Orientahsm, the perception of Islam changes. According to the Rurmymede Trust’s 
consultation paper, which preceded the report on Islamophobia:
hr the case of the new coining ‘islamophobia’, both kinds of dread are imphed: 
the object of fear is both out there, beyond national boundaries, and also here, 
all too close to home. Precisely because Islam is perceived to have this dual 
location it is ah the more feared and dishked by many non-Muslims. Recurring 
metaphors to refer to Muslim communities withirr Emope include fifth column, 
bridgehead, enclave, trojan horse and enemy within (Commission on British 
Mushms and Islamophobia 1997a: 6).
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As I argued in section 2.3, the intermediate option for Muslims to respond to 
internal Orientalism, a combined Westem-Muslim identity, can also be used to reinforce 
internal Orientalist stereotypes. It can be seen as contradictory and inational, or it can 
be supposed that there must be something behind the combined identity, whether it be a 
barrier against the West or arr attempt to irrfiltrate the West. A classic statement of this 
perception is cited in the Runnymede report:
You can be British without speaking Errglish or being Christian or being white, 
but nevertheless Britairr is basically Enghsh-speaking, Christian and white, and 
if one starts to think that it might become basically Urdu-speaking and Muslim 
and brown, one gets frightened and angry. .. Because of our obstinate refusal 
to have enough babies, Western European civilisation will start to die at the 
point where it could have been revived with new blood. Then the hooded 
hordes wUl win, and the Koran will be taught, as Gibbon famously imagined, in 
the schools of Oxford (Moore 1991; cited in Commission on British Muslims 
and Islamophobia 1997b: 9).
3.3. Examples of Islamophobic discourse
Another qualification which must be added to the statements about the 
Islamophobic perceptions of Muslim cultme as inferior to Western cultme, and the 
‘closed views of Islam’, is that the systematic nature of their expression means that they 
are also somewhat general, and aloof fiom the empirical situations in which 
Islamophobia is really expressed. In order to compliment that approach, I would like to 
continue from Charles Moore’s quotation, to examine some other specific, empirical.
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concrete examples of Islamophobic discomse. These will help us to understand the 
diversity of Islamophobia, and the possibihties for international comparisons.
hi October 1995, members of the Groupe Islamo-Chrétien du Hautmont-Mouvaux, 
near Lille, with whom I did an important amount of fieldwork, received a hand-written 
note in the post. It read as follows:
Centre anti-islamique de Lambersart 
96 me de fabbé Lemire 
59130 Lambersart
Le coran est un tissu d’inepties, une hérésie complète. L’islam est une rehgion 
de déséqurhbre. Seul l’évangile est source de véiitées [sic].
Madame Rahnonde Debeh, 96 me de l’abbé Lemhe à Lambersart offie une 
prime de 1000.00 fiancs à un islamiste si il se converti à l’évangile. Qu’on se le 
dise!"^
One way in which Islamophobia is expressed is by claiming that Islam is inferior to 
other rehgions or worldviews, in this case Christianity. So the particularity of this 
example of Islamophobic discourse hes in its motivation, which is clearly rehgious. 
However, it is not uncommon for people to thhrk that their own rehgion or worldview is 
superior to others—in many cases, this is why people have a particular rehgion or 
worldview, and this would constitute a legitimate disagreement with Islam, not 
Islamophobia per se. Clearly, it would not be useful to say that beheving strongly in 
something other than Islam constitutes Islamophobia. But here, there is an explicit
This letter has a number of errors in spelling and grammar, but I have reproduced it as written. I 
have translated it as follows: ‘Anti-Islamic centre of Lambersart, 96 rue de l ’abbé Lemire, 59130 
Lambersart. The Qur’an is a web of absurdity, a complete heresy. Islam is a religion of imbalance. 
Only the Gospel is the source of tmtlis. Mrs Raimonde Debeir, 96 rue de l’abbé Lemire in Lambersart, 
offers a reward of 1,000 francs to an Islamist if  he converts to the Gospel. May someone tell him!’
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attempt to denigrate Islam in particular, presumably because the wiiter feels that Islam 
constitutes a significant threat to Christianity. This belief comes firom a particular 
understanding of contemporaiy socio-political realities, not fiom theological conviction, 
which is why it does seem to cross the line between a legitimate criticism of Islam and a 
rehgiously-motivated Islamophobia.
If fiuther evidence for this analysis is needed, the writer claims that the Gospel is the 
only sour ce of truth, leading to the logical (in terms of her argument) conclusion that 
Islam, hke other rehgions, is mistaken. So far, her argument is theological, not 
Islamophobic. However, she does not stop there. She also claims that Islam, in 
particular, is characterised by absurdity, heresy, and mental instabihty. fir addition, the 
bounty of one thousand fi*ancs is offered to an Tslamist’, rather than a ‘Muslim’. This is 
probably an unconscious confusion of the two terms, but the common association of 
‘Islamist’ with terrorist’ is stih invoked here, and this plays on people’s fears, 
undei'nhning attempts of Mushms and Christians (to whom the letter was sent) to achieve 
a mutual understanding.
This common association, between Islam and terrorism, exists throughout the West, 
though it seems to be expressed and analysed in a particularly lucid way in France. This 
is undoubtedly due to the history of French coloniahsm, the contemporaiy pohtics of 
immigr'ation, and the civil war in Algeria. The classic example of this 'Islamalgame\ as 
it has come to be known (from a combination of the French words for ‘Islam’ and 
‘amalgam’), must be the headline which appeared in France-Soir six days after the 
bombing of the Port-Royal RER station in Paris on 3 December 1996. It read: ‘57 Beurs 
jugés: Le procès des commandos du Maroc s ’ouvre à Paris, 6 jours après l ’attentat du 
RER'.^^ This headline said a great deal in the way m which it mixed issues of nation ahty,
‘37 Beurs judged: The trial of the Moroccan commandos opens in Paris, 6 days after the RER bomb 
attack’ (front-page headline in France-Soir, 9.12.96). Beur is a slang expression for the children, born
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immigration, urban ‘social problems’, tenoiism in France, armed conflict in Morocco, 
and the fear of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. In the popular imagination, the Beurs are 
associated with the banlieues (large peripheral estates of major cities), with overtones of 
social deprivation, unemployment, crime, dings, and violence, and these same banlieues 
are perceived as fertile recinitment ground for the preachers of an 'Islam de rupture' 
(see Aziz 1996). In addition, their nationality is an issue of struggle: they were bom hi 
France, of North African origin, which illustrates the conflict between jus solis and jus 
sanguinis principles of nationahty, and the fear (exploited by the Front National) of 
immigration. The article was about the trial of a group of Beurs for teiTorist offences in 
Morocco, which had nothing to do with the RER bomb attack to which the headline 
refers. However, the assumption that the RER attack was the work of ‘Islamic 
fundamentalists’, and the perception that conflict in North Africa (which itself conflates 
the quite different situations in Algeria and Morocco) is solely or mainly about ‘Islamic 
ftmdamentahsm’, were grounds for putting the two together. The use of the words 
'Beurs\ 'commandos du Maroc' and ' l ’attentat du RER' indicates a fear of 
ftmdamentahsm, violence, and cultural incompatibihty, and the danger of ‘their problems’ 
being exported ‘over here’ as a result of migration.
There is a direct connection between such Islamophobic, or ‘Islamalgamic’, 
discourse, and the anti-immigration racism of the Front National, or, by extension, the 
extreme right in other European countries. However, there is no clear expression of 
racism in Madame Deb eh’s letter, nor is there a dhect attack on Mushms, as opposed to 
Islam. To give the writer the benefit of the doubt, she is making a point similar to that 
made by Fay Weldon, in her response to the Rimnymede Trust document which accused
in France, of migrants from North Africa, coined by the Beurs themselves as an alternative to the 
pejorative, even racist, raton or melon.
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lier of Islamophobia. An article by Giaham Ball in The Independent on Sunday reported 
her reaction as follows:
In 1989, soon after the Ayatollah Khomeini declared a fatwa against Salman 
Rushdie for writing The Satanic Verses, Fay Weldon published Sacred Cows, a 
pamphlet critical of the fundamentahst inteipretation of the Koran. The 
authors of the pamphlet say that her wilting helped to demonise Islam and they 
quote the following passage: ‘[The Koran is] food for no thought. It is not a 
poem on which society can be safely or sensibly based. It gives weapons and 
strength to the thought pohce’.... ‘The piece they quote seems to be a perfectly 
vahd comment to make about either the Bible or Koran. I feel outraged and 
besmirched that these peaceflil and apt words have been used in this way’, Ms, 
Weldon said.... ‘Are they seriously arguing that Islamophobia is the same as 
racism? Officially Britain is a Christian culture—who goes to church these 
days? I say hooray for Muslims and down with Islam. The mullahs have done 
everyone a great disseivice’, she said.^ '*
It seems from this that we should recognise two kinds of Islamophobia: a hostihty to 
Islam wliich becomes a hostihty towards Mushms; and a hostihty towards Islam without 
hostihty towards Mushms. hi principle, it may be more helpfiil to use the term 
Islamophobia to denote hostihty towards Islam, and Modood’s earher term Muslim- 
phobia to denote hostihty towards Mushms. However, Islamophobia appears to be the 
teim we are stuck with, and it does have the virtue of indicating that there is a degr ee of 
fluidity between hostihty towards Islam and hostihty towards Mushms. Furthermore, it
The Independent on Sunday, 2.3.97, p. 10.
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may not be useful to use the label ‘Islamophobia’ to represent hostihty towards Islam 
without hostihty towards Mushms. This is because there seems to be a danger of 
‘conceptual inflation’ (to use Robert Miles’s teim), which leads to such a broad 
definition of Islamophobia that it becomes difficult to subject it to critique. The first 
kind, which is clearly Islamophobic, seems to have more in common with racism, 
because it is directed against people, rather than against an idea.
hr some cases, there is a common expression of racism and Islamophobia, in which 
the conceptual distinction is not reflected in the actual discourse. For example, one 
Danish group has pubhshed material on the internet, which is cited here because it is a 
particularly vivid example of a more widespread discourse:
Why could a World religion like Islam be invented in the poor desert part of the 
Middle East? Why not in the more densely populated Egypt or Iraq or Iran? 
Perhaps because the barbarian populations have some unspoiled quality, that 
makes them open to new chances. Mohammed took in what was fitting his 
people fiom Jew-dom, Christianity and MongoHan warfare.
Our democratic and enlightened aristocratic tradition makes us advanced and 
valuable people to the world. We have little to learn and much to lose by 
mixing our people with what may be envir onmental (not genetic) half-apes.^^
The ‘black school’ we call the old church school where rote-learning was top 
priority. We support Moslem schools which are worse—learning the Koran in 
a dead Arab language. We should use less money on the im m igrants and it 
should aim at integration, not aim at supporting then crnsade against us.^ ^
http://www.glistrup. coni/desert. htm 
http://www.glistmp. coni/osmanic. htm 
http://www.glistmp.com/koran.htm
9 6
The particularity of such discourse lies in the explicit mixing of racism and 
Islamophobia/^ The fir st one characterises Muslims as irrferior and backward, but with a 
‘noble savage’ quality. The second statement adds to this that Muslims and Westerners 
are incompatible, thus adding to the inferior stereotype a programme of isolation, a kind 
of racist quarantine rather than apartheid (and a clear example of TaguiefiPs racisme 
differentialiste). The third statement adds to this a perception that the inferior and 
incompatible Other is constituting a direct threat to ‘us’. This is an extreme example 
insofar as it mixes racism and Islamophobia in such an exphcit way, but different parts of 
the statements cited can be found in a variety of different places.
This section has contributed to the analysis of Islamophobia by identifying different 
examples of how it is exjrressed. It is expressed in rehgious terms, with the claim that 
Islam in particular is ioferior to other rehgions or worldviews. It is expressed by 
associathrg Islam and terrorism, and hr this way there is a comparison between 
Islamophobia and the French concept of an 'Islamalgame'. It is expressed as hostfiity 
towards Islam and as hostihty towards Mushms, though there are legitimate doubts 
about whether hostihty towards Islam per se is usefully refen ed to as Islamophobia. It is 
expressed hr the context of racism and anti-immigrant sentiment, hi discomses of 
Mushms as inferior and backward, as incompatible with, or a danger to, the Western 
countries in which they are perceived as ‘immigrants’. By identifying these expressions, 
this chapter has highhghted the complexity and diversity of Islamophobia, further- 
showing (in answer to the fir st central question of this thesis) that there are diverse 
expressions of Islam as fiindamentaUy different from the West, and as homogeneous or 
even inferior.
I have not discovered any examples from the United Kingdom or France which are anywhere near as 
explicit, though I have no reason to believe they do not exist.
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3.4. Comparative issues
The different types of Islamophobia wliich have been identified in section 3.3, and 
this highlighting of diversity, also demonstrate that there are possibilities for comparison 
between different countries, as well as between Islamophobia and racism. As such, it is 
particularly relevant to this thesis. The fear or hatred of Muslims is expressed thr ough a 
variety of discourses, some of which are specific to one country, while others exist 
across Europe.
One specific comparison which has been cited hr this chapter is between 
Islamophobia in the United Kingdom and the 'Islamalgame' in France. There is a clear 
difference between these two concepts in that the Islamalgame refers to a discourse 
which portrays all Muslims as homogeneous and responsible for the actions of a few. 
The concept of Islamophobia refers to practices as well as discourses, and reflects a 
consciousness of Muslims being confronted with antipathy or hatred rather than a 
homogenising discourse (though the homogenising discomse is often present). As we 
would expect, based on the arguments in section 2.5, there is an emphasis, in France, on 
the discursive power (a form of cultural power, dependent on cultural capital) to label, 
define and characterise the religious group. This reflects the French use of culture to 
explain religion, hi the United Kingdom, there is a consciousness of an expressed 
antipathy which creates disadvantage, and this has its roots in discomses which explain 
cultural practices, and acts of teirorism, in teims of the Islamic religion (‘they do these 
things because they are Muslims’). Such discourse is also expressed by critics of 
Islamophobia, by pointing to the cultural enrichment which is brought to British society 
by the presence of Islam, and reflects the British use of religion to explain cultme. Tlie
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comparison between Islamophobia and the 'Islamalgame' is discussed further in section
4.6.
Issues which are relevant across Europe include the place of Islam in state 
education, and pohtical discourse about integration (or multiculturalism). The Danish 
group, cited above, certainly linked the two. Jurgen Nielsen (1995b: 158) has argued 
that the educational sphere is a major arena in which such representations of Islam are 
developed. Comparing the Rushdie affair' and the affaire du foulard, he writes:
The ‘affairs’ exposed tensions between ideological secularists in the pohtical 
and cultmal estabhshments of Europe, the bearers of the cultme of the nation 
state, and those who saw rehgion as having an active and critical role to play hr 
pubhc life. Above all, issues of the education of children were central: were 
they to be educated into a national culture, or did parents have the right to 
determine the nature of their' children’s education?
On the pohtics of integration, Christopher Husbands (1995) addresses ‘the issue of 
Muslim assimilabihty and Muslim responses to it’ in Britain, France and the Netherlands, 
and suggests that there is a connection between Islamophobic discomse and the extent of 
‘moral panics’ about the national identity of the country in question. Tliis may account 
partly for the lesser consciousness of Islamophobia in France. There is no suggestion 
that this connection is a dir ect correlation; nevertheless, a strong connection between the 
two phenomena may be a hemistic hypothesis with which to begin comparative research 
on the relationship between racism and Islamophobia.
f hr order to compare racism and Islamophobia—systematise a conceptualisation of 
what they have in common, where they influence and constitute each other, and where
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they must be kept conceptually separate—-we shall identify and classify the diverse 
definitions of racism. Michel Wieviorka (1995: 37) makes a useful distinction between 
three dimensions, or referents, of the teim ‘racism’, which can be paraphrased as: (i) 
prejudices, opinions and attitudes; (ii) behaviours and practices of discrimination, 
segregation and violence; and (iii) racism as a cognitive doctrine, pubhc discourse or 
pohtical ideology. Social scientific definitions of racism tend to take the third dimension 
as a starting point, so racism is essentially an ideology which manifests itself in pohtical 
programmes, exclusionary practices, violence, or prejudice. Even then, there is no real 
consensus about how the ideology of racism should be defined, and the debates of the 
1980s, though they may have become stale, remain umesolved. So racism may be an 
ideology which holds that human beings are separated by somatic (‘racial’) criteria into 
different groups (‘races’), and which imphes a negative judgement about one or more of 
these groups. Racism may be an ideology which holds different groups to be 
incompatible, even if they are culturahy defined and, in theory, equal. Or racism may be 
an ideology which takes social and historical processes, and assumes that they are 
biological givens. These three views are associated with Robert Miles (1989), Pierre- 
André Taguieff (1987), and Martin Barker (1981), respectively.
Perhaps part of the problem is the chameleon-like nature of racism. It is capable of 
changing its appearance, while retaining the same essence. The problem is exacerbated 
by the appearance of racism being more than superficial. TaguiefiPs vicious circle of 
racism and antir acism should alert us to this. There is a vicious circle of heterophobic 
and heterophUic racisms and antiracisms. This begins with a heterophobic racism, a 
hatred of the Other, which is confr onted by a heterophihc antir acism, or appreciation of 
the Other. This is taken on board by a heterophihc racism, an apparent appreciation of 
the Other which is in fact an appreciation of Otherness and a determination to maintain
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this Otherness (the theoretical basis of apartheid), which is again confronted with a 
heterophobic anthacism, a rejection of Otherness and insistence on universahty (which is 
what has instigated elements of the anti-racist left in France to support assimilation). 
The circle is completed by a heterophobic racism which objects to anything which is 
different or Other and threatens to undemhne this principle of universahty (Taguieff 
1987: 409-10).
I have aheady defined Islamophobia as rehgious prejudice, hi one sense, it is 
narrower than this definition would suggest, because it refers solely to prejudice against 
Mushms. hr another sense, it is broader, because it can refer to more than prejudice. 
The Runnymede Trust define it as ‘referring to dread or hatred of Islam—and, therefore, 
to fear or dislike of ah or most Mushms’ (Commission on British Mushms and 
Islamophobia 1997b: 1). They identify four' separate, but overlapping, interconnected 
and mutuahy reinforcing aspects of Islamophobia (though it should be emphasised that 
causal relations cannot be taken for granted): prejudice, discrimination, exclusion and 
violence. Prejudice is expressed in everyday conversation and in the media. 
Discrimination exists in the provision of services, notably education and health, and in 
employment practices. Exclusion fiom employment occms, also fiom pohtics and 
government, and fiom management and responsibihty. FinaUy, Mushms are subject to 
violence, in the forms of verbal abuse, vandahsing of property, and physical assaults 
(Commission on British Mushms and Islamophobia 1997b: 11-12).
There are three aspects of this definition which aUow us to compare it with our 
definitions of racism. Fhstly, Islamophobia is defined primarily as a hostihty towards 
Islam, rather than Mushms, though it must manifest itself (secondarily) as hostihty 
fiowards Muslims. The thing to note is that hostihty towards Mushms is str'ictly 
secondary. Thus, although Islamophobia is not defined as being an ideology, it is
101
defined in terms q/"ideology, or with reference to ideology, as is racism. In other words, 
Islamophobia is defined as being in opposition to an ideology, whereas racism is defined 
as being an ideology in its own right.
Secondly, the different aspects of Islamophobia minor two of Wieviorka’s 
dimensions of racism: prejudices, opinions and attitudes; and behaviours and practices of 
discrimination, segregation and violence. However, there is no mention of Islamophobia 
as cognitive doctrine, public discourse or pohtical ideology. On the other hand, this does 
not mean that such an ideology does not exist, though it is difficult to say where it exists, 
or who articulates such an ideology.
Thirdly, it is theoreticahy possible to conceptuahse Islamophobia in terms of 
Taguieff s vicious chcle. This starts with a (heterophobic) Islamophobia, or a hatred of 
the Muslim Other. A heterophihc critique of Islamophobia, hke the Runnymede report, 
emerges in response to this. Such a critique ‘acknowledges that Islam is distinctively 
different in significant respects fiom other rehgions and “the West”, but does not see it as 
deficient or as less worthy of esteem’, and argues that Islamophobia ‘prevents non- 
Muslims from appreciating and benefiting fiom Islam’s cultural, artistic and intehectual 
heritage, and from its moral teachings’ (Commission on British Mushms and 
Islamophobia 1997b: 6 , 12). This, in turn, reinforces a kind of heterophihc Islamophobia 
(though this term is an oxymoron, so ‘heterophihc Orientahsm’ may be preferable), 
which values the Otherness of Islam and of Mushms, seeks to maintain this Otherness, 
and exclude the constituted Other from consideration as ‘one of us’. FinaUy, the critical 
response to this, seen, for example, in Edward Said’s work, is one which rejects this 
piinciple of Otherness, shows it to be a social constmction rather than a natural or quasi-
r natural division between human beings, and emphasises the heterogeneity of Muslim and 
Western cultures.
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3.5. Conclusion
We have seen that racism and Islamophobia have in common certain aspects of then 
definitions and expressions, though then origins are more comphcated. We can say that 
they both originate fi om representations of the Other, but so do other foms of prejudice, 
such as sexism or homophobia. Among those things which racism and Islamophobia 
have in common are: (i) that they are both defined piimarily with reference to ideology; 
(ii) that they are both constituted by prejudices, opinions and attitudes, and by 
behaviours and practices of disciimination, segiegation and violence; and (iii) that they 
can both be conceptuahsed in terms of a vicious cncle of heterophobia and heterophilia.
The most obvious answer to the question of how racism and Islamophobia influence 
and constitute each other, as we have seen in this chapter, is that ‘Muslims’ have been 
subject to raciahsation. What happens here is that another criterion of difference is 
added on to the rehgious criterion to emphasise the perceived incomp atibihty between 
‘white’, ‘Christian’, ‘European’ Westerners and ‘Mushms’, as also happened in the 
development of antisemitism. Yet this is not a dominant discourse of Islamophobia, 
except perhaps in the United Kingdom (because in British Orientahsm, rehgion was used 
to explain culture, rather than vice-versa), hr any case, the rehgious criterion can also be 
added on to the ‘racial’ one, and this is something which happens increasingly, hr some 
ways, it seems as if the medieval image of the ‘Moor’ or ‘Saracen’ was more raciahsed 
than the contemporary stereotype of the fanatical, misogynistic terrorist who quotes the 
Qur’an in support of authoritarianism and violence.
 ^ This chapter has isolated an effect of the perception of a West-Islam duahsm, 
homogeneity of Islam and homogeneity of the West, which is refened to as
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Islamophobia, and shown that the religious character of the Muslim communities in the 
West is a pretext for a fonn of prejudice and disciimination which is distinct from racism. 
Many of the stereotypes involved in this process, which have been discussed in this 
chapter, can also be found in media discourses, and so the next chapter analyses media 
representations of Islam in greater detail and diversity.
104
4. Media representations of Islam
4.1. Introduction and context
In earlier chapters of this thesis, I argued that the critique of Orientahsm entails a 
moving away from ‘Occidentahst’ discourses. These discourses represent the West as 
homogeneous in the way it represents Islam, and maintam the subject-object duahsm of 
the West and Islam by reducing Islam to a passive victim of Orientahsm. We need to 
move towards a theoiy of interaction between Islam and the West, between Orientahsm 
and Occidentahsm, and between Mushm identities and Western representations of Islam 
and Mushms. hi this chapter, I show that Western representations of Islam and Mushms 
are diverse and fluid, by refeiring to empitical data which was coUected duiing my 
fieldwork in Lihe and Glasgow. The emphasis m this chapter is on written 
representations of Islam, particularly media sources dating back to the 1970s, showing 
that they exist within a context which also includes academic, pohtical and popular 
discomses, historical and structmal circumstances. Hie reasons for focusing on media 
discomses are that they are accessible, they are a part of people’s hves, which helps to 
make them particularly nifluential, they can be seen as occupying a ‘middle ground’ 
between popular ‘commonsense’ discourses on the one hand, and pohtical or academic 
discomses on the other, and the media gives a tangible reflection of popular discourses. 
(There is a focus on ‘quahty’ newspapers which are pohticahy centrist or left-wing, as it 
would be easy to find sensationahsed material on virtuaUy anything in the United
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Kingdom tabloids, and because these newspapers are more amenable to comparison 
(there being no real French equivalent of the tabloids, when we consider their popuhsm 
and influence).
Although this chapter identifies similarities and differences between French and 
British representations of Islam, the main thrust is to identify the differences. 
Furtheiuiore, it identifies some differences between media and other discourses, enabling 
us to situate the material more clearly, and to recognise the diversity of representations 
which exist. I have placed a major emphasis on the paradigm shifi;, which was identified 
in Chapter 2, fiom an exotic to a fanatical stereotype of Islam. Clearly, it is not the 
intention to identify long term trends in Orientahst discomse by examining a limited 
number of texts with a quahtative method. Such an approach would be methodologically 
untenable. However, the texts do illustrate other points which arise fium om historical 
and theoretical discussions, and the approach is consistent with an attempt to identify the 
diversity of representations of Islam. This is because paradigm shifts do not always 
entail the disappearance of the previous paradigm, but the two (or more) paradigms can 
continue to co-exist, even if they are in some Idnd of conflict with each other. This point 
will become clearer when the specific example is discussed.
The structme of this chapter is as follows. To begin with, it looks at the exotic 
representation of Islam and Muslims in earher and cmient discomses. Then, the shift 
fiom exoticism to fanaticism is discussed in terms of some important events (an approach 
which is bon owed fi om two French doctoral theses, by Elghazi 1990 and Salem 1994), 
such as the Rushdie affair, and the development of a media focus on tenorism. A not 
umelated image is that of Muslims as sociahy delinquent, the discussion of which ensues 
.from that of the fanatical stereotype. The chapter emphasises that these discourses have 
an effect on the situations of Mushms, the natme of extreme-right pohtics, and the
106
development of nationality and immigration laws. Then, I make a point which follows 
from Chapter 3, as well as this chapter, which is that there are media discomses which 
are more critical of homogenising representations of Islam and Muslims. Tliis raises the 
possibility of an emergent critique of Islamophobia, which goes beyond the exotic and 
fanatical representations and takes account of the principles of a critique of Orientalism. 
Finally, I discuss some of the issues involved in a comparative perspective. It should be 
noted that this chapter does not examine the educational sphere, although it is a subject 
of frequent media debate, and also an important site of sociahsation in which the younger 
generation of Muslims can experience a tension or reconcifration of Muslim aird Western 
cultmes. This is discussed, with some reference to media material, in Chapter 8 .
Before addressing these subjects, it is important to emphasise that there is a wider- 
international context to this discussion, wlrich can be identified with the pohtical 
discourse to which I have refened, and which has differing impacts on French and British 
discourses. For example, the cmient state of relations (as I am writing) between the 
American-British axis and Iraq has the clear potential to develop into a wider conflict 
between the West and the Arab-Muslim world. Such possibihties have been identified in 
Samuel Huntington’s (1993) infamous self-fulfilling prophecy known as the clash of 
civihsations. He has argued that the most significant line of confr ontation may be ‘the 
cultmal division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and 
Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other’ (Huntington 1993: 29-30), as it was at 
the time of the Great Schism, in 1054, and the Fir st Crusade, which began m 1096. Not 
only is this a line of conflict, but Huntington is clear about whose fault he thinks it is: the 
clash of civihsations is ‘the perhaps irrational but smely historic reaction of an ancient 
Tival against om Jrrdeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the world-wide
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expansion of both’ (Huntington 1993: 32). Furthennore, he sometimes seems to blame 
the victims:
... the proliferation of ethnic conflict, epitomized at the extreme in ‘ethnic 
cleansing’, has not been totally random. It has been most frequent and most 
violent between groups belonging to different civilizations. In Eurasia the great 
historic fault hues between civilizations are once more aflame. This is 
particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of 
nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between 
Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, 
Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Pliilippines. Islam has 
bloody borders (Huntington 1993: 34-5).
Himtington is not unique in propagating this sort of discourse, though I suspect he 
has had a particularly strong influence on Western pohcies and, by extension, on curTent 
affairs. But the international context is frequently cited in media discourse; other 
examples include Palestine, the Taleban in Afghanistan, and the Chechen conflict. 
French newspapers have tended to be supportive of the Palestinian cause, and acts of 
violence committed against Israelis have been attributed to ‘Islamists’ rather than 
‘Palestirrians’.^  ^ As I argued in the introduction to this thesis, there has been a shift in 
British media and academic discourses from references to ‘Asians’ or ‘Pakistarris’ tu 
references to ‘Muslims’, and this can be attributed partially to the international corrtext 
(for example the involvement of Iran in the Rushdie affair ).
See, for example, the article by Christophe Boltanslci in Libération, 12,12.96, p.8.
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Similarly, the civil war in Algeria is never far from French concerns. Although it has 
been reported world-wide, there are obvious reasons why it should be particularly 
prominent in France: the population of Algerian origin in France; the colonial link; the 
continuing implication of France in North African politics. As a result, reporting on 
Algeria has been more in-depth, but it has also provoked a particular representation of 
Muslims in France as linked to tenorism, which has a negative influence on the situations 
of Muslims in France. Similarly, as we shall see, discourses such as Huntington’s have 
had an effect on the representations and situations of Muslims in Britain, and no doubt in 
the rest of the English-speaking world.
4.2. Exoticism
A 1975 article hi a local newspaper from Lihe described the Wazemmes market, 
then and now an important location in the economic and social life of many Muslims of 
North African origin in the Lihe area, in the fohowing tenus:
Les Nord-Africains, très nombreux ont apporté les teintes ciues, parfois 
criardes de leur s tapis et de leurs couvertures, des sacs en euh, des chapeaux de 
peau. Les femmes drapées dans leurs gandomas s’embrassent en riant; les 
hommes en djehaba, la chéchia en tricot foulée sur la tête, se senent la main, la 
portent ensuite au cœur : «Salamalec». Ils ont amené la menthe fraîche pour le 
thé, qui sent bon dans les travées. Sur les étaux on trouve les pastèques, 
rouges et juteuses dans leurs gangues vertes; des merguez côté boucherie; des 
beignets, des loukoums côté patisserie. Wazemmes, c’est le bazar. On y 
retrouve, comme à Istanbul, les narghilés (ces pipes au long tuyau souple
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communiquant avec un flacon d’eau aromatisée), les cuivres jaunes, les odeurs 
d’encens des petits camelots, les senteurs fortes des épices. Des noirs, 
vendeurs de sagaies, de masques, d’amulettes appellent le client au son de 
petits tam-tams; les boules de bois flappent inlassablement la membrane tendue. 
D’autres fiixits exotiques: ananas, noix de cocos, des dattes, des avocats 
évoquent une autre Afiique.'’”
Tbe exotic tone of this article is quite apparent, but when it is analysed, we may 
have a clearer idea of why it seems exotic. The use of Arabic and Turkish words 
certainly contributes to this, as does the frequent use of certain adjectives which 
inevitably has an evocative effect on a text. There are also some less obvious factors. If 
we analyse the text, we find that the article is structured by a number of oppositions, 
which are set out in Table 4.1, and these create a juxtaposition of the North Africans and 
the ‘black people’, the gravity of the men compared with the gaiety of the women, and 
aspects of the visual and olfactory experiences of being there. These serve as a context 
for the additional juxtapositions of the ‘familiar’ and the ‘exotic’, set out in Table 4.2, 
and it is the famiharity of one part which emphasises the exoticism (to the assumed 
Western reader) of another part.
Even now, in the late 1990s, it seems impossible for a non-Muslim Westerner to 
escape fully from the idea of Muslim exoticism. If I may be reflexive for a moment,
‘The many North Africans liave brouglit the glaring, sometimes gaudy colours of their rugs and 
blankets, leather bags, hats made from skin. The women clothed in their gandouras kiss each other and 
laugh; the men in Jellaba, their knitted chéchias pressed onto their heads, shake hands, bringing them 
straight to the heart: “Salamalec”. They have brought fresh mint for making tea, which smells good in 
, the stalls. On the tables can be found watermelons, red and Juicy in their green crusts; merguez at the 
butcher’s stall; fritters and Turkish deliglit at the patisserie. Wazemmes is a chaotic bazaar. Like in 
Istanbul, nargliiles (those pipes with a long, flexible tube joined to a flask o f aromatic water), articles 
made from brass, the smell o f incense from the street peddlers, and the strong scent of spices can all be 
found. A few black people, sellers of spears, masks and amulets, call to their customers with the sound 
of little tam-tams; wooden bowls strike the stretched membrane without tiring. Other exotic fruits: 
pineapple, coconut, dates and avocados evoke another Africa’ (La Voix du Nord, 27.7.75).
no
Nord-Africains noirs
Les Nord-Africains, très nombreux Des noirs
femmes hommes
gandouras djellaba
drapées foulées
s’embrassent se serrent la main
en liant «Salamalec»
travées étaux
rouges vertes
boucherie patisserie
aromatisée, odeurs d’encens senteur s fortes
Table 4.1: Oppositions in article on Wazemmes market 
(see footnotes for translations)
Familiar Exotic
tapis, couvertures, sacs en cuir chapeaux de peau
femmes gandouras
hommes djellaba, chéchia
se serrent la main la portent ensuite au ccem*
la menthe fraîche la menthe fraîche pour le thé
boucherie merguez
patisserie loukoums
Wazemmes Istanbul
fruits exotiques
Table 4.2: Familiar/exotic juxtapositions in article on Wazemmes market 
(see footnotes for translations)
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when I did my fieldwork in LiUe, I hved in the district of Wazemmes, just a few hundred 
yards away fiom the market, and my own initial impression was that it seemed quite 
exotic. I was struck by the North African clothing (worn by some people, and on sale), 
the music, food (merguez sausages, olives), Islamic bookstalls, and so on. These were 
not only my impressions. Local people, some with a knowledge and experience of 
Muslim culture and the Muslim communities in France, had the same impression. 
Alain,'’^  a social worker who works with homeless people, many of whom are of North 
African Muslim origin, and who deliberately chose to live near the Lille Sud mosque, 
where many of Lille’s Muslims also live, told me that the Wazemmes market, the rue de 
Marquillies (where the Lille Sud mosque is found), and some districts of Marseilles, felt 
like being in a Muslim country.
I tried to test some of my impressions by mapping the geographical locations of 
mosques, ^halaV butchers, other Muslim-owned businesses catering specifically for 
Muslims (such as tea rooms and cafés, Islamic bookshops, and Muslim undertakers), and 
the ‘Muslim culture industry’ (that is, restaurants and businesses which seek to sell 
commodities associated with Muslim countries to French ‘non-Muslims’) in Wazemmes. 
This is expounded in more detail in section 6.4. What is of relevance here is that the 
public image of the exotic stereotype seems to have continued, to some extent, in the 
culture industiy, which imphes that stereotypical images of Islam and Muslims come to 
the fore in areas where Muslim and ‘non-Mushms’ have the most contact. As a result, it 
is not surprising that joumahstic discourse about ‘Muslim culture’ contained a mixture pf 
famihar Orientahst stereotypes, a concern with ‘authentic’ Muslim culture, and an 
emphasis on the pohtical significance of ‘immigrant culture’ hi France. I collected a wide
Unless otherwise stated, the names of subjects in my research are pseudonyms. In Tables 1,1 and 1.2, 
I have included details of occupation, national status, place of residence, religious affiliation (unless the 
respondent was a practising Muslim), gender, and the means by which I gathered information from 
them.
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range of documentation concerned with ‘Muslim culture’ (art, literature, film, theatre, 
music, gastronomy) in France. Some could be said to show that such cultuie exists in its 
own right, and is equal with Western culture, wlule others seemed to be based on 
stereotypes of the Orient. To give a couple of examples, one restaurant advertised itself 
as being "dans un cadre typiquement orientaV (in a typically Oriental setting), while one 
series of concerts and dance was entitled Des nuits d'Orienf (Oriental nights). The 
latter, however, included a debate entitled ^Orient/Occident, la culture partagée?’ 
( Orient/Occident, sharing of cultur e?), which showed some degr ee of critique of the 
Orientahst stereotypes.
The existence of such critique highhghts the necessity of the above article behig seen 
as part of a ‘struggle’ between the exotic and fanatical representations, and this is a point 
which is common to France and the United Kingdom. In 1975, when it was written, the 
paradigm shift was well underway, so there is a sense hr which the exotic representation 
can be seen as a negation of the fanatical one. This is a very important point, which 
shows that the article carmot be seen sinq)ly as a negative portrayal of Muslims, fir fact, 
there is no reference to Muslims at all, but rather to North Afiicans. This focus on 
nationahty or ethnicity, rather than rehgion, is typical of discourse throughout the 1970s 
and into the 1980s. It was oirly during the Rushdie affah that academic discourse in the 
United Kingdom switched its focus fiom ‘Asians’ or ‘Pakistarris’ to ‘Muslims’ (compare, 
for example, articles by Pnma Werbner 1979, 1980, 1981, 1987, 1991, 1996). I discuss 
this pomt in the next section, and it provides a point of comparison between the United 
Kingdom and France.
Wlule doing my research in Lille, I looked at some press dossiers in the public 
jhbrary, contairring press cuttings fiom as far back as 1972, which make it possible to 
recognise some trends which were part of the paradigm shift. A consideration of a few
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examples fiom these dossiers will help us to ftuther understand the paradigm shift, or 
‘struggle’ between the exotic and fanatical representations. Where Islam was addressed 
at all in material fiom the 1970s, as opposed to North Afiican and other ‘Mushm’ 
national cultures, it tended to be explanatory in nature, concerned with the rehgious 
practice and life of Muslims in France, such as the fast of Ramadhan. An example of this 
explanatory approach is an article fiom another local newspaper, Nord-Matin, which said 
that there were more than 100,000 Muslims in the region, and one million in France 
(making it the second rehgion). It refened to the donation of a chapel by a Cathohc 
monastic community to the Mushm community in the region (the chapel became the 
Mosquée de Lille). It was pointed out that the chapel was no longer in use, and that its 
conversion was paid for by the Algerian government—Christian symbols were removed 
and the Dominican founder’s body was exhumed.'*  ^ fir 1975, an article in La Voix du 
Nord showed pictur es of the work in progr ess: the minbar (a chair fi om which the 
sermon is preached), Arabic calhgraphy, and so on. The article focused on the 28 metre 
minaret, and on the fact that it had taken more than two years to do the work.'’^ 
Whatever the relevance of these pieces of information, it is clear that they were 
concerned with transmitting information and educating their- readers about Islam and 
Muslims in France, and it is possible that they were trying to make Islam and Muslims 
seem more famihar,
4.3. Fanaticism
As I have indicated, academic discomse in Britain tended to focus on ‘Asians’ or 
‘^Pakistanis’ before the Rushdie affair, after which the focus switched to ‘Muslims’.
Nord-Matin, 26.5.72.
La Voix dll Nord, 19.1.75.
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Husbands (1995: 117) analyses this in the context of the pre-Rushdie affair period, as 
follows:
It would be wrong to say that there has never in Britain in the post-war period 
been a sensitivity to the Muslim presence; in the early days of mass immigr ation 
Muslim communities offered a particular focus to those studying immigrant 
pohtics because, being a dehberately self-defining group, they presented the 
possibihty of distinctive pohtical behaviom* (Le Lohé 1979). However, it 
would also be true to say that, apart perhaps from certain northern cities such 
as Bradford and Rochdale where they were especiaUy weh represented, they 
had not been a sociaUy or pohticaUy intrusive group.
I am broadly in agreement with Husbands on this, but it is worth exarnhiing some of 
these representations in more concrete detaü. When the Rushdie affah began, there was 
a great deal of reference to Muslims in media discourse, much of which had an air of 
superiority, as if ‘we’ in the West were better able to understand principles such as 
moderation and discretion, which would, hopefiilly, influence Muslims living in the West. 
An article in The Independent^ which I quote at length in order to analyse in detail, read 
as follows:
If members of Britain’s community of some two million Muslims do not want 
to read Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses, aU they have to do is 
abstain from buying it or taking it out of the local hbrary. They should not seek 
to impose then feeling about its contents—or, more probably, what they have 
been told about them—on the rather larger non-Islamic part of the population.
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Their campaign to have the book banned, on the grounds that it blasphemes 
Islam, led to a demonstration over the weekend in Bradford in which, following 
the example of the Inquisition and Hitler’s National Sociahsts, a large crowd of 
Muslims burnt some copies of the book.
W.H. Smith, the booksellers, cannot be blamed for following pohce advice and 
temporarily withdrawing copies from display in then Bradford shop to avert 
serious danger to then staff and damages to then premises from the 
demonstrators. Having come mider such pressure, they will have to be all the 
more careful to do nothing further which might be seen as a surr ender to it.
The Islamic campaign would be more understandable if Rushdie’s novel were 
in any way trashy. But its hterary merits are not in doubt. Shortly after coming 
near to winning this year’s Booker Prize (wliich was awarded to Rushdie’s 
Midnight’s Children in 1981), it won this year’s Whitbread hterary prize, 
worth £20,000. It is hardly likely that the worthy and Hberal-mhrded hterati 
who sat on the panels awarding these prizes would have thought so highly of a 
book which was overtly blasphemous, even of another faith. The Satanic 
Verses was written as a moral parable, and that is how they inter*preted it.
It may indeed be thought that Muslims are furnishing material for further moral 
parables about Islam by attacking Rushdie’s fictional creation, not otdy 
throughout the Islamic world—it has been banned in the author’s native 
India—but in Britain. Their crusade not just against the book but against 
Rushdie personally does them rro credit.
The Muslim minority has contributed much to the nation’s commerce and 
entrepreneurial sphit. Its members have been notably law-abiding, and then 
devotion to family values, hard work and personal integrity are rightly admhed.
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It is important that then spiiitual values should be respected, and that they 
should be spared from racial discrimination in all its forms.
They in turn, however, must not seek to impose then values either on then 
fellow Britons of other faiths or on the majority who acknowledge no faith at 
all. Their leaders should examhie the imphcations of then war against the 
Rushdie novel. Do they really feel this book poses a serious threat to their 
followers? Is the Islamic faith not strong enough to withstand some 
controversial fictional analysis? Is then campaign not doubly counter­
productive, first, hi giving the book so much pubhcity, and second, in 
reminding Britons of the intolerant face which Islam has all too often shown 
abroad? There are enough pressures for censorship in Britain today without 
religious minorities endeavouring to suppress books which they find 
controversial or distasteful.^^
There are a number of statements which are made in this text, and value judgements 
which are imphed. Some are positive, wlule others are negative, but the positive 
statements are mostly contained in three sentences, which emphasise the negative or 
morahstic discourse in the rest of the article (a ‘Muslims are good people, but...’ 
discourse). Furthermor e, there is no indication that the positive values relate in any way 
to Islam and its teachings. These statements and implications can be summarised as 
follows:
The Independent, 16,1.89; reproduced in Appignanesi and Maitland (eds) (1989: 67-9).
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Positive statements and implications:
1. Muslims have contributed to commerce and entrepreneurial sphit.
2. They are law-abiding.
3. They have strong family values.
4. They work hard.
5. They possess personal integrity.
6 . Then spiritual values are worthy of respect.
7. Muslims should be protected from racism.
8. The ‘Islamic faith’ is strong.
9. Muslims constitute a commimity.
Negative statements and implications:
1. Muslims have not read The Satanic Verses (and therefore cannot make a 
judgement about its contents).
2. There are alternative (passive and peacefrd) means of protesting.
3. They sliould not seek to impose then own point of view.
4. There is a hierarchical transmission of information among Muslims.
5. Muslims are in a minority (and therefore should give way to the majority).
6 . Then course of action is comparable to the Inquisition and the Nazis.
7. Tliey caused ‘serious danger’ to people and premises.
8 . The campaign was self-defeating (Muslims did not have the acumen to make 
it work).
9. The ‘hterati’ were ‘worthy’ and capable of understanding The Satanic Verses 
(the Muslims were not, and were therefore unworthy phihstines).
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10. The Muslims were confusing the issue of the book’s pubhcation and the 
person of Salman Rushdie.
11. The Muslim leaders have not really thought about then campaign (therefore 
it was no more than an emotional, knee-jerk reaction).
12. The Satanic Verses is a work of fiction (Muslims were incapable of 
perceiving this).
13. Islam has fi equently shown itself to be intolerant.
14. Islam comes from abroad (so Muslims are outsiders with ahen ideas).
Despite the constant reminders that Muslims are in a minority, and therefore should 
not impose then views on the majority, there are also imphcations of an Islamic threat. 
There was a danger to the staff and premises of W.H. Smith fr om a Targe crowd’ who 
represented ‘Britain’s community of some two million Muslims’. Academic estimates, 
even the higher ones, indicate that the Mushm population in Britain is presently under 
1.5 milhon, while lower estimates are between one miUion and 1.2 milhon (Commission 
on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997b: 65). But population statistics are never 
innocent, at least when it come to Mushm populations in Western Europe. Estimates of 
the Muslim population in France have sometimes gone as high as five milhon. These 
tend to come from the extreme right, who want to exaggerate the threat of a ‘foreign 
invasion’ turning France into an Islamic state. After Kliomeini’s fatwa cahmg for 
Rushdie’s death,Jean-M arie Le Pen was reported in Le Monde as saymg: ‘Whgt 
Khomeini has just done with revolting cynicism is exactly what I fear for France and 
Europe, that is the invasion of Europe by a Mushm immigration. fionicahy, the same
It should be noted that, contrary to much popular opinion, a fatwa  is not necessarily a death sentence, 
but a legal opinion from a suitably qualified Islamic scholar, and the extent to which it confers legal 
obligations on other Muslims is a matter of debate among experts in Islamic law.
Le Monde, 28,2.89; cited in Appignanesi and Maitland (eds) (1989: 185).
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figiue of five million has come fiom some Mushm organisations, principally those who 
are in contact with the mstitutions of the French state (one inteiviewee, Amar Lasfar, 
who had been a member of the Conseil de réflexion sur l ’islam en France, or CORIF, 
set up by the Ministry of the Interior, and who is still an important spokesman for 
France’s Muslims, gave this figme). They also have an interest in supposing a liigher 
figure, as this helps to increase then bargaining power, though it should be noted that the 
CORIF, and Amar Lasfar in particular, have been very much concerned with developing 
an Islam de France, emphasising intégration and the dictum, ‘un bon musulman est un 
bon citoyen’ (a good Mushm is a good citizen).
A more hostile reporting of Islam and the Mushm communities in France seemed to 
emerge in the aftermath of the Lardjoune/Kerzazi affah, where a girl in Roubaix (near 
Lüle) died after aUegedly being made to swahow several htres of salty water as part of a 
traditional Islamic remedy for epilepsy (though, in reahty, there is nothing Islamic about 
this). There is no evidence that this was part of a long-term paradigm sliift, and it seems 
more hkely that it was a short-teim shift in emphasis. Nevertheless, short-teim media 
obsessions about Islam can have an impact on pubhc perceptions, and, by extension, on 
the lives of Muslims. Articles in Le Monde reported that two leaders were an ested and 
questioned for dorture et actes de barbarie ayant entraîné la morf (causing death by 
torture and barbarie acts). One wonders if the word "barbarie’ would have been used in 
other situations. According to one article. Imam Kerzazi was self-proclaimed, which led 
Le Monde to talk about the dangers of self-proclaimed hnams and pf 
communautarisme?^^ which refers to communitarianism or multicultmahsm, frequently 
seen as an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model which is contrasted with French-style assimilation.
Le Monde, 5.7.94; 8.7.94.
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When I discussed popular impressions of the exoticism of the Wazemmes market, I 
pointed out that local ‘non-Muslim’ French people, some with a knowledge and 
experience of Muslim culture and the Muslim communities in Lille, had this impression 
as well. Popular discomses are particularly affected by other discomses, for example, 
media portrayal of teiToiism or delinquency, and pohtical opposition to immigration, and 
these discourses are rmxed with everyday racism and Islamophobia, or with people’s 
own experiences. Charlotte talked of VrUeneuve d’Ascq, where she hved and worked as 
an Enghsh language assistant, as a ‘rough area’ with lots of ‘immigrants’. Ghles, an 
éducateur spécialisé (residential social worker) who hved hr Lihe, said that, according to 
many Mushms in Wazemmes, the planned bombing of the Wazemmes market in 1995 
was to reproach them for not behig sufficiently "intégriste’.
Articles in one issue of Le Nouvel Observateur, in 1989, juxtaposed Khomeini’s 
funeral in Tehran with the estabhshment of ‘Islamist’ groups hr France. The article "La 
Mecque du onzième’ looked at the mosquée Omar in Paris (rue Jean-Pierr e-Timband), a 
centre for the Tablighi Jama ’at in France, and argued that, although they should not be 
confused with dangerous tenorists, they were now the principal Islamic fimdamentahst 
{fondamentaliste) organisation in France. Other important Islamist groups were cited as 
the FNMF {Fédération nationale des Musulmans de France), which had Saudi support. 
La Voix de l ’Islam for converted intellectuals {"Elle s ’apparente plus à une secte qu’à 
une confrérie religieuse’'^ )^, the Jam’at al Islami, the Ligue Islamique Mondiale, which 
controls hundreds of small mosques in France and Europe, the linked Trmisian MTI {"Les 
groupes islamistes maghrébins, dont le MTI tunisien est le plus influent, considèrent la
48 Tt seems more like a cuit than a religious brotherhood.
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France comme un sanctuaire’'^ )^, and the ‘chiites intégristes’ (fimdamentahst Shiites), 
particularly influential among students/"
Despite the spectacular tone of this article, there was a reasonable depth of 
explanation. In 1997, an article by Jon Ronson in The Guardian documented the hfe of 
the leader of the Tslamist’ organisation Al-Muhajiroun (which means ‘the emigrants’, 
those who accompanied the Prophet Muhammad on the hijra from Mecca to Medina). 
The article was based on filming which was done for a television documentary, and was 
perceptive in parts, for example:
... he requests that we do not film the women members of his organisation....
This is an ÜTitating demand. I am surprised to discover the women to be the 
most shrewd and articulate of Omar’s followers, tenaciously rmafiaid to yell at 
him, and rigidly, astutely, mistrustful of us. This is the antithesis of my 
perception of Islamic women: I had imagined them to be silent and subservient.
And now, by not filming them, we will be unintentionally perpetuating this 
stereotype.
On the other hand, comments in this article about other ‘Islamist’ groups were 
sometimes partial or even misleadhig. Hizb-ut-Tahrir was ‘best knowrr for going round 
university campuses distributing leaflets that preach death to homosexuals’, which 
reflected popular awareness more than the aims of Hizb-ut-Tahrh, and the Muslim 
parliament was ‘the representative body for Britain’s Muslim community’, which is
‘The North African Islamist groups, of which the Tunisian MTI is the most influential, consider 
France to be a safe haven.’
Le Nouvel Observateur, 5.10,89, pp. 11, 38, 43.
The Guardian (weekend supplement), 29.3.97, pp. 19-24.
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certainly not the case, as there are several bodies which claim to represent Muslims in the 
United Kingdom.
There is some evidence from material of the 1990s which suggests that the French 
media has placed more of an emphasis on the alleged problems smiounding Muslim 
integration in France. These have nevertheless been linked to issues of ‘fundamentahsm’ 
and ‘fanaticism’. It was possible to find an article fiom La Voix du Nord in 1992 which 
reported that the FIS were holding a pubhc meeting in Roubaix—the newspaper 
deplored this pubhcity coup despite writing an article about it, and thus contributing to 
the pubhci ty.Reports  from a couple of years later, however, suggested that such 
reticence had disappeared in the local newspapers from the Lhle area, and discourse 
about the ‘problems’ of ‘integration’, ‘fimdamentahsm’ and ‘fanaticism’ was much more 
in evidence. One article referred to a café being vandahsed in Roubaix after the owner 
had put an anti-Islamist poster in his window.” Articles appeared soon after this one to 
do with a number of people being expelled from France on the grounds of then aheged 
Islamist sympathies.” This led to another article on the Islamist movement in the region;
Bien implantée dans la région, la mouvance islamiste s’est développée sous 
forme de «tentacule» dont l’activité essentiehe semble se limiter aujourd’hui à 
la propagande. Accusée d’être noyautée par les intégristes, la mosquée 
«Dawa» à Roubaix a renouvelé son équipe.”
, ”  La Voix du Nord, 30.4.92.
' Nord-Eclair, 19.8.94.
”  For example, Nord-Eclair, 26.8.94,
”  ‘Its existence in the region being well consolidated, the Islamist movement has developed itself in the 
form of a “tentacle” which, today, seems to be limiting its essential activity to propaganda. Accused of 
being infiltrated by Islamists, the "Dawa" mosque in Roubaix has renewed its leadership’ (Nord-Eclair, 
8.9.94). The Dawa mosque was associated with Imam Kerzazi.
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Some Muslims in France have argued that they are represented in the national media 
by an "Islamalgame’ of terrorist, Islamist, Muslim, North African, Arab and immigrant. 
If true, tliis suggests an intensification and enlargement of the scope of discourse which 
focused on the alleged problems of integration, and the link with ‘fimdamentahsm’ and 
‘fanaticism’. Not only were these issues being linked together hi a way which was 
clearly detrimental to the image of Muslims in France, but this discomse was being 
produced on a nation-wide scale with a nation-wide audience. I would argue that the 
Muslims hi France who have argued this point are conect. For example, the bomb in the 
Port-Royal RER station in Paris on 3 December 1996 produced an enormous amount of 
joumahstic material. While care was taken not to identify the bomb with ‘Islamic’ or 
‘Islamist’ groups, it only took two days for an article by Franck Johannes to appear hi 
Libération speculating about the possible role of the GIA.” At the same time, the front­
page headline hi France-Soir, which was discussed in Chapter 3, appeared. As I 
suggested, this headline mixed issues of nationahty, hnmigiation, mb an ‘social problems’ 
(such as deprivation, unemployment, crime, drugs and violence), terrorism in France, 
armed conflict in Morocco, the fear of ‘Islamic fimdamentahsm’, the violence which has 
been experienced in Algeria, cultmal hicompatibihty, and, to combine some of these 
themes, the danger of North Africa’s problems being ‘exported’ to France as a result of 
migration.
I conducted a number of hiteiviews shortly after the bombing, hi many cases, 
discussions about the tenorist stereotyping of Islam arose in these interviews. I spoke to 
Naïm (a social worker in Roubaix) the day after the bomb, and he brought up the 
subject. He said that, although it was clearly caused by extremists, the average French 
^person would confuse islamiste (Islamist) and musulman (Mushm)—which would not be
Libération, 5.12.96, p.2.
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done with Chiistian extremists, for example—and express displeasure with ‘the Muslims’ 
{"on en a marre des musulmans’^ f. Ibrahim argued that the media were largely 
responsible for the stereotyping of Muslims as tenorists, because they always chose the 
images which would shock the most, hi reality, tenorism was nothing to do with Islam., 
but he saw the marginahsation of young Muslims in French society as attracting some to 
more extreme movements {"les mouvements durs’). Ahmed (who was bom in Morocco, 
but had moved to France partly because of an attraction to the greater freedom which he 
perceived to exist there, and was carrying out doctoral research on the histoiy of Sufi 
Islam) argued that the stereotype went beyond Islam and was apphed to all North 
Afiicans;
... M y a un grand problème, un grave problème, comme le cas actuellement du 
terrorisme. Là, un teiToriste qui met une bombe dans les stations du métro, là il 
y a une très grande partie, peut-être une majorité des Français qui rejette le 
Maghrébin. C’est pour ça qu’ü y a un appel à ne pas faire l’amalgame. .. C’est 
des terroristes et leur but est aveugle, c’est de tuer le maximum, peu importe 
que ça soit musulman, que ça soit chrétien, juif ou bouddhiste.... Ce sont des 
gens malades, et il faut aiiêter de penser que c’est un problème grave pour le 
Maghrébin. C’est comme si le Maghrébin est responsable de tout.”
57 w e’re sick of the Muslims’, 
there’s a big problem, a serious problem, like the present case of terrorism. Wherever a terrorist 
puts a bomb in the underground stations, a large proportion of French people, perhaps even a majority, 
reject the North African. That’s why there’s an appeal not to make the amalgam.... They are terrorists 
and their goal is blind, it’s to kill as many as possible, not caring whether they are Muslim, or Christian, 
Jewish or Buddhist.... They are sick people, and people must stop thinking that it’s a serious problem 
for the North African. It’s as if the North African is responsible for everything.’
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4.4. Delinguencv
The phrase "responsable de touf could also be applied to the stereotype of 
Muslims, or ‘Arabs’ in France, as delinquents. This kind of amalgam has also been 
identified in relation to Muslims in the United Kingdom. A 1995 article in The 
Independent, written by Andrew Brown and Paul Vahely, discussed this phenomenon 
critically, arrd related it to Huntington’s clash of civihsations discourse. What is 
significant is the identification of a perception that delinquency, terrorism, interuational 
corrflict and Islam are all related. The article read as follows:
Today, the rest of the community regards the emerging social and pohtical 
force of Islam with an unspecified unease. Riots in Bradford, gang activity in 
the East End of London, reports of fimdamentahst sects at work on university 
campuses, the prospect of separatist schools, a vendetta minder behind King’s 
Cross station—where pohce logbooks show that raciahy motivated incidents 
happen almost daily—have recently fiiehed the potent mixture of apprehension 
and mistrust that makes up attitudes to Islam. Fimdamentahst violence 
abroad—teiTorism in the Middle East, Algeria and the marching Black Mushms 
of the Nation of Islam in Washington—has only made things worse. As have 
theories among some intehectuals, such as the American pohtical theorist 
Samuel Huntington, who predicts ... that the great conflict of the 21st century 
whl be between Islam and the West.
It is a heady mixture of fact, half-truth and myth. It has led some to the fear 
 ^ that Britain’s 1.2 milhon Mushms (no one is sure of the exact figure) may be a
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dangerous fifth column in our midst—a Trojan horse in the heart of the nation 
with a deadly cargo of fimdamentahsm”
However, I suggest that this article is an exception to the rule, for two reasons. 
Firstly, it engages in a critique of Islamophobia, which is a marginal rather than 
mainstream discourse in the United Kingdom media, as has been stated in Chapter 3. 
Secondly, United Kingdom stereotypes tend to separate ‘Muslims’ from ‘ethnic 
minorities’, associating the former with tenorism, and the latter with delinquency. This 
contention can be supported by the observation that ‘race relations’ has a similar place in 
United Kingdom pubhc discourse to "intégration’ in French discourse (see Miles 1993: 
175-6).
As has been suggested, there is evidence that French media discourses have evolved 
in a different direction. While it was possible to find an article fiom 1991 which 
associated violence in the banheues with immigration and racism, citing different views 
fiom the Front National and SOS-Racisme?^ things were much less balanced by 1995. 
Immigration and "intégrisme islamique’ were cited as social problems alongside 
delinquency, drug misuse and unemployment.®  ^ One article argued for a ‘Marshah plan’ 
for the banlieues (a tenu also used by Jacques Chirac): ‘... sur l ’urgence qu'il y  a à 
regler le problème de l ’Islam «car tant qu ’on forcera les gens à vivre leur religion dans 
la clandestinité, on fabriquera des Khaled Kelkal»’F  Such articles were stating 
exphcitly that Islam was a problem, and the reference to Khaled Kelkaf accused of
The Independent, 5.12.95, pp. 1, 2, 5.
Voix dn Nord, 1^.5.91.
La Voix du Nord, 30.10.95; 3.11.95; 4.11.95. The term 'intégrisme islamique’ is most easily 
translated ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, though, strictly speaking, intégrisme refers to a nineteenth-century 
movement among Catholics in Spain, and is no more appropriate than ‘fundamentalism’, a movement 
among American Protestants at the beginning of the twentieth century.
‘... on the urgency o f solving the problem of Islam “for when we force people to live their religion in a 
clandestine way, we create Khaled Kelkals’” (La Voix du Nord, 4,12.95, p.2).
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participating in a number of tenorist attacks in tbe summer of 1995, and shot by pohce 
on 29 September of the same year. It was said that he was shot without being allowed to 
smiender. Paradigm shifts in Orientahst discourse can have poweifiil and tangible 
effects, which go beyond discourses and stereotypes.”
Amo Ferhati, the dh ector of Espace Intégration, an organisation which works for 
the ‘integration’ of ‘immigrants’ and then descendants in France, argued that Mushms in 
France were always scapegoats for a range of social problems by the parties of the right 
and the left: the fomer directly; the latter indirectly:
... quand tu vas chercher du boulot et tu as im geule d’arabe..., et tu t ’appeUes 
Mohammed et que tu es musulman, tu trouves pas de boulot. Donc, dans ma 
communauté aujomd’hui, le taux de chômage chez les jeunes est de 75 à 85 
pour cent..., ce qui est dramatique. Imagine que aujourd’hui en France, la 
moyenne de chômage, ou en Grande-Bretagne, soit de 30 pour cent seulement, 
c’est la guerre civile. Nous, on est à 75 pour cent ... de chômage, ce qui 
sécrète la délinquance, la drogue etc. Le problème de déviance sociale n’est 
pas un problème de race, c’est un problème social avant tout. .. Mitterrand a 
utihsé des immigrés pour fane monter les fascistes, et pom casser la droite. 
Mitterrand a fait monter le droit de vote aux immigrés, qu’il n’a jamais doimé, 
mais par contre c’était un leitmotiv pour rassembler la gauche et pour casser la 
droite. Nous avons donc été des boucs émissahes des partis pohtiques, même 
des partis pohtiques qui disaient nous aimer.®'’
®^ Khaled Kelkal was interviewed by a German sociologist, Dietmar Loch, on 3 October 1992. The 
 ^interview was published in Le Monde (7.10.95, pp. 10-12), a few days after his death.
‘... when you look for work and you look like an Arab..., and you’re called Mohammed and you’re 
Muslim, you don’t find work. So today, in my community, youth unemployment is between 75 and 85 
per cent..., which is dramatic. Imagine if  unemployment in France today, or in Great Britain, was just 
30 per cent, there would be a civil war. We are at 75 per cent ... unemployment, which is a cause of 
delinquency, drugs etc. The problem of social deviance isn’t a problem of race, it’s first of all a social
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Ahmed took up the same theme, citing the regional press in particular. He obseived 
that crimes committed by North Africans are much more likely to be reported in the 
newspapers than crimes committed by French people, something which he argued could 
be inferred from the names of people in couit reports (examples being Rachid, Kaiim, 
Kadir). This was particularly evident when it came to violent crime, but lesser ciimes, 
such as shoplifting, were often dramatised when attributed to a "maghrébin’. Examples 
from reports in La Voix du Nord are cited in Table 4.3. These were collected over a 
period of only one month, and the short time-span adds a definite vividness. Athough 
some of the aheged crimes were certainly serious, others may not have been reported if 
they were attributed to people with French names’. In the more serious cases, the hnk 
between delinquency and origin was sometimes made exphcitly. The fohowing example 
is from the case of Smail Larabi:
Agérien, cet homme très athlétique, le cheveu ras et le verbe rare, vit en France 
depuis 1967. Après une scolarité chaotique, il a plongé dans la délinquance.®^
Looking at this issue, the perception of delinquency, m the context of French 
pohtical discomses, it is particularly relevant insofar as it has a real impact on French 
attitudes, government pohcies, and actual legislation pertaining to nationahty and 
immigration. Wlule doing prelirninaiy fieldwork in Lhle in June 1996, I collected some 
documents concerning the controversies sunounding French nationahty and the right of
problem..,. Mitterrand used the immigrants to raise support for the fascists, and to smash the right. 
I Mitterrand raised the possibility of immigrants having the riglit to vote, which he never gave, but, on the 
contrary, it was a leitmotif for uniting the left and smashing the right. So we’ve been scapegoats for the 
political parties, even the political parties who claimed to like us.’
®^ ‘Algerian, this very athletic man, with shaved head and unconventional speech, has lived in France 
since 1967. After a chaotic time at school, he plunged into delinquency’ {La Voix du Nord, 6.12.96,
p.2).
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Name Conviction (or charge) Sentence Date reported
Hachemi M, Sexual abuse 2 years 20.11.96
Majdid Hadjemar 
Abdelrazek F rid
Burglary 7 months 20.11.96
Mohamed G. Figliting 5 months 26.11.96
Kamel O. Burglary 1 year 26.11.96
Karim Ali Moussa ‘Aggression’ 16 months 26.11.96
Marhez Djendoubi Mugging 10 months 26.11.96
Alimed O. Burglary (related to drugs 
and homelessness)
8 months 26.11.96
Kamel Hechaichi 
Mourad Cheriet 
Faycal Cheriet 
Mohammed Harrachif 
Keddour Kazdari
Burglary, violence, forgery 
(charges)
29.11.96
Saïd Bououden Rape (charge) 30.11.96 and 3.12.96
Small Larabi Armed robberies (charge) 30.11.96 and 6.12.96
Norredine Cheikh 
Amer Ouedarbi
Armed robbery (charge) 30.11.96
Malik A. Throwing stone througli 
window of employment 
office (charge)
(Remanded in 
custody)
6.12.96
Aziz E. Vandalism and violence 
against police
3 months 10,12.96
Farid D. Breaking in to a house (for 
shelter)
8 months detention 
(not in prison)
10.12.96
Mohammed Langhari Burglary 2 years 11.12.96
Mergliabi
Chebira
‘others’
Drug smuggling 5 years 
3 years 
1-2 years
19.12.96
Mustapha Meftah 
Karim Boumaza 
Karim Sellam 
Romuald Podwysocki
‘Making a noise’ and 
vandalism
1 year 19,12.96
Table 4.3: Selection of court reports in La Voix du Nord
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residence in France. These indicated a diversity of representations, but also that events 
were often dictated by the perception of delinquency, and this affected other people who 
had migrated to France, whether or not they were ‘Arab’ or ‘Mushm’. In other words, 
not only was the stereotype apphed, but it was sometimes apphed and acted on 
indiscriminately. At the time, there was a situation in which seven African men were on 
hunger stiike, having been threatened with the non-renewal of then residence peimits, 
even though they were the fathers of children who were bom in France (and who would 
be entitled to French citizenship). They were granted one year residence peimits, leading 
to the suspension of their hunger strike.®® In the media, it was often the individual side 
which was emphasised—stories were told of certain sans papiers who had ‘clearly done 
nothing wrong’, such as a schoolghl in Roubaix®’—as well as the illogical aspects of the 
law, represented by the fact that many had been in France legally until a change in the 
law made then presence illegal. However, there was httle direct investigation of the 
racism of the French state. Nevertheless, demonstrations agahist this racism were 
reported, as well as a comt case which found that a sans papier had been subjected to 
prejudice,®  ^ and there was a demonstration in Lille calling for the granting of ten year 
residence permits, which was attended by people of Eur opean, West African and North 
African origin, members of anti-racist organisations such as SOS-Racisme and the 
MRAP {Mouvement contre le racisme et pour Vamitié entre les peuples), French 
anarchists and others.
The Ministère des Affaires sociales, de la Santé et de la Ville and the Ministère de 
la Justice published a newspaper in September 1994 entitled Info Nationalité, 
advertismg the contention that French nationality was now a personal choice. It read:
®® Libération, 26.6.96.
®’ La Voix du Nord, 19.11.96, p.2; 20.11.96, pp,3, 6. 
®" La Voix du Nord, 22.11.95, p.5.
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Depuis la loi du 22 Juillet 1993, adopter la nationalité française prend un sens 
nouveau, un sens plus profond. C’est le résultat d’une démarche volontaire et 
personnelle que l’on appelle aujourd’hui la manifestation de la volonté.®"
The article, which was somewhat didactic and even propagandist, went on to insist 
that access to French nationahty was not being limited, but that children of ‘foreign’ 
parents, bom in France, could decide for themselves if they wanted to be French or not. 
FLowever, the denial of the right of residence in France to parents of French childien 
showed that the law was more xenophobic than was being claimed. Some organisations 
were critical of the new law, and the way in which it was being used. The argument was 
that the law was racist, and even the more tolerant parts of the Pasqua laws were being 
apphed in a racist manner.
Again, although the Debré bill, involving stricter immigration control at the French 
borders and inside France, was criticised, it seemed to be considered obvious that 
immigration clandestine (hlegal immigration) and travail clandestin (ihegal working) 
were real problems. Even SOS~Racisme were beginning to consider immigration 
quotas.’" In addition, it was generaUy assumed that ihegal work was carried out by 
foreigners, despite a series of articles in La Voix du Nord on illegal work by French 
people; this was refened to as a ‘new slaveiy’ {nouvel esclavage), implying that the 
culprits were the employers rather than the employees, but this was never imphed in the 
case of ‘foreign’ ihegal workers.”
The connection between the extreme-right Front National and racism is obvious, 
especiahy in the hght of assertions by then leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, about the
‘Since the law of 22 July 1993, adopting French nationality has taken on a new and deeper meaning. 
It is the result of a voluntary, personal approach, which today is called the demonstration of w ill.’ 
Libération, 21.11.96, p. 13.
”  La Voix du Nord, 5.12.96, p. 18; 6.12.96, p. 18; 7.12.96, p.22
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inequality of races (in September 1996, be refened to tbe inégalité des races—when 
challenged about this on a television programme,” he said that all races were in fact 
equal, but that some were more equal than others), but to what extent is this seen, in 
jomuahstic discourse, to be provoked or caused by immigration and travail clandestin! 
A  connection between Front National support and unemployment (often attributed to 
immigration) was cited, as was the success of the Front National in ‘areas affected by 
delinquency’ {zones touchées par la délinquance)F
As can be ascertained from the material in this section, the supposition that 
‘dehnquency’ and other ‘social problems’ are linked to ‘immigration’ is quite common. 
Athough this issue is rarely raised exphcitly in debates about integiation, it does seem to 
be present beneath the surface. For example, an article in Libération argued that 
integration at work was contingent on fighting disciiinination (24 per cent of ‘foreigners’ 
were unemployed compared with 11 per cent of French people)—however, there was an 
emphasis on legal immigrants {étrangers en situation régulière), which imphed that 
ihegal immigration was a part of the problem.” Another article linked ‘fir st generation’ 
integration with education and hteracy, again makhig integr ation the responsibihty of the 
‘immigrant’ and not of the ‘host society’.” Yet there stUl seems to be a behef in the idea 
of intégration à la française, as opposed to multiculturahsm, which is ülustrated by 
Jean-Luc Abouche’s somewhat tortuous review, written in Libération, of Michel 
Wieviorka’s book. Une société fragmentée '.
Le «pluralisme culturel» devient la nouveUe instance du «pluralisme
démocratique». «La frontière à ne pas franchir est celle qui sépare la
”  France 3, 15.9.96.
”  Jean-Marc Dreyfus’s article in Libération, 2.12.96, p.5; Vanessa Schneider on 23.11.96, p. 14. 
”  Libération, 5.12.96, p. 13.
La Voix du Nord, 12.12.96, p. 8.
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reconnaissance de VAutre de l'obsession de l ’identité.» Admettons.... Les 
antems, même s’ils trahissent çà et là leurs sympathies «multiculturelles», ou 
s’y résignent, ne sont pas des adeptes échevelés du «politically correct» à 
l’américaine. Mais l’heure n’est pas, pom eux, à la nostalgie. Mais à 
l’urgence. La République une et indivisible, tout de même, cela avait de la 
gueule.”
4.5. A new critique of Islamophobia?
It may be that such a tortuous, even pessimistic view, is the appropriate one when it 
comes to the evolution of media representations of Islam. However, optimism is not 
impossible. As there was a paradigm shift from exotic to fanatical representations of 
Islam and of Muslims, so there is the possibihty of a new paradigm shift, which takes 
account of the principles of a critique of Orientahsm, asserting the heterogeneity of Islam 
and of the West, and then mutual compatibrhty. It is important to bear this in mind. 
However, pessimism is not impossible either. We may be caught in a vicious circle, as I 
suggest below. Madeleine Bunting’s analysis in The Guardian commented on media 
reports of the Luxor massacre in Egypt, showing that media discourses are also 
heterogeneous, and sometimes engage in a critique of Islamophobia and Orientahsm:
In reporting on the Luxor massacre in Egypt on Monday, the media did not 
mince their words: the fanatics or maniacs behind it were evil and
I ”  ‘“Cultural pluralism” becomes the new face o f “democratic pluralism”. ‘T he line which must not be 
crossed is the one which separates recognition of the Other from an obsession with identity.” Granted.... 
The authors, even if they betray their “multicultural” sympathies in places, or resign themselves to 
multiculturahsm, are not dishevelled followers of American “political correctness”. But for them, this is 
not a time for nostalgia. But for urgency. All the same, the one indivisible Republic, that was an 
elegant idea’ (Libération, 19.12.96, p.5),
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brutal... What happened in Luxor has more to do with politics than Islam, but 
the media coverage ensures that such tenoiist attacks aSect the lives of 
Muslims thousands of miles away. British Muslims said yesterday that Luxor 
would only reinforce the stereotypes and prejudices which to some in Britain 
link Muslim inextricably with violence and inationahsm.... There is a strong 
sense of grievance that Muslims are sufifering a high degree of economic 
discrimination which government has not addressed. Bangladeshis and 
Pakistanis combined have a long-teim unemployment rate which is nearly three 
times that of the next most disadvantaged ethnic minority, Caribbeans.... There 
are more than 600 mosques in this country, and a growing number are 
developing as cultural and community centres, with programmes for youth, the 
elderly and for women.... As one of the piime movers behind the Muslim 
Council has argued, the most effective way to combat Islamophobia is not to 
participate in futile debate in a media which is heavily stacked against you, but 
to build up gradually another positive image of Islam. An image of Islam which 
emphasises its tradition of justice, of responsibüity to the weaker members of 
the community and of peacehd co-operation which is credible because it is 
putting such piinciples into practice.
There is perhaps an bony m this being a media report which criticises media 
discourse, but that underlines the fact that there is a diversity of media discourses, and 
that there are struggles to estabhsh and consohdate different discourses. There is a real 
attempt in this article to critique the analytical eiTors and dangerous consequences of 
f Islamophobia. The economic difficulties which are faced by Muslims in the United
The Guardian, 20.11.97, p. 19.
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Kingdom are emphasised in connection with the experience of Islamophobia—indicating 
a critique of government inaction as well as media discourse—as are attempts of 
Muslims to amehorate their own situation, represented by the ‘cultural and community 
centres’, and the Islamic ‘tradition of justice’ and ‘responsibihty to the weaker members 
of the community’.
This is not the only example of such an approach, indeed, it is not the only one 
which is cited in this chapter. Such discom se can be found m the médias of the United 
Kingdom and France, and there is a tradition of academic joumahsm hi France which has 
shown how damaging Western representations of Islam can be. One example is Olivier 
Roy’s article in Le Monde^ in which he argued that the contemporary Algerian conflict 
has been exacerbated by a Western perception that democracy equals secularism, 
whereas it is often the Islamic pohtical parties, across the Aiab and Muslim world, who 
are attempting to overthrow highly comipt and oppressive regimes, which happen to be 
secularist.
In 1995, some years after the Rushdie aftah, an article by Andrew Brown and Paul 
Vallely in The Independent looked back. The superior tone of the earher article, written 
at the time of the Rushdie aftah, was replaced by an attempt to understand the feelings of 
Muslims, while still seeking to justify the initial reactions:
The Rushdie aftah marked the emergence of an enthely new and assertive 
group: British-bom Muslims. They were aggressively Muslim in ways that 
shocked secular Britain. But they were also British m ways that shocked theh 
parents, not least in their displays of pubhc aggression. ‘Muslims found the 
book offensive’, says Dr Pnina Werbner, a social anthropologist who has made
Le M onde, 24.4.97, p.2.
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a study of Muslim women, ‘but they also found it offensive that no one in the 
West could understand why they were offended. So they launched major 
protests—but the state did notliing. It was a moment of tmth, and it had two 
consequences. The Muslims were forced into the reahsation that they were 
British citizens having come to the conclusion that they had to follow British 
law. They recalled the Islamic ruling—when in a foreign countiy you follow 
the law of the land—and that absolved them from dealing with Rushdie. But 
the affair also confrrmed then feeling of ahenation in this country: people don’t 
respect them, there is growing Islamophobia, there is racism—all of which is 
true, but which is a seh-fiilfiilling prophecy.”^
Such ambivalence illustrated one important point however, that Islamophobia, like 
Orientahsm, cannot be seen in the context of a subject-object duahsm of the West and 
Islam, in which Islam is a passive victim. Call it a self-fiilfiUing prophecy, or a vicious 
chcle, or indeed a kind of negative dialectic, there is an unfortunate process by which 
Western representations of Islam, and Muslim representations of the West and of 
themselves^ influence each other in such a way that they become more and more 
divergent. However, it is not impossible that the emergence of a new critique of 
Islamophobia is one aspect of a new paradigm shift which breaks out of this pattern, 
which recognises the compatibihty of the West and Islam, and a capacity for mutual 
emichment.
The Independent, 5.12.95, p p .i, 2, 5.
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4.6. Comparative discussion and conclusion
There are a large number of comparisons which emerge fr om this chapter. The first 
is that material on Islam in France is more easily available, even though this chapter has 
attempted to find a balance by identiJfying some themes in media discourse which are 
more characteristic of the United Kingdom. The difference m availabihty may indicate 
that Islam is a more important part of pubhc discourses in France, which would be a 
significant finding. On the other hand, it may be because I had access to information in 
France, since I was a foreign researcher and not in a position to influence French pubhc 
discourses in a way which would affect them It has certainly been my impression that 
respondents in France were more open for this reason, even though there was sometimes 
suspicion. In reahty, my position in the United Kingdom is not much more poweiful, but 
the perceptions can be more important than the reahty. This can be iUustrated with some 
ethnographic evidence. One person wanted to know if I was a journahst, and he was a 
social worker, and not a Muslim, though there was a group of Muslims present with 
whom I was talking (including Naïm, another social worker). When I said that I was not 
a journahst, and explained what I was doing, he stih asked if I was sur e that I was not a 
journahst. One other person refirsed to do an interview, insisting that I should speak to a 
^savanf (somebody with knowledge). I later found that he had been interviewed for 
Phihppe Aziz’s book Le paradoxe de Roubaix, which portrayed the Muslims in the north 
of France in a somewhat unfavomable hght, and has been strongly criticised by 
academics and Muslims. On the other hand, it is less likely that such a book would have 
been written in the United Kingdom, not because the British are more favourably 
Î disposed towards Muslims, but because they are happier to ignore Muslims, fir a sense, 
the national stereotypes do explam something here: the stereotype of the French is that
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they want Muslims to integrate and appreciate French civihsation (a late twentieth- 
centmy version of the mission civilisatrice), while the stereotype of the British is that 
they don’t mind what other people do, as long as they don’t trespass on anyone else’s 
tenitoiy (hterally or metaphorically), or interrupt then afternoon tea. This also illustrates 
the emphasis on intégration, or even assimilation, in France, compared with 
multiculturahsm in Britain. However, it may be that, m theory, both countries expect 
Muslims to mtegrate, but make it impossible in practice.
Similarly, hr France, there is more depth to reporting of situations like the Algerian 
conflict. Again, this may indicate its importance within French public discourses, though 
it may imply that the French media is still more explanation-oriented. Furthermore, 
Algeria is much more central to the international context of representations of Islam in 
France, whereas, in Britain, there is not the same focus on any one country, despite the 
majority of Muslims in Britain being of Pakistarri or Bangladeshi origin. When situations 
of corrflict, apparently involving Islam or Muslims, are reported, there is often a 
discomse of Islamic extremism hr both countries, hr France, the most commonly used 
term is intégrisme, compared with ‘ftmdamentahsm’ in Britain, hr both cases, this 
represents the rehgious culture of the country in question, and has nothing to do with 
Islam itself However, the term fondamentalisme is increasingly used in France.
There is an extreme-right démonisation of Muslims m France, which is not 
prominent in Britain. Neither is there an association of Muslims with delinquency m 
Britain. However, this does not indicate that France is ‘more racist’ than Britain (though 
several respondents, Muslims and ‘rron-Mushms’ in Britain and France, thought this was 
the case). Rather, racist discourses in Britain focus on a different Other, particularly 
r people of AJfrican-Caribbean and Asian origin, indicating that popular discourse has not 
caught up with the shift m academic discourse to a focus on ‘Muslims’. In addition,
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racism and Islamophobia may be more mainstream political discourses in Britam, for 
example on the right wing of the Conservative party, which may partially account for the 
consciousness of Islamophobia in Britain, compared to the dslamalgame'’ in France.
Finally, there are differences between popular, media, pohtical and academic 
discourses in both countries, and this sets the media material in a wider context of 
diversity. When academic discomses focused on national and ethnic identities (such as 
‘Asian’, ‘Pakistani’ or ‘North African’), the media focused on explanations of Islam, the 
hves, practices and constitution of Muslim commmrities. In academic discourses, this 
changed as a result of specific ‘watersheds’, like the Rushdie affah, whereas media 
discour ses have been more event-oriented, and what seems like a paradigm shift can be a 
temporary fad. fir addition, poprrlar discourses seem to be particularly amenable to 
influence by other discourses, for example media or pohtical discourses, and this has an 
effect on the construction of Muslim identities, as is argued in the next part of this thesis.
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Part II
Muslim identities in the United Kingdom and France
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5. Identity
5.1. Introduction
As we saw in section 2.4, Aziz Al-Azmeh asserted that there was a coiTespondence 
between the Orientahst imagining of a homogeneous Islam and contemporary Muslim 
discourses of authenticity and identity. Indeed, he argues that there is ‘an objective 
comphcity between exoticism and the rhetoric of identity and authenticity’, and a further 
conespondence with Emopean racism based on an isolationist worldview and 
mythologisation of history. Thus, there is ‘a putative Islamic essence’ according to 
which Muslim identities are ‘intrinsically and definitively constituted prior to and beyond 
acts of constitution and without conditions of constitution, as social essences which, 
without mediation, become pohtical forces’ (Al-Azmeh 1996: 28, 57, 59-60, 63).
According to Al-Azmeh, the concept of identity is a social psychological one whose 
place in antliropological or sociological thinking is highly contentious:
... the ego is not a subject and can only be analyticaUy defined in relation to its 
conditions. The same is tnie of cohective identities: not only do they have no 
exclusive, absolutely and self-reflexive psyches, but such psyches, even if we 
admit them hypotheticahy, do not constitute subjects. This is not to exclude 
I altogether, however, forms of behavioural coherence that might episodicahy 
display traditionahst regression and similar phenomena, or that might have a
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wider anthropological salience. What needs to be emphasised is that this social 
psychological theme is often assumed to be self-evident, when in fact it requhes 
clarification and proper elaboration (Al-Azmeh 1996: 32).
There is no doubt that identity is a theme which requhes careful reflection, and it 
cannot be assumed to be an ahistorical a priori of social scientific research. Further, I 
agree that an investigation of Muslim identities in the West must take account of the 
following three things. Fhstly, it must take account of the need for a critical evaluation 
of Orientahst discourse. Secondly, it must maintain an awareness that Muslim identities 
are constructed, at least in part, through and in response to Orientahst discourse. 
Thh dly, Muslim identities are not constructed in conformity to an Islamic essence which 
precedes the existence of the Muslim, a fallacy discredited by Sartre’s existence- 
precedes-essence. However, I do not agr ee that a critique of Orientahsm is feasible if it 
neglects or disparages Muslim identities. To put this differently, AI-Azmeh neglects 
thr ee inqrortant principles: fir st, identity does not necessarily imply homogeneity, because 
identities change over time; second, group identities are progressive as weh as 
regressive, that is, they look to the future as well as the past; third, there are different 
ideas of what it means to be a Muslim, and they are not ah based on the same idea of a 
homogeneous Islamic essence. Looking at this question sociologicahy entails defining 
Islam according to Muslims (existence preceding essence) rather than vice-versa, in 
other words, Islam is what Muslims beheve and practice. For the theologian, on the 
other hand, Muslims would be defined as those people who beheve and practice Islam. 
Generally speaking, the same can be said of the rehgious behever, which is why Muslims 
fiequently draw a distinction between Islamic identity and Muslim cultural values or 
national traditions.
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Ill tills chapter, we shall address the above three principles, while attempting to 
cany out a carehd reflection, claiification and elaboration of Muslim identities in the 
context of a critique of Orientahsm, Fhstly, we examine the philosophical and 
psychological context of theories of identity. Secondly, we look at the combination of 
progress and regress in national identities, arguing that this principle has wider 
imphcations, including for Muslim identities, as is imphcit in the concept of the ummah. 
Then, thirdly, we look at the theme of changing identities, comparing some 
contemporary themes with Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentiahsm. Together, this discussion 
wih form a model for the emphical study of Muslim identities, examining them in the 
context of a critique of Orientahsm which emphasises then fluidity (or ‘changingness’), 
then heterogeneity and the different ideas of what it means to be a Muslim.
5.2. Theories of identity
The classic identity statement in philosophy is a^n, a is identical to a. Further, a 
cannot be identical to non-a. For a to be identical to b, b must also be identical to a, and 
according to Leibniz’s law, whatever is true of a must also be true of b and vice-versa. 
In the terms which we have been using in our discussion of Orientalism and Al-Azmeh’s 
critique, if a=b, then a and b are homogeneous, and they cannot be heterogeneous. So 
how can we talk about a personal identity, a changing identity, a group identity or a 
Muslim identity, and insist that these identities are heterogeneous? To answer this 
question, we must distinguish numerical identity—with its three properties, outlined 
above, of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity—flom qualitative identity:
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... if a and b are qualitatively identical, then they are exactly ahke in then 
intrinsic quahties and properties and in the relationships thereof—but it does 
not follow that they are numerically identical. Rather, this relationship between 
a and b might be expressed by saying that they are tokens of the same type 
(Bailhe 1989: 3).
A personal or group identity is quahtative rather than numerical, though it is unlikely 
that we could find human beings who are ‘exactly alike in their intrinsic quahties and 
properties and in the relationships thereof. Due to problems such as this, the 
philosopher Derek Parfitt (1975, 1976, 1984) concluded that the concept of personal 
identity was so elusive and unclear as to be meaningless and melevant. Further 
difficulties emerge in the more metaphysical philosophies of identity: if identity connotes 
what each member of the group has in common, and what distinguishes each member 
fi:om those who are not part of the group, does the group’s identity exist independently 
of the members of the group, in a Platonic realm of ideas? Is it really possible to define 
what its members have in common? As a generahsation, social scientific thought has 
been less metaphysical and more pragmatic, so a more subjective approach to the 
question of identity has predominated, either exphcitly or impHcitly. Thus, identity is 
what I feel myself to have in common with some, and what I feel differentiates me from 
others. Even more simply, my identity is who I am. But who is the I’ refened to here? 
What makes me me and not someone else?
This question is stdl metaphysical, but it does have immediate imphcations for 
empirical studies of identity, such as in this thesis. Much of the histoiy of Western 
^philosophy has been a conflict between two different answers to this question, the mind 
and the body, contemporaiy theoiy tending to concentrate on the body. This is arguably
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a consequence of an association between modernity and materialism, in which the mind is 
held not to exist, or to be a physical entity (brain waves), and it may also be connected 
with a post-Cartesian philosophical reaction against the idea of disembodiment (see 
Bailhe 1989: 49, 88). Thus, argues Hemietta Moore, ‘it seems quite evident that the 
most important characteristic of the person over time, and the one which constitutes its 
identity, is the fact of physical embodiment’, though she maintahis that this is a 
problematic aspect of Western discourse: ‘Attributes of personhood, such as the 
contmuity and coherence of the person through time, are sociaUy and culturaUy 
estabhshed, they are not merely given in the physical fact of embodiment’ (Moore 1994: 
36). Her own theory is summarised as:
... a notion of the ‘hved anatomy’ and of bodily praxis as a mode of knowledge 
that draws on an miderstanding of experience as a form of embodied 
intersubjectivity. The very fact of being present as an embodied subject gives a 
particular character to the ontology of experience which emphasizes the degree 
to which social interactions are embodied ones taking place in concrete space 
and time (Moore 1994: 3).
On one level, this seems to be an obvious and pragmatic statement—we cannot 
experience anything unless we are physically there. Yet it also underhnes the importance 
of the body in the construction and transfonnation of identity. As we shall see later, 
Mushm identities are influenced by bodily practices such as wudu ’ and ghusl (ablution), 
wearing the hijab, chador or other head covering, observing dietary regulations, fasting 
(during Ramadhan, and rak'a or sajdah (prostration) during the prayers. Contemporary 
theories of identity, such as Moore’s, must be seen in the context of Michel Foucault’s
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work. Embodiment was central to his writings on incarceration and sexuality, and his 
understanding of the subject can be seen as an aspect of identity:
The precise object constituted by Foucault as his historical field is the forms 
and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual is constituted and 
recognizes himself as s u b je c t . . . . I t  appears fiom the text that ‘self is a 
neutral, ahistorical tenu, almost a synonym for ‘individual’. ‘Subject’ is an 
active, historical term that refers to a process of interiorization.... Foucault’s 
intention, if I may use that term, apparently is to define the subject 
experientially and historically. .. The subject takes shape through historically 
experienced discourses-practices (Poster 1986: 212).
This seems to imply that identity involves consciousness (without being fiiUy 
constituted by consciousness), and that a specific identity carmot exist without the 
subject being conscious of that identity. This is similar to Sartre’s (1943: 20, 29) notion 
of conscience (de) soi, or conscience (de) conscience, the argument being that 
consciousness does not exist without self-consciousness, and self -consciousness does not 
exist unless one is conscious of that consciousness. One’s identity is what one is 
conscious of, and it may be defined in terms of subjugation to (or acceptance of) power, 
or of resistance to that same power (understood as power/knowledge).
In fact, Foucault’s fiamework is more plurahstic than this brief summary may 
suggest. He writes: ‘There are two meanings of the word subject, subject to someone 
else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self- 
(knowledge’ (Foucault 1982: 212); so power/knowledge can be imposed externally or
Foucault (1984: 12).
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internally as bio-power, in both cases estabhshing the subject and the subject’s identity. 
In addition, Foucault identifies ‘three modes of objectification which transform human 
beings into subjects’, that is, ways in which the subject and the subject’s identity are 
constituted:
L Scientific classification'^^ ‘... the modes of inquhy which try to give 
themselves the status of sciences; for example, the objectivizing of the speaking 
subject in grammaire générale, philology, and linguistics. Or again, in this first 
mode, the objectivizing of the productive subject, the subject who labors, in the 
analysis of wealth and of economics. Or, a third example, the objectivizing of 
the sheer fact of being alive in natural history or biology’.
2. Dividing practices'. ‘The subject is either divided inside himself or divided 
fiom others. This process objectivizes him. Examples are the mad and the 
sane, the sick and the healthy, the crmiinals and the “good boys’” .
3. Subjédification'. ‘... the way a human being turns him- or herself into a 
subject. For example, I have chosen the domain of sexuality—how men have 
learned to recognize themselves as subjects of “sexuahty”’ (Foucault 1982:
208).
While the use of this model may seem limited to pure theory, it has some 
epistemological and methodological use, as consciousness, power and the intemahsation 
of power can all be investigated, probably in decreasing order of simphcity. The TST 
test is a psychological model which allows us to investigate individuals’ consciousness of 
^identity. Numerous variations of this test exist (see Turner and Oakes 1989; Yardley
These labels are used by Rabinow (1984).
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1987; Younes-Matton 1987; Zavalloiii and Louis-Gnerin 1979), and more complex self­
administered tests, such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) are 
based on similar epistemological premises (see Butcher, ed., 1972; Lanyon and 
Goldstein 1982).®^  The simplest versions of the TST consist of asking an individual to 
complete a schedule such as the ones reproduced in Figure 5.1 (overleaf), with no 
prompting other than what is on the sheet.
Claudine Younes-Matton uses this method to address the identities of Algerian 
migrants to France who are faced with the question of returning to Algeria, and develops 
a typology based on their responses: (i) those with a strong national (Algerian) identity 
and a sense of belonging to the ummah, who want to return to Algeria; (ii) those who 
have not decided if they want to retmn, and who have an ambivalent attitude to French 
and Algerian society; (hi) those who are negative about return, but for whom the 
religious identity is strong; and (iv) those who do not envisage returning to Algeria 
(Yoimes-Matton 1987: 403-8). She argues that there is a link between Algerian 
Muslims’ identities and their aspirations, and that this link affects how they hve in French 
society. The main issue facing the ‘first generation’ has been the wish to return, though 
they eventually adjust to a provisoire durable'"\
... afin de résister à la cultme qui cherche à F étouffer et à l’envahh', l’individu 
en réaction peut renforcer son identité sociale d’origine et au heu de s’intégrer 
se renfermer dans son propre monde avec ses propres valeurs, ses propres 
normes, exagérant même certains aspects culturels ou traditiomrels (Younes- 
Matton 1987: 159).®^
One application of the MMPI which has some relevance to this study is in The Authorilarian 
Personality by Adorno et al (1950: 91 Off.).
'... in order to resist the culture which seeks to suffocate and invade them, the reacting individuals can 
reinforce their social identity of origin and, instead of integrating, shut themselves off in their own 
world, with their own values, their own norms, even exaggerating certain cultural or traditional aspects.'
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Variation 1: Who are you? 
or Variation 2: Tell me about your self
l .Ia m .....................................................  11. I am not..................................
2.1am .....................................................  12.1 am not...................................
3.1am.....................................................  13. I am not...................................
4.1am .....................................................  14. I am not...................................
5 .1 am ....................................................  15. I am not..................................
6.1am .....................................................  16.1 am not..................................
7 .1 am ....................................................  17.1 am not..................................
8.1am.....................................................  18. I am not..................................
9.1am.....................................................  19. I am not..................................
10. I am...................................................  20. I am not..................................
Figure 5.1: Two variations on the TST (twenty statements test)
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This enables the first generation to identify with the group, to have a sense of 
belonging, hi the case of the ‘second generation’, however, identification with Algeria 
or Arab-Muslim culture leads to a stronger self-image, a consciousness of individuahty 
and a sense of being different, rather than of belonging, which is not necessarily 
compensated by an identification with France:
Cette volonté d’affirmation de l’identité nationale et de préservation des hens 
avec le nhheu d’origine peimettent aux jeunes immigrés de revaloriser leur 
image de Soi, à forteriori lorsque les parents souhaitent retourner en Algérie 
(Younes-Matton 1987: 179).®'^
We can see that the TST model is capable of providing usefiil data. However, if we 
are going to look at identity in a sociological maimer, we need to move beyond its 
methodological individuahsm, and be aware of the extent to which researchers can 
induce responses and elaborate on the responses given by subjects. Kiysia Yardley 
(1987: 212) points out that the TST lacks ‘sophisticated epistemological awareness’, and 
underestimates the extent to which subjects ‘actively construct meanings and identities 
for themselves in relation to the investigatory process’. For example, a Mushm who 
knew that the researcher was studying Islam would be more likely to put ‘Muslim’ first 
than a Mushm who was unaware of the researcher’s motivation, and Younes-Matton’s 
respondents may have tried to ‘fit in’ to her categories. Identities are in a constant 
process of change, being constituted and reconstituted vis-à-vis other individuals, 
groups, and social processes, including academic research, hr addition, we must ask to 
^what extent the group itself has an identity, and what is the relationship between the
‘That will to affirm their national identity and to preserve their links with the place of origin permits 
young immigrants [sic] to revalorise their self-image, particularly when their parents wish to return to 
Algeria.’
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group’s identity and that of the individual. Is the group identity the sum total of 
changing individual identities? A sociological instinct is likely to rebel against this 
proposition, and maintain that we should not study individuals, but interactions between 
individuals, or even groups themselves. But it is difficult to see how interactions or 
groups can have identities, if identity imphes consciousness. It is more likely that 
individual identities are caused by the intemahsation of social structures and interactions, 
as Moore and Foucault both suggest. This does makes it possible to base our 
methodology on an individuahst epistemology, but, alternatively, to take a more 
stmctural and interactionist approach. This would entail a focus on the types of 
hiteraction and power stmctures which exist, then consequences for intemahsed 
individual identities, and the process of intemahsation itself.
5.3. The nation, the group and the ummah
These questions can be partially addressed by Sartre’s distinction, made in the 
Critique o f dialectical reason, between the series, the fused group, and the statutory 
gi’oup (Sartre 1960, 1976 in translation). These are best explained using Sartre’s 
ihustrations. The series was exemplified by the bus queue in the Place Saint-Gennain. 
The individuals were there for the same reason, doing the same thing, but had only a 
minimal consciousness of being a gioup, if at ah. The individuals did not share the 
identity of the group, having no consciousness of this identity, but the gioup itself had 
some kind of purpose, raison d'etre, and thus, in a sense, identity. The fused group, 
exemplified by the revolutionaries of 1789 who stormed the Bastihe, identifies a situation 
(where the individuals are consciously a part of the group, the group itself existing for a 
consciously defined purpose. Tlie statutory group could take two forms: the surviving
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group, that is, a fused group which has lost its raison d'etre while the individuals have 
continued to identify themselves consciously with it; and the group wliich is estabhshed 
or reproduced through a pledge {serment) such as the tennis court oath, an act of 
‘mediated reciprocity’ where individuals have a conscious and commonly accepted 
responsibihty to the group, and the other individuals within it.
Before looking at this in a more concrete way, by looking at the concept of 
identification with the ummah, I want to addr ess one of the issues which arose fiom our 
consideration of Al-Azmeh, namely, that group identities, including Mushm identities, 
are progressive as weh as regressive, because they look to the future as weh as the past. 
This principle is familiar from Tom Nairn’s analysis of nationahsm:
The point is that, as the most elementary comparative analysis wih show, ah 
nationahsm is both healthy and morbid. Both progress and regress are 
inscribed in its genetic code from the start. This is a structural fact about it.
And it is a fact to which there are no exceptions.... Nationahsm can in this 
sense be pictured as like the old Roman god Janus, who stood above gateways 
with one face looking forward and one backwards. Thus does nationahsm 
stand over the passage to modernity, for human society. As human kind is 
forced through its strait doorway, it must look desperately back into the past, 
to gather strength wherever it can be foimd for the ordeal of ‘development’ 
(Naim 1981: 347-9).
However, this is not unique to nationahsm. Ah group identities have a backward- 
^looking face and a forward-looking face, they look to the past for the strength to face the 
future. Ah group identities are healthy and morbid, because they combine inclusion and
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exclusion, biingmg to individuals a sense of belonging and self-worth, which is offset by 
a loss of identification with human society as a whole.
My thinking on this subject, briefly summarised to contextuahse my discussion of 
the ummah, is as follows. Because national identities in the modem (particularly post­
cold-war) world are the strongest and most durable identities to be found, other large- 
scale gr oup identities are, in a sense, simulations of national identity. From the rise of 
nationalism until very recently, a national identity impUed a clear-cut allegiance to a 
terTitory, to the people, authorities and symbols of that tenitory. Writers such as Gellner 
(1983) and Hob shawm (1991) have argued that nationahsm is now in decline, and that 
national identities are growingly anachronistic. However, I would argue, fohowing 
Naim (1981) and Mine (1993), that a decline of the nation state does not necessaiily 
imply a dechne of nationahsm or national identities. A declining pohtical role for the 
nation state may impel a renewed focus on other foimdations of national identity, which 
may be cultural, ethnic, or indeed rehgious. The identity of the nation could be 
understood by asking what are the meanings of those foundations. Similarly, other 
group identities can be studied by identifying then cultural, ethnic and rehgious 
foimdations, looking at their relative importance and meanings.
National identities and Mushm identities have a great deal in common. As well as 
the simulation of national identity which is found in ah large-scale group identities, the 
concept of the ummah is very similar to the idea of the nation. Of cour se, the nation is 
very difficult to define, but we can say that it exists as ‘an imagined pohtical 
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (Anderson 1991: 3, 
6), so it is an aspiration rather than a fact. We can also say that the nation is associated 
with a dialectical process of inclusion and exclusion, by which members of the nation are 
defined vis-à-vis those who are excluded fiom membership (see Anderson 1991: 7; Naim
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1981: 329-63). Furthermore, according to Benedict Anderson (1991: 12ff.), nations 
emerged from extant cultural systems, including rehgious communities, of which the 
Mushm ummah is a clear example. The Qur’an (Al Baqarah, 2: 143) presents this 
concept as follows:
Thus have We made of you 
An Ummah justly balanced.
That ye might be witnesses 
Over the nations.
And the Messenger a witness 
Over yourselves.®^
The word ummah can be translated as community, refeiiing to any community or 
tribe, but it is more commonly understood as a diminutive of al-ummah al-islamiya (the 
community of Mushm behevers), or ummat Allah (the community of God). We shah 
return to this shortly, hi the Qui ’anic verse above, it is notable that the ummah is to the 
nations what the Messenger {ar~rasul, i.e. Muhammad) is to the behevers—that is, the 
pre-eminent one of that type. Having said that, the Arabic term translated nations is an- 
naas, more commonly translated mankind, but we would not expect to find a modem 
concept of the nation in the Qur’an, written in the seventh centuiy. Ron Geaves (1996: 
10-27, 41-4) argues that the understanding of the concept of ummah has evolved 
through different periods of Islamic histoiy: the smaU group of behevers in Mecca; the 
‘ideal society’ of Medina; the growing pohtical dimension as Islam spread and the 
jummah was mstitutionahsed m the cahphate of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties;
Quotations from the Qur’an are taken from the revised edition of Yusuf A h’s translation, cited in the 
bibliography as Qur’an (1989).
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divisions among Sunni, Shi’a and Kliarijites; contacts with the West in the foim of 
Chiistianity, the cmsades, coloniahsm, and post-war labour migiation. So at the end of 
the twentieth centuiy, the ummah can be seen as a non-territorial nation of the world’s 
Muslims, defined either exclusively (as people who follow hilly the pillars of Islam and 
the sunnah) or inclusively (as aU who were bom Muslim). The exclusive definition has 
something in common with social nationalism, according to which one’s national identity 
is defined in tenns of conscious adherence to a nation, its culture, values, and destiny. 
The inclusive definition has more in common with ethnic nationahsm, where national 
identity is considered to be transmitted through blood ties, causing the nation to be 
imagined as limited in space, but not in time (cf. Anderson 1991: 5-7; Kellas 1991: 51-2).
fir the West, Muslims have often been represented in racialised tenus, as has been 
shown in Chapter 3, and raciahsation imphes a focus on the body. While Muslims have a 
variety of national and cultural origins, the body does play a role in everyday 
constructions of Muslim identity. Examples, cited earher, include ablution, 
headcoveiings, dietary regulations, fasting during Ramadhan, and prostration. In these 
cases, what a Mushm does with his or her body is an indicator of a rehgious identity, 
sometimes an ethnic or national identity which is articulated in rehgious terms. As we 
see later in this thesis, the number of Muslims who fast dming Ramadhan is higher than 
the number who perform salat—the group identity is here constructed through what is 
done with the body.
One could observe that this apphes to Mushms everywhere, not just in the West. 
However, such practices are given added significance in the context of power relations in 
the West, and these power relations are temporaUy and spatially specific. Nations and 
diaspora communities are both defined spatially, the nation being spatially legitimised 
because its homeland is ‘here’. Because of the centrahty of the Arabian peninsula to
156
Islam, and the origins of many Western Muslims in North Afiica, Pakistan and 
elsewhere, Muslims in the West have some characteristics of diaspora, and are defined 
with reference to ‘there’, somewhere else. Power, at least legitimated power, belongs to 
those who are perceived as belonging here.
The West’s relationship with Islam adds another dimension to the Foucauldian 
principle of power/knowledge, in which the lack of knowledge is a basis for power. Said 
(1997b: 163) has aheady been cited in this thesis as arguing:
... knowledge of Islam and of Islamic peoples has generally proceeded not only 
fiom dominance and confiontation but also from cultural antipathy. Today 
Islam is defined negatively as that with which the West is radically at odds, and 
this tension estabhshes a framewor k radically limiting knowledge of Islam.
Muslims hr Western Europe are in a terTitory which defined Islam as inimical, and 
consequently have a very particular relationship with power. To escape the 
epistemological limitations to which Said refers, we can ask how Muslims’ relationships 
with power affect the construction of their identities, taking as an example a situation 
where issues of power and identity have come together—the Salman Rushdie affair. In 
one episode of The Satanic Verses, Ayesha, a young Muslim holy woman, leads her 
followers through the sea on a pilgrimage to Mecca, causing most of them to be 
drowned (Rushdie 1992: 203-40, 471-507).®'’ Some saw this episode as a mockery of 
religious devotion, particularly the hajj, or even of the Prophet’s wife Aisha (evoking the
The story ended with the disappearance of Ayesha and some of her followers, and the survivors 
• claimed to have seen the sea open before them, analogous to ‘the gates of Paradise’: ‘When he found 
out that he was the only survivor of the Ayesha Haj not to have witnessed the parting of the waves— Sri 
Srinivas was the one who told him what the others saw, adding mournfully: “It is our shame that we 
were not thouglit worthy to accompany. On us, Sethji, the waters closed, they slammed in our faces like 
the gates of Paradise”— Mirza Saeed broke down and wept for a week and a day, the dry sobs continuing 
to shake his body long after his tear ducts had run out of salt’ (Rushdie 1992: 505).
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Smitii-Shi’a split).®’ For others, it was relatively acceptable due to its dismissal of 
superstition, or, it has been suggested (based on stereotypes of women’s role in Islam), 
because Ayesha was an uneducated woman (see Akhtar 1989: 28; Hanne 1994: 194, 
229, 231).
This episode highlights the diversities within Islam, and the difficulties of a rehgious 
group in relating to the ethnic-political power stmctme. In respondmg to internal 
Orientahsm, Mushms have a number of choices, which can be classified as assimilation 
(practising Islam in a private way, reducing then cultural distinctiveness, and 
demonstrating then ‘noiTuahty’ to the West), withdrawal (accepting then exclusion fiom 
Western society, forming a world-rejecting Gemeimchaft, and carving out a distinctive 
identity in the West), and a combined Muslim-Western identity. During the Rushdie 
affair, according to Akhbar Ahmed (1992: 171): ‘Muslim passions were inrming high and 
their spokesmen vied with each other in expressing anger.... fir this atmosphere, even to 
hint at a dispassionate analysis of the situation was to risk being labeUed disloyal to the 
cause, a traitor to the community’. Those who had a combined identity were associated 
with the assimilationists, who in turn were not considered representative of the true 
Islam It was the diversities within Islam, and the lack of commonly recognised
Aisha and Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter, are often seen as representatives of the two ‘ideals’, or 
stereotypes, o f femininity, Aisha representing beauty and sensuality, Fatima representing purity and 
deference. Fatima, being the wife of Ali, has had a particularly important place among Shi’a Muslims 
(who regarded Ali as the rightftil successor to the Prophet), and some Sunni Muslims have perceived 
this as an attack on Aisha. In fact, as Denise Spellberg writes: ‘The accusation of adultery made against 
' A ’isha in 5 A.H./A.D. 627, as remembered by Muslims, remained a critical, controversial part of her 
medieval legacy. The majority of Muslims termed the incident hadith al-iJJc, “the account of the lie”, the 
tale o f the slander and vindication of 'A ’isha by a divine revelation recorded in the Qur’an. However, 
the event also contained the seeds o f conceptual conflict regarding issues o f honor and shame, belief and 
unbelief, and truth and falsehood. Each of these three apparently dichotomous pairs would become the 
object of Shi'i-Sunni polemic. The medieval inteipretation of the accusation of adultery became 
synonymous with definitions of communal honor and identity. Both Sunni and Shi' i Muslims integrated 
the accusation into the broader framework of their disputes about faith and politics. Sunni Muslim 
rpraise o f ' A ’isha’s reputation included a celebration of her divine vindication. Shi'i Muslims did not 
accept either ' A ’isha’s vindication or innocence and found in the incident a potent weapon in their 
polemic against the entire Sunni community.’ Furthermore, for the Suimis, ‘'A ’isha embodied his 
[Muhammad’s] honor and the accusations against her chastity threatened to undermine both the 
Piophet’s male honor and the prestige of his religious mission’ (Spellberg 1994: 61-2; cf. Combs- 
Schilling 1989: 80, 93ff et passim).
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spokespersons, which made the Rushdie affair so intense. It was not simply a power 
struggle, but to the extent that it was one, we can see that there is a relationsliip between 
group (including maslakf^ identities within Islam, and power relations. To some extent, 
Muslims’ relationship with the Western power stmctme was mediated through the 
‘internal’ power structures of the ummah.
5.4. Changing identities
Much recent theory in the social sciences, particularly postmodern theory, has 
focused on the plurahty and fluidity of identity, or, rather, identitygj' and \&Qntification. It 
is no coincidence that contemporaiy theoiy focuses both on the body and on the fluidity 
of identities. These concepts represent, respectively, space and time, and some theorists 
have integrated the contemporary scientific emphasis on the unity of space/time into theb 
theories (see, for example, Massey 1993). For Keith and Pile (1993a: 1), the relationship 
between space and time, and the construction of identity, are two central aspects of the 
debate about modernity and postmodemity (alongside the potential of poHtics). Muslim 
identities are fiequently influenced by particular places and times, or at least an imagining 
of them. Centrally, there is the Arabian peninsula in the time of the Prophet and the fbm 
‘rightly guided’ caliphs (570-661), and even more centrally, the Medinan period (622- 
630), fiom which the Hijra calendar is dated.
However, the fluidity of space and time makes it difficult to situate the construction 
of Muslim identities in a specific context, and, by extension, to distinguish the
The Arabic word maslak (plural masalik), is an established word translated ‘way’ (Çatafago 1873, 
Elias and Elias 1983). It is to be preferred to the term ‘sect’, which has pejorative connotations, 
particularly as it translates the Arabic nihla and firqa  (see Chebel 1995: 316, 382). Nielsen (1995b: 
133) and Andrews (1993b: 9) have used the word maslak to denote a tendency or movement within 
Islam, which has some centralised organisational structure, but without implying deviancy. Similarly, 
Philip Lewis defines masalik as ‘discrete schools of Islamic thouglit and practice’ (Lewis 1993: abstract; 
cited in Geaves 1996: 6).
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specificities of Muslim identities in that context fi om the generahties of Muslim identities 
in any context. Muslim identities, as with all identities, are influenced by history, and by 
the time and place in which they live. This is at the root of the West-Islam duahsm 
which was discussed in Part I of this thesis, and it highhghts the effect that space (or 
place) has on the changing character of identities. In methodological teiins, time does 
not stand stdi to allow a perfectly synchronic study. The temporal context always 
changes, and spaces (and places) change as time moves on. We cannot situate the 
constmction of Muslim identities in one time and one place. Rather, we must 
acknowledge that they have been constmcted historically, and that their spatial situation, 
being variable and fluctuating, can only be studied hnpeifectly. This also underlines the 
value of a comparative approach. Granted, comparisons are also imperfect (0yen 1990: 
1-18), but, in the case of this thesis, the French data sheds hght on the United Kingdom 
data and vice-versa.
hi part, the fluidity of identity is contingent on its plui ahty—obviously, because it is 
impossible for someone’s identity to change if it is homogeneous. This has an important 
pohtical im^hcation, as Keith and Pile (1993b: 35) argue:
Where identities are assumed to be fixed and singular, then this provides a fiim 
base on which to mobflise pohtics; the down side is that this can all too easily 
exclude potential alhes and may be unable to adapt to changing circumstances.
On the other hand, where identity is assumed to be multiple, then this facihtates 
a kind of guenilla warfare against the powerful, and it authoiizes all kmds of 
alhances and tactics; unfortunately, this may be unable to distmguish between 
important and melevant stmggles, and it may create coimter-productive 
alliances between groups who should not be 'bedfellows’.
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One can appreciate the attractiveness of fixed, singular identities. We all know 
where we stand if the only identity which counts is, for example, class identity. 
However, the changmg chcumstances of the post-cold-war world highlight Keith and 
Pile’s contention that fixed, singular identities are unable to adapt. The multiple-identity 
model also gives a more accmate representation of reahty. For example, having a 
Muslim identity does not exclude one fiom having a working-class identity, a female 
identity, a given national identity. Indeed, in some cases, a Muslim identity will 
transfoim those other identities and give them a different meaning. An example of this is 
the father-of-family identity, as we see in section 6.5. Keith and Püe identify some 
problems with multiple identities, but these seem rather spmious. After aU, what criteria 
exist to distinguish important struggles fiom melevant ones, and who decides who is an 
appropriate 'bedfellow’?
It seems to me that the contemporaiy emphasis on the plurahty and fluidity of 
identities and identification is also present, perhaps in a clearer and fuller way, in 
existentialist thought. To summarise Sartre’s ideas of fieedom and authentic existence 
very briefly and simply, we cannot be bound by the past to be something in the present or 
the futme. We have the fieedom to change or convert, and if we insist that we have no 
choice but to remain the same, we are in bad faith. However, bad faith is not, as a 
superficial reading of Sartre might suggest, the cardinal sin of existentiahst ethics. We 
are flee, and even have the freedom to choose bad faith, maintaining that our identity is 
fixed by past events or chcumstances. fix both cases, the consciousness of the subject 
becomes identical to her objective reahty—if she chooses authentic existence, her 
^identity is radically individuahsed, and she recognises her fieedom to change or mamtain 
her identity. Importantly for our puiposes, she may actually choose to change her
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identity. If, on the other hand, she chooses bad faith, her group identity will be regarded 
as fixed, and may effectively become fixed as a result. Her role within the group, and the 
group with which she identifies, would become regarded as imposed by someone or 
something else.
As we saw in section 2.4, Laroui (1990; 165) argues for a contrast between the moi 
présent and the moi passé or moi futur to replace the juxtaposition of Self and Other. 
This is only possible because of existential fi eedom, the possibihty of authentic existence. 
Otherwise past, present and firture would be indistinguishable, because notliing would 
change. The past caimot be changed, but change takes place hi the present, and this can 
change our understanding of the past. The futme cannot be known, but, as with the 
modem Janus of nationahsm, looking to the past can provide the strength to change the 
present and constmct the futme. But there are two questions which remain. Firstly, 
how do identities change? Secondly, what contrasts can be drawn between the moi 
présent and the moi passé or moi futurl It is my view that these questions can only be 
answered in specific terms. There is no law-hke regularity here, because individual and 
group identities change in different ways at different times. Each case is a special case, 
but, in the words of Pien e Bom dieu: T beheve it is possible to enter into the singularity 
of an object without renouncing the ambition of drawing out universal propositions’ 
(Bom dieu 1984: xi). Such is the rationale of this thesis.
We must balance Laroui’s vision with an awareness that the self-other dichotomy 
remains a major factor, perhaps the major factor, in the construction of identities, 
including Muslim identities. However, self and other are not necessarily identified with 
Muslim and non-Muslim. Self and other are changing categories, and they can even 
overlap as circumstances change. Foucault’s approach is useful here, in that it begins 
with the other. It is when abnormality is defined that we can begin to identify what is
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nonnal. In this case, the definition of other allows us to define self In the earher surahs 
of the Qur’an, the terms beUever {mu'min) and unbehever {kafif) are explicitly 
juxtaposed, as in Small ri/Kafirun (109: 1-6):
Say: O ye that reject faith!
I worship not that which ye worship.
Nor will ye worship that which I worship.
And I will not worship that which ye have been wont to worship,
Nor will ye worship that which I worship.
To you be your way, and to me mine.
Here, the behevers are those who do not have the characteristics of the unbehevers. 
fir later surahs, this was reversed, and the unbehevers were described as lacking the 
quahties (and ultimate destiny) of the behevers (for example, Al Tcmbah, 9: 71-80).^  ^
Islam began as a critique of the society, and the Muslims were defined as different jfrom 
that society, but later on, the society was defined as different from the Muslims. As 
Esack (1997: 138) writes: 'The Qm’an portrays kufr [unbehef] as an important factor 
that both shaped a bloated image of the Self and manifested itself in it and in the 
accompanying contempt for the weak O t h e r H o w e v e r ,  this can work both ways. It is 
not necessarily a question of bloatedness or contempt, merely that the self becomes seen 
as the norm, and the other as deviant.
However, as has been said, self and other are not always equivalent to Muslim and 
non-Muslim. The existence and significance of different nroW/A:—varieties of Islam—in
By ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ surahs, I mean that Surah 109 is one of the eaiiy Meccan surahs, that is, it is 
said to have been revealed when the Muslims were still a small group, and they had not yet faced serious 
persecution. Surah 9, on the other hand, is said to have been one of the last revealed, after the battle of 
Badr— see Yusuf Ali’s commentary on pages 413, 435 and 1707.
For a fuller discussion of this subject, see Esack (1997: 114-45),
163
Britain have been studied by Francis Robinson (1988), Phihp Lewis (1994b) and Ron 
Geaves (1996), among others. Some are recognised as Muslim, while still being seen as 
other. Examples of this are the divisions or disputes between Sunni and Shi’a, or 
Barelwis and Deobandis. In contrast, there are other movements, such as the 
Ahmadiyya, which see themselves as Muslim, but are defined by others as non-Mushm.^* 
We shall look at some of these varieties in Chapter 6, but we can note here that this is a 
very complex area of analysis. Geaves (1996: 52-79) identifies a long fist of binary 
opposites: first generation migrants v. later British-born generations; women v. 
patriarchal structures of Asian society; secular education v. rehgious education; 
integration v. assimilation; Sufism v. reform Islam; status within migrant community v. 
class position in British society; regional languages v. Enghsh; majority v. minority 
(racism); Dar al~Islam v. Dar al-Harbf^ ethnicity v. Islam; individual v. community; 
tradition v. modernity; and fimdamentahsm v. secularisation.
An additional complexity is added when we consider that identity is not simply 
something which Hes inside the individual, nor is it something which refers solely to the 
self. We construct identities for other people, and other people construct identities for 
us. So when we talk of Muslim identities, we are not talking solely about how Muslims 
see themselves, but also about how others see them. So the Muslim identity, like any 
identity, is highly complex and sometimes even contradictory. Not only do self-identity 
and other-identity coexist, they also influence each other. This has a consequence for 
om methodology—we must look at Western representations of Islam and Muslims in
The Ahmadiyya movement divided into the Lahori branch, and the Qadiani branch. The latter was 
j considered heretical for maintaining that their founder, Mirza Ghulam Almiad, was a prophet. The 
controversy damaged the Lahori branch as well, which was predominant in London between 1913 and 
1935, and was largely responsible for the pioneering Islamic missions in Europe (Nielsen 1995b: 5, 87).
That is, the House of Islam (where Islam predominates) v. the House of War (where the practice of 
Islam has been impeded by means of religious persecution). There are debates about whether or not the 
West can really be considered Dar al-Harb— on the one hand, it is certainly not D ar al~lsîam, but on the 
other hand, the practice of Islam is not generally forbidden or impeded.
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order to study Muslim identities, wliich is why Part I of this thesis was about Western 
representations of Islam. Even within the context of a critique of Orient ahst discom ses, 
we must accept that Muslim identities are in part constructed according to these 
discourses.
Western Em ope is a socially constmcted entity, which has been spatially expressed. 
The same can be said of Western Emope’s historical relationship with Islam. The 
Ottoman Tmk was defined as an outsider, and this was reinforced by his distance. 
However, the incmsions of the Ottoman empue into Austria, and the Moorish civihsation 
into southern France, threatened the geographical status quo, so the relationship between 
the West and Islam was defined as Christendom, the church of the martyr s, being 
threatened by Islam, the rehgion which was spread by the sword. So Muslims in 
Western Europe five in a tenitory which once defined them as inimical to its ethos and 
existence. This attitude had a profound effect on Western Emopean identities, and 
survives to some extent today (Rattansi 1994; 36; see also Daniel 1993; compare Henry 
and Fregosi 1990). Jean-François Clément (1990: 90) recounts the legend of a statue in 
Narbonne, fi om the time of the Muslim invasion of 719, on which was inscribed:
Fils dTsmâ'îl, demi-tom ! Vous ne pouvez aller plus loin. Je vous en donnerais 
l’explication si vous me le demandiez, mais si vous ne faites pas demi-tour, 
vous vous entretuerez jusqu’à la consommation des siècles.^^
Clément concludes:
‘Son of Ismael, about turn! You can go no further. I will give you an explanation if you ask, but if 
you do not do an about turn, you will kill each other until the consummation of the centuries’.
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Rétrospectivement, on peut y voû l’idée d’une France non-islamisable, encore 
faudrait-il pouvoir inteiToger cette statue pour savoir pomquoi. '^^
5.5. Conclusion
Meiviewing statues may be methodologically impractical. In any case, it would tell 
us httle about Muslim identities, which are not cast in stone, but are living, dynamic and 
in a process of constant change, hi this chapter, we have looked at some of the reasons 
for the complexity of identities—they are heterogeneous, even though the concept seems 
to imply homogeneity, they are subject to the freedom of human beings to choose 
authentic existence or bad faith, and therefore they change, though they can be imagined 
as static and fixed by circumstances, other people, or providence. We have also 
considered identity as a personal matter, defining who T’ am, and as a group matter, 
involving who 'we’ are, who T am in that context, the place of the nation, and ways in 
which our identities are defined by others.
Clearly, identity is an extremely complex phenomenon, or constmction, and it would 
be quite impossible to say all that there is to say about the constmction of Muslim 
identities in the United Kingdom and France. However, we are looking at one particular 
aspect of this question, situating it in the context of a critique of OrientaHsm. That is, the 
perception that Muslim identities are homogeneous, and the effects which this perception 
has. At the same time, we are insisting that Muslim identities are heterogeneous, and we 
are making every effort to demonstrate this. Not only are Muslim identities 
heterogeneous, but so are the ways in which the West perceives Islam, and in which 
f Muslims perceive the West.
‘Retrospectively, we can see there the idea of a non-Islamisable France, thougli, to know why, we 
would need to be able to ask that statue’.
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The questions are all intertwined, but, as we look at empirical case studies of 
Muslim identities in the United Kingdom and France, we can imderstand the central 
questions of this thesis in a more concrete way. What perceptions exist of a West-Islam 
dualism, homogeneity of Islam, and homogeneity of the West? These perceptions can be 
found in newspaper articles, mteiviews with Muslim leaders and ordinary Muslims, 
academic material, and many other places. How are they expressed? Sometimes they 
are expressed in everyday language, sometimes in a discourse which is aimed at a wider 
public, sometimes in non-linguistic discomses and symbols. What are theii causes and 
effects? The causes can be foimd in earlier Orientalist and colonial discomses, the 
histories of Christianity and Islam, the crusades, and post-war labour migration to 
Western Em ope. They have many effects, which impinge dh ectly on the everyday hves 
of Muslims and non-Muslims in the United Kingdom and France, on the pohtical 
situations of these countries, and in the question of who, or what, do people identify 
themselves with. What dissenting voices exist, how are they expressed, and what are 
theii causes and effects? This is perhaps the most important question, because, if these 
dissenting voices do not exist, it is difficult to see how the polarisation of Islam and the 
West will not continue. However, dissenting voices do exist. We looked, in Chapter 2, 
at the ideas of Esack, Rahman, Arkoun, Laroui and Al-Azmeh. When we ask to what 
extent respondents have reconciled being Mushm with being Western, French, British, 
we look for echoes of their voices among the everyday actors of Islam in Western 
Europe.
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6. The diversity of Muslim identities
6.1. Introduction
If we are looking for echoes of Esack, Rahman, Aikouu, Laroui and Al-Azmeh, 
does this mean that we are only interested in the views of Muslims who have effectively 
been assimilated by the West, who have allowed then rehgious practice to be diluted by 
secularisation? If this was the logical consequence of such an assertion, we would have 
to give up the aim of afiSrming Mushm identities within the context of a critique of 
Orientahsm, and allow the context to take precedence. However, this is not the aim. 
We continue to recognise the existence of Muslim identities, with the proviso that there 
are dissenting voices. A synthesis of these two positions is that Mushm identities are 
diverse, in spite of Al-Azmeh’s problematic which equates identity with sameness, so our 
immediate task is to describe this diversity and show that it does exist empiricaUy, and 
can be addressed theoretically.
As a result, the purposes of this chapter can be expressed as foUows. The fir st is to 
show that there is a relationship between representations of Islam and Mushm identities, 
in other words, that Islam and Mushm identities are perceived as homogeneous, that they 
are in fact diverse, and that there is a relationship between these two reahties. In making 
this point, I am addressing the hypotheses of this work, as expressed in section 1.3. 
'Secondly, this chapter completes our analysis of the dialectical basis of Muslim identities, 
which, like all identities, are constituted by an interaction between identity as it is
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constructed by other people (which was analysed in Part I of this thesis), and identity as 
it is understood and hved by the individual or group in question. To put this differently, 
there is an attempt in this chapter to address the tension (Al-Azmeh’s problematic), 
which has been discussed in previous chapters, between a valorisation of Muslim 
identities and an insistence that identity, in this context, does not imply sameness. So, 
the third pmpose of this chapter is to demonstrate, primarily with reference to 
ethnographic and interview data, the heterogeneity of Muslim identities within and 
between the United Kingdom and France, and the interaction between representations of 
Islam and the constmction of Muslim identities as responses to these representations.
In this chapter, then, I concentrate on the diversity of Muslim identities. Firstly, I 
look at the meanings and articulations of Islam, both at the level of mosques and Muslim 
organisations, and also at the individual level. Then, I identify some sources of Muslim 
identities, and make some comments about the combination of Mushm identities with 
other identities. Following from this, I analyse the comparative issues from this data, 
principally as they are seen by interviewees and respondents in the United Kingdom and 
France. Finally, I make some comments about Muslim identities, as described in this 
chapter, as responses to Western representations of Islam and Muslims. In discussing 
these issues, I draw extensively on interviews with various individuals, mostly caiiied out 
in Lille and Glasgow, and on fieldwork notes from the Halaqah chcle (an Enghsh- 
speaking Muslim men’s study group which meets weekly in Glasgow to read and discuss 
the Qur’an, Hadith and other topics of interest), the Haqqani Islamic Priori in London (a 
centre which is owned by Sheikh Nazim’s branch of the Naqshbandi Sufi order), and 
other talks, discussions and observations hr settings as varied as a Jesuit sphitual centre, 
( an Ar ab tea room, and a university lecture hah.
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6.2. Meanings and articulations of Islam: mosques and organisations
In asserting the diversity of Islam, it is important to address the issue of sectarian 
influences, theological and social divisions, and the development of specific masalik, 
‘discrete schools of Islamic thought and practice’ (Lewis 1993: 4),^  ^ with some kind of 
central organisation. Identification with the maslak is fiequently claimed to be less 
significant than identification with the ummah, but it still affects the social circles in 
which Mushms hve, the groups to which they belong, and how they relate to other 
groups, fiom different masalik to state institutions. It also affects theological emphases 
which they might make, leading to agreements and disagreements with other Muslims, 
leading in turn to specific conceptions of Self and Other. So, this section looks at this 
issue in terms of the kinds of disagreements which exist between mosques m Lille and 
Glasgow. It begins by identifying some criteria of diversity. Then it examines the impact 
which the pohty and ethos of a mosque or organisation might have on the identities of its 
individual members, by looking in some depth at the identities of Ismaili Mushms and 
members of the Naqshbandi order.
Alongside Paris, Marseilles and Lyon, the Muslim community in the Lille 
conurbation is one of the biggest in France. Due to the insufiGlcient facihties for Mushm 
worship, and a commitment to anti-racism as part of a pastoral responsibihty for 
migrants, the Cathohc bishop of Lille, Monsignor Adrien Gand, put a chapel, free of 
charge, at the disposition of the Mushm community in 1972. Due to a number of 
problems, including the Chmch’s tendency to confuse the Mushm community with the 
Algerian authorities, the Mosquée de Lille was not opened imtfl 1980 (see Kepel 1991:
, 118ff^  295ff). Another mosque was built from 1985 hi the Lihe Sud district (the last
Cited in Geaves (1996; 6). Compare Nielsen (1995b: 133).
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phase being finished in early 1997). These are the two biggest mosques in Ldle itself. 
There are smaller mosques in Ldle and smiounding towns, particularly Roubaix. One in 
Roubaix which has acquired a reputation for preaching an Islam de rupture is the 
Mosquée Ad-Dawa on rue Archimède (see Aziz 1996: 153-4).
Most of the Muslims in the Lille area who I was able to meet were attached to the 
Ldle Sud mosque. It was more difficult to meet Muslims firom the other mosques, 
including the Mosquée de Lille. Jacques, a Catholic priest who has had a long 
involvement with the Muslim community in the Ldle area, and has been a leading 
participant in inter-religious dialogue, told me that this was due to different ideas 
concerning the integration of Muslims in French society. Both mosques consider 
integration to be worthwlide, but the leaders of the Ldle Sud mosque consider that it has 
not yet been achieved, so it necessitates an openness to interested ‘non-Muslims’: 
politicians, joumahsts, researchers, members of other rehgions. My interviews with 
leaders and attenders of the Lille Sud mosque tended to confirm this. For the Mosquée 
de Lille, however, integration has effectively been achieved, so then priority is to 
practice their rehgion in as private and low-key a manner as possible.
The integration of ‘immigrants’ into ‘French society’ is an important and 
controversial subject in French pohtical discourses, and the acceptance, at least in 
principle, of laïcité is often considered a measure of Muslims’ integration. These 
mosques have a generally positive attitude to laïcité and integration. In this context, I 
am referring to religious integration, that is, a view that Mushm and French values are 
not incompatible, and a willingness to adapt Islamic practices to ‘fit in’ with ‘French 
ways of life’. I am certainly not accepting the integration problematic, as I make clear at 
Tother points in this thesis, nor am I seeking to make a positive value judgement about 
rehgious integration. Nevertheless, other people do, and some of them are important
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leaders of the Muslim communities in France, so I use the notion of integration 
analytically from the point of view of actors who use the term in then everyday analyses, 
but not as an objective measmement. Amar Lasfar, the rector of the Lille Sud mosque, 
said in an interview which I conducted:
On a toujours dit que la laïcité est une chance pour la rehgion musulmane ici en 
France. Dieu merci que l’Etat est laïc. Sinon, je pense pas qu’on va pratiquer 
la rehgion musulmane en France. C’est la laïcité qui nous offie l’existence. Le 
cadre laïc, c’est pas uniquement on l’accepte, nous, on le défend. Nous, les 
musulmans, nous défendons la laïcité, nous défendons le cadre laïc. Ce qui 
nous chagrine, c’est l’interirrétation de ce mot laïcité.... Moi, je peux vous dire 
que il y a deux ans, juste avec le déclenchement de l’affaire du voüe ici en 
France, on a découvert qu’il n’y a pas un seul sens à la laïcité. Donc, chaque 
groupe, ou voile chaque citoyen, a son interprétation de la laïcité.
The Mosquée Ad-Dawa in Roubaix has a reputation for being ‘fundamentahst’ 
{intégriste), but we need to be aware that, besides the problems with applying terms like 
fimdamentahsm and intégrisme to Islam, this is only a reputation (though reputations do 
have a complex sociological significance). Amar Lasfar has argued that it is due to two 
factors: ah Mushms, particularly Algerian Muslims (who comprise most of that mosque’s 
constituency), are suspected of intégrisme', and the Mosquée Ad-Dawa does not
‘We have always said that laïcité is fortunate for the Muslim religion here in France. Thank God that 
Tthe State is laïc. If not, I don’t think we would practice the Muslim religion in France. Laïcité offers us 
existence. The framework of laïcité, we don’t just accept it, we defend it. We, Muslims, defend laïcité, 
we defend the framework of laïcité. What grieves us is the interpretation of the word laïcité.... I can 
tell you that two years ago, with the triggering of the headscarf affair here in France, we discovered that 
there isn’t just one meaning of laïcité. So each group, or even each citizen, has its own interpretation of 
laïcité.’
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subscribe to the piinciples of an Islam de France^^ These piiiiciples, to which Lasfar 
himself has publicly subscribed, are based on the idea that Islam is flexible, and can be 
adapted to the smiounding culture. Where a mosque, or a group of Muslims, does not 
follow this idea, what is practised is a traditional articulation of Islam, which is olden 
labelled fundamentalist or intégriste
There are also a number of smaller mosques in the Lille area, which are sometimes 
difficult to find. Often, someone’s fiont room, or some other building, is used as a 
mosque. French Muslims often refer to these as salles de prière, rather than mosquées, 
following the Maghrebian Arabic distinction between masjid, used for any mosque, and 
jami, reserved for mosques in which the Friday khutba (seimon) is preached (see 
Lamchichi 1989; 319). These mosques tend to be frequented by the first generation of 
Muslims in France, and then attitude to the rehgious integration of Islam in French 
society seems to be relatively de t ached . Tha t  is not to say that those Mushms are 
apathetic about integration. On the contrary, they have had to work particularly hard to 
integrate into French society. On the other hand, rehgious integration is not one of their 
priorities, they do not subscribe to an Islam de France, and could be labehed 
traditionahst. Yet they are never labehed intégriste, like the Mosquée Ad~Dawa.
Fohowing on from this, it is possible to construct a typology of the various mosques 
in the Lihe area according to their outlook on integration. There are those who are 
generahy positive about rehgious integration, and maintain that it is a fait accompli (hke 
the Mosquée de Lille), those who are positive but consider it an (as yet) unreached goal
Cited in Aziz (1996: 154).
There was a situation in 1994, which 1 discuss in section 4.3, where a woman died as a result of 
drinking several litres of salty water, allegedly part of a traditional Muslim remedy against epilepsy. 
:The treatment was prescribed by the Imam of the Mosquée Ad-Dawa, and the story was taken up by the 
press, who deduced that this mosque was intégriste. It seems to be from this event that the mosque got 
its reputation for intégrisme, thougli the confusion with traditionalism is obvious (see Aziz 1996: 19ff.).
I am aware that expressions like ‘first generation’ are problematic, but I use it here (and elsewhere in 
this chapter) to denote those Muslims who migrated from North Africa to France as part of the large- 
scale labour migrations of the 1950s and 1960s.
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(Lille Sud mosque), those who are generally negative about religious integration, and see 
it as happening {Mosquée Ad-Dawa), and those who are negative or detached, and for 
whom religious integration is not a question which arises (the smaller ‘first-generation’ 
mosques). As I argue in Chapter 9, those Muslims who are involved in inter-rehgious 
dialogue tend to belong to the first two groups. They are not the only ones who are 
affected by laïcité, but the third and fom th groups are unlikely to participate in dialogue. 
The third group has a very different way of dealing with laïcité, and is more concerned 
with distinguishing Muslim fiom non-Muslim than Christian from laïc. Concomitantly, 
the fourth gr oup is becoming less significant in terms of the statistical composition of the 
Muslim community in France, and hr terms of its influence.
An analogous typology would probably not be appropriate to an analysis of Islam in 
the United Kingdom. According to Michael—a Cathohc priest in Glasgow who has a 
long involvement in trilateral dialogue between Christians, Muslims and Jews—it is more 
common for mosques in the United Kingdom to be divided according to language, 
though it should be emphasised that this is connected with countries of origin, national 
identities and pohtical divisions, which often influence French Muslims’ attitudes towards 
rehgious integration. He specificahy cited the mosques in PoUokshields, in Glasgow, of 
wlrich he has some knowledge. Linguistic divisions are often tied up with arguments 
about who wift be the Imam in a specific mosque (for example, whether it should be an 
Urdu or Punjabi speaker), or spokesperson for the wider Mushm community in the 
absence of fidl-time clergy. He said that European converts to Islam often think that 
they are the ones who ‘have been here ah the time’, who know the surrounding society.
In theory, Sunni Islam has no clergy. On the other hand, there are problems with the assertion that 
f there are no c ler ^  or anticlerical movements in Islam: there are clerics in Shi’a Islam (see, for example, 
Roy 1994: 28-30); anti-mullali jokes are common in some Muslim countries (for example Afghanistan—  
Tirard-Collet 1997), connoting a kind of anticlericalism; there is a ‘latent anticlericalism’ directed 
against the mullahs by some Islamists (Roy 1994: 58); and ‘the attempts in most countries to establish 
some form of common Muslim front or umbrella organization is evidence of an adaptation of structures 
in a pseudo-ecclesiastical direction’ (Nielsen 1995a: 108).
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and who can communicate best with that society, while Asian Muslims often think that 
they understand Islam more deeply, they have been taught it fiom childhood, so they 
know ‘how it’s done’, or what the customary practices are. However, I have come 
across Asian and other ‘born’ Muslims who have cited ‘the converts’ as the ones who 
often have the best understanding of Islam. There is some truth in this, as there are 
variations in ‘customary’ Muslim practices. For example, many British Muslims of 
Pakistani origin practice as they were taught by their parents, relatives, or other people 
with an important role in the secondary religious sociahsation of children, but some of 
these practices may be more reflective of Hindu influence (positive or negative) than the 
prescriptions of the Qur’an and Sunnah. In reahty, there are two sides of the coin here. 
As Michael pointed out, there is a ‘show-of-unity ethic’, according to which Muslims 
will attempt to hide their divisions fiom ‘non-Mushms’, but this does sometimes involve 
a real attempt to develop unity and to appreciate other forms of practice and ways of 
thinking withhi the Muslim ummah, sometimes even to learn fiom them.
This ‘show-of-unity’ ethic was sometimes in evidence, though only up to a point. 
Mustapha, for example, was insistent that there is orfly one Islam, that Shi’a and Sunni 
are all the same. At the same time, he was critical of groups which (as he perceived 
them) seemed to worship Ali, and of certain Sufis who have said things like ‘I am God’. 
Al-Ghazah, the famous medieval ‘harmoniser’ of Sufism and ‘orthodox’ Islam, was 
acceptable to him, because he came back to a much ‘purer’ Qur’anic Islam after his time 
as a Sufi, and it was then that he wrote his important works. So he showed what was 
good about Sufism, while also highhghtmg its dangers. Early on in my research (late 
1995), I asked Akbar, an Imam in Glasgow who came from Egypt, about the different 
Î mosques. I remarked that I was a bit confused by aU the different names, like Barelwi 
and Deobandi. He also said that there is not such a big difference—any Muslim can, in
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theory, pray in any mosque, though some (the Shi’as in particular) effectively reserve 
their mosques for the members of their own ‘sects’ (this was the word he used).
On the same theme, I once visited the Glasgow Central Mosque for ifthar (breakmg 
the fast at sunset during the month of Ramadhan), and Ah (a university lecturer from 
Egypt, who is a leading figure within Glasgow’s Muslim commimity) was givmg a talk 
about Eid. He said a few thhigs about worship, and emphasised that it is important to 
worship Allah as He would like, not as we would hke. Afterwards, somebody asked a 
question about the possibility of having one Eid, because the Imams had been unable to 
agree on the dates for Ramadhan that year. Ah agreed that it would be good if their 
leaders could agree on a common day for Eid, enabling Mushms to be one ummah. This 
was a genuine unity ethic, in my judgement, not a /^^(Tu-of-unity ethic. However, there is 
a diversity ethic as well. After Ah’s talk, Mustapha pointed out to me that there is no 
central authority in Islam to decide things such as the date of Eid, or questions of 
doctrine, and he saw this as a blessing rather than a curse, even though it does cause 
certain problems.
Although there are different masalik in ah countries with a significant Mushm 
population, I found that this had a particularly tangible (but not necessarily greater) 
effect on Mushm identities in the United Kingdom (though not in Glasgow, which is why 
I went further afield). Naima gave me some information about the Ismaih community in 
the UK and Scotland. The present conmnmity has been in the United Kingdom for about 
25 years, coming mostly fiom the Indian sub-continent and East Africa, due to the 
expulsion of Asians fiom Uganda in 1972 and Tanzania in 1970. Some have come fiom 
Iran and other parts of the Middle East where they have faced similar difficulties and 
^persecution. There were some Ismaihs in London before this period, but not very many, 
and they are still mostly based in London. Now, there are about 10,000 Ismaihs m the
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United Kingdom, of whom 8,000 are m London, 500-1,000 in Bhmingham, a similar 
number in Leicester, and some in Liverpool and Manchester. In the 1970s, there were 
about 200 in Scotland, though this number has now declined to about 100. Though most 
of them hve in Glasgow and Edinburgh, the rest are quite spread out, with a few hving in 
Dundee, Aberdeen and the Borders.
The Ismaihs do put an emphasis on the relationship with their Imam, which Naima 
referred to as a covenant, and this can be compared to the relationship some Sufi tariqas 
have to then pir. Similarly to the Sufis, the Ismaihs emphasise the esoteric aspect of the 
Qur’an, behevmg that the Imam’s role is to interpret the Qur’an for the present age. 
Nevertheless, there is an emphasis on personal search and the use of one’s God-given 
intellect. The previous Imam placed a great deal of emphasis on education, particularly 
of women. For example, if a couple have a son and a daughter, but can only afford to 
educate one of them, they should educate the daughter, since she will educate her 
children and her education wih be of benefit to the community, whereas a man’s 
education is more hkely to be of benefit to himself only. Thus, the Ismaih communities 
tend to be very highly educated, on average shghtly more than the societies in which they 
hve. hi terms of dress and social codes, they have a pohcy of consciously blending in, so 
that Ismahis in the West (she referred to ‘we in the West’) will dress in Western clothing. 
There is also an emphasis on economic empowerment, again particularly for women, and 
there are various support systems to enable this to operate, along with social, cultural 
and rehgious support systems. People who are given a leadership role exercise it for a 
specified period of time, usually three years. Economic empowerment, however, is 
combined with an emphasis on service and philanthropy.
I asked Naima a twin question, firstly about identity, and whether or not Ismaihs 
reahy had a Muslim identity which would be seen as something in common with a Sunni
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Muslim, and, secondly, how the stereotypes of Muslims which exist in the West affect 
the Ismaih community specificahy. Naima was enqihatic that Ismaihs see themselves as 
Muslim first, as Ismaih Muslims. In saying this, she was taking a diametiicahy opposed 
view fiom the one expressed by Tissa Fernando (1979: 361), that: ‘The Ismaihs are a 
Mushm sect, but they identify themselves as Ismaihs rather than Muslims’. According to 
Naima, they recognise that then interpretation of Islam is different, but wih insist on its 
vahdity, that they are in mainstream Islam and not ‘a sect of a sect’ as they are often 
understood to be. Some Ismaihs, for example, when they talk about the history of the 
spht between the Ismaihs and other Shi’a, wih insist that it was the others who broke 
away, not the Ismaihs themselves. The Imam has often addressed this issue in his 
speeches, pointing out that the perceived division between Shi’a and Sunni is simphstic, 
comparing this with a Cathohc/Protestant division in which ah Cathohcs are perceived as 
terrorists because of the IRA.
We talked about the relationships which Ismaihs have with the Ahl al-Kitab, and 
participation in inter-rehgious dialogue. Dialogue does take place, though not often the 
formal ‘sitting round a table’. There is an emphasis on the theological simharities 
between Ismaihs and other Mushms, and other rehgious groups, and also the simhar 
attitudes to ethics and humanitarianism, which makes for a kind of practical dialogue. 
Naima talked about the rehgious experiences of some of her chents (she works in a 
counselling centre for ‘black’ and ‘ethnic minority’ women in Edinburgh). Often, there is 
a problem with the ‘fr eezing’ of rehgion and culture among Mushms and ethnic minority 
cultures in the United Kingdom. When they come here, they ensure that things remain 
the same, but when they visit their country of origin they find that things have moved on. 
..So, while there is no separation between the rehgious and social sphere for Ismaihs and
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other Muslims, the question arises of what is the rehgion within the context of the rest of 
(social) life.
The issue of identity was less exphcitly addressed by members of the Naqshbandi 
Sufi order in London, but there were numerous tangible and significant indicators of a 
distinctive identity within Islam and United ICingdom society. I visited the Haqqani 
Islamic Priori, a centre of their order m North London, in September 1997. There was a 
school {madrassah) alongside, which had been converted fiom a church budding, though 
I was told it was about to close. Apparently, the centre came into behig when someone 
offered a large sum of money to Sheikh Nazim, who is the head of then branch of the 
Naqshbandi order. He refused, but told the donor to buy a house which could be used 
by ‘the British people’.
Hussein, a convert fiom a Greek Orthodox backgr ormd, who, like most of the men 
there, wore a tmban, told me that I could meet ‘a Sufi master’ (it was afterwards that I 
found out who Sheikh Nazim was), though he was anxious that my reasons for meeting 
liim should be related to a sphitual search, rather than academic curiosity. He referred to 
the 73 sects of Islam, and said that the Naqshbandi order represented the true sect, 
because of their allegiance to the Sheikh, who is a successor to the Prophet. His picture 
of the order was very strongly couched in terms of the Sheikh, but he was quite bemused 
by me asking what they did, and what was special about them. He told me that Islam is 
Islam, that fundamentahsts are not Muslims, people don’t beheve in Islam or come to 
Islam Rather, they come to God.
Hussein then took me to meet Sheikh Nazim, and said I shoidd ask for his blessing. 
He asked if I had ever met a saint before—when I said no, he said I should get ready for 
i^t. He spoke about the Sheikh in quite glowing terms—not only was he ‘not like any of
There is a Hadith in which Muhammad said that his followers would be divided into 73 sects, of 
which only one would be saved.
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us’, but he was a very humble man.... I was warmly welcomed by the group of about 
jfifiy men and women, many of whom were wearing turbans and using rosary beads/°^ 
and I was introduced to the Sheikh. When he found out that my studies related to Islam, 
he asked: ‘What is Islam?’ I rephed; ‘You know better than I.’ He answered me with a 
kind of Socratic dialogue. He asked about my own rehgious affihation, then pointed to a 
number of others, referring to each one by name, and telling me about their nationahties 
and backgrounds. In each case he said that this person was Christian, now Muslim 
When he got to the end, he said that Muslims and Christians were aU the same. The 
Socratic dialogue ended (much to the group’s amusement) with me saying: ‘So I am 
Muslim?’; and he said: ‘Very good.’
He spoke about a number of issues, including the importance of being prepared for 
death, and a number of the world’s problems which, for him, were a result of people not 
knowing the difference between haram and halal. People would say ‘a/ haq^ while he 
was making his pronouncements, and he would start praying from time to time, calling 
something (often the shahada) which everyone would repeat. People seemed to hold on 
to every word he said, someone was doing a video recording and others were putting 
Dictaphones in front of him Someone asked if he would rejoin them for the ‘asr prayer, 
and he wasn’t sure—he needed to sleep, and his deputy could preside since he was ‘a fiiU 
Sheikh’. Everyone laughed. Otherwise, he would pray ‘asr with them People kissed 
his hand as he left, someone else touched the material which hung from his turban.
Afterwards, I spoke to some others. A few people told me how lucky I was—one 
said you don’t come to the Sheikh, but you get brought—another said that the Sheikh 
had just been saying that someone with a httle bit of good in his heart wih be brought to
The Sufi Muslim rosary (tasbih) has 99 beads (sometimes 33, to be repeated three times), which have 
a number of meanings and representations, such as the 99 names of God, or the 99 stages towards 
unification with God (see, for example, Chebel 1995; 89, 412-3; Schimmel 1975: 169-70, 177).
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meet the friends of God^ ®^  (as if I was the fulfihneut of this prophecy)—another asked if 
the Sheikh had given me a new name. As I was leaving, I spoke to Omar, and we talked 
about the turban (he said it acted as a reminder to him, helping him to concentrate on 
prayer), his thoughts about the hajj (he hasn’t been yet, and can’t really afford to, but the 
intention is more important, and there are other acts of worship which can be done en 
lieu), his wife and child (they met in Eastbourne, and he took her to the centre, where 
they were told that if they were going to sleep together they should get mairied—the 
ceremony was extremely simple), a Quaker retreat he had done, and other things. He 
also asked about Scottish devolution and other things. He said he often goes to pray in 
churches, becoming a Muslim for him was not a conversion away, but another step. His 
father, Abduhnalik, seemed to be a leading member of the priory as well He talked to me 
about the shahada, saying it was making a step into Islam (not within). As an illustration 
of the esoteric quahties of this group (or perhaps then sense of humour), he told me that 
he had a potion to cure baldness.
In Ldle, I spoke to Ibrahim, who was also a member of the Naqshbandi order. I met 
him first in December 1996, before I had visited the Naqshbandi centre in London. 
Ibrahim said that his parents were not particularly practisiirg Muslims, but that at the age 
of 18 he wanted to practice and to know {connaître) his rehgion better. So he started 
learning Arabic, then the Qur’an, then he travelled in some Muslim countries, particularly 
Morocco and Syria, where he learned from a number of Imams, some quite well known, 
and joined the Naqshbandi order in order to ‘deepen’ {approfondir). Now he teaches 
Islam in the Mosquée Abu Bakr in place Faidherbe m Roubaix. About this ‘deepening’, 
he said:
Sufis often refer to themselves as the friends of God.
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... à partir du moment où on veut approfondir sa foi, on se rend comte qu’il 
faut une certaine discipline spirituelle. C’est un travail spirituel aussi, et cette 
discipline spirituelle, cette éducation spirituelle, on peut pas l’apprendre 
n’importe comment, dans un livre ou dans les cassettes. C’est pas le livre ou la 
cassette qui peut nous éduquer. C’est l’enseignement d’une personne qui est 
vivante en face de nous, qui donne des conseils, et qui voit aussi ce qui est 
bon.... H dorme un conseil plus personaUisé, alors qu’im livre donne un conseil 
plus général. Donc j ’ai senti un besoin d’avon cette éducation spirituelle, et 
donc ça m’a poussé à chercher ime affiliation dans une confr érie soufre.
Significantly, Edgar (a Cathohc priest in Lihe who was heavily involved in Mushm- 
Christian dialogue) told me that Ibrahim had been at a Mushm-Christian meeting, and 
said that, for Mushms, the Qm ’an is the Word of God written, while Jesus Christ is the 
Word of God made flesh, a comment which is something of a chché, but in this context I 
would say that it radicated some depth of thought. We shah consider the significance of 
such an insight in Chapter 9. Having visited the Naqshbandi centre in London, however, 
I was struck by the contrast between Ibrahim’s independence and depth of thought on 
the one hand, and the importance, sainthood, and (I thought) near rofahibhity which were 
attached to Sheikh Nazim on the other. I met Ibrahim for a second time in October 
1997, and asked him about this. He explained that the Naqshbandi order had two 
branches, one of which was led by Sheikh Nazim, who lived in Northern Cyprus, and the 
other one of which was led by his Sheikh in Damascus. Sheikh Nazim’s branch had more
ri”'’ from the moment when one wishes to deepen one’s faith, one realises the need for a definite 
spiritual discipline. It is also spiritual work, and this spiritual discipline, this spiritual education, cannot 
be learned any old way, from a book or cassettes. A book or cassette cannot educate us, but the teaching 
of a living person in front of us, who gives advice, and who also sees what is good.... He gives more 
personal advice, while a book gives more general advice. So I felt a need to have this spiritual 
education, and so that pushed me to search for membership of a Sufi brotherhood.’
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Western converts who were completely new to Islam, so it was necessary to explain 
Islam in a simpler, more formulaic way. As a result, the Sheikh became a more central 
figure (a bit too central, he seemed to imply), though he insisted that the two Sheikhs 
were on very good terms, and met each other fiequently.
6.3. Meanings and articulations of Islam; individuals
We see fiom this that particular masalik, hke the Ismaihs or the Naqshbandi order, 
have their own specific understandhigs of Islam, and that the maslak provides a sense of 
belonging, a group ethos, and an influence on the identities of its members. Aside fiom 
membership of different masalik, individuals expressed a diversity of meanings attached 
to Islam, or what it meant to be Muslim, and that is the subject of this section. For 
some, the foimulaic, or, to use a less pejorative term, prepositional understanding was 
predominant, while for others, the answer was more related to an internal, personal, 
subjective, experiential, existential reahty. Of course, the two understandings are not 
mutuaUy exclusive—many Muslims would insist that certain behefs and practices are sine 
qua non of Islam, and that they must be intemahsed and ‘real’, to ‘cultivate an intense 
relationship with Allah’, as Fouad (who was generahy oriented to what seemed hke an 
Islamist understanding of Islam) put it. However, these two imderstandings do 
constitute different emphases, so I shah examine them hi turn.
Within the first category, prepositional emphases, it is possible to discern two sub­
categories: an emphasis on practices; and an emphasis on behefs. While some expressed 
the essential practices of Islam in terms of a ‘boy scout ethic’ of being kind and helpfiil to 
people, more referred to ibadat (worship, obedience, often seen in terms of the phlars of 
Islam) or dawa (propagation of, or invitation to, Islam). For Abdahah, a law student and
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president of the Tourcoing branch of Jeunes Musulmans de France (JMT), Islam was a 
message to transmit, which was a responsibihty of ah Muslims, though conversion was 
the work of God:
l ’ai des copains qui sont non-musulmans, je leur exphque F Islam de temps en 
temps, on parle de la rehgion, je lem exphque qu’est-ce que c’est l’Islam, sans 
pom' autant leur imposer. Bien sûr, c’est natiuel, et même c’est un devoir pour 
nous, puisqu’on considère qu’on est tous des mini-prophètes, au sens où, 
comme le Piophète, on veut transmettre la rehgion, on doit exphquer aux gens, 
informer les gens que ça existe. Il est à eux de prendre leur responsabihté.
There were various attitudes towards the idea of dcma, fiom this one to the very 
negative (expressed by Amo Ferhati). Hassan, who was vice-president of the Ligue 
Islamique du Nord, occupied a middle ground. For him, dawa could take place within a 
context of inter-rehgious dialogue, because it started fi om the Qui ’anic principle of ‘no 
compulsion in rehgion’ {Al Baqarah, 2: 256), and could only fohow an initial opening of 
confidence and mutual understanding. To perform dawa was imderstood as taking the 
initiative to develop this mutual understanding.
When we consider Islam qua practices, we must also consider degrees of practice. 
Amar Lasfar argued that one could not make a distinction between practising and non- 
practismg Muslims, but this distinction was made by a number of interviewees who 
perceived themselves as practising, and who perceived themselves as non-practising. 
When I asked Abdahah if he thought the whole Mushm community shared the same ideas
T have friends who are non-Muslims, I sometimes explain Islam to them, we speak about religion, I 
explain to them what Islam is, without ever imposing it on them. Of course it’s natural, and it’s even a 
duty for us, since we consider that we are all mini-prophets, in the sense that, like the Prophet, we want 
to transmit the religion, we must explain it to people, tell people that it exists. It’s for them to take their 
own responsibility.’
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which were important to him, he replied that not all shared the same ideas, only about 15 
per cent were fully practising (indicating that he saw his own ideas as synonymous with a 
fully practising Islam). When I asked him to elaborate on what he meant by practising, 
he said those who practised the fast of Ramadhan and the five daily prayers, wlfile the 
fast alone was perfoimed by perhaps as many as 60 per cent of Muslims in France. 
However, he saw this as a cultural phenomenon rather than a religious one: in North 
Afiica, for example, the fast is a tradition and is performed by everyone, even some who 
do not see themselves as Muslim. Other estimates would indicate that 15 per cent is a 
lower estimate (20 per cent being the upper estimate), and 60 per cent is an upper 
estimate (the lower estimate being about 40 per cent).
The distinction between ‘Muslim cultmes’ and Islam per se was emphasised by 
Saïd, who came to France fi om Algeria hi 1993. He said that in Algeria Islam is mixed 
with many traditions, sunoundhig, for example, the role of women, which were nothing 
to do with Islam In France, however, these traditions were not so present, and the 
generation of Muslims who had been boiu hr France were more independent fi om those 
traditions than then parents. Jean also insisted on making a distmction between those 
who had been bom hi France and those who had moved to France from North Africa, 
asserthig that, within the latter group, there were many who were musulmans de 
tradition, hi other words, those whose practice was motivated by tradition rather than 
theological or inner conviction.
For Abdallah, part of the ethos of relating to others was the principle of openness 
{ouverture). He cited a Hadith to show that Muslims had to be open to wisdom no 
matter where it came fr om, fr om a Muslim or a non-Muslim, fr om one kind of experience 
. or another. Nevertheless, in his discourse, and that of others, there was an implicit tmth 
claim for the beliefs of Islam. One evening at the Halaqah ch cle, Malik gave me a book
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entitled The Choice, by Ahmed Deedat (1993), which was about Chiistianity and Islam, 
using some of the prophecies in the Old Testament to prove that Muhammad was the 
one who was to come, the greatest of the Prophets, even the Paraclete. Malik said 
that it was very good, though Ah said that it was quite a combative book. Although its 
demohtion of Christianity is based on veiy tenuous interpretations of the bibhcal texts 
and of Christian behefs (I examine aspects of such a combative approach to Mushm- 
Christian relations in Chapter 9), it provides some insights into the conviction of many 
Muslims that Islam is the truth, and that this claim is backed up by pre-Qur’anic evidence 
from God’s other books, as weU as from history and nature. Fatima, who regarded 
herself as ‘non-practising’, argued that the Qur’an contained teachings about astronomy 
and meteorology which were not loiown at the time, and that this was evidence of its 
divine origin. Ali was particularly enthusiastic about the Qur’anic references to ‘pahs’ 
(e.g. ‘fruit of every kind He made in pahs’, and ‘Glory to Allah, Who created in pahs all 
things that the earth produces’) , a r g u i n g  that the ‘gendered’ nature of plants and 
atoms would not have been known at the thne, and that this was therefore a part of ‘the 
miracle of the Qur’an’.
While the propositional mrderstanding of the nature of Islam was exjrressed partly in 
terms of practices, such as dawa or ibadat, and partly in tenus of furrdamental beliefs or 
truth claims, Amar Lasfar insisted that practice followed behef:
Pour être musulman, déjà, il faut crohe d’abord. C’est-à-dhe crohe en Dieu, 
crohe à ses Prophètes, reconnaître qu’il y a un certain nombre de voies 
rehgieuses. C’est la première question. Deuxième question: la pratique, h faut 
pratiquer. Il faut crohe et pratiquer..., parce que déjà le premier pilier de
In Christianity, the term Paraclete (often translated ‘Comforter’) is usually used to refer to the Holy 
Spirit,
Surah AÎ Ra'd, 13: 3; Surah Ya Sin, 36: 36.
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l’Islam. c’est le témoignage chahada. Le témoignage de ça, c’est croire: 
achhadou arma la-ilaha ilia Allah. Donc vous manifestez une croyance, que 
vous croyez en Dieu, et à son Prophète. Donc être musulman a mi caractère 
pubhc. Le reste maintenant, les autres devoirs musulmans, à mesure, c’est la 
prière, l’aumône, le jeûne, le pèlerinage....
The second category of meanings attached to Islam, or what it meant to be Muslim, 
which I identified at the beginning of this section, was an emphasis on an internal, 
personal, subjective, experiential, existential reality. One time when I went to the 
Halaqah circle in Glasgow, Akbar was leading a study from Surah Al-Furqan, and made 
the point that the day is for working and for enjoying the daylight which is a gift of Allah, 
and the night is for resting (‘And it is He Who made the Night and the Day to follow 
each other; for such as have the will to celebrate His praises or to show their 
gratitude’ On the other hand, he continued, the prayers which are said in the mosque 
are only an external part of Islam—the ‘real Islam’ is what is done in private, when 
Muslims can take their time over their prayers or say them quickly to get them out of the 
way, and at night, when those ‘who spend the night in adoration of their Lord prostrate 
and standing ... say: Our Lord! Avert us from the Wrath of hell, for its Wrath is indeed 
an affliction grievous’."^
One participant, Yusuf, who was particularly anxious to make me feel welcome 
started explaining more about the Qur’an to me, that it was important to read it in the
108 <Yobea  Muslim, to begin with, it is necessary to believe. That is to say, to believe in God, in His 
Prophets, to recognise that there are a certain number of religious ways. That’s the first question. 
Second question: practice, it is necessary to practice. It is necessary to believe and practice..., because, 
to begin with, the first pillar of Islam ... is the shahada witness. The evidence of that is believing: 
ashadu anna la-ilaha ilia Allah  [I bear witness that there is no god but Allah]. So you demonstrate a 
belief, that you believe in God, and in His Prophet. So being Muslim has a public character. Now, the 
rest, the other Muslim duties, in d m  course, are prayer, almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimage....’
Surah Al-Furqan, 25: 62.
Surah Al-Furqan, 25: 64-5.
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‘first person’ (what does it say to me?), how he had done that and ‘became’ a Muslhn 
(even though he had already practised) three years before, and how important it was to 
search for the tmth, which was to be found in the Qur’an. He believed that that was the 
reason for my being there—it was part of my own subconscious search for truth which 
leads people to the Qur’an.
Akbar and Yusuf were both expressing an intenral view of Islam, but it was still 
based on a propositional understanding. The interual view was expressed in a more 
radical way by Nairn, for example, who said that, although he was a believer {croyant), 
he could not express precisely what he believed, he could not express his beliefs hr 
propositional terms as believing x, y, z.... Jean expressed it even more strongly still, and 
in a very positive way, talking of an interior, ‘individuahstic’ Islam, which was not 
‘mosque-based’—he hardly ever went to the mosque, though he did pray and performed 
the fast of Ramadhan—but an interual relation with God. He believed that it was 
possible to listen to God, in a manner of speaking, by ceasmg the ‘interual dialogue’ with 
oneself. This led to a communion with others who believed in God, and was therefore 
entirely compatible with Christianity:
... je suis musulman, mais, tout en même temps, attaché au Christianisme.... H 
y a des gens comme moi, qui sont très très minoritahes, ceux qui croient en 
Dieu, qui ont une idée très libérale de l’Islam, mais qui n’appartiennent pas à la 
Gommrmauté musulmane, qui sont très pensifs dans lems façons d’être, dans 
leiu’s façons de vivre etc., mais pom qui la religion musulmane reste au niveau 
intime. C’est-à-dire très très intime. Ce qu’on ne partage même pas avec son 
, conjoint, c’est sa religion, sa relation avec Dieu. Mais je peux être avec 
quelqu’un quand je suis en train de prier Dieu, mais sans qu’ü le sache. C’est
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parce que c’est quelque chose qui m’appartient.... J’essaye de cultiver ma 
relation avec Dieu tout en m’orientant et vers l’Islam et vers le Christianisme, 
parce qu’ils m’aident. C’est une approche individuahste. .. Quand on est 
croyant en Dieu, il y a systématiquement une communion. Le fait que 
quelqu’un croit en Dieu, qu’il soit chrétien, juif ou musulman, pour moi on a 
quelque chose en conmiun. On croit en Dieu..., on peut avoh l’échange.^"
So there are a number of different ways in which the nature and meaning of Islam 
are understood, and in which Islam is expressed. This must be emphasised, as it is a 
crucially important theme of this thesis. However, to see if it really has a significant and 
diverse influence on Muslim identities, we must look at some sources of Muslim 
identities. The next section looks at a number of these sources, inter alia Muslim 
history, international affairs, the influence of prominent individuals, umbrella 
organisations and youth organisations, education and travel, primary reUgious 
socialisation in the family, conversion to Islam, and the construction of Muslims’ 
geographical envhonments.
6.4. Sources of Muslim identities
According to Ali, one of the aims of the Halaqah circle was to train people in 
speaking about Islam, which is why he was always trying to persuade people who did not
I anr Muslim but, at the same time, attached to Christianity.... There are people like me, who are 
a very small minority, those who believe in God, who have a very liberal idea of Islam, but who don’t 
belong to the Muslim community, who are veiy thoughtful in their ways of being, in their ways of living 
etc., but for whom the Muslim religion remains at an intimate level. What one doesn’t share, even with 
rone’s partner, is one’s religion, one’s relationship with God. But I can be with someone else when I am 
praying to God, but without him knowing. That’s because it’s something which belongs to me. .. I try 
to cultivate my relationship with God by turning myself both towards Islam and towards Cliristianity, 
because they help me. It’s an individualistic approach ... When someone believes in God, there is 
systematically a communion. The fact that someone believes in God, whether he is Christian, Jew or 
Muslim, for me we have something in common. We believe in God.,., we can share something.’
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see themselves as ‘experts’ or ‘scholars’ to participate, either by talking about a Hadith 
or a special topic (these ranged from fasting and jihad to Palestine and aspects of Muslim 
history). These talks were often interesting in their own right, but, from the point of 
view of this thesis, they were particularly interesting because they constitute, in various 
ways, some of the sources of Muslim identities.
The histoiy of Islam often came into these discussions. Once, the talk was about 
jihad—not only is it necessaiy to do jihad for the right reasons, it is also necessary to do 
it in the right way. The speaker said that during the crusades, the Christian artnies took 
Jerusalem with a great deal of slaughter, of men, women and children. The Muslim 
armies killed only a few. According to Fouad, at the thne of Muhammad, the Muslims 
woidd send ultimatums to other states: they could either accept Islam, allow MusHm 
preachers to come and tell them about Islam, or there would be war. In one case, war 
went ahead without the other state beiig given this choice, and when this was drawn to 
Muhammad’s attention, he ordered Ms army to withdraw, and then gave them the choice. 
They accepted Islam because they were amazed at tMs code, and wanted to follow the 
same rehgron. When the Mushm heartlands were invaded by other powers, the invaders 
often ended up turning to Islam, and tMs is (allegedly) a case uMque in Mstoiy.
At the time, I noted that they often tell these stories to encomage one another, but it 
is also a concrete example of my argument, in sections 5.4 and 6.4, that Mstory can be a 
source of Muslim identities (the centraHty of the Arabian peninsula to Muslim identities is 
the example wMch was given in section 5.4). Ismael, a tea room proprietor in the Fives 
district of Lrlle, told me that at the time of Muhammad, the Jews and Christians were 
protected and got on well with the Muslims. Among the pagan tribes, there had been a 
rtradition of burying women alive with their husbands when they died, but Muhammad 
had put a stop to tMs. Such stories, wMch do have a basis in Mstory, are useful means of
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giving Muslims a sense of secmity or even pride in then faith, particularly by countering 
criticisms from the West about the alleged intolerance of Islam, and its treatment of 
women. Sometimes, the imagined history is as important as verifiable history. Ismael 
also told me that Muhammad was bom with a ring on his back, which fulfilled a 
prophecy about the last Prophet, that a Jewish rabbi recognised the fulfilment of this 
prophecy, announced that this was the last Pophet, and other signs which had been 
prophesied occurred, such as the sea rising, and other fr eaks of nature as far away as 
Persia.
But the present day is also a source of Muslim identities. Current affahs, 
particularly in relation to Palestine, Algeria, Bosnia and other situations where Muslhns 
perceive a part of the ummah as subject to oppression, have a powerfid impact on 
Muslim identities. Material from Mushm newspapers and magazines which I collected in 
the United Kingdom, and even more so in France, showed a particular preoccupation 
with such international issues. This points to Islam as world consciousness, that is, it 
positions Muslims vis-à-vis British subjects or French citizens, but it also indicates that 
world consciousness is a source as well as an aspect of Muslim identities, hi some cases, 
this can have the consequence of creating a belief that Muslims are all victims, which can 
ultimately breed an unhealthy combination of resentment and passivity in response to the 
new world order, hi other cases, it drives Muslims to action, for example collecting 
money for Muslims in Bosnia, or helping to provide refrige for them in the United 
Kingdom (as has happened in Glasgow—see McFarland 1994), and creates a more 
proformd and sceptical analysis of the same new world order than seems to be prevalent 
in Western societies.
 ^ hi the present day, Muslim identities are also constituted through the writings and 
talks of prominent individuals, such as Ahmed Deedat, who I mentioned earher, and
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more ‘liberal’ thinkers like Soheib Ben Cheikh (who is the Gr and Mufti of Marseilles), or 
even Tariq Ramadan, through his writings on Islam and laïcité (though the French 
government at one time managed to regard him as a dangerous fundamentalist and 
banned him from entering France). The Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) is one umbrella 
organisation which has been prominent in organising talks in the United Kingdom, 
particularly through the amiual Islam Awareness Week. Their leaflet states:
The Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) was launched in Jime 1990. Our 
membership demonstrates the diversity of the Muslim community in Britain and 
the unity of Muslims regardless of nationahty, race or language,
We beheve that Islam should shed its image of the ‘immigrant religion’ but 
should instead be seen as a new hope and a campaign against social mjustice 
and exploitation.
The ISB is not just another organisation, rather it is a movement which 
endeavours to contribute towards building a better Britain for everyone, 
through Islam. Om priorities and concerns are geared towards the British 
society where we hve, work, and where we hope to contribute positively to the 
common good of all citizens.
Islam, if followed m its totahty can give rise to a society where the hfe, 
property and honour of everyone, iriespective of their rehgion, race, language 
or colour, is protected, and where no one will be victim of mjustice or 
oppression. It is the vision of such a society that ISB is committed to. Since 
our inception we have managed to emerge as a nation-wide movement, 
estabhsMng branches and circles m many towns and cities throughout the UK.
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The stractme and programme of work caters for all members of the 
community; men, women and children.
hi Glasgow, Islam Awareness Week has generally consisted of exhibitions and talks, 
hi 1996, talks were given on the subjects: maiiiage and family life (Dr. Muneer Ahmed); 
Islam and science (Dr. Salah Beltagui); Islamic economy (Sahib Mustaqim); Muslim food 
mles (Michael Bany, from BBC Food and Diink); human rights in Islam (Azzam 
Tarnimi); and law and order (Dr. Fareed Shayal). In 1997, talks were given on the 
subjects: moral values in Islam (Gamal Zarabozo, from the USA); family hfe (Sahib 
Mustaqim); women in Islam (Tahmeena Saleem); and the history of Islam in Britam 
(Sarah Joseph). Some of these people travelled to Glasgow from London, or from as far 
afield as the USA, and there was a sense of excitement among the Muslims present about 
being addressed by people who were considered to be highly knowledgeable. One talk, 
which was jointly organised by the ISB and Young Muslims UK, was on the subject of 
Christ in Islam, and the chah introduced the speaker with a long hst of his credentials, his 
knowledge of and passion for comparative rehgion. As it happened, a few Muslims 
commented to me afl;ei’wards that he wasn’t veiy good, and a number of Christians who 
were present became veiy angiy. Nevertheless, this illustrates the way in which aspects 
of a Mushm identity can be affected by the insphation of a prominent individual, but in a 
completely different way from Sheikh Nazim, whose role I discussed earher. It also 
Ulustrates the significance of umbrella organisations and youth organisations as sources 
of Mushm identities.
Divisions between French Muslims, and the need to negotiate more effectively with 
^the government, led to a number of attempts to create a representative body for Muslims 
in France. The CORIF {Conseil de Réflexion sur ITslam en France) was established by
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and answerable to the Ministiy of the Interior (the minister at the time being Pien e Joxe), 
and it made certain recommendations regarding the State’s attitude to Islam and the 
needs of Muslims. Amar Lasfar, the rector of the Mosquée de Lille Sud, was a member 
of the CORIF. For him, the estabhshment of an Islam de France— on the idea that 
Islam is flexible, can be adapted to the sunoimding culture, and must be explained in 
these teims—is a priority. This is one sour ce of an awareness that Muslim identity and 
French identity are not incompatible, but rather (to use Amar Lasfar’s dictum), ^un bon 
musulman est un bon citoyen"
Amo Ferhati focused on this issue as well, though he had very different ideas about 
it. For him, Islam could not be seen solely ni spiritual terms, nor could an Islam de 
France be articulated without Mushms taking the initiative to estabhsh their own 
nistitutions to speak on their behalf. The CORIF could not be seen in these terms, and 
the Dunkhk council of mosques, which Piene (who participated in the Groupe Islamo- 
Chrétien and other forums for inter-rehgious dialogue) enthusiastically described as a 
dialogue interislamique, was too limited to spiritual matters:
Le CORIF..., c’était le début du début du début de quelque chose. Le Parti 
Sociahste nous a baisés. Joxe nous a baisés..., il a rien fait. H a créé le CORIF, 
et il n’a rien fait. H a voulu récupérer l’Islam de France. Pasqua a fait la même 
chose, en allant plus loin, mais il a échoué aussi... Dunkerque, c’est un conseil 
des mosquées, mais qui est très limité sur le plan technique et rituel. C’est-à- 
dire, avoir un cané musulman au cimitière, des petites choses comme ça. Ca 
n’a pas eu une dimension politique globale, c’est plus religieux et technique.”^
a good Muslim is a good citizen.’
‘The CORIF ... was the beginning of the beginning of the beginning of something. The Socialist 
Party screwed us. Joxe screwed us..., he did nothing. He created the CORIF, and he did nothing. He 
wanted to recuperate the Islam de France. Pasqua did the same thing, while going further, but he failed 
as well.... Dunkirk is a council of mosques, but which is very limited to technical and ritual issues. In
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Abdallah was the responsable of Jeunes Musulmans de France in Tom coing, just 
outside Lille. As such, he was involved in the organisation of cultural activities, 
conférences (public lectures or debates), and he would also speak in mosques and 
translate the Friday sermon in the Ldle Sud mosque from time to time. They organised a 
meeting on the subject "Être Musulman au Quotidien", at which there were two 
conférences (one on the subject of the meeting, an other on the ‘reahties and inspirations 
of young Muslims’), a round table and some drama, animations and music. The round 
table included one Cathohc priest (Jacques) and a laïc (Amo Ferhati). When I asked 
AbdaUah why they were mcluded, he rephed (as I indicated above), that part of the ethos 
of relating to others was the principle of openness, and that Muslims had to be open to 
wisdom no matter where it came from
Fatima said that, for her, openness, or a more complex relationship {rapport plus 
compliqué) with Islam, came from a combination of travel and education. She told me 
that she was Muslim, but she would keep her distance {garder la distance). In other 
words, she was from a Muslim family, but not a practising Muslim herself  ^though if she 
were to choose a religion it would be Islam. She also said that she knew a bit about 
Senegalese Islam I asked her about this, and she said she had been to Senegal twice on 
hohday. She noticed a number of differences—the practices, e.g. prayer and fasting— 
were the same, but they were integrated into their culture, the Islam practised was in 
general more harmonious, "détendu", and not so aU-encompassing. They had local holy 
places and, although they were very practising, they were not so austere as in the 
Maghreb, and the women were not veiled. She had also been in North Africa and 
Andalusia, and said that North African Muslims had a stronger rapport with the rehgion,
other words, having a Muslim plot at the cemetery, little things like that. It hasn’t had a global political 
dimension, it’s more religious and technical.’
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and the veil was worn much more often. She saw herself as neither French nor 
Algerian—although she was bom in France and was closer to French culture and society, 
she found her place in Islam, but an individual Islam. She talked about people’s first 
names and the question of identity. She seemed to be implying that Muslims should 
adopt, for themselves or then children, French names rather than Aiab-Muslim ones, but 
when I tried to claiify this she seemed less sure. She compared this with the Black 
Muslims m the USA, rehgion as something to miderline a separate identity, almost more 
to do with what you are not than with what you are. But it is difficult to be a Mushm m 
France—in comparison, it seemed to her to be much easier in the United Kingdom, and 
Senegal, she said shghtly tongue-in-cheek, was the ideal.
hi many cases, the source of Mushm identity was perceived to be the family, either 
tbi’ough an inculcation of Mushm practices and values, or simply through bemg bom 
Mushm, that is, as a rehgious affihation. In other cases, it was through conversion. 
Seiwyn, who was an artist by training, told me about bis conversion to Islam He had 
had a Chiistian upbringing, but had problems with the doctiines of the tiinity and the 
deity of Christ, so he was attracted by the Qur’anic references to ‘Jesus, son of Mary’. 
Becoming a Mushm had led to change in his lifestyle, but he considered himself much 
like anyone else except for not going out to the pub on Friday evenings, which he didn’t 
reahy miss anyway, and he admitted that he had problems with his boss at work (m an 
electrical shop) because of his sometimes ‘coarse’ humom. Another Scottish convert to 
Islam, Edward, was clearly quite eccentric, but he had some fascinating insights mto 
Islam, not always expressed in a serious way (much to the exasperation of some other 
participants in the Halaqah circle). For example, he foimd it quite funny that I should 
consider Muslims a social group, which he determined was clearly the case since I was a 
sociologist studying Muslims. He also pointed out with great delight that Muslims were
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temble timekeepers, and he would never know how they managed to travel the world. 
One time, when they were discussing the relevance of the Hadith, he got straight to the 
heart of the issue with the simple statement, ‘so Qur’an is Hadith’. This started a lively 
argument, but it was an example of the perception that converts are able to separate the 
core of the rehgion from the cultural baggage, and that conversion is therefore a more 
authentic source of a Muslim identity. It is not only converts who have this view. In 
support of this assertion, we could cite the example of Yusuf (see above) who argued 
that he had ‘become’ a Muslim through reading the Qur’an ‘in the first person’, even 
though he had a Mushm upbringing, and had practised for many years. He wanted to be 
a convert, even though he was a ‘bom’ Muslim, because he saw this as a more authentic 
way of being Mushm.
Ismael was bom in Morocco, but moved to France and married a French woman in 
1990. She was not a Mushm when they got mariied, and was worxied by the prospect of 
going to Morocco to meet the in-laws, because she thought there would be lots of 
snakes and scorpions there. Anyway, they went, and she was very impressed with the 
welcome from the family. After a few days, he asked her if she had seen snakes and 
scorpions, and she hadn’t. She became a Mushm while she was there—I don’t think this 
was specificahy because she hadn’t seen snakes and scorpions, but he mentioned this at 
the same time. After coming back, she asked him to get her a copy of the Qur’an in 
French, and she has gone to a women’s class in Islam at the Lihe Sud mosque. Ismael 
wanted to emphasise that she became Mushm through a free choice, since a woman of 
the Ahl al-Kitab (‘people of the book’, principahy Christians and Jews) who is mariied 
to a Mushm man is not obhged to become Muslim.
 ^ A couple of other interviewees spoke about French converts to Islam. Fatima 
insisted that converts came from different backgrormds and social classes, but that they
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were not always accepted by the North African Muslims. So some woidd try to adapt to 
North African cultural values as well—Amo Ferhati even said that they were ‘crazier 
than the Arabs’ {"plus fous que les while others would strongly insist that
Islam was something which transcended ethnic or national distinctions or values. Smce 
Ibrahim was a member of the Naqshbandi Sufi order, I asked him if he thought many 
French converts to Islam were attracted by Sufism. He rephed that many converts who 
converted to Islam tluough an inteUectual search, rather than through contact with 
Mushms or an attraction to a Mushm way of life, could be found in the Sufi orders 
{confréries).
The final source of Mushm identity which I want to identify is locahty. As I 
mentioned in Chapter 4, I tried to find some supporting circumstantial evidence for my 
impressions about the perception of exoticism by mapping the geogiapliical locations of 
mosques, "halaV butchers, other Mushm-owned businesses cateiing specificahy for 
Mushms (such as tea rooms and cafés, Islamic bookshops, and Mushm undertakers), and 
the ‘Muslim cultme industry’ (that is, restaurants and businesses which seek to seh 
commodities associated with Mushm countries to French ‘non-Muslims’) in Wazemmes. 
The locations of the different mosques and salles de prière in Lhle, and the boundaries of 
Wazemmes, can be seen in Figme 6.1. The mosques, as numbered, are:
1. Mosquée de Lihe Sud (al-Imân), rue de Marquilhes, Lihe Sud
2. Mosquée Badi, rue d’Aiias, Lhle Sud
3. Mosquée al-Hudâ, rue Piene Loti
4. Mosquée as-Suunah, me Paul Lafargue, Wazemmes 
 ^ 5. Mosquée al-Fath, me Dr. Yersin, Wazemmes
6. Mosquée al-Nom, rue de la Mitterie, Lomme
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7. Mosquée al-Wifaq, me Verhaereu, Moiis-eu-Baroeul
8. Mosquée at-Taqwâ, me de Lauuoy, Fives
9. Mosquée de Lille (al-Fmqâii), me du Faubourg de Roubaix, Lille
10. Mosquée at-Tawiba, me Ofîenbach, Villeneuve d’Ascq
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It is interesting to note that the mosques in Lille are quite spread out, but that there 
are none in Vieux Lille, which is where the Aiab quarter used to be. Indeed, there are 
scarcely any signs of Aiab-Muslim influence in that district any more. In contrast, two of
Lille’s mosques are situated in Wazemmes itself, and another two, including the
prestigious Lille Sud mosque, are within a kilometre. As can be seen in Figure 6.2, the
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^halar butchers are concentrated in a central area of the district, many around the 
market place, and others in between the two nearby mosques. As Figure 6.3 shows,
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other businesses cateiing specifically for Muslims are concentrated in the same areas, 
though some can be found to the south-east, in the dhection of the Badr mosque in rue 
d ’Arras^ and others to the north-east, in the direction of the town centre. Nevertheless, 
these sites are concentrated, which lessens the amount of contact with ‘non-Muslim’ 
French people. Although dhect contact does not necessarily result m a more accurate 
image, the probabihty that a more accmate image of Muslims wUl spread is even lower 
when there is no contact. As Figure 6.4 demonstrates, the ‘Muslim culture industry’ is 
much more spread out throughout Wazemmes, especially as one nears the town centre of 
Lille (though it has not influenced the middle-class residential area in the north of
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Wazemmes, or the HLMs^^ '  ^ in the west). It is in such town centre areas that images of 
Muslims will be the most influential among French ‘non-Muslims’. As was pointed out 
in Chapter 4, the pubhc image of the exotic stereotype seems to have continued, to some 
extent, in the culture industiy. Perhaps this indicates a specific perception of 
perceptions: Mushms perceive the Western perception of them to be based on exoticism, 
so they make use of this in order to make a hving and integrate then culture with the 
suiTounding culture. This is a key point, and reflects the issue raised by Cesari (1994: 
14), that Mushms present themselves to others with particular goals, and the role of the 
sociologist is to ask how they do this, and what are these goals, rather than what is 
Islam. To some extent, this has the consequence of influencing media representations of 
Islam, so that they contain a mixture of famihar Orientahst stereotypes, a concern with 
‘authentic’ Muslim cultme, and an emphasis on the pohtical significance of ‘hnmigrant 
culture’ in France.
I did another study in the Woodlands district of Glasgow, which also has an 
important Muslim, population, and found some similar patterns, though on a smaller 
scale. Figure 6.5 identifies the mosques and Mushm centres in Glasgow, and the 
boundaries of the Woodlands district. ^  These mosques, as numbered, are:
1. Glasgow Central Mosque
2. UK Islamic Mission (Al-Furqan Mosque), Carrington Street
3. Masjid Noor, Forth Street
4. Lang side Mosque (Madni Mosque), Langside Road
 ^ Habitation à loyer modéré— council flats
While the boundaries of Wazemmes are officially defined, those of Woodlands are not. At times, 
Woodlands has been a geographically-defined Council Ward, but the boundaries keep changing. The 
map in Figures 6.5 to 6.8 is a map of Woodlands as it is understood by local people. Although this is a 
less precise approach, it does not aSect the conclusions of this research, as there are no comparable 
establishments (e.g. halai butchers) in the immediate vicinity.
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5. Paisley Mosque (Madrasa Al-Aibia A1 Islamia), Paisley Road West
6. Mudiasa Taleem-ul-Islam, Nithsdale Road
7. Central Mosque Khizi a, Butterbiggins Road
8. Masjid Jamia Islamia, Tautallon Road
9. Muslim House, Queens Crescent
10. Dawat-ul-Islam, Oakfield Avenue
11. Shi’a Mosque
12. Ahmadiyya Mushm Mission
13. Ismaih Society
14. Arlington Street Mosque
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Again, we see that many of the city’s mosques are in or near Woodlands, which is 
not surprising, as it has a similarly multicultural character, and compares well with 
Wazemmes. Most of the other mosques in Glasgow are on the South Side, in the 
districts of Shawlands and Pollokshields. Of those Muslims in Glasgow who live in the 
West End of the city, many hve in the eastern half of Woodlands, where there are four 
mosques. Although, as we see in Figure 6,6, there are only four "halaV butchers m
lJ>o
Woodlands, tluee of them are within 100 metres of a mosque. The other shops and 
busmesses which cater specifically for Mushms, shown in Figure 6.7, are a bit more 
^spread out, though they can generahy be found in locations which surround the 'halaP 
butchers. On the other hand, the ‘Muslim culture industiy’ (Figure 6.8) has tended to
204
mg>S^ XSo M e r  ft
f\NO 6 >OiS I 
C'?KCV_-0 0  \ w c \ H  AuA»_ & v ) T L A 4 € ^ ^ ]^  
CATeRif^c, sP E C ie ic A u C / <=oA 
\^^OSL.i<MS (fO W O o O L A N O S
Tj So  M erf tg ^
L. M05£:?o£
MogsÿOk
r-\r%;6:us
y—\ c_4, vjR ^  Qj ■'?>
A , \ V ) C , u  i v ^ A  C _ v J  L - T  ' - J
move away fiom the same locations, towards Kelvinside and tfiUliead in tlie north and 
west, fii contrast to Wazemmes, these districts are largely populated by professional 
people and students, so we can infer that the ‘Muslim culture industiy' will have an 
influence on the perception of Muslims among these specific groups of people. On the 
other hand, people of Asian origin in Woodlands belong to a number of different 
rehgious groups (Muslim, Sikh and Hindu), so it is probably the perception of ‘Asians’ 
which wUl be affected. Nevertheless, this is a way in which Muslims in Woodlands 
present themselves to others, with differing goals, and is therefore a source and 
expression of Muslim identities.
So there are diverse sour ces of Mushm identities—this section has identified history, 
cunent affairs, the writings and talks of prominent individuals, umbrella organisations, 
youth organisations, education, travel, the famUy, conversion, and locahty—and these 
are ofl;en related to the ways in which Islam is understood and expressed. But Mushm 
identities do not exist in a void, they are always combined with other identities, and this 
adds further complexity and diversity. It is not possible to captur e all of the complexity 
and diversity here—it is a difficult subject to gather data on—but it is possible to signal 
some important issues which contribute to our understanding of the diversity of Mushm 
identities.
6.5. The combination of Muslim identities with other identities
According to Jacques, a Cathohc priest, many young Mushms perceive Islam to be a 
valorising identity. They could be poor or unemployed, demotivated with nothing to get 
u^p for in the morning. But when they went to the mosque and heard the Imam telling
It may also be noticed that the ‘Muslim culture industry’ has more sites than the shops and businesses 
which cater specifically for Muslims. However, there is a strong element of subjectivity in these 
classifications, so we cannot really infer anything from this.
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them ‘you are Muslims’, this was found to be veiy poweidul, conveying motivation and a 
sense of worth, possibly the only identity which gave them value. Other identities would 
flow fiom, or be affected by this one. For example, when a young Muslim man gets 
married and starts a family, his identity changes from single to married and father of the 
family. Within a rehgious culture, these identities have specific meanings attached to 
them, so his other identities are transformed by virtue of his being a Mushm.
The combination of Mushm identities with other identities could be classified in 
three ways. Fir stly, a ‘Muslim-and-therefore’ identity, such as the identity I have just 
described, demarcates an identity which is either contingent on, a necessaiy corollary of, 
or strongly affected by a Mushm identity. Secondly, a ‘Muslim-and-nevertheless’ 
identity describes a situation where the other identity is perceived to be hr tension with 
the Mushm identity, perhaps undesirable, but nevertheless real and possibly unavoidable. 
Finally, there is a ‘Muslim-and-also’ identity, where the other identity is neither 
specifically Muslim, nor incoiqpatible with Islam, but simply a different identity.
Although such a classification identifies real debates about the combination of 
Mushm identities with other identities, it may not be readily apphcable to any analysis. 
This is because any other identity can be seen in either of these three ways, depending on 
the actor’s point of view. In France, for example, the major issue of importance as 
regards the combination of Mushm identities with other identities, for writers and 
respondents, has imdoubtedly been the question of nationahty and citizenship, or being 
Mushm and French, which is central to debates about integration, assimilation and 
multiculturahsm (see, for example, Wieviorka, ed., 1997; Lapeyronnie 1993; Crowley 
1992). There are so many issues at stake here that I have devoted Chapter 7 to these 
issues, viewed in a British-French comparative perspective. Nevertheless, it is worth 
stating here that there has been a real debate about whether or not acquiring French
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citizenship, for a Muslim, is an act of betrayal to Islam, or to the Muslim’s allegiance to 
the ummah.
When I asked Ibrahim how he saw the situation of Muslims in France, he combined 
some comments about national identities with issues related to generation and the length 
of time which Muslims had spent in France. One popular theoiy which is expressed 
about Muslims in Western Europe is the ‘three generations theory’. According to this 
theory, the ‘first generation’ migrate to Western Em ope, intending to stay for a short 
period of time, so they maintain the same religious practices and cultural expressions, 
without seeking to adapt them to the comrtry in which they find themselves. The 
‘second generation’, being born in Western Europe, find that then cultural values are 
those of the surrounding society, so they rebel against their* parents’ unchanged values 
and practices, becomhrg much more Westernised and secular. En revanche, the ‘third 
generation’ find much more value in the religious identity, and emphasise this much more 
strongly, seeing their raison d'être as the Islamisation of life in the West, rather than the 
Westernisation of Muslim communities. As I commented earlier, Naima told me that 
there is often a problem with the ‘fieezhig’ of religion and culture among Muslims and 
other communities of migrant origia in the United Kingdom, that is, they ensure that 
things remain the same when they come to the United Kingdom, but they find that things 
have changed when they visit then country of origin. Nevertheless, I put it to Ibrahim 
that this ‘three generations’ theory was simphstic, and he agreed. He said that the ‘first- 
generation’ mothers often had reproduced the Algerian model, but not the fathers. While 
the mothers had spent a substantial time at home, the fathers had interacted more with 
French society, and had discovered {"connu') alcohol and gambling, which were much 
(more taboo in Muslim society. While this was particularly characteristic of the ‘first 
generation’ men in the 1970s, he said that they had begun to leave the cafés in the 1990s,
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and return to the mosques. Often, this was because then sons had ‘returned’ to the 
mosques, and because religious practice—particularly attending the mosque for prayer 
and peifoiiuing the hajj—provided a certain dignity which goes with age. So, the ‘three 
generations’ theory falls down at the ‘first generation’, or, at least, it is shown to be 
simplistic.
As I indicated, this was tied up with some questions of national identity, particularly 
between Algerians and Moroccans. Ironically, since Ibrahim was of Algerian origin, the 
Moroccans came out better m his discour se, which explained (fiom one point of view) 
the Moroccan ascendancy in many of the mosques. It was the Algerian men who had 
met in the cafés, and who had discovered alcohol and gambling, because they had the 
right under French law to open cafés and establish their own businesses. On the other 
hand, for the Moroccan men, the mosque was the main meeting place {"leur lieu de 
rencontre'), so they were better able to ‘live’ and ‘integrate’ their Islam in a more 
‘harmonious’ way.
So these are a few examples of the difficulties and complexities which are added 
when Muslim identities are combined with other identities. It is not necessary to accept 
Ibrahim’s analysis (indeed, some aspects of it are sociologically untenable, such as the 
unproblematic acceptance of national characteristics) hr order to see that these difficulties 
and complexities are present. In some other cases, respondents were expressing ideas 
about the differences between the United Kingdom and France, particularly respondents 
in France when they knew where I came fiom. Before concluding this chapter, I want to 
cite briefly a few of these comparisons, which illustrate some important features of how 
Muslim perceive the West, and indeed how they perceive other Muslims.
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6.6. Comparative issues
There are three issues which I want to address here; the relationship between Islam 
and the customs of Muslim countries; the difficulties which are faced by Muslims in the 
United Kingdom and France vis-à-vis the surrounding societies; and sectarian influences.
On the first of these issues, Kahina, from Roubaix, spoke to me about her time in 
Glasgow. She was working in a newsagent’s shop, which was owned by a man of 
Pakistani origin. When other men of Pakistani origin came into the shop, they would 
greet the owner, saying al-salaam alaikum. She rephed wa alaikum as-salaam^ and the 
men asked the owner why she was replying to them in this way. When they reahsed that 
she was Muslim, they seemed to understand, but Kahina felt that she was not accepted as 
Muslim because she was not Pakistani. Rachid, another Muslim J&om the Lille area who 
had also hved in Glasgow, felt the same way about the attitude of ‘Pakistani Muslims’. 
The ir ony, as they both perceived it, was that they were of North Afiican origin, and 
much closer to Arab culture and the Arabic language (despite the fact that Kahina was of 
Kabyle origin), than Urdu or Punjabi-speaking people of Pakistani origin.
Mustapha, who was fi*om Mauritius, whose first language is French, and who had 
also lived in Gr enoble, attem|3ted to explain this type of situation. He pointed out that 
Muslims of Pakistani origin are the biggest group of Muslims in the United Kingdom and 
in Glasgow, so it is them who effectively run places like the Central Mosque, and much 
of Muslim cultur e in the United Kingdom is Pakistani Muslim culture. In France, this is 
different because of the North Afiican dominance, which tends to encourage aspects of 
folk Islam, though he thought that the Barelwis seemed close to this, and admitted that 
.there is folk Islam hi Pakistan. Nevertheless, he insisted that the country of origin had a
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significant impact on how Muslims ‘fit in’ to Western societies, while Islam itself was 
coBo^aratively insignificant.
Mustapha and I discussed a lot of the differences between the situations of Muslims 
in the United Kingdom and France, and agreed on the significance of the 
assimilation/mvlûculimB]ism distinction. Uiis leads us to the second point, difficulties 
faced by Muslims vis-à-vis British and French societies. Like many in both countries, 
Mustapha thought that the British approach was much more open. One popular belief 
was that it was easier to be Muslim hi the United Kingdom than hi France, and this was 
expressed by a wide variety of respondents—Muslim and ‘non-Muslim’, ‘practising’ and 
‘non-practishig’, Imams and ‘ordinaiy’ Muslims, men and women—on both sides of the 
Channel. Difficulties for Muslims in France which were often cited included the affaire 
du foulard^ media and pohtical discourses which associate Islam with teirorism, 
impediments to the constmction of mosques, the rise of the Front National, and racism.
Although racism exists hi both countries, Ismael attempted to contrast the basis for 
racism hi France with that of the United Kingdom. He saw French racism as something 
which is strongly based on skin colour. For example, when he told a French person that 
he was Moroccan, the French person would keep a distance (though this didn’t 
necessarily seem to be anything to do with skin coloui). By contrast, in the United 
Kingdom this would depend on his behaviour (he seemed to be basing this on the bowler 
hat stereotype of the British). He said that ‘Ar abs’ are much more convivial—they hke 
to be with then fiiends and families, and to crack jokes at each other’s expense, which 
the French would find insulting or even threatening. However, tliis is an unusual 
perception; a more common stereotype, hi my experience, is that British racism is based 
on skin colour, and French racism is based on ability to speak French fluently and 
‘without an accent’.
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Finally, on sectarian influences, I commented to Nairn that Islam in France appeared 
to be much less sectarian than in the United Kingdom, but he disagreed with me 
completely. There are two main mosques in Roubaix, where he lives and works as a 
social worker, the Mosquée Ad~Dccwa in me Aichimède and the Mosquée Abou Bakr in 
place Faidherbe. According to Nairn, the Imams never agree on anything, one says black 
and the other says white. One Imam, for example, citing verses from the Qur’an and 
Hadith, will say that Muslims should boycott North African shopkeepers who seU alcohol 
in then shops, the other Imam will take a different line. Shortly before I interviewed 
Naim, an Imam in Belgium, in a town just across the border, was calling eveiyone to a 
jihad (in the sense of holy war), but other Imams in the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing area 
have come out against that kind of statement. So there is a kind of sectarianism in 
France as well, which can influence the membership of particular umbrella organisations, 
as discussed earher in this chapter, and be a source and expression of a diversity of 
Muslim identities.
6.7. Conclusion: Muslim identities as responses to Western representations
This chapter has identified numerous examples of Muslim identities—their sources, 
modes of expression, and significance—and ideal types which enable us to understand 
their conq)lexity and diversity. The chapter has shown that there are a number of 
different ways hi which the nature and meaning of Islam are understood, and in which 
Islam is expressed. It has shown that this has a significant and diverse impact on Muslim 
identities, because, firstly, there are diverse som ces of Muslim identities, which are often 
^related to the way in which Islam is understood and expressed, and, secondly, because 
Muslim identities are always combined with other identities, and this alters the
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understanding and expression of the Muslim identity and the multiple identities of the 
Muslim.
The Muslim identities which 1 have described in this chapter often have elements of 
a response to Western representations of Islam. For example, a positive approach to 
laïcité is particularly weft developed by the Muslim theologian Tariq Ramadan (1994), 
who recognises that Westerners often consider laïcité and libeity so intertwined as to be 
inseparable, but also argues that it has contributed to the démonisation of Islam, and to a 
Muslim reaction against the West. Also, I argued that the imagination of Muslim histoiy 
often provides a means of counteiing Western criticisms of Islam, thus giving Muslims a 
sense of security and pride in then faith. Ahmed Deedat was particularly affected by the 
negative portrayal of Islam which he saw coming fiom Western Christian missionaries, 
and incorporated this into his defence of Islam through a similarly negative portrayal of 
Christianity.
What is particularly significant, however, is the contrast between the perception of 
Islam and Muslim identities as homogeneous, which was discussed in Part I of this thesis, 
and the rich diversity which has been discussed in this chapter. Sometimes this diversity 
leads to disagreements and divisions, sometimes to an appreciation of diversity. One 
useful way of looking at this diversity is to turn on its head the perception of Islam as 
static, and see Muslim identities as a constant attempt to ‘juggle’ (rather than synthesise) 
a number of different, sometimes opposite, aspects of Muslim life. Tliese can include the 
secular and the religious, integration and specificity, unity and diversity, maslak and 
ummah, belonging and practice, upbringing and conversion, the prepositional and the 
internal, history and the present, imagination and actuahty, exjreiience and youth, 
rspecifically Muslim identities and other identities, ethno-linguistic identification and faith, 
acceptance of authority and independence of thought.
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In reality, however, we need to examine arenas where Islam and the West actually 
meet each other in order to grasp this dialectic. It is true that Islam is now a part of the 
West, and, in a way, that the West is a part of Islam in some of its manifestations. But 
there are many arenas where perceptions of the West, to a greater or lesser degree, 
exclude Islam. One of these is the perception of the West as being comprised of nation 
states, which necessarily exclude people of other national (Pakistani, Algerian) or para- 
national {ummah) identities from consideration as part of the nation in the same way as 
‘the rest of us’. Another is the educational sphere, which has often been seen as having a 
duty to transmit Western values, and this can ahenate Muslim pupils, their parents and 
communities in different ways. Still another is the perception of the Chiistian West, 
which is at least related to the borders of Western Christendom in the eleventh centmy, 
and which, a fortiori, excludes people of another faith. These are arenas where we can 
examine the contemporary relations between Islam and the West, or between Orientalist 
representations and Muslim identities. Hence, the next three chapters address each of 
these arenas in turn, and each chapter begins at the point where this one ends.
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7. Muslims and national identities
7.1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter, expressed in the briefest possible way, is to answer a 
deceptively simple question: what does it mean to be Muslim and French, or to be 
Muslim and British? The theoretical background to this chapter can be found in Chapter 
5, in which I made four important arguments. Firstly, I argued that Muslim identities, 
like national identities, are progressive as well as regressive, because they look to the 
future as weU as the past, and that all group identities are healthy and morbid, because 
they combine inclusion and exclusion, bringing to individuals a sense of belonging and 
self-worth, offset by a loss of identification with human society as a whole. Secondly, I 
argued that large-scale group identities are, in a sense, simulations of national identities, 
and that they must be understood in terms of their relationship with national identities. 
This would involve identifying their cultural, ethnic and religious foundations, and 
looking at the relative importance and mearrings of cultural, ethnic, religious and national 
identities. Thh dly, I looked at the concept of the ummah, and cited the argument of Ron 
Geaves (1996: 10-27, 41-4), that it had evolved through different periods of Islamic 
history, from the small group of believers in Mecca to post-war labour migration to the 
West. I argued that at the end of the twentieth century, the ummah has become a non- 
^territorial nation of the world’s Muslims, defined either exclusively (as people who 
follow fully the pillars of Islam and the sunnah) or inclusively (as all who were bom
215
Muslim). I argued that the exclusive definition had something in common with social 
nationalism, according to which one’s national identity was defined in terms of conscious 
adherence to a nation, its culture, values, and destiny, and that the inclusive definition 
had more in common with ethnic nationalism, where national identity is considered to be 
transmitted through blood ties. Fourthly, I argued that Muslims in the West have been 
defined in racialised terms, for example ‘Pakistani’ or 'maghrébin\ terms which may 
connote an irreconcilable ‘racial’ difference based on a perception of somatic features, 
such as skin colour, and which have particular significance in the context of power 
relations in the West. Because of the centrahty of the Arabian peninsula to Islam, and 
the origins of many Western Muslims in North Africa, Pakistan and elsewhere, MusHms 
in the West are defined as belonging elsewhere, while legitimated power belongs to those 
who are perceived as belonging here.
There is also an empirical background to this chapter, which can be found in 
Chapter 6. Section 6.5 was concerned with the combination of Mushm identities with 
other identities, and I suggested that, in this respect, the major issue of importance in 
France was the question of nationality and citizenship, or being Muslim and French, 
wlrich is central to debates about irrtegration, assimilation and multiculturahsm. This is 
also relevant to the United Kingdom, as I shall demonstrate, hr Chapter 6, I identified a 
threefold classification for the combination of Muslim identities with other identities, 
which were labehed a ‘Muslim-and-therefore’ identity (either contingent on, a necessary 
corollary oft or strongly affected by a Muslim identity), a ‘Mushm-and-nevertheless’ 
identity (where a degree of incompatibility is perceived between the two identities), and a 
‘Mushm-and-also’ identity (neither specifically Muslim, nor incompatible with Islam, but 
simply different).
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Following from this, there are several questions which this chapter addr esses, with 
reference to empirical and theoretical data. What is the relationship between Muslim 
identities and national identities? What is the relationship between Muslim 
understandings of the ummah and of the nation? What are the crrltmal, ethnic and 
rehgious foundations of these relationships, and, in this respect, what is the significance 
of the raciahsation of Muslims? And finally, what is the effect on the politics of 
integration, and debates about nationality and citizenship, in both the United Kingdom 
and France?
Although some of these issues may appear to be more relevant to France than the 
United Kingdom, questions about the nation are hugely important in United Kingdom 
politics (which is given an added poignancy by the fact that I am writing this in 
Scotland). For this reason, and because the United Kingdom material sheds hght on the 
French material and vice-versa, this chapter, like others in this thesis, is stmctured in 
such a way as to enable me to intertwine the discussions of the United Kingdom and 
France at some points, while also analysing the two countries separately where 
appropriate. Fir stly, then, I discuss the significance of national identities to Muslims, 
considering the concept of the ummah and the importance of unity to Muslims, the 
significance of national identities in so-called Muslim countries, and the identification of 
Muslim and ethnic identities which does sometimes take place. Following on fr om this, I 
discuss the combination of Muslim identities with national identities, suggesting that 
there is often a threefold tension between Muslim identities, identification with a Muslim 
coimtry of origin, and identification with the Western country of residence. This also 
highlights the significance of migration as a variable which influences the constmction 
and interaction of Muslim identities and national identities. Finally, I look at the politics 
of integration and multiculturahsm, which is an area where there is an apparent contrast
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between the United Kingdom and France (between multicultnraUsm and intégration), but 
where there is striking similarity of practice, and of issues which face Mushms in their 
everyday hves. Here, I consider the different models of the nation, the attitudes of 
Muslims to intégration and assimilation in France, comparisons with the United 
Kingdom through the eyes of Muslims on both sides of the channel, as well as my own, 
and the views of intemewees about how integr ation can be best accomplished, an issue 
which begins the conclusion to this chapter.
7.2. Islam and national identities
When we address these issues, we do so in the context of a world of nation states 
and national identities. As I have argued throughout this thesis, the construction of 
identities must be understood as a dialectic of Self and Other, in which we are constantly 
engaged. As this is also the case with national identities, we can say that they are, in a 
sense, rooted in basic human attitudes, and that they endure even as the nation state 
passes hito history. As a result, it is possible that the decline of the nation state is leading 
to a kind of anomie, which results in people identifying themselves with a rehgious or 
national community, not necessarily congruent with a state. Such a commurrity gives a 
sense of belonghrg, and the basis for a Self-Other dichotomy, leading to an emphasis on 
identity as well as gradual fragmentation, polarisation and conflict. Sami Zubaida (1993; 
152-3) points to:
... one particular form [of Islam], specially relevant to popular attitudes, which 
is ‘commrmahsf ideas and sentiments. This is Islam as an ‘ethnic marker’ 
marking the boundaries of a community (or ‘imagined community’) as against
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others identified in terms of different religions. This form of communal 
identification, we may add, is quite common throughout the world, historical 
and modern. Communalist sentiments are ofl;en competitive, and under suitable 
conditiorrs break out into open conflict and struggles.
hr the Middle East, many Arab governments and Islamic groups assume that they 
have the right, even responsibility, to protect people outside then own national 
territories. The post-imperialist map of the Middle East has not been based on the 
principle of the nation state, and this has lent legitimacy to the allegiance oft say, a Slri’a 
Muslim in Beirut to the governmerrt of han, rather than Lebanon. Where nation-state 
hegemony has not been established, we should not be surprised that authority, and 
allegiance to authority, is informal and fiagmented. Yet Middle Eastern states are 
expected to behave as if they were nation states, which maintains a degr ee of Western 
control over former colorrial territories, and means that national identities within these 
states exist without the nation state. The alternative to nation-state nationalism may be 
an expanded ethnic dimension, but it may also be cultural, linguistic or religious. Islam is 
certainly becoming a powerful legitimator of supra-national identities, and therefore an 
important basis for a Self-Other dialectic, and an important factor hr nationahstic 
corrfiicts. This may be the case with other religions as well, though my co m m ents are of 
course confined to Islam and Muslim identities.
hr fact, national identities do constitute a very particular dilemma for Muslims. On 
the one hand, they have played a leading role in liberatmg ‘Muslim’ countries from 
‘Western’ rule, and in some cases this has led to some sort of Islamic government 
(though, of comse, not all Muslims are convinced that this is a good thing). In a world 
of nation states, it seems as if Islam must ally itself with the nation in order to fulfil its
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raison d ’être as a total system, as din wa dawla (religion and government). On the other 
hand, the emergence of national identities has historically been part of a wider process 
which also includes secularisation, leading to a shift fiom religious identities to national 
identities, and there is a rare consensus on this pomt among writers on the subject of 
nationahsm (see, for example, Anderson 1991: 9-19; Hobsbawm 1991: 67-79; McCrone 
1998: 93; though cf. Hastings 1997: 185-209). Furthermore, national (and ethnic) 
sentiments or identities can undermine the unity of the ummah, and they can lead to a 
confiision of national or local customs with the values and practices of Islam, or even a 
subordination of rehgious imperatives to the expediency of the nation state.
There is an agreement here between the academic hterature and the emphical data 
fi om my research. It was for reasons such as those just described that Abbas, a doctoral 
student in Glasgow who was fiom fiaq, insisted on the importance of distinguishing 
between Islam and specific countries which, though they were supposedly Muslim 
countries, had leaders who were ‘against Islam’. They did respect Islam, he argued, but 
out of pohtical necessity. Similarly, a letter to the New Internationalist made the 
fohowing argument:
Nationalism ... is one of those erroneous concepts wliich was innovated by 
European coloniahsts and then exported to then subordinates. I agree with 
Eric Hobsbawm who wrote that ‘the world of the next century whl be largely 
supranational’. I beheve one of those Super-States will arise in the Mushm 
world very soon caUed the Khilafah, the Ruling system of Islam. Islam 
condemns nationahsm vehemently. The Prophet Mohammed said: ‘He is not
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one of us who calls for asabiyyah (nationahsm) or who fights or dies for it. ’
He also said: ‘He who calls for nationahsm is as if he hit his father’s genitals.
There are three important problems with this argument. Firstly, it makes the error 
of characteiismg nationahsm as solely a mechanism for repression—it is, in part, a 
mechanism for repression, but it is also an ideology which inspires hberation. Secondly, 
the behef in the Khilafah would be regarded as anachronistic or eccentric by many other 
Mushms. Thir dly, the writer corrfiises the seventh- centmy concept of asabiyyah with the 
modern concept of nationahsm. In fact, as Erwin Rosenthal (1965: 18) points out, 
asabiyyah has not, in Mushm history, been considered fundamentaUy inimical to Islam:
‘Asabiya is a concept of Ibn Khaldun’s that has aroused the opposition of 
modem orthodox Muslim thinkers, who regard it as contrary to Islam. In fact, 
he stresses its significance, saying it is needed for the success of prophecy and 
of da‘wa.,.. Its foremost role, however, he assigns to the power-state, for 
'asabiya is a corporate feeling; a common bond, due in the first place to ties of 
blood and family tradition, creating a sense of sohdarity; it inspires common 
action and is an indispensable driving force m the formation of states and 
dynasties.
Nevertheless, the argument made in the letter to the New Internationalist is not 
uncommon, and it expresses an important aspect of Islam, which is a valorisation of unity 
and an opposition to factionahsm This can also be seen in the Hadith which says that 
fthe commurrity of Muslims would spht into seventy-thr ee sects ifiraq) after the death of
New Internationalist, 282, 1996, p.2.
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Muhammad, of which only one would be saved, while the others went to hell (Chebel 
1995: 316). The problem is that no isolated individual can express this opposition to 
factionahsm in a way which has any impact, nor can one simply identify oneself with the 
whole ummah at the expense of identification with a particular group, a ‘face-to-face 
community’, of Muslims, hr order to express this opposition to factionahsm effectively, 
one must be part of a group with a strong consciousness of having a particular mission of 
restoring the unity of the ummah. hr other words, paradoxically, one must be part of a 
faction. Bassam Tibi (1997: 219-20) expresses the dilemma between Islamic projects 
and ethno-national contexts as foUows:
Now, the claim of Islamic fimdamentahsts is urriversal, but the reahties they are 
operating within are related, amorrg others, to ethiric, sectarian and natiorral 
strife. Thus, in Islamic fundamentahsm we can observe a mix of ethnicity, 
nationahsm and sectarian tivahies (Sruma versus Shi‘a) combined with a 
rhetoric of universal claims.
In theoretical terms, there is a parahel here between nationahsm and Islam. 
Nationahsm is always a fundamentally specific doctrine, that is, a doctrine which is 
articulated in connection with one particular state, territory or people. However, it also 
makes a claim to universahty, that all people belong to a nation (a claim which demands 
some reflection to appreciate how astorrishing it is), arrd that this is a urriversal law of 
historical development, or even the nature of things, hr parallel, Islam as a political or 
quasi-pohtical project is articulated in the context of the nation state, but it makes a 
rurriversal claim on behalf of the entire ummah, or even the whole of humarrkind.
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It is possible to take further the particularising aspect of this argument, and assert 
that the Islamic project is often the project of a particular etlmic group. For example, the 
Taleban in Afghanistan, often portrayed as the most ‘extreme’ ‘Islamic fundamentahst’ 
group which can be found, are almost entirely members of the Pashtun ethnic group, 
which also has connections to the ruling classes in Pakistan. This has been a source of 
conflict with other ethnic groups, particularly the Persian-speaking Tajiks in the province 
of Herat, who have accused the Taleban of attempting to establish Pashtun hegemony 
(Tirard-Collet 1997).
In order to understand this, and, more particularly, to understand the connection 
with Muslims and national identities in Western Em ope, we must consider the following 
argument. Wlren Islam is conceived as din wa dawla in a world of nation states, the ideal 
would be for the principles of nation-state goverirment to follow the principles 
enunciated by Islam qua religion, hr reahty, however, the reverse may be the case, and 
anyone who does not belong to the national group would be perceived as an Other in 
religious as well as national terms. This is a logical argument, but there are emphical 
examples of it which have aheady been cited in this thesis. Kahina and Rachid both felt 
that they were not accepted as Mushm in Glasgow because they were not Pakistani. At 
the same time, they felt that this was honic because then North Afiican origin made them 
closer to Ar ab culture and the (sacred) Arabic language than people of Pakistani origin. 
So they felt that people of Pakistani origin, by identifying a Muslim rehgious identity 
with a Pakistani national identity, regarded them as Other, but at the same time they 
perceived Islam, to some extent, in terms of its relationship with an Ar ab (pan-)national 
identity.
Of course, the ideal for Mushms is expressed in the concept of the ummah, which 
coimotes a community of the world’s Mushms, in which differences of national or ethrric
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identity are laid aside. As I argued in section 6.4, the preoccupation with international 
issues (such as Palestine or Bosnia) in many Muslim publications, and even informai 
discussions among Muslims, point to Islam as world consciousness, and this consolidates 
the idea of the ummah. When I talked with Abdallah on this subject, he argued that the 
ummah was a ^communauté de pensée\ that Muslims could not come together irr the one 
country, but that their union, or community, became particularly tangible when they went 
to Mecca. He said that the hajj created an awareness that Muslims were a community 
which transcended not only national boundaries, but also time, since they were walking 
on the same ground, and round the same Kaaba, where the Prophet had beeir in the 
seventh centmy.
But, as Ali told me in Glasgow, Muslims are not always one ummah, because the 
difficulties of Muslims hr one part of the world are often ignored by Muslims elsewhere. 
The ummah is simply too big to be a fimctioning community, and so Muslims more 
readily identify themselves with other Muslims with whom they are in regular contact. 
Frequently, this means members of their national and/or ethnic community.
7.3. The combination of Muslim identities and national identities
There is often a threefold tension between Muslim identities, identification with a 
Muslim country of origin (a Pakistarri or Ar ab identity, for example), and identification 
with the Western coimtry of residence (for example, France or the Uirited Kingdom). 
Let us take a hypothetical example of a Muslim, bom in the Urrited Kingdom to parents 
who were bom in Pakistan. His national identity is aheady subject to tension, because he 
rwishes to assert that he is British, and therefore has the same formal rights in the United 
Kingdom as any other British person, while at the same time identifying himself with
224
Pakistan, where many of his relatives live, and where he perceives his roots as being. 
Because he has been born and brought up in the United Kingdom, he has met Muslims of 
many different origins, including British converts, and so he makes a clear separation 
between Muslim and Pakistani identities, wliich his parents do not. hi reahty, this is not 
merely a hypothetical example, but one which describes the situation of many Muslims, 
some of whom I have met.
There are different aspects of this situation in piint. There have been many articles 
on Pakistan in magazines which are pubhshed for Muslims in the United Kingdom, like 
Q-News and Trends, and these magazines are diiected at younger Muslims. However, 
there is also a noticeable distancing from Pakistan. The cover of one issue of Trends 
asked the provocative question: 'Pakistan: Was it a mistake?’.A n o t h e r  article in Q- 
News asserted that: ‘Pakistan is becoming httle more than a sentimental backdrop for a 
generation bom and raised in Britain.’ Samina, a Muslim woman who migrated from 
Pakistan to the United Kingdom in the 1960s at the age of seven, was mteiviewed for the 
article and described her own sense of identity in a way which is similar to the 
hypothetical example I have just given:
One day my friend dragged me along to the Central Mosque where I saw 
Muslims of different races and colours together for the fii st time, many of them 
inteimarried. That was when it hit me that despite all our differences we all had 
something in common—our faith.
Suddenly bemg Muslim was more important than anything else. We all have 
multiple identities but there must be a dominant one. I found that Islam gave
Trends, Vol. 7, Issue 4, n .d , p .l.
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me direction, it gave me a sense of serenity and peace knowing who I am. I felt 
comfortable in a way that simply being Pakistani didn’t allow me to feel.
That didn’t mean seveiing the umbilical cord with my motherland. I was still 
Pakistani and Pathan. Part of me is also British. But my faith allows me to be 
all these things so long as I remember that Islam conditions all of them.
As this example illustrates, Muslims often argue that there is no tension between 
then different identities, but that they are compatible in some respects and complimentaiy 
in others. The logical difficulties which this presents to the researcher are frequently 
overcome, or simply ignored, m eveiyday hfe. One documented example from the 
United Kingdom is of members of the Naqshbandi Sufi order, in then centre in London, 
wealing different coloured turbans which identify then nationahty, as well as the fact that 
they are Muslims, Sufis, and members of the Naqshbandi order with an allegiance to 
Sheikh Nazim. Ah Ko se (1996: 162-3) writes that: ‘In general, Germans wear puiple, 
Enghsh wear green, and black members wear red turbans. Green and white turbans are 
commonly worn by all nationahties; e.g. one can see a black member wear a green 
tmban, but none of the Germans would wear a red turban. ’
On what is perhaps a more mimdane level. Hassan had been bom m Algeria, but 
also claimed to be of French culture {"je me prétends de culture aussi française^) since 
his education had been in French, and he had ‘deepened’ his understanding of Islam 
{"mon approfondissement en Islam") in France. Daoud told me that he had not been able 
to practice his Islam freely m Egypt, particularly since he was in the army, and that it was 
easier to practice in the United Kingdom. He was impressed with Western tolerance and 
y fr eedom, something which many inteiviewees repeated. When I asked Abdallah what
Q-News, 275, 5-18 September 1997, p. 20-21.
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Islam was for him, in the context of the common perception that being Muslim and 
French are mutually incompatible, he replied:
Je suis français, je suis né français, ça c’est une appartenance qui vient à tous 
qui habitent en ce territoire.... Donc c’est ça que nous voulons, mais, donc moi 
personnellement, chacun a une rehgion, chacun veut organiser sa vie 
communautahe, et moi, j ’ai envie de l’organiser comme l’Islam l’a fixé, l’a 
étabh. Donc, pom moi, l’Islam, c’est un mode de vie..., c’est de l’ordre du 
privé, mais ... l’Islam gère les relations pubhques, les relations entre les gens. .. 
L’Islam gère tout. H gère les rapports sociaux. H gère la personne depuis sa 
naissance jusqu’à sa mort, que ça soit à sa naissance, à son maniage, à son 
divorce (parce qu’il a des enfants). H gère tout. H gère tous les aspects de la 
vie de la personne. H donne des directives à suivre dans les rapports avec ses 
voisins, dans les rapports avec les autres religions, avec les chrétiens, avec les 
juifs, dans ses rapports avec les autres en général.
So, for Abdallah, like Samina who is cited above, his Muslim identity was sometliing 
which enabled him to claiify his other identities and social roles. But for him, and for 
many who argued that being Muslim and French at the same time was unproblematic, 
there was still the problem of how to unite the universahty of Islam with the particular 
demands of French society. Amar Lasfar ex[)lained that Islam was a universal rehgion—
‘I aiii French, I was born French, that is a belonging wliich conies to everyone who lives in this 
country.,.. So that’s what we want, but, for me personally, everyone wants to organise their community 
Uife, and I want to organise it as Islam has fixed it, established it. So, for me, Islam is a way of life..., it’s 
something private, but ... Islam directs relations in public, relations between people. .. Islam directs 
everything. It directs social relations. It directs a person from birth to death, whether that be at birth, 
marriage, divorce (because the person has children). It directs everything. It directs all aspects of a 
person’s life. It gives directives to follow in relations with neiglibours, in relations with other religions, 
with the Christians, with the Jews, in relations with others in general.’
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only one third of Muslims being Ar abs—and that there were no differences between 
Islam in Morocco, France or Pakistan. However, the practice of Islam in any of these 
countries had to take aceount of the ‘particularities’ {"particularités") of the country, 
both because Islam was flexible enough to accommodate cultural differences, and 
because it was important to avoid causing an affront to the society in question. As a 
practical example of this ethos, the Lille Sud mosque organised lessons to teach people 
French and Arabic, like many mosques in the United Kingdom which have classes in 
Enghsh, Arabic and Urdu. Amar Lasfar insisted that Arabic was taugirt as a hving 
language which also enabled Muslims to learn their rehgion—although it was definitely a 
second language for those bom in France, it enabled them to understand their history and 
culture ‘of origin’.
For others, however, there was a real tension between being Muslim and being 
French, which caused them to emphasise one and neglect or negate the other. Jean cited 
Michel Foucault, arguing that to understand one’s own culture, one had to leave it, go 
elsewhere and look at it from a distance. I asked him if moving to France had enabled 
him to understand Moroccan culture better. His answer was quite complex, and linked 
the question of his national identity, or the tension between his national identities, with 
the issue of assimilation. He had arrived in France at too early an age to be asking 
‘metaphysical’ questions, but his upbringing in the very cosmopolitan city of Casablanca 
helped him to understand French culture, and that hr turn helped him to understand his 
own culture of origin. He pointed out that being French meant being from somewhere, 
for example Paris, Brittany or Alsace, and that he was also from somewhere. In this 
sense, the principles of assimilation and droit à la différence were not incompatible.
I In contrast, Ahmed, who had married a French Catholic woman, described a 
situation of tension between identification with a Muslim country of origin and
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identification with the Western country of residence. A French couple refused to be 
married by a woman of North Afiican origin, even though she was actually a French 
citizen, elected to a municipal council, and the daughter of a Harki who had fought on 
the French side in the Algerian war of independence. Questions of identification with the 
nation state do not hmit themselves to questions of one’s own self identity, but they 
necessitate a consideration of the extent to which one is accepted by other members of 
the same national group, hi formal terms, these are the issues which are considered in 
the pohtics of integration and multiculturahsm, so this discussion can be continued into 
the next section.
7.4. The politics of integration and multiculturalism
It could be argued that the United Kingdom and France constitute opposing models 
of the nation. The United Kingdom model is of a nation state which incorporates 
different nations—England, Scotland, Wales and Northern heland—with different 
histories, cultures, languages. So, when we refer to the nation, it is unclear whether tliis 
means the whole of the United Kingdom or one of its constituent parts, hi France 
however, it is taken as read that there is a high degree of congruence between the French 
nation, the French state, the French language, French citizenship, and so on. So, in the 
United Khigdorn there has been a de facto multiculturalism for centuries, while the 
process of nation building in France, since the revolution of 1789, has necessitated an 
assimilationist policy.
Let us consider how the United Kingdom model of the nation state affects Muslims 
(in Scotland, since that is where I did much of my research, and because that is where the 
consciousness of the multinational complexity of the United Kingdom is particularly
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developed. There are important differences between Scotland and England as regards 
interaction between the model of the nation and the situation of Muslims. Fir stly, people 
in Scotland are faced with a tension between a British and a Scottish identity, and this 
affects Muslims as well. In part, this often means that their national identities are 
particularly complex (for example, Muslim, Pakistani, British and Scottish), and in part it 
means that they live in a society where a complex national identity is the norm. 
Secondly, Scotland and England have differ ent histories of migration and racism. Since 
1945, the patterns of migration to Scotland have meant that the ‘ethnic minorities’ are 
mostly of South Asian origin (about 90 per cent), while migration to England has created 
much more ‘ethnic’ diversity (see, for example, Bowes, McCluskey and Sim 1990c). 
Thirdly, the United Kingdom model of the nation state brings about different 
relationships between national identities and migration. As Robert Miles (1993: 77-8) 
points out, ‘Asian migrants to Scotland have not been the object of a systematic and 
hostile pohtical agitation as happened in England (although this is not to deny that racist 
images of these migrants are commonly expressed in everyday life in Scotland)’. To 
explain this, he argues:
... pohtical nationahsm in Scotland dming the twentieth century has tended to 
focus on the perceived economic and pohtical disadvantages of the Union. 
Nationahsm in Scotland during the 1960s and 1970s therefore identified an 
external cause of economic disadvantage/decline, without reference to ‘race’, 
while in England the idea of ‘race’ was employed to identify an internal cause 
of crisis, the presence of a ‘coloured’ population which was not ‘truly’ British.
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However, there are also things which Scotland and England have in common as a 
result of the de facto multicultmalism which I have identified as existing between the 
constituent parts of the United Kingdom. This reflects a common principle of 
multicultmalism throughout the United Kingdom, and, as many of my respondents in 
France pointed out, the flip side of this can be a degree of ghettoisation. hi Glasgow, 
people of South Asian origin are concentrated in the Woodlands and 
Govanhill/Pollokshields areas, which is where most of Glasgow’s mosques are found 
(see the map in Figme 6.5, in the previous chapter). So the diversity which the United 
Kingdom and multiculturalism represent in theory may have a homogenising or 
ghettoising impact in practice.
The contrast between the French system of integration and the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
model of multicultmalism is common in French academic and journalistic discourse, but I 
think it is overstated. Hassan was concerned about the ghettoisation imphcit in the 
multicultural model, and this concern was shared by other inteiviewees in France. When 
I pointed out to him that the development of an ‘ethnic minority’ middle class may be 
reducing this ghettoisation, and suggested that neither the United Kingdom nor the 
French model would work in the other countiy, he agreed that the volonté, the will of 
people, was a more important factor than the actual model. There are two other reasons 
for my assertion that the contrast between the Anglo-Saxon model of multicultmahsm 
and the French model of assimilation is highly overstated, and hence being increasingly 
challenged (see, for example, Crowley 1992; Wieviorka, ed., 1997). Fiistly, 
multicultmahsm denotes the principle, or philosophy, of integration in the United 
Kingdom, but not the practice. Secondly, assimilation has nothing like the importance 
^which it once had in France—as a concept, it is somewhat passé, though still supported 
by some pohticians, academics, activists and ordinaiy people, hi reality, the United
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Kingdom and France share a common practice on the pohtics of integration—expecting 
so-called ‘immigrants’ or ‘ethnic minorities’ to integrate, while at the same time making 
it impossible.
Nevertheless, this contrast has been made, and the piinciple of assimilation in 
France has been challenged in recent years, by the activities of migrant and anti-racist 
organisations, Mushm movements and campaigns such as the struggle to wear the hijab 
in state schools, and also by the extreme right. Some have been particularly attracted by 
the multicultuial model. For example, Amar Lasfar argued that everybody belongs to a 
community—and that this is something natural—whether it be a family, a community of 
interests (such as culture or sport), or a rehgious or national community. He felt that 
criticisms of the United Kingdom model were misplaced, and that Mushms in the United 
Kmgdom were more relaxed, more ‘free’, and less likely to be considered a danger. 
Even if there was an element of ghettoisation, it did not necessarily imply that the 
different communities were mutuaUy antagonistic.
Amo Ferhati, the dir ector of Espace Intégration, argued that multiculturahsm was a 
system of integration by despah {"une façon de s ’intégrer par désespoir"), because it 
was the only one left hr France. Abdallah seemed to suggest that it was not the model of 
assimilation which was the problem, but rather its apphcation to the Mushm communities 
in France. It had not posed a particular problem to people who migr ated fr om Poland, 
Spam or Portugal, because they were of the same rehgious origin {souche) as the French. 
But the Muslims had a different system, a different rehgion, and a different identity, 
which they refused to give up. Among Mushms, support for the principles of integration 
and laïcité alongside criticism of then inter-pretation and apphcation has been expressed 
with the pluase "pour l ’intégration, contre l ’assimilation" (a phrase which was used by 
Fatima and AbdaUah). Amar Lasfar expounded tliis principle as foUows:
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Or, aujourd’hui, malheureusement, surtout ici en France ce qu’on est en train 
de demander aux musulmans, et surtout aux musulmans parce que c’est eux qui 
sont concernés aujourd’hui par l’intégration, on leur demande de se fondre dans 
un moule fiançais. Le mot moule fiançais, qu’est-ce que ça veut dire? C’est-a- 
dire le devoir à la ressemblance, que vous devez me ressembler. Or c’est 
comme dire qu’il y a une seule France, c’est comme due qu’il y a un seul visage 
à la France. Nous disons qu’on ne peut pas fondre les gens, on ne peut pas 
fondre les valeurs cultmehes, les valeurs sphituelles, les valeurs historiques, on 
ne peut pas passer comme s’il y a une planche sur des valeurs qui ont des 
années et des années ... d’existence.
For Amar Lasfar and Saïd, different values, including Muslim ones, could only 
emich French society, so attempts to assimilate them, causing them to lose their 
specificity, was not only damaging to Muslims, it was damaging to France as well. Of 
course, the support for intégration combined with an opposition to assimilation was 
exphcit in France, and expressed in these terms, but similar sentiments were expressed in 
the United Kingdom. For example, the Islamic Society of Britain has argued that 
Muslims need to shed the image of Islam as ‘the immigrant rehgion’, but they still have a 
distinctive and exphcit agenda for propagating Islam and challenging social injustice and 
exploitation. According to the United Kingdom Muslim magazine Q-News\ ‘Educational 
attainment and integration has failed to improve the employment prospects of second and
‘Now today, unfortunately, especially here in France, what is being asked of the Muslims, especially 
’of Muslims because i f  s them who are at the centre of concern about integration, they are being asked to 
melt into a French mould. The word French mould, what does that mean? It means the duty of 
resemblance, that you must be like me. Well i f  s like saying that there’s one sole France, it’s like saying 
that France only has one face. We say that people caimot be melted, cultural values, spiritual values, 
historical values cannot be melted, you can’t pass over values, like on a plank, when they have existed 
for years and years.’
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thii’d generation British Muslims’; implying that Muslims have made integration a 
priority, but, in the words of the headline; ‘Britain shuns Muslim integration’/^^
There are two issues which are of significance here: the fact of disciimination, and 
the priority which is given to integration by Muslim actors themselves. Like Q-News, 
Abduhahman thought that the main problems in the United Kingdom related to 
employment and qualifications. People fiom the ‘ethnic minorities’, even graduates, 
found it difficult to get employment due to disciirohiation—many ended up having ‘a job 
Hke a bus conductor’ or being self-employed—and progress up the career ladder was 
hampered due to a lack of training and encouragement, as well as discrimiiiation. Daoud 
compared the situations of Muslims fiom the Indian subcontinent who had come to the 
United Kingdom with those who had gone to the USA. He said that Muslims who had 
come to the United Kingdom came initiaUy as labourers, intending to coUect money and 
return home ‘to buHd a factoiy or something’, constantly saying ‘I’ll go home next year’, 
but then Hfe in the United Kingdom eventuaUy became peimanent, whereas Muslims 
who went to the USA went, for example, as scholars, doctors or students, leading to 
massive differences.
On the other hand, Abduhahman thought that baniers of language, culture and 
rehgion were often used as an excuse. Further, disciimination had other consequences, 
and he said that the situation regarding immigration restrictions was ‘reahy bad’, 
specificahy insofar as it prevented people’s relatives fiom coming to visit. He said that 
there was a fear o f ‘swamping’, leading to unemployment. This was only propounded by 
a hard core who were ‘extremely racist’, but it was also exjiloited by the Conservative 
party. The result was that ‘ethnic minorities’ were themselves blamed for the problems 
which faced them. He said that there was a need for partnership between rehgious
Q-News, 274, August 1997, p.6,
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bodies, ethnic iniuoiity organisations and employers to overcome this. The Ethnic 
Minorities Enteiprise Centre, where he worked, encouraged employers to look at 
positive action and consider "ethnic minorities’ as a potential workforce. He insisted that 
they were looking for equal representation, not preferential treatment (he cited the Race 
Relations Act which allows positive action but not positive discrimination). This shows 
that the work of "ethnic minority’ organisations, or associations which work for 
‘integration’, is highly significant in the United Kingdom, as it is in France and other 
countries. As I mentioned in Chapter 6, Naima’s counselling work, in a centre for 
"black’ and "ethnic minority’ women in Edinburgh, gave her an insight into the religious 
experiences of her clients, particularly the "fieezing’ of religion and culture among 
Muslims and "ethnic minorities’ in the United Kingdom. Her organisation was able to 
address some of these issues on a personal level, as private troubles rather than public 
issues.
Amo Ferhati’s association, Espace Intégration, was concerned with the integration 
of immigrants into French society, something which he contrasted with the anti-racist 
organisations like SOS-Racisme, who, he said, were too content with the immigrant 
identity:
Nous sommes pas là pour aider les immigrés à rester immigrés. Nous som m es  
là pour aider les immigrés à devenir français, et nous sommes là pour faire en 
sorte qu’ils aient, que nous ayons notre place, tous notre place dans tous les 
espaces pubhcs fiançais.
A vivid demonstration of the Europe-wide relevance of this point can be found in the European 
directory o f  migrant and ethnic minority organisations (Ô Maolâin 1996), which lists more than 10,000 
such organisations.
‘We are not there to help immigrants remain immigrants. We are there to help immigrants become 
French, and we are there in order to act so that they have, so that we have our place, that we all have our 
place in every French public space.’
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For him, this was a Repubhcan principle, but he was a long way from considering 
the France into which he was anxious to integrate Muslim and immigrant communities to 
be perfect:
Dans cette association qui est pom l’intégration à cent pour cent bien sûr, nous 
essayons de trouver des réponses concrètes au racisme, des réponses concrètes 
au respect des droits de l’homme, parce qu’en France on parle de la patrie des 
droits de l’homme. Dans la réalité c’est faux, c’est le contrahe. Les droits de 
l’homme c’est l’égahté des droits, l’égahté pour tous. Cette commmiauté n’est 
pas en situation égahtahe avec le reste de la population française. La France, 
c’est des branleurs intellectuels. Ça veut dhe quoi? Ils pensent être les 
meillems, ils pensent être le peuple élu du monde, et dans l’effet c’est le tout 
contrahe. Us se gargarisent la gorge avec de la théorie; dans l’effet c’est le tout 
contrahe. Alors nous, ce que nous faisons, on répond aux problèmes 
piincipaux de nos concitoyens qui sont les immigrés.
Though the piinciple of support for integration, but opposition to assimilation, was 
the most common among those who I inteiviewed, there was a minority support in 
France for assimilation, expressed most strongly by Jean. Within the context of the 
French debate, he contrasted the principle of assimilation with droit à la différence:
‘In this association which is o f course one hundred per cent for integration, we try to find concrete 
responses to racism, concrete responses to respect for human rights, because in France we speak of the 
countiy of human riglits [or the rights of man, as in the declaration of 26 August 1789]. In reality, 
nhat’s false, on the contrary. Human rights means equal riglits, equality for everyone. Tliis community 
is not in a situation of equality with the rest of the French population. France is a country of intellectual 
wankers. What does that mean? They think that they are the best, they think that they are the chosen 
people of the world, and in practice it’s the exact opposite. They gargle with theory in their throats; in 
practice it’s the exact opposite. So we, what we do, is to respond to the most important problems of our 
fellow citizens who are immigrants.’
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... c’est très controversé, mais je trouve qu’ü y a beaucoup plus de générosité 
dans l’assimilation que dans l’intégration... L’intégration, à la rigueur, on 
continue à cultiver cette question d’origine, à la riguem. C’est vrai, parce que 
pour l’instant c’est une vision d’mtégration, ce système, mais ça marchera 
pas.... n y a un risque de vivre d’une façon marginale. Par contre, 
l’assimilation peut être, si je le comprends, comme le droit d’être comme moi, 
le droit de partager mes valeurs. Moi, j ’ai pem que le droit à la différence se 
traduit quelquefois par l’exclusion....
Oui, mais le droit d'être comme moi, de partager mes valeurs, ça peut être 
aussi une obligation, pas seulement un droit...; c'estpas ça, l ’assimilation?
Pour moi, non. L’assimilation, pom* moi, c’est un droit, c’est pas une 
obligation.
There were différent ideas regarding how integration could be achieved, and this is 
to some extent reflected in the debate as to whether integration is a fait accompli or 
something which must be worked towards. Those who had ideas on this question tended 
to agree that integration had not yet been achieved, though there was some optimism, 
particularly as Muslims who were being born in the United Kingdom or France were 
frequently British or French citizens by bhth (thus, the issue of taking citizenship 
somehow "betraying’ Islam was becommg hrelevant). Some, like Amo Ferhati, insisted
‘... it’s very controversial, but I find that there is much more generosity in assimilation than in 
integration.... Integration, at the extreme, that question of origin continues to be cultivated, at the 
extreme. It’s true, because at the moment this system is a vision of integration, but it won’t work.... 
(There is a risk of living on the margins. On the other hand, assimilation can be, if I’ve understood, like 
the right to be like me, the right to share my values. Personally, I’m worried that the right to be 
different can sometimes be translated as exclusion....
‘'Yes, but the right to be like me, to share my values, that can also be an obligation, not ju st a right...; is 
that not what integration is?
‘Not for me. Assimilation, for me, is a right, it’s not an obligation.’
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ou the need to tackle racism and unemployment as a precondition for effective 
integration, while others, like Ahmed (who moved from Morocco to France partly 
because of the greater freedom of expression which he beHeved existed in France), 
emphasised that integration could only be achieved through culture, inter alia schools, 
hbraiies, cultmal associations, ait, music, architectuie, but not rehgious or political 
organisations. For Amo Ferhati, Europe was an opportunity to experiment with different 
foiTQS o f integration, notably the "Anglo-Saxon’ model o f multiculturalism, since the 
French model had faded. He argued that integration could only succeed if an élite 
franco-musulmane was created, which could raise the social and economic status of the 
Muslim population of France, and provide effective role models. This did not mean that 
Muslims had to achieve spectacular success, but that doctors, engineers, executives and 
managers could demonstrate that they had ‘succeeded’, and that this was something 
normal. At the same time, he argued that it was the Muslims who had to integr ate into 
French society, not vice-versa. He saw the affaire du foulard as showing a desire for 
integration, but that Muslims wanted France to do the integrating, rather than doing so 
themselves. He thought that there were similar occurr ences hi the United Kingdom, due 
to the principle of multicultur alism.
7.5. Conclusion
It is important to emphasise, particularly in the hght of the above discussion of ideas 
about how integration can best be made to work, that this integration problematic is to 
be rejected, even if it is an important issue for some actors. It is racism and the rejection 
 ^of difference which is the problem, not mtegration, and the right to integr ate is denied to 
a whole range of people who are labelled as deviant m some respect, not just those who
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are labelled as ‘foreigners’. Analytically speaking, all migrants to the West are aheady 
integrated as soon as they arrive. Many came in response to a request for migrant 
labour, so then very arrival was an act of economic integration. As Hans Enzensberger 
(1994; 135) writes;
New arrivals traditionally showed themselves extremely willing to adapt, even if 
it is doubtful that the famous ‘melting pot’ ever existed. Most were well able 
to distinguish between integration and assimilation. They accepted the written 
and unwritten norms of the society which took them in, but they tended to hold 
on to their cultural tradition—and often also to their language and rehgious 
customs.
Surely cultural diversity can only enrich a society, not destroy it. If integration has 
broken down, and been replaced with conflict, it is because of exphcit and institutional 
racism, not an unwillingness to integrate. And if a preoccupation with identity, or 
national identity, is a symptom of this corrflict, the causes are the same.
Although the Urrited Kingdom has proceeded on the basis of a theory of 
multicultui’ahsm, imderpinned by a discourse of race relations and the de facto 
multicultural model of the nation state, and although France has proceeded on the basis 
of a theory of assimilation, underpiruied by a discourse of intégration and the uniform 
model of the nation state, this chapter has argued that the practice of integration or 
rnulticulturahsm has been broadly similar, and that there is diversity within each country. 
This divergence between appearance and reaUty constitutes the essential context for the 
data which is presented m this chapter. So, we must recognise that national identities are 
complex, and that Muslim identities are no less so. As a result, we would not expect the
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interaction between national identities and Muslim identities to be anything other than 
complex.
However, this should not be taken as a counsel of despair. The work of Piene 
B our dieu (for example 1984, 1991) and C. Wright MUls (1959) should alert us to the 
contention that the job of the sociologist is to recognise chaos and divergence where 
there is apparent harmony, and to recognise order where there is an appearance of 
freedom and diversity, frr the same way, this thesis has generally emphasised the 
diversity of Muslim identities, and of representations of Islam, in a context where each 
side, so to speak, views the other as monoHthic. hi this chapter, however, we have taken 
what appears to be diverse—the contrasting models of the nation state and of integration 
in the United Kingdom and France—and shown that this hides a degree of homogeneity.
This may seem hke a strange conclusion, and somewhat out of step with the rest of 
this thesis. However, we should consider that there is a Western model of the nation 
state, and by this I mean, like Benedict Anderson (1991: 5-7), that the nation state is an 
imagined teiTitoiial community with fixed borders, which exclude all who are perceived 
to belong outside those borders. This model appHes equally to the United Kingdom and 
France, but it is necessary to create differences between nation states in order to justify 
this imaghring. By creating different models of the nation state, the Western model 
achieves legitimacy within the West. By exporting the model outside the West, as has 
been done, it achieves hegemony. Thus, Muslims are excluded from being frilly 
perceived as members of the nation state, and this exclusion is achieved not on the basis 
of a crusader ideology, or an Orientahst hnagming, but on the basis of modernity. It is 
this exclusion, and the responses and resistance which it has provoked, which has been 
'the subject of this thesis.
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8. The school and the hiiab
8.1. Introduction
The educational sphere is a site of frequent media debate regarding the place of 
Islam, and also an important site of socialisation in which the younger generation of 
Muslims can experience a tension or reconciliation of Muslim and Western cultures. As 
such, it is clearly an example of an arena where Islam and the West actually meet each 
other (following on from the end of Chapter 6), and, as such, it is of major relevance to 
the emergence of a dialectic of neo-Orientalist representations of Islam and the 
expression of Muslim identities. It is an arena where perceptions of the West, to a 
greater or lesser degree, exclude Islam, as the educational institutions of the West are 
often seen as having a duty to transmit Western values, and this can have an ahenating 
effect on Muslims within the educational sphere, which may also be felt by other 
Mushms.
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the relevant issues of contention in the 
educational spheres of the United Kingdom and France, and assess their relevance to 
Muslim identities. It begins by addressing the debates about state-funded Muslim 
schools in the United Kingdom, a countiy where the law expects state education to be 
‘broadly Christian’, and this is situated within a more diverse debate which also includes 
questions about religious education, physical education, sex education, and the provision 
of halal food for pupils. Then, it addr esses the French debate about the wearing of the
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hijab in state schools, the so-called affaire du foulard, wliich has dominated discussion 
about the place of Islam in French schools. Following this, I look at the meanings of the 
hijab in Orient ahst discourse, in the Qur’an, among opponents and supporters of the 
right of Muslim women and schoolgirls to wear the hijab, and for the women and 
schoolghls themselves. The pmpose of this is to problematise the debate, showing that it 
has been premised on the hijab having a single meaning, whereas in reahty it has diverse 
meanings. It is therefore of major importance to addressing the central hypotheses of 
this work, that Muslim identities are diverse, but perceived to be homogeneous, and that 
there is a connection between these phenomena, hi the conclusion, I look at the 
consequences of this analysis for the thesis as a whole, commenting on the complexity 
and wider significance of the debate, and the particular significance of the comparison 
between the United Kingdom and France.
8.2. The educational sphere: a comparison
In the United Kingdom, an important bone of contention has been the issue of gr ant- 
maintained status for Muslim schools. It was pointed out that state fimding was available 
for Roman CathoHc, Church of England and Jewish schools, but not Mushm schools, 
until the government approved such status for two Muslim schools on 9 January 1998. 
In The Guardian, there were a number of letters and articles which illustrate the 
complexity of this issue, and some similarities between Britain and France. Roy 
Hattersley, a self-confessed atheist, praised the decision, arguing that it marked "a long 
awaited advance in the creation of a multhacial society’, that ‘the idea of being British 
and Muslim will seem far less fanciful than it did before the aimouncement was made’, 
and that it would ‘undennine the undeshable extreme Islamic minority’ and ‘the fear of
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what is called Islamic fiuidamentalism’, since Mushms were being ‘welcomed into the 
mainstream of British society’.
On the other hand, Yasmin Ahbhai-Brown, a Muslim, wrote that, although her 
initial reaction was one of joy, she would not send her own children to a Muslim school:
Not because I don’t trirst them to provide my daughter with an adequate 
education (though there are schools which do dehberately cHp the aspirations of 
girls); not because the schools will provide recruits for a British intifada, or 
because I am ashamed of my religion. I am immensely proud to be a Muslim 
and love deeply my many Islamic cultural legacies. But separation is 
dangerous, as is the behef that victims automatically accrue vhtue and 
perfection.... Separated out, oiu' children might acqune an overdeveloped 
sense of their own special status and a sense of grievance.... The unanswerable 
question is whether they will get more or less mihtant surTOunded only by other 
Muslims with no experience, untd it is too late, of friendship and mutual respect 
between different faiths.
So, and this point must be emphasised, the issue cannot be seen as a straightforward 
fight between Muslims and non-Muslims, although some people on both sides would like 
to see it that way. At least one atheist was positive about Muslim schools, and at least 
one Muslim was negative. As m France, there is also a secularist opposition to the 
presence of Islam in the education system. A letter from the General Secretary of the 
National Secular Society read as follows:
The Guardian, 12.1.98, p. 14. 
The Guardian, 13.1.98, p. 15.
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It takes a huge leap of logic for Roy Hattersley to reach the conclusion that 
state-fimding of Muslim schools wiU undennine Islamic extremists. Surely, 
separating Muslim, Jewish and Christian children from their peers (including 
Hindus and Sikhs) can cause nothing but division and misunderstanding in 
society, as Northern Ireland will testify. Smely, a better way forward is to 
withdraw funding from aU rehgious schools, say over 10 years. Stop the 
separatism and allow children to mix fr eely with each other in then formative 
years. Only hi this way can there be any hope of easing hostiUties between 
races and rehgions.
The writer clearly did not intend to pick on Mushms, but rather to criticise the 
pubhc role of all rehgious bodies. But does a negative portrayal of rehgion hr general do 
anything to improve, or worsen, representations of Islam and of Muslims, or even the 
degree of Islamophobia? This is a particularly pertinent question when we consider that 
Islam is relatively powerless, particularly compared to Christianity in the United 
Kingdom, and that the Estabhshed Chmch of England has a significant role in the 
educational sphere (cf. Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997b: 24). 
Nevertheless, this is an open question, and I would not hke to commit myself either way.
The issue, which was raised by Jorgen Nielsen (1995b: 158), of whether children 
should be educated into a national culture, or whether parents should determine the 
natme of then children’s education, is also relevant to the place of Muslim pupils in 
British state schools. When a Muslim schoolteacher protested about Mushm pupüs 
singing Christmas carols, the editorial in The Independent read:
The Guardian, 14.1.98, p. 16,
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... for all that there may be genuine Muslim gripes against the hold of 
Christianity over state education, the Bhmingham maths teacher went too far. 
There is notliing wrong with a good Cluistmas sing-song, and most families, 
whatever then religion, should be glad for then children to participate.... AU 
parents are at Uberty to withdraw their children.... Teachers are mostly acutely 
sensitive to the different behef systems and cultural backgrounds of the pupUs 
in then care.... Learning about other rehgions and cultures, whether we choose 
to beheve m them or not, is an essential part of a rounded education. .. The 
rituals through which others worship arrd celebrate then faith are as much a 
part of rehgion as the names of the Gods they believe in. Teaching rehgion and 
cirlture through songs, stories and drama is probably the best way to 
communicate it to non-behevers, particularly young ones.... Mr Khan, the 
maths teacher, should have sat through the carol concert and enjoyed the 
singing, rather than perceiving the Christian songs as a threat to his own 
rehgion...
This commentary is in marked contrast to some interpretations of laïcité in France, 
as is outlined below. As weU as rehgious education, important issues which emerge in 
the state sector include sex education, physical education and the provision of halal 
meat:
... once immigrants from the Indian sub-continent started to bring in wives and 
to raise famihes, Islam moved into the pubhc sphere. Schools became one of 
' the first areas of conflict: Muslim parents demanded halal meat at first and.
The Independent, 20,12.96, p. 17.
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later, special clothing for ghls in PE classes and modifications of the sex 
education syUahus; some had objections to the teaching of evolution. Many 
were not happy with mixed-sex schools. Even the demand for halal meat was 
controversial at first, partly because it was not understood. ‘At one time the 
education committee said to us: “We already serve curry. Why do you want 
more?’” says Dr Bashh* Ahmed, a Manchester GP and the chairman of the 
city’s coimcil for mosques. But of coiuse what matters is how it’s prepared.
You can have Yorkshhe pudding and roast beef so long as the ingredients are 
halal
There was a reaction against this, which shows that misunderstanding, once 
challenged, could lead to hostdity:
The resulting conflicts coalesced aroimd the figure of a headmaster: Ray 
Honeyford, at the Drummond middle school in the heart of the Muslim 
Manningham area. Honeyford ... objected to the withdrawal of children fiom 
school for long hohdays at home, to the end of the bussing poUcy that had 
distributed Muslim children aroimd the city’s schools, and to the provision of 
halal meat. ‘How do we reconcile that sort of indifference to animal care with 
one of the school’s values, love of dumb creatures and respect for then 
welfare?’ he asked, a question that would have had a better ring had it not been 
echoed by the local National Front, which had its own agenda. Honeyford saw 
the school’s job as the transmission of Enghsh culture, which would assume 
, priority over the values with which the children arrived. A committee of local
131 The Independent, 5.12.95, pp. I, 2, 5.
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parents was formed to try and have hhn sacked. There were boycotts and 
demonstrations outside the school The coimcil dithered, and finally decided to 
be rid of him, saying that he had lost the confidence of parents. In 1986, he 
took early retirement.
French newspaper reports on the subject of Muslims and the educational sphere 
were dominated by the continuing affaire du foulard in the Lille area and elsewhere in 
France. The affaire du foulard fir st came to prominence in the Autumn of 1989, shortly 
after France had celebrated the bicentenary of the Revolution, when three Muslim 
schoolghls in the town of Creil, not far fiom Paris, were expelled for wearing the hijab, 
and refiising to remove it. fir so domg, they were judged to have itifiinged secular 
Repubhcan principles, or, more accurately, the principle of laïcité (the xmderstanding and 
apphcation of which has been central to this affah, and which is analysed in more detail 
in Chapter 9). This principle had been developed fi om the ideas of the Revolution, and 
was held to be an important guarantor of religious and civil liberties, and even of 
democracy itself. The debate had the appearance of dividing France in two: one part of 
France saw the hijab as an attack, either on French values or the universal value of 
laïcité; the other part saw its ban as a negation of those same principles, which implied 
tolerance, rehgious hberty, and the welcome of other people’s cultures and ideas. It was 
compared to the Dreyfus affah (see Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 1995: 11), which had 
polarised France with an even greater intensity, and had highhghted the centrality of 
rehgious intolerance in France, but, ironicahy, the Dreyfus affah was an important factor 
in the institutionahsation of laïcité, which was being used against those and other Mushm 
(schoolghls.
The Independent, 5.12,95, pp. 1, 2, 5.
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One person who I spoke to while doing ethnographic research in France told me, 
memorably, that: le foulard, c ’est pas un vêtemenf On one level, of comse, the
hijab is an item of clothing, but there are several other levels which are related to 
important questions of modernity and citizenship, inter alia questions of rehgion and 
secularisation, the essence of the nation state, and the autonomy of the family. Of 
course, an item of dress can possess an important social significance. But why the hijabj 
A headscarf can be mainly fimctional, a means of protecting its wearer from the 
elements, or it can be a fashion item, fir neither case does it serve as a tool in any 
struggle between rehgion and secularisation, nor does it even possess any rehgious 
significance. Other items of rehgious dr ess possess some social significance, but they are 
not usuaUy connected with ultimate questions of modeimity and citizenship. There are 
rarely problems with school pupils in France wearing a cnicifix or a yaimulke, for 
example, and even when there are, these tend to be perceived and addressed as private 
troubles rather than pubhc issues. In order to understand why the hijab is so different, 
we must consider it in the context of Orientahsm, and of meanings of the hijab in Islam. 
Then we wih be able to rmderstand the French debate.
Nielsen’s point about children being educated into a national cultme, or parents 
detennining the nature of their children’s education, was made with reference to a 
con^aiison between the affaire du foulard and the Rushdie affair. However, it makes 
the more general point that the education of children is an important field affecting 
relations between Mushms in the West and the wider society. This question is m the 
background of all the cases to which I have referred in this section, both hr Fr ance and in 
the United Khrgdom. Otherwise, there would be no debate on state-funded Muslim 
(schools (although excuses were often given to delay this request, such as the number of
‘...th e headscarf is not an item of clothing’.
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other schools hi the immediate area), on physical education, religious education, sex 
education or the provision of halal food.
There are areas of contrast as well. It is mteresting that there is no one oveniding 
issue of concern hi the United Kingdom—the issues which are cited above are all 
important—while the issue of the hijab does dominate this discussion in France (though 
it is not of course the only issue). Furtheimore, as is stated above, the French emphasis 
on laïcité is in marked contrast to the commentary in The Independent about Mi’ Khan. 
The admission of ‘genuine Muslim gripes against the hold of Christianity over state 
education’ is played down, with an assertion that Mr Khan ‘went too far’, that 
participation in ‘a good Christmas sing-song’ is appropriate to ah pupils, and that a 
degree of participation in rehgious rituals is an essential part of a multicultural education. 
In France, any Christian predominance in state education would be considered 
intolerable—indeed, it was a century ago.
8.3. Meanings of the hiiab
While, as has been stated, the hijab is of particular importance to discussions about 
the place of Mushms in French society, it is of general significance to the West as a 
whole, including the United Kingdom. Indeed, there was an exhibition hi one of 
Glasgow’s museums, from August 1997 to January 1998, entitled ‘The Veh hi Islam’, 
and this featured a video project entitled ‘The Veh in Glasgow’. This showed that there 
were different perceptions of the hijab worldwide, hicludhig in Glasgow. The broader 
significance hes in the hijab being perceived as an Orientahst symbol, which is of 
fparticular, though not exclusive, relevance to France. As I argued in Chapter 2, it used 
to be premised on a stereotype of the Orient as exotic and sensual, exemphfied by the
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Eui’opean imagination of the Ar abian nights, snake channers, harems and so on. This 
was particnlariy the case in French Orientahsm, which saw an almost Freudian 
domination of sexual symbols over Oriental society, in which the Oriental woman was 
seen as the sensual object par excellence. For Gérard de Nerval, the preponderance of 
veils and headcoverings in Cano concealed ‘a deep, rich fund of feminine sexuality’, 
which brought out complex responses and fiightening self-discoveries in the Orientahsts 
(Said 1995: 182, 188).
So there was aheady sometliing fiightening about the ‘veh’ in the nineteenth 
century, and that has still not disappeared. However, the sensual stereotype of the 
Orient and of Muslim society is scarcely recognisable in contemporary discourse. In the 
late twentieth century, the Orient and the West are closer together, so to speak, so this 
exoticism is no longer convincing. It has been largely replaced with a discourse about 
the alleged fanaticism of so-called Muslim ‘extremists’ and ‘fundamentahsts’. Thus, the 
Western stereotype of the Mushm woman shifts fi om the sensual object to the victim of 
misogyny. In my research, Muslim interviewees often cited the role of women in this 
connection, that is, as an example of Western stereotypes of Islam, and only rarely as an 
illustration of what was perceived to be Western decadence. Ismael, the tea room 
proprietor in Fives, did beheve that women were beginning to dominate men—pohticaUy, 
culturally and demographically—and that this was a sign of the end of the world. He 
argued that men were always tempted in the presence of women due to the work of the 
shaitan (devil) and the seductive power of women themselves. The divine norm, on the 
other hand, was that men should protect then own women.
Others argued that Mushms had given an impression of misogyny, even though it 
was contrary to Islam. Fatima, hke others in France, saw this in terms of the hijab, and 
pointed out that it varied from culture to culture. For example, she argued that women
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would not usually wear the hijab in Senegal, but would in the Maghr eb. In France, many 
women were wearing the hijab by choice, not as an act of submission, but as an attempt 
to escape from Western materialism through a "retour aux sources\ Another 
interviewee, Sard, who had only been in France for a few years when I interviewed him, 
was particularly critical:
Les musulmans donnent une très mauvaise image de F Islam. Donc, le français, 
quand il voit ... le musulman, il voit sur le mhoh, quoi, donc pas l’image de 
l’Islam. Quand il voit sur un mhoh ü voit cette image diffamée, bien sur, donc 
l’Islam est triste, cet Islam conompt, cet Islam qui tue des gens..., cet Islam qui 
laisse la femme dans un petit coin. Non, c’est pas ça.
It is worth emphasising that tlris is particularly relevant to France, but has a more 
general significance to the West as a whole, including the United Kingdom. Another 
reason for this comes from the distinction, which has already been drawn in this thesis, 
between assimilation, withdrawal and a combined Mushm-Western identity as different 
responses to Orientahst representations. Significantly, when the decision is taken to 
assimilate, and the perception that Western culture and values are superior to then 
‘Muslim’ or ‘Oriental’ equivalents is reinforced, Muslim women who refuse to wear the 
hijab are valued according to a perception of what they have in common with the West. 
By extension, when women do choose to wear the hijab, either as a token of withdrawal 
or of a combined Muslim-Western identity, this is perceived as a rejection of the West, or 
even an attack on its values and essence.
‘Muslims give a veiy bad image of Islam. So, when a French person sees ... a Muslim, he sees in a 
mirror, so he doesn’t see the image of Islam. When he sees in a mirror, of course, he sees this defiled 
image, so Islam is sad, this Islam corrupts, this Islam which kills people..., this Islam which leaves the 
woman in a little corner. No, that’s not it.’
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The Tablighi Jama ’at is a good example here. It is a particularly powerfirl maslak 
in Belgium (Dassetto 1988: 165), and is also significant in France under the name of Foi 
et Pratique (Kepel 1991: 179-209; Nielsen 1995b: 19, 135-6). However, it emerged as 
part of the Muslim response to British rule in India (Joly 1995: 9; Rizvi 1994: 338), and 
is linked to the Deobandi mosques in the United Kingdom. As a movement, it has 
some characteristics which come close to the withdrawal ideal type, in that it ‘addresses 
itself entirely to Muslims, and makes no attempt to preach to the unconverted’, and some 
members ‘who live within the movement rather than in society tend to wear specific 
dress’ (King 1994: 14, 18). The principles as set down by the founder, Muhammad 
Ilyas, in 1934, seem to fit this ideal tyjre quite well, and the integration of dress, including 
the hijab, and the role of women with more obviously religious (as the term is widely 
understood) beliefs and practices is noticeable:
Article of faith; 
prayer;
acquisition and dissemination of knowledge;
adoption of Islamic appearance and dress;
adoption of Islamic ceremonies and rejection of non-Islamic ones;
seclusion o f women;
performance of nikah or marriage ceremony in the Islamic manner; 
adherence to Muslim dress by women;
non-deviation fi om Islamic beliefs and non-acceptance of any other rehgion; 
protection and preservation of mutual rights;
7 participation of responsible persons in every meeting and convention;
According to Danielle Joly (1995: 69), the Deobandis control about 16 per cent of the mosques in 
Birmingham. This implies that they, and, by extension, the Tablighi Jama'at, have an important 
presence on a United Kingdom-wide scale.
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pledge not to impart secular instmction to children before they have had 
rehgious learning;
pledge to strive and endeavour for the preaching of rehgion; 
observance of cleanliness;
pledge to protect the digirity and respect of one another (Haq 1972: 110-11).
In spite of the principles of the Tablighi Jama ’at, there are differences of opinion 
among Mushms on the obhgation, or other'wise, of Mushm women to wear the hijab. 
The following verses from the Qm’an may, on the face of it, seem clear:
And say to the beheving women that they should lower then gaze and guard 
then modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except 
what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw then veils over- 
then bosoms and not display then beauty except to then husbands then fathers 
their husbands’ fathers then sons then husbands’ sons then brothers or their 
brothers’ sons or their sisters’ sons or then women or the slaves whom then 
right hands possess or male servants fr ee of physical needs or small children 
who have no sense of the shame of sex {Al Nur, 24: 31).
O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters, and the beheving women, that they 
should cast then outer garments over then persons (when abroad): that is most 
convenient, that they should be known (as such) and not molested {Al Ahzab,
33: 59).
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Yet these verses are inteipreted in different ways. Muslims in France, and indeed 
world-wide, have different views regarding the hijab. It is undoubtedly true that some 
have taken a hterahst interpretation of these texts, and it may be tnie, as Camille 
Lacoste-Dujardin (1995), an important French writer on ceremonies, festivals and gender 
roles in Arab-Muslim societies, and others have argued, that this interpretation is the one 
most favoured by Islamist ideologues. On the other hand, the instruction in these verses 
is not given to women themselves. The first verse is an instruction to say this to the 
women, and the second one is exphcitly dhected to the Prophet. Even at the level of 
lower criticism, there are problems with the interpretation. Furthermore, there are other 
interpretations of the texts which situate them in the context of hroader principles, such 
as the importance of education. Following this interpretation, which has been 
propounded by some Sufi thinkers, parents would not be justified in aUowhig their 
children to be deprived of education in order to make a point about the hijab. 
Another interpretation, similar in effect, is that of Soheib Ben Cheikh, the Grand Mufti of 
Marseilles (cited in Aziz 1996: 233):
Maintenant, on doit s’interroger: pomquoi Dieu a-t-ft voulu voiler la femme? 
Quand on mène ime exégèse textuelle, je crois qu’il faut éviter de ridicuhser 
Dieu. Quand H a imposé à la femme le voile, c’était dans le seul objectif de 
préserver sa dignité et sa persoimahté en fonction des moyens de l’époque. 
Aujourd’hui, le moyen qui préserve la dignité et la personnalité de la femme, ce , 
n’est plus le voüe, c’est l’instruction.
I am grateful to Dr Nabil Salem for this information.
Today, we need to ask ourselves: why did God want to veil women? When we carry out a textual 
exegesis, I think it necessary to avoid ridiculing God. When He imposed the veil on women, it was with 
the sole purpose of preserving their dignity and personality according to the means of the time. Today, 
the way to preserve the dignity and personality of women is no longer the veil, but education. ’
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Interpretations of tire Qur’an, as with any sacred text, are based on an assumption 
about its pmpose. Where the Qur’an is seen as a rule book, revealing a number of 
propositions, a hterahst interpretation is logical. Wlrere it is seen in more contextual or 
even existential terms, God revealing Himself, hterahst interpretations frequently become 
untenable.
When it comes to the debate in French society about the hijab, it is instructive to 
consider the affaire du foulard as an example of laïcité in practice, and being contested. 
It enables us to see why laïcité is important to relations between Muslims in France and 
the rest of French society. While the ban on the hijab may appear to verge on racism, 
and this charge has indeed been made, it has been strongly resented by opponents of the 
hijab, particularly those who see themselves as the defenders of laïcité. One of these 
people, Emmanuel Todd (1995: 32), was asked to comment on the reported opposition 
of 80 per cent of French people to the hijab, and rephed:
H exprime, paradoxalement et d’une façon malhemeusement répressive, ce que 
la France a toujoms refusé: le statut mineur de la femme et l’endogamie. Il y a 
là comme une exhortation, maladroite mais réelle, à la mixité. Considéré sous 
cet angle, le rejet du foulard est le contr ahe même du racisme.
It is true that opposition to the hijab has been widespread, and has sometimes been 
based on an understanding of the Revolutionary principle of equahty. When the affaire 
du foulard returned to media prominence in the autumn of 1994, it was instructive to 
note that press coverage on the political left and right wings was generally hostile to the
‘It shows, paradoxically and in an unfortunately repressive fashion, what France has always opposed: 
the lower status of women and endogamy. There’s a call there, inept but real, to mixité [mixture, 
integration, co-education]. Looking at it from that angle, opposition to the headscarf is the very opposite 
of racism.’
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hijab. Put simply, the right were opposed to what they saw as an attack on French 
culture and institutions, while the left saw themselves as defending the progressive 
principle of laïcité and, in some cases, equal rights for women. The Cathohc press, such 
as La Croix, seemed to be the oirly promhient dissenters from this view, arguing that the 
ban on the hijab was a denial of religious hberty.
Indeed, some of the self-appointed defenders of laïcité have displayed au 
Islamophobia which has bordered on paranoia, though they are not unique in this respect. 
Guy Coq (1996: 6), an editor of the French jourual Esprit, wrote a polemical article hi 
Libération in which he refened frequently to the hijab as the voile islamiste (Islamist 
veil). In doing so, he confrrsed the hijab with the fuU veil, and islamique (Islamic) with 
islamiste, which often has overtones of so-called Tslamic fimdamentahsm’. At the 
stroke of a pen, schoolghls who wore the hijab were aligned with r ehgious extremism, 
terrorism, and the subjugation of women. Jean-François Monnet (1990: 54), in words 
aheady quoted in this thesis, exjrressed this amalgam more exphcitly, stating that 
"derrière les jeunes filles au foulard se cache la stratégie des islamistesj^^^
On Coq’s use of the term ‘veil’, this often hnphes a garment which covers the face, 
whereas hijab usuafty refers to a garment wliich covers the top and sides of the head, and 
the shoulders. While the Arabic word hijab does mean curtain, or covering, so ‘veil’ is a 
legitimate translation, the connotations are misleading. Having said that, Lacoste- 
Dujardin (1995) has lent some credibihty to Coq’s polemic by distinguishing between the 
Ar abic terms for different kinds of veil or headscarf™such as khimar,jilbab and hijab-^ 
charging that the latter has been hrvented and prescribed quite recently by Islamist 
ideologues. We shah retmrr to this point shortly.
'... behind the young girls in headscaives hides the strategy of the Islamists’.
256
Coq’s argument was that the hijab was fundamentally anti-republican and inimical 
to the rights of women, and that the French constitutional court, in upholding the rights 
of schoolghls to wear it, were upholding religious hberty at the expense of equality. His 
polemic ended with a call to legislate against the hijab hr schools:
Le foulard islamiste perturbe profondément la communauté scolahe.... Que des 
jiuistes idéologues ne voient pas qu’il met en cause l’ordre répubhcahi, alors il 
faut le leur montrer. Quant toutes les classes où le voile a été imposé par les 
fbnctionnahes ignorants des problèmes éducatifs seront de fait dans 
l’impossibihté de fonctionner, il restera à l’Etat répubhcain, à choish clairment 
de s’afiSrmer (Coq 1996: 6).^ '^ '^
Coq’s argument did not go unchallenged, and a letter in Libération argued that the 
attempt to change the law was playhig games with xenophobia. However, more 
expulsions were r eported, and the minister for education, François Bayrou, also called 
for a law against the hijab. Debates in the press seemed to tmn around the question of 
whether or not the hijab should be illegal, while it was assumed that it was indeed 
harmful and "antilaïque'.^"^  ^One school in the Lhle area attempted to define the principle 
that children should be educated into a national culture (to use Nielsen’s distinction 
which is cited above), and that this formed an important part of democratic, republican 
principles. The school chculated a paper among its staff, as they had decided not to 
expel pupils for wearing the hijab, but to use persuasion. I was able to obtain a copy of 
this paper, which is quoted in full hr Appendix 1 (and translated in Appendix 2). There
‘The Islamist headscarf is disturbing the educational community deeply.... If the jurist-ideologues 
cannot see that it is calling the Republican order into question, they must be shown. When all the 
classes, where the veil has been imposed by bureaucrats ignorant of pedagogic problems, are unable to 
function, the Republican state will have to make a clear choice to assert itself.
Libération, 12.12.96, p. 13; 4.12.96, p. 12; 5.12.96, p.6; La Voix du Nord, 28.11.96, pp.l, 4, 12.
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are a number of in^ortant points which can be made with reference to this document, as 
they encapsulate the arguments and contradictions in the position taken by opponents of 
the hijab.
Fhstly, the document seeks to provide a negation of criticisms made by those m 
favour of allowing the hijab to be worn in state schools, by insisting that opposition to 
the hijab is not a racist or Lepenist act, it does not imply exclusion (unless this is a self­
exclusion on the part of the pupils concerned), it does not call any religious beliefs or 
practices mto question, it is not a Qui’anic obligation (on the basis that it had not been 
seen in French state schools ten years before), the education system is not Cathohc, and 
it does not marginahse Islam.
Secondly, the document reflects a particular conception of the Repubhc, the nation, 
and intégration (which has a similar place in French pohtical discourse as ‘race relations’ 
in the United Kingdom), which are common to left-wing opponents of the hijab. Tire 
Repubhc means laïcité, equahty, and respect for the law, which is the same for everyone. 
The nation means unity and openuess to others, and therefore cannot permit 
Jftagmentation or the estabhshment, in any way, of communities which are autonomous 
or closed. Such communities would cause intolerance, exclusion, ghettoïsation and 
confrontation, and it is only the nation which can prevent this. Integration means 
accepting these principles, beheving oneself to be welcomed and equahy treated, 
whatever the reahty might seem to be.
Thirdly, it is aheged that there is a stark choice between laïcité on the one hand, arrd 
exclusion, racism and persecution on the other. The document states; "La laïcité assure 
même une protection des convictions religieuses, elle est un rempart contre l ’exclusion, 
l^e racisme ... et la persécution: en la mettant en cause on s ’expose soi-meme à ces
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dangers It should be noted that one does not have to oppose laïcité in order to 
become exposed to these dangers. Even questioning laïcité has this effect, and can be 
identified with a rejection of fieedom and equahty, though the document does not say 
whether questioning laïcité means questioning the principle, the ideal, or the way in 
which it has heen inteipreted in French legal doctrine, and put into practice in French 
pohtical and civil society, includmg the state education system.
Fourthly, the document betrays certain perceptions, or misperceptions, of Islam 
which are common to Orientahst discourse, and which tend to support Said’s rather 
harsh view that the West is only capable of understanding Islam in a demeaning way (see 
Said 1997b: 162-73). I have aheady mentioned the contention that the ‘veh’ is not a 
Qur anic obligation, on the basis that it was not worn in French state schools ten years 
before, even though the one-time non-appearance of the ‘veh’ in French schools does not 
affect the obhgations laid down in the Qur’an, whatever diversity of interpretations exists 
regarding the relevant verses. In addition, the hijab is aheged to be a symbol of sex 
discrimination, infériorisation, manipulation and imposition by men, the negation of 
citizenship, and a symbol of rehgious discrimination against schoolghls (Mushm or non- 
Muslim) who do not wear it. The aUegation of sex discrirnination is unsurprising, given 
the context of the Orientahst shift to a fanatical stereotype of Islam, but it is mteresting 
that the hijab is held to discriminate simultaneously against those who do wear it, and 
against those who do not. In addition, the interpretation of Mushm culture and 
civUisation is that it ÛW been more tolerant and ‘civilised’ than the West, implying that it 
is now less tolerant and civihsed, and that its principal role was to transmit European 
(Greek and Roman) civihsation to moderu Europe, rather than making significant 
( contributions of its own (though the authors try to claim respect for Islam on the
‘Laïcité even ensures protection  for religious beliefs, it is a bulwark against exclusion, racism ... and 
persecution: in questioning it, one exposes oneself to these dangers.’
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grounds that they teach the history of Muslim civilisation and recognise its contribution 
to mathematics and anatomy).
It is not suiprising that such popular discomses (even though this is a popularisation 
of an important strand in French academic thought) should be problematic, but even 
Lacoste-Dujardin’s argument lacks force, due to her insistence on identifying the 
meaning (singular) of the hijab. Thus, she neglects what is demonstrated clearly by 
Gaspard and Khosrokhavar (1995), that the hijab has different meanings for different 
people. To some it means oppression; to others it means religious devotion, or even 
liberty. To some it implies sexism; to others it valorises women. Even where the Ar abic 
distinctions are followed, we find that many Muslim women, whether they wear it or not, 
regard the hijab as more liberal than, for example, the chador. Chador is an Iranian term 
for a black garment which is longer than the hijab: it completely hides the hair, face, and 
even hands. Among French Muslims, the term is sometimes used pejoratively (see 
Altschull 1995; 46-7).
It may seem that opposition to the hijab came fi om all sections of (secular) French 
society. Flowever, some have taken a different position, whether for academic, political 
or legal reasons. The charge of racism has been lent credibility by academic analyses 
such as that of Bernard Defiance (1996: 78), who cited a legal maxim at the heart of 
laïcité and the Republic: Ww/ ne peut être mis en cause pour un acte dont il n 'est pas 
responsable, dont il n ’est pas l ’auteur p e r s o n n e l le m e n tTo piurish someone for 
belonging to a community, or for abiding by the norms of that community, is tantamount 
to racism. Similarly, Michel Wieviorka’s (1995: 126-7) analysis associates opposition to 
the hijab with racism and xenophobia, though he avoids the mistake of conflating these 
'categories, that is, charging that opposition to the hijab is racist and xenophobic. He
‘No-one can be accused of an act for which he or she is not responsible, of which he or she is not 
personally the author. ’
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also suggests that the focus on the hijab has served to deflect attention fiom 
shortcomings and inequahties in the education system, hi other words, the whole debate 
has become a tool of legitimation;
The more the problem of schooling is experienced ... as one of immigration or 
Islam, the more one sees, on the one hand, individual behaviours which 
establish a de facto segregation and, on the other, resentment on the part of 
those French people "born and bred’ who do not have the means to take then 
children out of schools with a high proportion of immigrants. And the more 
one also sees media and politico-ideological explosions like the "Islamic 
headscarf affair’, which betray the presence of fear and anxiety, and sometimes 
also more or less overt racism or xenophobia. Would it not be desirable for the 
interest here to be shifted more clearly towards debates on the goals of 
education, towards conflict and protest around what the schools produce, 
around teaching methods, academic under-achievement, the aims of training or 
the autonomy of educational establishments?
Some have argued against the banning of the hijab on political grounds. Danielle 
Mittenand remonstrated: "Si aujourd’hui deux cents ans après le Révolution, la laïcité 
ne pouvait pas accueillir toutes les religions, c ’est qu ’il y  ’aurait un recul... Si le voile 
est l ’expression d ’une religion, nous devons accepter les traditions, quelles qu’elles 
s o i e n t . At the time of the first affaire du foulard in 1989, Lionel Jospin was 
education minister in the national government. Wlien he was asked in the National 
F Assembly what the headteachers should do, he replied: "L’école ne peut exclure car elle
‘If, today, two hundred years after the Revolution, laïcité cannot welcome all religions and forms of 
expression in France, then there will have been a step backwards.... If the veil expresses a religion, we 
must accept all traditions, whatever they are.’
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est faite pour accueillir’ However, lie was strongly opposed within the National 
Assembly, by the teaching unions, and the silence of his own Prime Minister was 
inteipreted negatively (Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 1995: 21-2).
Nevertheless, the legal position has been settled, in the absence of a change in the 
law, in favour' of the right to wear the hijab in state schools. The Conseil d'Etat 
(uppermost French administrative court) rnled, on 10 July 1995, that the wearing of the 
hijab was not in itself an attack on laïcité, and therefore did not constitute a sufficient 
reason to exclude pupils. Exclusion could only be justified in case of an ‘ostentatious 
wearing of religious signs’ {"le port ostentatoire des signes religieux’), implying 
proselytism, or in case of a disordering effect on the school curriculum, such as a refusal 
to participate in physical education (Durand-Prhiborgue 1996: 79-80). However, this is 
unlikely to please anybody. The ruling of the Conseil dEtat can easily be chcumvented 
by claiming that the hijab is being worn in an ‘ostentatious’ or ‘disordering’ way, and 
exjmlsions have been reported since 1995. In addition, some defenders of laïcité have 
attempted to raise a cry of ‘judges against the Republic’ (Coq 1995), and to have this 
decision overturned by the introduction of a law against the hijab.
This chapter has undoubtedly been more critical of the arguments employed by 
opponents of the hijab than the arguments employed by its supporters. However, I hope 
there is some balance in this respect, for two reasons. Fhstly, I have argued that the 
hijab is not necessarily a Qur’anic obligation for all Muslims, though it becomes a 
Qur’anic obhgation for some Muslims, m the context of a particular imderstanding of the 
purpose of the Qur’an. Secondly, I insist that opposition to the hijab is not in itself to be 
identified with racism—indeed, some people have opposed it in good faith in order to 
oppose racism and other forms of discrimination—but it is associated with racism in the
T h e  school cannot exclude because it is made for welcoming’.
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public sphere. The hijab means different things to different people, whether they wear it 
or not, or, indeed, whether they are Muslims or not.
In making this point, I am expanding on an earlier point, that, to some people, the 
hijab means oppression, while to others, it means religious devotion or liberty; to some it 
implies sexism, while to others it valorises women. One Catholic priest in the Lille area 
told me an anecdote about having arranged a visit to a mosque for some school pupils. 
One girl asked the Imam why Muslim women had to wear the hijab, and he rephed that 
it was to protect women from the male gaze, and to protect men from sexual temptation. 
The girl replied that she also fomid some boys attractive, and asked why they did not 
wear a veil to protect her fr om temptation. Of course, the Imam had not really been 
replying to her question, but had given her an already established pat answer, and so he 
was unable to cope with a challenge to it.
Having said that, the same point is argued by some Muslim women, who find that 
they are protected by the hijab, or that it gives them a certain dignity within the Muslim 
sub-culture and within the wider French society. A fortiori, the hijab can thus be seen as 
a femiirist symbol of liberation, providing a secure social space for women which, at least 
symbolically, is free from male invasion. However, Musfim women who wear the hijab 
rarely express ex r^licit support for femirrism, although this is not a universal rule.
For others, the hijab is more of an identity statement, and this complicates the 
debate stül fiuther. In Paris, I saw a picture of a woman on a pubhc beach, dressed in a 
bikini and hijab, hr this case, it is unlikely that the hijab was being worn for rehgious 
reasons, otherwise the rest of the body would have also been covered. One interviewee, 
Nairn, told me that he had seen ghls leaving school, wearing the hijab and smoking 
cigarettes. To him, smoking contradicted the Islamic ethos more strongly than failure to
The writings of Fatima Mernissi (for example 1987, 1991) provide an excellent introduction to 
Muslim feminism.
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wear the hijab, though he regarded himself as a ‘non-practising’ Muslim. When the 
hijab is worn as an identity statement in this way, or perceived as such, opponents have 
claimed that, since it is not being worn as a religious obhgation, it should not be worn at 
all. However, defenders of the hijab have been able to reply that it is not being worn as 
a rehgious garment, and therefore in no way contradicts the principle of laïcité. On this 
subject, complexity breeds complexity.
To return to the beginning of this section, the exhibition and video project about the 
hijab, which was shown in Glasgow, demonstrated that the same diversity of perceptions 
existed. Interestingly, some Muslim women said that it took time for them to wear the 
hijab, that then faith had to develop to the extent that this became appropriate, and that 
it should not be rnshed in to, never mind imposed by someone else. A similar point is 
made by Nicole Bourque (1998: 9), with specific reference to women converts:
Most of the female converts I talked to were Muslim for a few years before 
they wore a headscarf in pubhc. These women said that they needed to be 
inwardly confident of their Mushm identity and devotion to AUah before they 
could declare then identity to the rest of British society. They said that they 
had to wait until then imari (faith) was stronger. Most of those who wear a 
headscarf now feel comfortable with it and say that it makes them feel more 
secme in pubhc. However, as Bah (1987) indicates, some women feel self- 
conscious about being stared at because they have a white face underneath the ’ 
scarf and have stopped wearing it as a result.
hi both cases, not wearing the hijab is, at least temporarily, part of trying to be a 
good Mushm. In the fir st case, there is an attempt to develop iman, while in the second
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case, it is felt that wearing the hijab would draw attention to the wearer, which goes 
against the spirit, if not the letter, of the Qur’anic injunctions.
8.4. Conclusion
To summarise the comparisons which have been made in this chapter, the juridical 
and pohtical principle of laïcité is particularly significant in France, leading to a further 
marginalisation of Muslims qua rehgious group. It is because of this that laïcité and the 
hijab are the main issues of debate as regards Muslims in the educational sphere. In 
Britain, the questions of Mushm schools, rehgious education, sex education, physical 
education and halal food are more important. Nevertheless, debates regarding Islam in 
the educational sphere are complex (not straightforwardly ‘Muslims versus non- 
Muslims’) in both countries, and, while it might be supposed that the secular critique is 
particularly prominent in France, due to laïcité, it is also prominent in Britain.
A reflexive statement, on my own view of the hijab, wih ihustrate the significance of 
this chapter within the context of the thesis. My view is that the hijab should be 
permitted in state schools, because a ban would have the effect of fulfilling, hr part, the 
agenda of the extreme right in France. On the other hand, Muslim organisations should 
consider the Qm’anic data and context in more depth, and emphasise that Muslim 
women and giris should not be forced to wear the hijab, nor should they/cc/ obUged to 
wear it, and, indeed, as the Glasgow case shows, it may be inappropriate in light of the 
spirit of the Qur’an. Freedom of conscience should be recognised, whether the import of 
this, in individual cases, is the wearing of the hijab in state schools or not. However, this 
view has the limitation that it encapsulates an individuahstic view of freedom, with may 
ultimately be an ethnocentric Western view. Because of this, the issue of Muslim
265
identities in the West is important, as is the observation that the hijab is a symbolic or 
even material affirmation of such identities.
As Muslim identities have often been constructed hr opposition, or at least in 
contrast, to Western identities and values, it must be recognised that an attempt to 
denigrate Muslim identities, or to suppress the symbols and materials of these identities, 
has the opposite effect. It strengthens these identities, which in turn has the effect of 
exacerbating the polarisation which aheady exists between Islam and the West, causing 
fiuther conflict and misunderstanding, hi the end, it becomes impossible for Westerners 
to appreciate the real value of Islam, and, in a vicious chcle, Islam by necessity becomes 
more authoritarian, and the hijab is more likely to be seen as an obhgation which must be 
imposed if necessary, rather than a vahd choice which expresses rehgious devotion or 
identity. If Islam and the West can demonstrate that they are capable of mutual dialogue 
and enrichment, this vicious ch cle can be avoided. But if we have aheady entered this 
vicious chcle, it can no longer be avoided. Instead, we must try to break out, and this 
will be demanding and painful.
These observations encapsulate some of the complexity and wider significance of 
the debate about the hijab in France, including its relevance to understanding the United 
Kingdom. In addition, I indicated at the beginning of the chapter that the comparison 
between the United Kingdom and France has a particular significance of its own. Part of 
this comes fiom a better understandmg of the commonsense notions about the purposes 
of education in each coimtry. Although Nielsen’s point about education into a national 
culture versus the rights of parents holds in both cases, the concept of education into a 
national culture means different things, it is culturally relative. In France, the issue here 
is primarily about education into the values of citizenship, within the context of a 
république laïque. In the United Kingdom, the issue is more clouded, partly because of
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a reluctance to define the essence of the national culture, and partly because of a 
different state polity vis-à-vis the religious sphere. This is not only an issue which affects 
Muslims—it affects other rehgious groups as well. One analytical consequence of tliis is 
that it becomes necessary to look at the relationships between different rehgions, and I 
address this issue in the next chapter.
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9. Miislim-Christian relations
9.1. Introduction
As well as addressing the analytical consequences of Chapter 8, that is, the necessity 
of analysing the relationships between different religions in the context of the state pohty 
(for example, a statute of laïcité or an established church), this chapter examines an 
arena in which the dialectic of Orientalism and Muslim identities is manifested, or in 
which Islam and the (Christian) West actually meet, hi other words, the idea of the 
Christian West excludes people of another faith fr om consideration as completely a part 
of the West, and this itself has an impact on Muslim identities. So, this chapter addresses 
the contention at the end of Chapter 6, that we need to examine arenas where Islam and 
the West actually meet each other hi order to grasp the dialectic of Orientalism and 
Muslim identities.
If the aims of this chapter are to addiess the above issues, the objectives are to make 
three specific comparisons, and to demonstrate their veracity and significance. If we 
compare Muslim-Christian dialogue in the United Kingdom and in France, we find that it 
is more theoretical, hifoimal and multilateral in the United Kingdom, and, conversely, 
more practical, formal and bilateral in France. By this, I mean that the formal dialogue 
which exists in the United Kingdom is more concerned with the similarities and 
differences between Christianity and Islam, while in France there is more of a focus on 
the common concerns and aspirations of Christians and Muslims. Furtheimore, formal
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groups established for the purpose of Muslim-Chiistiau dialogue are particularly 
important in France, whereas, in the United Kingdom, the dialogue which takes place 
between neighbours, colleagues and fiiends is more significant, hi addition, significant 
dialogue in the United Kingdom tends to take place within a context of dialogue between 
several different rehgious confessions, whereas hi France the bilateral dialogue between 
Muslims and Chiistians is more self-contained.
In this chapter, I shall demonstrate that these differences between the United 
Kingdom and France are to do with the social and pohtical context, the degiee and 
nature of secularisation, and not with theological views about dialogue. As I have taken 
the overaU problematic as being to examine an area in which this dialectic comes to the 
forefi’ont, that is, in which Mushm identities meet, or clash, with the West, there are 
thiee routes fiom the problematic to the conclusion, that is, the three comparisons 
outlined above. The first I shall caU the sociological route, which is to demonstrate that 
Muslim-Christian dialogue is sociahy significant, despite, or even because of^  the 
challenge of secularisation, and that this has different consequences in the United 
Kingdom and in France. The second, the ethnographic route, rests on a presentation of 
data fiom my fieldwork in these countries, particularly obseivations fiom the Groupe 
d ’amitié Islamo-Chrétien du Hautmont-Mouvaux—a group which meets fiequently in 
the vicinity of Lille—and inteiviews with participants and non-participants in Muslim- 
Christian dialogue in both countries. The thud route, the theological route, examines 
some of the theological issues wliich suiround dialogue for Muslims and Christians 
(Pi'otestant and Cathohc), examining some issues on which there is agreement among 
Christians, or among Muslims, and other issues on which there is disagreement. Wliile 
neither one of these routes takes us all the way fi om the problematic to the conclusion, it
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is my submission that taking all thr ee routes together does make this possible (even if the 
metaphor breaks down at this point).
9.2. The sociological route
There is a temptation for sociologists to exaggerate when discussing secularisation, 
that is, having proved one thing, to assume that it proves something else. For example, 
less people go to chmch, therefore rehgion has lost its social significance. Alternatively, 
secularisation has occurred in many countries, therefore it means the same in all cases, 
and affects ah rehgions equahy. The first of these examples has been fiequently 
discussed and debated by sociologists, over a long period of time. Some, like Steve 
Bruce (1995, 1996), ably defend the proposition that the statistics consistently show a 
decline in rehgious practice and belonging. Others, Hke David Martin (1969), argue that 
the statistics merely demonstrate that there has been a dechne in certain kinds of religious 
activity, mainly going to chmch on Sundays, that such activity is not the same as 
rehgious behef or belonging, and that the secularisation hypothesis is premised on a 
‘golden age’ of rehgious practice which never reahy was.
The second example is more relevant to this chapter. Wliile it is legitimate (though 
controversial) to speak of secularisation as a phenomenon which has occurred 
throughout, and, to some extent, outside, the West, it has occurred in different ways. 
For example, the Church of England is the estabhshed chm ch in England, a status which 
emerged from the Pr otestant Reformation of the 16th century, and particularly fi om the 
doctrine ofErastianism,^^^ alternatively known as Byzantinism or Caesaro-Papism:
The term comes from Thomas Erastus (1524-1583), whose teachings have been discussed in detail by 
Ruth Wesel-Roth (1954; especially 90-124), though she does not discuss their significance to the 
development of Anglicanism.
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In Erastus’s view, and the same should be said of nearly all the Erastian divines 
of the 16th and 17th centuries, there was no claim to set a purely secular power 
above the church. What they claimed was an enth e recognition of the coercive 
jurisdiction of the civil authority in a state which tolerated but one religion and 
that the true one. What they refuse to allow is any competing jurisdiction 
(Figgis 1948: 211).
This doctrine was in direct opposition to the doctrine of ‘toleration’, which mrphed 
that different rehgious confessions should be tolerated within the same state. However, 
the ‘settlement’ between church and state evolved. Thomas Cranmer, Archbishop of 
Canterbury at the time of the Reformation, recognised the unconditional authority of the 
state (that is, this recognition was not subject to any test of doctrinal pmity), while the 
temporal authority of the chur ch, under the supreme authority of the monarch, was also 
recognised. Furthermore:
With the development of toleration Parhament has come to consist of men of 
all religions and none. Modern Erastianism claims the right of a body so 
composed to adjudicate on matters of behef either in person or by deputy, and 
would allow ecclesiastical causes to be decided by civil judges, who might 
every one of them be agnostics (Figgis 1948: 211).
This settlement was expressed in ‘Cranmer’s Oath to the King for his Temporalties’, which read: T, 
Thomas Cranmer, renounce and utterly forsake all such clauses, words, sentences, and grants, which I 
have of the pope’s holiness in his bulls o f the archbishoprick of Canterbury, that in any manner was, is, 
or may be hurtfiil to your highness, your heirs, successors, estate, or dignity royal: Icnowledging myself 
to take and hold the said archbishoprick immediately, and only, of your highness, and of none other. 
Most lowly beseeching the same for restitution of the temporalties of the said archbishoprick; promising 
to be faithful, true and obedient subject to your said highness, your heirs and successors, during my life. 
So help me God and the holy evangelists! (Cox 1844: 460)’
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So now the Church of England exercises a role in the government of the state, as 
part of which some bishops sit in the House of Lords, and as a consequence of which the 
views of senior clergy, particularly the Ar chbishop of Canterbury, receive some pubhcity. 
In addition, the chmch submits its senior appointments to the approval of the state. 
Strangely, perhaps, this is not an issue of significant conflict, or even debate, at the 
present time. The Chmch of Scotland has a lesser role in Scotland, but still has the 
status of the national chmch. Although there is no national or established chmch in 
Wales or Northern Ireland, we can say as a general mle that secularisation in the United 
Kingdom, where it has occmied, should be analysed as a social process, or a change of 
mentalités, but not of political stiuctme. It is important to be clear about the specific 
natme of secularisation, and the degree to which it has occurred, and such clarity is not 
facilitated by simply debating whether or not secularisation has happened.
As far as the place of Muslims in contemporary British society is concerned, the 
principle of establishment has a number of consequences. On the one hand, some strands 
of Islam are clearly in sympathy with the Erastian principle of a single jmisdiction over 
temporal and religious matters. Muslims are formally equal with Christians, as they can 
be civil judges, and, as such, can decide on ecclesiastical matters. Fmthermore, although 
there is the appearance that the Chm ch of England has an urrfah inbuilt advantage, it can 
sometimes be of help in bringing other rehgions into public consirltation. Rehgious 
groups sometimes act against their apparent interests. For example, when attempts were 
made to ‘Christianise’ the 1988 Education Reform Act, the then Archbishop of 
Canterbmy and Bishop of London were instrumental in urging the House of Lords to 
reject them.
On the other hand, few bishops have chahenged the principle of estabhsliment, and 
there is a fimdamental inequahty between Islam and Christianity, particularly the Church
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of England as the pre-eminent rehgious body. On a more concrete issue such as 
blasphemy, which Salman Rushdie was accused of^  the Church of England is protected 
by law, but Islam is not. Indeed, on this issue, Christians may have something to lose by 
seeking closer relations with Muslims in the United Kingdom. Having said that, the 
blasphemy laws do not protect other Christian denominations, so the denominational 
diversity of the United Kingdom may mean that Mushms and (some) Christians have 
somethmg to gain.
If this is the case, Mushms and Chiistians in France certainly have something to 
gam, as secularisation has mfluenced pohtical stmctmes as well as social process and 
mentalités. The term in use is laïcité, which is in marked contrast to estabhshment, and 
it should also be distinguished fiom secularisation. Notwithstanding the etymology of 
the word (which refers to the laity, as opposed to the clergy), laïcité is essentiahy a 
jmidical principle. It dates fiom the law of 1882, which separated the Cathohc church 
fiom pubhc education, the Jules FeiTy law of 1905, which separated church and state, 
and Article II of the 1958 Constitution:
La France est une Répubhque indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. EUe 
assme Fégahté devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinctions d’origine, de 
race ou de rehgion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances (Godechot, éd., 1995: 
426).^ °^
AU behefs are respected, but within the fiamework of laïcité as estabhshed in 1905. 
This fiamework was clear:
For a historical view of laïcité, see Costa-Lascoux (1996).
‘France is a Republic, indivisible, laïque, democratic and social. Equality of all citizens before the 
law, without distinction on the grounds of origin, race or religion, is assured. The beliefs of all are 
respected’.
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... la République ne reconnaît, ne salarie ni ne subventionne aucun culte
(Duiand-Piinborgne 1996: 21) 151
Though laïcité is used as a synonym of secularism or secularity (dictionaries tend to 
translate laïque as secular), there is an analytical distinction to be drawn, opposing the 
jmidical nature of laïcité to the socio-pohtical nature of secularity. Nevertheless, 
Wilson’s (1966: xiv) famous definition of secularisation as ‘the process whereby religious 
thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance’ points to sometliing which did 
happen in France in the late nineteenth centiuy: rehgious thinking, practice and 
institutions lost much of then legal significance. Indeed, one could say that turn-of-the- 
century France saw what Mohammed Mouaqit (1984) cahed a spmtual, temporal and 
ideological process of secularisation and laicisation—in other words, secularisation and 
laicisation were part of a common process.
It is important to make the distinction between laïcité and secularisation because of 
the conflict which there has been over laïcité in France, exemplified by the affaire du 
foulard, which has often been exacerbated by a lack of clarity on aft sides. The conflict 
cannot be analysed, never mind resolved, if we are not clear about the meaning of laïcité. 
Nevertheless, it is important to make a connection with secularisation, because some 
Mushms (and other rehgious people) see laïcité as a turning away fiom rehgion, or as 
antithetical to the ‘ideal’ of a rehgious state. As such, it is seen as an atheisation of 
society wlüch must be resisted, not just because of the intiinsic value of rehgion, but also 
because of the ‘moral decline’ which is associated with secularisation. On the other 
hand, some people have judged the wearing of the hijab in school to be an unacceptable
‘... the Republic neither recognises, pays the salaries of, nor subsidises any religion or act of 
worship’.
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demand that Islam be recognised, that is, be made an exception to the principle of laïcité 
(which they see as guaranteeing religious fieedom) in the educational institutions of the 
Repubhc. The lawmakers of 1882 considered the school to be the starting point for a 
laicisation of the whole state (Durand-Prinborgne 1996: 20-1). So it is felt that any 
delaicisation of the school will lead to a delaicisation of the Repubhc, a new 
obscurantism, and an Islamic invasion of the French body pohtic.
At the same time, it seems as if laïcité and Mushm-Christian dialogue are 
intertwined. The simplest way of expounding this hypothesis is to say that Mushms and 
Christians are faced with the common chaUenge of laïcité, and this prompts them to 
dialogue. This is why I suggested earher that that Mushm-Chiistian dialogue is socially 
significant because c/the chahenge of secularisation, not just in spite of it. In the United 
Kingdom, on the other hand, there is no statute of laïcité, so this particular incentive 
does not exist, and, as I have suggested, Christians may have something to lose, for 
example on the issue of blasphemy laws. There is a logic to this hypothesis, because the 
establishment of one religious group in a particular state creates an inequahty between 
that and other rehgious groups. The principle of dialogue necessarily involves some sort 
of equahty, otherwise it is not reahy dialogue, even though there may be a profound 
tolerance. In the United Kingdom, belonging to a ‘non-Christian rehgion’ may confer 
‘outsider status’, implying that one is regarded by others as a ‘rule-breaker’, and, 
consequently, one may regard those others, one’s ‘judges’, as outsiders (Becker 1963: 1- 
2; Coney and Tritter 1996; 5). This does not seem to make for effective dialogue.
Andrew Wingate (1988), hr his account of Muslim-Christian dialogue in 
Birmingham, was very conscious of the problems involved, the smah number of 
participants, and the suspicion of co-behevers in both communities. In addition, this 
dialogue tended to involve a particular kind of Mushm and a particular kind of Christian:
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Wingate’s account refers primarily to Muslims fiom a Sufi-oriented tradition (those fiom 
a more ‘orthodox’ or ‘exoteric’ background found this dialogue particularly difficult); 
and the Christians who participated were primarily fiom theological seminaries.
On the other hand, although dialogue in France has not been easy, and the 
participation of the Muslim and Christian ‘ehtes’ (priests, imams and other leaders of 
both rehgions) has been considerably stronger than that of the ordinary behevers, it is not 
the case that the participation of ordinary behevers has been insignificant. In a way, this 
is quite smprising, because ordinary behevers who participate are likely to have work or 
other commitments, as well as being heavily involved with then own rehgious community 
(for example, their local church, denomination and ecumenical group). Dialogue in 
France has also led to projects involving young people in the banlieues, and inter- 
rehgious mariiages happen, even if they are uncommon, fir general, it has been said, 
dialogue in France has worked weh (Babes 1996: 41). In addition, there has been 
Mushm-Christian dialogue on the subject of laïcité, such as the cohaborative work by the 
Groupe de recherches islamo-chrétien (1996), a group of Mushm and Christian 
researchers based in Brussels, Dakar, Paris, Rabat and Tunis, and concrete dialogue 
wliich I discuss hr section 9.3, the ethnogr aphic section of this chapter. This shows that 
the corTelation between laïcité and dialogue must not be seen as a rmilinear causation. 
Not only does a consciousness of laïcité become a cause of dialogue, but dialogue also 
brings about different understandings of laïcité.
Coming back to the purpose of this section, which is to show that Muslim-Christiui 
dialogue is sociahy sigirificant, the existence of such dialogue says something about the 
social ambience in which it takes place. Many participants in Muslim-Christian dialogue 
(would say that such dialogue is ‘mhaculous’, given the history of radical antipathy 
between Christiairity and Islam fi om the time of the Crusades (and, to some extent, even
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earlier). It certainly does show that a major social change has taken place. Does it 
reflect a change in the attitudes of Chiistians and Muslims to each other, to then own 
faiths, to then ideas of who Self and Other are? Or does it reflect a wider social change, 
which goes beyond the small number of participants in dialogue, or even the participants 
in organised religion? It could be either, but the sheer comprehensiveness of the change 
involved does seem to indicate that it could reflect a wider change.
It also underlines the value of the comparative approach, and the significance of the 
dialectic of Orientahsm and Muslim identities. The social and political significance of 
religion is different in the United Kingdom and in France, which has an impact on the 
context in which, and sometimes against which, Muslim identities are constructed. As I 
have shown, there is a threefold distinction to be drawn between the Church of England, 
other Chiistian denominations in the United Kingdom, and the chmches in France, as far 
as their structural relationship with Islam is concerned.
This is particularly significant in the context of Orientalism, as the perception of 
Islam which has existed in different national and ecclesiastical contexts has ramifications 
for the natme and significance of Muslim-Christian dialogue. In both countries, there 
have been what are clearly misconceptions about Islam, such as the use of the term 
‘Mohammedanism’ (French: mahométisme), on the basis of Muhammad having the same 
place in Islam as Christ in Christianity, or of Islam being a system of apostolic succession 
culminating in Muhammad (see Said 1995: 280). There is a need for dialogue to clear up 
some of these misconceptions, and the existence of dialogue demonstrates that there is a 
social ambience conducive to it. hr other words, dialogue shows that the social and 
political significance of rehgion, even at a formal level, is in a process of change, and 
(dialogue plays a part in this process.
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9.3. The ethnographic route
Indeed, the ethnographic research which I did in the United Kingdom and France 
indicated a diversity of forms of dialogue, and of attitudes to dialogue. Some of the 
logical consequences of this sociological model were shown not to be the case, if the 
model is understood synchionically. In other words, there were many similarities 
between the United Kingdom and France, which shows that the model has to be 
understood diachionically, underlining the point about the social and pohtical 
significance of rehgion being in a process of change, and dialogue playing a part in this 
process. Of comse, it cannot be estabhshed that this ethnographic material is typical of 
either country, as it is locaUy based, but it does coiToborate the broader sociological and 
theological observations which are in this chapter, and it rmderlines the importance of 
understanding the issue diachr onicahy.
In France, I was able to do a great deal of participant observation within the Groupe 
d ’amitié Islamo-Chrétien du Hautmont-Mouvaux, and the associated Association 
Bammate. The Groupe Islamo-Chrétien is one of the longest standing groups engaged 
in Mushm-Christian dialogue, and meets in the Jesuit-rnn Centre Spirituel du Hautmont 
in Mouvaux, a town in the Lille comnbation. Similar groups have been estabhshed and 
dissolved within a few years (see Elghazi 1990: 104-7). However, the Hautmont group 
has held an annual weekend conference since 1979, along with regular meetings and 
courses. It also led to the formation in 1991 of the Association Bammate, which 
addresses the need for research into Muslim and Christian rehgious identities, carried out 
by ‘ordinary’ Mushms and Christians themselves, rather than academics and researchers. 
(The Hautmont group has iusphed the formation of other Muslim-Christian groups—such 
as in the nearby town of HaUuin, and further away in Saint Amand and Maubeuge, towns
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in the south of the département—something which they consider a particular evidence of 
success.
Towards the end of 1996, the Association Bammate carried out a series of studies 
on laïcité in France as it affects, and is seen by, Muslims and Christians (Cathohc and 
Protestant). A number of problems which affect Muslims imder laïcité were evoked: the 
affaire du foulard', the need for finance as a result of the exclusion of pubhc money 
based on the law of 1905, which has led to Saudi and Algerian influence over the 
mosques (for example, it was stated that the Mosquée de Lyon was 90 per cent financed 
by Saudi money); Mushm bmial rites and the desire of some to return to then country of 
origin for bmial; and the slaughter of animals for eating according to Islamic law.
One participant, Arsha, a Muslim woman who would be classified, using the 
typology developed in section 6.2, as positive about rehgious integration and considering 
it to be a fait accompli, circulated a paper at one of these meetings, summarising the 
relationship between Islam and laïcité in France as follows:
Si on parle de fait rehgieux, comme il existe un fait chrétien en France, il y a 
maintenant un fait islamique. Notre société a mr rapport problématique au 
rehgieux: la rehgion a été progressivement depuis im siècle refoulée vers la 
sphère famUiale ou privée et se retrouve à nouveau confrontée à ce problème 
rehgieux avec ITslam. Dans les armées 1980, TIslam smgit dans le champ 
social fiançais: cette rehgion vient remettre en cause Féquihbre établi par la 
laïcité. Ce phénomène est aggravé par le fait que ITslam devient ime rehgion 
de France regroupant des citoyens fiançais.
r
‘If we speak of a religious phenomenon, as a Christian phenomenon exists in France, there is now an 
Islamic phenomenon. Our society has a problematic rapport with the religious: for the last century, 
religion has been driven back into the familial or private sphere and finds itself confronted anew with 
this religious problem alongside Islam. During the 1980s, Islam appeared on the French social scene:
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There is a perception here of laïcité as a challenge for Islam in particular, also for 
Cluistianity and for religion in general. Yet this is not seen as an issue concerning the 
power of religion over society, but, rather, the inability of society to come to terms with 
the religious. Thus, religion is taught witliin the household and not in the school—it is 
kept at arm’s length, neither part of the society nor excluded fiom it. It is considered 
that Islam is challenging this ambiguity, which itself is seen (elsewhere) as constituting an 
equilibrium in French society. In addition, Islam is, in a sense, speaking on behalf of a 
wider constituency, which includes other rehgions, and which is categorically a French 
constituency.
To take one example of this, which demonstrates that laïcité is contested within a 
context of Muslim-Christian relations, we have seen that the school is an important 
symbol of, and locus for, contests over laïcité. This can be seen in the Jules Ferry laws, 
the affaire du foulard, and the teacliing of rehgion in the home. It can also be seen in the 
presence of Muslim pupils in Cathohc private schools. Naïm told me that many Mushm 
parents prefer to send then clhldien to private schools run by the Cathohc church. In 
some cases, this is because they are perceived as providing a better moral and rehgious 
education than the state schools, and/or because boys and ghls are often segregated. In 
Ms own case, he sent Ms daughter to a Cathohc school because the local school was 
"débordé’ (oveiworked, confhctual), though he would have preferred to send her to an 
école laïque. Both cases are similar though, because they exist within a context where 
the piivate, the Cathohc private school, the individuaFfamihal, rehgion, morahty and the 
ehte, are contrasted with the pubhc, the state school, society, /aic/Yc/citizensMp, 
?hbeity/hbertariamsm and the masses.
this religion has brought the equilibrium estabhshed by laïcité into question. This phenomenon is 
aggravated by the fact that Islam is becoming a rehgion of France, bringing French citizens together. '
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According to Michael—a Catholic priest in Glasgow who has a long involvement in 
trilateral dialogue between Chiistians, Muslims and Jews—there are problems with 
creating an awareness of the need for dialogue among Chiistians m the United Kingdom. 
He said that a common attitude was that, since they beheved they had the truth, there 
was no point in dialogue with an ‘exotic’ rehgion such as Islam. Dialogue with Jews 
would be worthwhile, since Christianity came fiom Judaism, but other rehgions had no 
such value. However, common ground was often found on issues such as rehgious 
education and abortion, both of which imply a degree of resistance to secularisation, as 
weh as social justice and some international issues. Robert, a director of the Inter-Faith 
Network for the United Kingdom, said that this sometimes led to more conservative 
members of a given rehgious gioup participating in dialogue for uthitarian reasons, 
despite then suspicions of the rehgious Other, hi time, he argued, people who entered 
into dialogue for practical reasons would come to appreciate the spiritual significance of 
the project, and vice-versa. Robert also suggested that inter-faith groups in the United 
Kingdom tended to look at issues of common concern relating to the local community, 
so dialogue was often between individual churches and individual mosques, or between 
local ecumenical groups and members of other faiths. Michael’s point and Robert’s ftist 
point tend to support the hypothesis that the importance of dialogue varies with the 
degree of secularisation, and that dialogue in France is likely to constitute a response to 
laïcité, though, as Robert’s second point imphes, local considerations must also be taken 
into account.
However, some of the issues which were discussed in Muslim-Christian dialogue in 
France, and which did arise fiom laïcité or secularisation, have also arisen in the United 
(Kingdom in a completely different context. I cited the exclusion of pubhc money for the 
building of mosques in France, which has led to Saudi or Algerian fimding, and, by
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extension, influence over the mosques. This is also characteristic of the United Kingdom 
(see, for example, Lewis 1994a: 71; Nielsen 1995b: 48), where a significant proportion 
of the finances for constructing new mosques comes fiom Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. 
More controversially, the Muslim College in London was partly funded by the Call of 
Islam Society, based in Libya, and the Saddam Hussein Mosque in Binningham, 
uusuiprisingly, was funded by the Iraqi regime. Sometimes, this can create a vicious 
chcle: Muslims have difficulty in obtaining finance, so they are forced to accept funding 
fiom overseas, which contributes to an image of Islam as being ‘foreign’ or even 
threatening (particularly as Libya and Iraq are perceived as enemies of the West, and 
‘terrorist states’), which contributes to difficulties which Muslims have in obtaining 
public money. Nevertheless, I think that there is a growhig consciousness among 
Mushms in the United Kingdom and France of the need to be self-sufficient, enabling this 
vicious chcle to be broken. Another issue which I cited with reference to France was 
Muslim parents sending then children to Cathohc schools, because they are seen as 
providing a better moral and rehgious education than schools in the state sector. This is 
also true of the United Kingdom.
Mushm-Christian relations, including dialogue, are clearly not confined to subjects 
arising fiom laïcité or secularisation. Other social issues are frequently discussed, as are 
international issues, and there is a fr equent deshe articulated to find out more about each 
other’s rehgious practices, and how they are experienced ‘deep down’. A document 
which was written by Guy Lepoutre (1996) about the Groupe Islamo-Chrétien stated 
that the dialogue at Hautmont had social imphcations, citing as an example the five 
resolutions on the equihbrium of society which were adopted at the weekend of 1989 
"(which was on the subject "Vivre ensemble nos differences’):
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1. ‘prendre les moyens pour éviter la ségrégation dans Tattribution des 
logements’ ;
2. ‘associer tous les habitants à la gestion et à l’animation de leur quartier ou de 
lem'vUle’;
3. ‘ne faire aucune discrimination dans l’embauche et l’attribution des postes de 
travail’;
4. ‘prendre en compte les besoins de la jeunesse et définir leur place avec eux’;
5. ‘encourager davantage les familles maghrébines et françaises à inscrire lems 
enfants aux corns de langue arabe’
On the significance of such resolutions, the document continues by arguing;
Même si le Groupe du Hautmont n’a pas de moyens opérationnels pour que 
soient appliquées ces résolutions, nous voyons qu’elles signifient des prises de 
conscience communes et font progresser l’opinion publique.
International issues which were fiequently discussed included Algeria and Palestine, 
subjects which also arose in discussions I had with Muslims and other respondents in the 
United Kingdom. Michael msisted that when international issues were discussed in 
dialogue, it was essential to ask how they apply to ‘us’, that is, to the group of people 
engaged in dialogue. This was to avoid the problem of members of a particular religion 
feeling that they have to take a specific fine on certain issues, and finding it difficult to
"... to find the means to avoid segi'egation in the allocation of housing.,.; to involve all inhabitants in 
the running and activities of their district or town,..; not to discriminate in hiring people or in the 
allocation of jobs...; to take the needs of young people into account and to define their place with them...; 
encourage more North African and French families to enrol their children in Arabic language classes....’ 
‘Even if the Hautmont group does not have the operational means that these resolutions be applied, 
we can see that they signify a collective awareness and contribute to the progression of public opinion.’
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stand out. An example of this is discussion between Muslims and Jews on the subject of 
Palestine/Israel. Similarly, Christians who have been missionaries, some of whom have 
experience of persecution by Muslims, often want to raise this from the beginning of 
inter-faith encounters, and sometimes even participate in dialogue with the Sf^ ecific aim 
of raising this issue.
Nevertheless, as I have argued elsewhere in this thesis, m sections 6.4 and 7.2, 
discussions of hitemational issues indicate that Islam can represent an international 
consciousness. This can and sometimes does involve an inter-religious consciousness, 
mteitwhied with a strong aspiration for peace. This is remmiscent of Hans Küng’s 
(1995; ii) dictum;
No peace among the nations without peace among the religions.
No peace among the religions without dialogue between the religions.
No dialogue between the religions without investigation of the foundation of
the rehgions.
We will return to this subject shortly, but what I am trying to do here is to illustrate 
something of the diversity of subjects which are covered in Muslim-Christian dialogue, 
since this contributes to the diversity of representations of Islam, and to the diversity of 
Muslim identities. A good way to do this is to quote from my fieldwork notes, fiom the 
first meeting of the Groupe Islamo-Chrétien which I attended. The extract is fairly 
lengthy, so I have placed it in the appendix. It enables us to capture something of this 
diversity, and the extent to which dialogue can lead to a different constitution of Self and 
(Other. It should be noted that subjects under discussion, at just one meeting, included 
mteniationai issues (the situations in Algeria and Palestine), social issues (French
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immigration policy, integration, human dignity, religious responsibilities towards 
‘foreigners’), ‘religious’ issues (representation of Muslims in France, the Pope’s visit to 
France, rehgious festivals, prayer, the meaning of death), culture (Iranian cinema) and 
dialogue itself (multilateral and bilateral). It should also be noted that Self was 
constituted as Christians and Mushms who participated in dialogue, who accepted each 
other, and who opposed violence and social repression. This clearly problematises an 
essentiahst notion of a Muslim identity.
I do not have any ethnograpliic data on bilateral Muslim-Chiistian dialogue in the 
United Kingdom, though I do have some inteiview data, some of which is cited in this 
chapter. There is a Muslim-Cliristian fomm which meets in Glasgow, but this is by 
invitation only, and consists of representatives fiom some Christian denominations in 
Scotland, and some leading Muslims. I was never invited to this fomm, but since 
Protestants and Catholics have enough trouble co-existing in Glasgow, it is 
understandable that relations ‘with other faiths’ will be a fairly taboo subject, and that 
such dialogue will need to take place in as low-key a manner as possible.
This is itself a significant finding, however, because it indicates another baiiier to 
dialogue in the United Kingdom which does not exist in France. Although Glasgow is a 
special case within the United Kingdom when it comes to sectarianism, it is tme to say 
that the denominational diversity of Christianity in the United Kingdom, though 
hierarchical, contrasts with the predominance of the Cathohc church in most parts of 
France. As a result, there is sometliing threatening about coming face to face with what 
is perceived to be a homogeneous ‘opposition’ for Christians in the United Kingdom, 
whereas this is less true of France.
This should not be exaggerated, however, because French Christians do not speak 
on aU subjects with one mind and one voice, and because dialogue in the United
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Kingdom does happen. Indeed, Protestants and Catholics who participate in dialogue 
with other, ‘non-Christian’ rehgions, often find that their stereotypes of each other are 
challenged and coiTected. There is an apparent lack of open bilateral dialogue in the 
United Kingdom between Muslims and Christians on the subject of rehgion—Robert 
agreed that bilateral dialogue in the United Kingdom was less pubhc, because the 
bilateral issue was more prominent in people’s minds in France. Nevertheless, there are 
two important issues which must be considered, namely the existence of other forums in 
which there is a formal or informal dialogue between Muslims and ‘non-Muslims’, and 
multilateral dialogue which includes Muslims and Christians. Examples of the former 
include discussions with education authorities about the provision of halal food in 
schools, and informal conversations between neighboms. I did find that there was a 
tendency for Christians in the United Kingdom to assume that Muslims would be in 
agreement with each other, and one inter-viewee (Jackie) agreed with me on this. 
Certainly, it is not only Christians who display this tendency, and it can also be found hr 
France. Although the Christians with whom I had contact in France were generally more 
educated, as far as Islam is concerned, than hi the United Kingdom, the heuristic 
hypothesis that Christians hi the United Kingdom feel more thr eatened by the perceived 
unity of Mushms goes some way towards explaining why they should be more wftling to 
participate hi multilateral than bilateral dialogue.
On the second of the two phenomena cited above, multilateral dialogue which 
includes Mushms and Christians, I do have some ethnographic material firom the 
Glasgow Sharing of Faiths Group, and an ‘inteifaith pilgrimage’ which they organised. 
There was only one Muslim present at the meeting, and he was a Scottish convert to 
r Islam, and there was not really dialogue (in the sense of searching for areas of 
agreement, and seeking to understand areas of disagreement, tluough discussion),
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because the purpose of the meeting was to plan the ‘pilgrimage’. However, it was clear 
that most of the participants were at ease with the situation, as the discussion was fi ee 
and flowing, almost like an infoimal discussion, as opposed to the more formal dialogue 
which took place at the Groupe Islamo-Chrétien. In addition, other meetings of the 
same group have consisted of ‘stories’ firom the dififerent rehgions which have been 
represented—this is ‘theoretical’ dialogue, as the term was defined in the introduction to 
this chapter, because it is more concerned with expounding the rehgion than reveahng 
what it means to the behever in his or her social context.
The interfaith pilgrimage was a particularly imaginative form of dialogue, and one 
which was significant for its educative value, which, as I explain later in this chapter, is a 
usefifl criterion for evaluating inter-rehgious dialogue. About fifty ‘pilgrims’ firom 
dififerent faith communities participated, and visited a mosque (the Carrington Street 
mosque, which is marked in Figure 6.5 in Chapter 6), synagogue, Fhndu temple, Sikh 
Gurdwara and an Anghcan cathedral. At each place, one or two people, who normaUy 
worshipped there, spoke and answered questions about a number of issues, inter alia the 
building, the rehgious significance of any interior objects, the worship, behefs, and 
history of their rehgion. I noted at the time that many of our hosts (Jewish and Sikh as 
weh as Muslim) were falling over themselves to explain the segregation of men and 
women in their places of worship, in a way which would not cause any ofifence. I 
mention this because it demonstrates that there is stih some way to go—where people 
are comfortable with each other in a situation of dialogue, they should in theory become 
more comfortable about expressing their behefs and not worry about other people takhig 
ofifence.
Although the formal dialogue which takes place in the United Kingdom tends to be 
multilateral, Robert referred to a ‘process of encounter and conversation ... also taking
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place in a non-stmctured setting’, wlücli, he explained, refened to a process by which 
formal multilateral dialogue enabled participants to get to know each other, leading to an 
informal bilateral exchange. As an example of this, he referred to a Shi’a Muslim in his 
inter-faith group, who usually invited him home for continued discussion after the formal 
group meeting.
Of course, multilateral dialogue exists in France as weh. In Lftle, there was an 
‘Assisi meeting’ {"rencontre d ’Assise") on 27 October 1996, the tenth anniversai’y of the 
Pope’s meeting with leaders of the major world religions in Assisi. Christians (Cathohc 
and Protestant), Mushms and Buddhists (Cambodian, Vietnamese and Laotian) were 
present, and Jewish representatives were involved in the preparation.
I commented earher that my research indicated a diversity of attitudes to dialogue, 
as weh as forms of dialogue, and it is worth looking at this diversity in more detail, 
because diversity is a major theme of this thesis, and because this diversity in relation to 
dialogue is a part of the diversity inherent in the dialectic of Orientahsm and Muslim 
identities. A simple hst of these attitudes could include the view that Islam and 
Christianity are compatible or even complementary, that they have something in 
common, that dialogue is a means of creating peace, that it is a good thing but with 
certain problems, that it is a means of dcma or mission, that the other rehgion represents 
the rehgion of the Other, or that different rehgions are inevitably in a situation of conflict. 
I discuss some of these attitudes now.
As I have argued, Chiistian-Muslim dialogue in France is often seen in the context 
of laïcité. Fatima beheved that the problems facing young people in contemporaiy 
France made Mushm-Christian dialogue particularly important, and agreed that the 
common chaUenge of laïcité was one possible reason for this dialogue being particularly 
strong in France, as compared to the United Kingdom. Amo Ferhati, however, saw
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dialogue firmly in a context of laïcité—his association had organised a festival for Eid 
ul-Adha which had been secularised {laïcisé) by inviting members of the Jewish and 
Christian communities to participate.
Looking at the diversity of attitudes to dialogue which are not connected to laïcité^ 
as has been said, Jean considered Islam and Christianity to be compatible, even 
complimentary, and his own practice of Islam was also oriented towards Christiairity. A 
similar viewpohit was expressed by some participants in the interfaith pilgrimage hr 
Glasgow, that all faiths were pointing m essentially the same direction. Although this 
was the position of the Hhidus and Sikhs, and not the Muslims and Christians, it was a 
behef to which Muslim and Christian participants were exposed, and wliich they clearly 
respected.
Naim also said that Christianity and Islam had many things in common, something 
which he had felt very strongly as a result of his own participation in Muslim-Christian 
dialogue. However, he noted that for many Muslims there were aspects of Christianity 
which were not incompatible with Islam, but for them represented the rehgion of the 
Other, and that this caused them to reject these aspects. An example which Naim gave 
was a high regard for Jesus ( Issa), an important Prophet in Islam (and mentioned far 
more times in the Qur’an than Muliammad), but who is perceived by some Muslims as 
representative of Christianity.
Hassan saw dialogue as a means to create peace and understanding between 
different rehgions, traditions and commurrities, in France and elsewhere, which was also 
the purpose behind the interfaith pilgrimage. Hassan participated in the rencontre 
d Assise, which also emphasised dialogue as a means towards peace between rehgions, 
Ï communities and human beings. When I asked him to speak about this, he said;
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[On a voulu] montrer surtout que la notion de paix est transcendante. Parce 
que, a côté de ça, on entend dire que c’est les religions qui sont la cause de 
tous les problèmes, et forcement, pour l’iiomme de foi, il essaye aussi de 
montrer que d’ici ü vient aussi des hommes de paix—de paix de l’âme, de paix 
de l’esprit, de paix du coeur—et que si nous l’avons perdu c’est parce que nous 
avons oublié ... des dhectives divines.
Ibrahim and Ahmed raised certain dangers with Muslim-Christian dialogue, though 
they were both committed to it. For Ahmed, who had done research on the liistory of 
Sufi Islam, the problem was one of "comparatisme"—Christians and Muslims becoming 
obsessed with comparing their respective rehgions instead of engaging in genuine 
dialogue. Comparisons, he argued, should be left to the speciahsts, otherwise mutual 
rmderstanding could be damaged, hi some circumstances, this could raise questions 
about the motives for participating in dialogue, such as people who participate in order 
to raise certain issues, such as rehgious persecution by members of another rehgion, as is 
mentioned above, or even people who participate in the hope that members of the other 
rehgion wih convert. However, such people often become disillusioned very quickly, 
and give up, or else they find a difference between the exclusive doctrines of their 
rehgion and the discovery of other people who also had a faith in God. On a similar, 
though not identical, note, Ibrahim was committed to dialogue because he beheved the 
development of mutual understanding to be important, particularly as Mushms and 
Christians had much in common concerning values and morality (theology being a
qWe wanted] to show that the notion of peace is transcendent. Because, at the same time, people are 
heard saying that religions are the cause of all the world’s problems, and so the man of faith must also 
try to show that men of peace also come from here— peace of soul, peace of spirit, peace of heart— and 
that if we’ve lost it it’s because w e’ve forgotten ... divine instructions.’
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different issue). For him, the problem was that Mushms and Christians displayed a lack 
of understanding of their own rehgions, and so could not engage m effective dialogue:
... dans un premier temps, U faut quand même que les deux parties, musulmans 
et chrétiens, connaissent mieux leurs rehgions. On ne peut pas ... dialoguer, 
apporter aux autres, sans bien comiaître sa rehgion. Et, si vous voulez, il y a 
beaucoup, même de gens dans les groupes islamo-chiétiens, qui sont 
musulmans très petit peu, ou chrétiens très petit peu. Moi, je ne vois pas 
comment on peut faire le dialogue islamo-chrétien, pour un musulman, sans 
faire la prière. Pour moi, ça n’a pas de sens vraiment.
This was reaUy a constructive criticism, because Ibr ahim was committed to Mushm- 
Christian dialogue. However, hrter-rehgious relations are somethnes more strained, as 
the note from Madame Debeh to members of the Groupe Islamo-Chrétien, cited in 
Chapter 3, demonstrates, hr a similarly negative vein, a Muslim con espondent of the 
French Islamologist Bruno Etierme insisted:
Lorsque deux rehgions s’affiontent, ce n’est pas pour se comparer et se 
déceruer les compliments mais pom' se combatte. C’est pour cela que jamais 
vous ne nous entendrez due que nous respectons votre rehgion.!.. De votre 
part, ce respect à l’égard de la nôtre paraît une abdication: vous renoncez à
'... well to begin with, both parties, Muslims and Christians, must laiow their own religions better. 
One cannot ... participate in dialogue, bringing something to others, without knowing one’s own 
religion well. And, if  you like, there are many people, even in Muslim-Christian groups, who are only 
very slightly Muslim, or very sliglitly Christian. I cannot see how a Muslim can be involved in Muslim- 
Christian dialogue without praying. For me, that doesn’t really have any meaning.’
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nous imposer votre foi, nous ne renoncerons jamais à étendr e FIslam (cited in 
Etienne 1987: 22-3)/^^
Less aggressively, though still with a negative portrayal of Islam, was the invitation 
from the Baptist church in Lille to hear a talk from a Pakistani woman who had 
converted from Islam to Christianity. Then leaflet of invitation used Ar abic writing and 
design, and was clearly aimed at Muslims in Lille with the intention of encouraging more 
conversions to Christianity. The Groupe Islamo-Chrétien were more balanced, and 
outlined their aims as friendship, convergence between the two cultures and religions, 
respect for doctrinal differences, and a mutual sphitual stimulation. The tension between 
these aims and the place of such missionary activities in Christianity is also expressed:
Ces quatre mots expriment une option qui va dans le sens du dialogue; ce n’est 
pas évident pour le chrétien que je suis qui vit une tension entre ‘dialogue’ et 
‘annonce du Message’. Des frères évangéhques d’autres éghses chrétiennes 
mettent la priorité dans l’aimonce du Message et l’invitation à la conversion. 
Leurs communautés dans la région comportent une boime proportion de 
maghrébins—qui, souvent, n’étaient musulmans que de très loin—devenus 
chrétiens.... Cette priorité dormée à l’armonce du Message s’appuie sur des 
phrases telles que: ‘Je suis la Voie, la Vérité et la Vie’ que nul chrétien ne peut 
récuser. Mais le risque est de ne pas respecter son interlocuteur, de diabohser 
ses écritures et de repartir en guerre de religion.... Notre option est autre. .. Il 
s’agit de nous respecter et de nous aimer mutuellement, en nous reconnaissant
‘When two religions face each other, it is not for comparing each other and awarding compliments, 
but for figliting each other. That is why you will never hear us saying that we respect your religion. .. 
From our point of view, this respect for ours looks like a surrender: you renounce imposing your faith on 
us, we will never renounce the propagation of Islam. ’
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dans nos différences: oui, ces différences bien reconnues permettent Tunité.
Nous nous encourageons à vivre nos fidélités respectives et nous croyons à la 
fidélité de Dieu qui nous conduit vers la vérité toute entière... (Lepoutre 
1996).
9.4. The theological route
This leads us conveniently onto the theological route from the problematic of 
exanmiing a concrete example of the dialectic of Orientahsm and Muslim identities, to 
the conclusion that Muslim-Christian dialogue is comparatively theoretical, informal and 
multilateral in the United Kingdom, while it is practical, formal and bilateral in France. 
Here, I show that there is not a significant theological difference between Catholicism 
and Protestantism, respectively the dominant strands of Christianity m France and the 
United Kingdom. This makes it possible to reject one alternative to the hypothesis that it 
is the social and poHtical contexts which have the most significant influence on the 
different dynamics and extents of dialogue in the United Kingdom and France, that 
alternative being that theological differences are as or even more significant. The 
theological issues are also worth discussing in then own right, for four reasons. Firstly, 
the Catholic and Protestant views may be broadly similar, but, as I demonstrate, they are 
diverse and ambiguous, and this contributes to the diversity inherent in the dialectic of
‘These four words express an option which goes in the direction of dialogue; it is not easy for the 
Christian which I am who lives a tension between “dialogue” and “announcing the Message”. Some 
Evangelical brothers o f other Christian churches prioritise the announcing of the Message and invitation 
to conversion. Their communities in the region contain a good proportion of North Africans— who were 
often only Muslims in a very distant sense— who have become Christians..,. This priority which is 
I given to announcing the Message rests on such texts as: “I am the Way, the Truth and the Life” which 
no Christian can challenge. But there is a risk of not respecting the people to whom one is speaking, of 
demonising their scriptures and going back to a war of religion.... Our choice is different.... We have to 
respect and love each other, recognising each other within our differences: indeed, a real recognition of 
these differences permits unity. We encourage each other to live our respective commitments and we 
believe in the commitment and faitlifulness of God, who leads us to the truth in its entirety’.
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Orientalism and Muslim identities. Secondly, where changes have occuned in theologies 
of dialogue, we can conclude that the social ambience, to which I have already refened, 
has not impeded these changes from occuning. Thirdly, there is a ‘mirroring’ of the 
dialectic of Orientahsm and Muslim identities in that Christian and Muslim theologies of 
dialogue influence each other, and they have air influence on how the ordinary behever of 
one rehgion perceives the other rehgion. Fourthly, participants in dialogue have often 
got involved because of an interest in the theology of rehgions.
Rehgious exclusivism in Christianity and Islam is often based on Bibhcal and 
Qm ’anic texts such as the foflowing:
And there is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven 
given among men by which we must be saved (The Bible, Acts 4:12);
No one comes to the Father but by me (The Bible, John 14:6);
The Rehgion before Ahah is Islam (submission to His wih): nor did the People 
of the Book dissent thereftom except through envy of each other, after 
knowledge had come to them. But if any deny the Signs of Ahah, Ahah is swift 
in calling to accormt (The Qur’an, Ali ‘Imran 3:19);
If anyone desires a rehgion other than Islam (submission to Ahah), never wih it 
be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter he wftl be in the ranks of those who 
have lost (ah spiritual good) (The Qur’an, Ali ‘Imran 3:85).’^ ^
In the Roman Cathohc tradition, magisterial dogmas such as "extra ecclesia nulla 
sallus" (outside the church there is no salvation) have also been invoked. On the other
See Wessels (1995) and Esack (1997) for a discussion of these verses.
294
hand, religious inclusivism, or dialogue, can also be supported by texts from the Bible 
and the Qur’an, for example:
And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and 
they shall hear my voice; and there shall be one fold, and one shepherd (The 
Bible, John 10:16);
Those who believe (in the Qur’an), and those who follow the Jewish 
(scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians—any who believe in Allah and 
the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have then reward with then Lord; 
on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve (The Qur’an, Al Baqarah, 2:62);
And nearest among them in love to the behevers wilt thou find those who say,
‘We are Christians’: because amongst those are men devoted to learning and 
men who have renounced the world, and they are not arrogant (The Qur’an, Al 
M a’idah 5: 82);
And argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious (The Qur’an, Al 
Nahl 16: 125).
Some writers, for example Jan Slomp (1992: 170), contrast the positivity of the 
Cathohc chmch towards Islam with the ‘rather negative remarks about Islam’ made by 
the Protestant theologian Karl Barth. Nostra Aetate, the document on the relation of the 
Cathohc church to ‘non-Christian’ rehgions, was one of the most revolutionary 
documents to come out of the aggiornamento of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), 
and formed the basis of subsequent Cathohc teaching on this issue. As John Renard 
(1986: 69-70) points out: "Nostra aetate"s remarks about Islam seem quite reseived and 
pohte in retrospect, but, given the prior history of Roman Cathohc attitudes towards—or
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simple inatteutiveness to—Islam, the texts on Islam were quite remarkable and even 
revolutionary.’ The whole document is reproduced in the appendix, but there are some 
excerpts which are worth citing here. With respect to Muslims specifically, the 
document begins by expounding the common ground, and the reasons for holding ‘the 
Muslims’ and ‘the faith of Islam’ in high regard:
The Chruch regards with esteem also the Muslims. They adore the one God, 
living and subsisting in Himself, mercifiil and all-powerful, the Creator of 
heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit 
wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom 
the faith of Islam takes great pleasure in linking itself, submitted to God. 
Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they revere Him as a prophet.
They also honour Mary, His vhgin mother; at times they even call on her with 
devotion, hr addition, they await the day of judgement when God will render 
theh deserts to all those who have been raised up from the dead. Finally, they 
value the moral life and worship God especially through prayer, almsgiving and 
fasting.
Continuing fiom this, the document makes a plea to Muslims and Christians to 
improve then relations with each other, exphcitly for the purpose of effecting social 
change and other benefits:
Since in the comse of centuries not a few quarrels and hostihties have arisen 
between Christians and Muslims, this Sacred Synod urges all to forget the past 
and to work sincerely for mutual rmderstanding and to preserve as well as to
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promote together for the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral welfare, 
as well as peace and freedom.
However, as Hans Küng (1978: 97-8) has pointed out, the Cathohc church has not 
abandoned the doctrine of extra ecclesia nulla sallus, merely reinterpreted it (though 
Küng insists that this is an unsustainable contradiction, and that extra ecclesia nulla 
sallus must be abandoned). This reinterpretation is based on Karl Rahner’s theology, 
which recognises the salvific potential of other rehgions, but which argues that this 
creates ‘anonymous Christians’, rather than any other rehgion being intiinsicaUy vahd.
Fmthermore, in contrast to Slomp’s juxtaposition of Cathohc positivity and 
Protestant negativity towards Islam, Barth’s theology has a more hrclusivist and positive 
side. He recognises Melchizedek as one Bibhcal example of a ‘foreign’, ‘pagan’ 
rehgious leader with something vitahy important to say, and with a constitutive role in 
the development o f ‘the revealed rehgion’. I n  fact, this is a universahstic statement of 
Barth. Without mentioning Islam by name, he writes ‘that man, our fehow-man 
generally, can become our neighbour, even where we do not think we see anything of the 
Church, i.e., in his humanity he can remind us of the humanity of the Son of God and 
show mercy upon us by summoning us in that way to the praise of God’. He continues 
in a long paragraph (not particularly long by Barth’s standards, but long enough to be 
placed hr the appendix) which explains both the Bibhcal basis and ambiguity of his 
theology of the world rehgions (Barth 1956: 425-6).
This ambiguity—by which individual ‘Gentiles’ were given a place, not only hr 
‘redemptive history’, but also in ‘the apparently closed chcle of the divine election’, by 
. which they had ‘very important and decisive things to say to the children of the
See Wessels (1995: 61). The Bible cites Melchizedek as ‘the priest o f God most high’, and a 
prototype of Jesus Christ, despite his being a ‘pagan’ Canaanite priest.
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household’, but also by which they caiuiot ‘be regarded as in any way the representatives 
of a general revelation’, by which they ‘have no Word of God to preach’, ‘are not 
witnesses of the resurrection’ and ‘have no hill power to summon to the love of God’— 
is an accur ate portrayal of the representations of Islam which can be found in different 
strands of Christianity. Although Barth was a Swiss Protestant theologian, he was 
reputedly regarded by Pope John XXIII as the ‘Einstein’ of twentieth-century theology, 
and, as we have seen, a similar ambiguity is present in the work of the Cathohc 
theologian Rahner.
If we think of this discussion as mhioiing the discussions of Western 
representations of Islam, in Part I of this thesis, then we should also consider Muslim 
theologies of dialogue as part of a dialectic which min ors the dialectic of Orientahsm and 
Muslim identities. I wih do so briefly, as I continue on this theme in the conclusion to 
the thesis. Almost inevitably, the same ambiguity arises in Islam as in Christianity on the 
basis of Qm’anic texts such as the ones cited above, though the existence of specific 
Qm’anic injunctions on the subject of relations with the Ahl al~Kitab (the people of the 
book, particularly Christians and Jews) contrasts with the absence of Bibhcal references 
to Islam (which is not surprising, given the historical sequence of events). This may 
explain why Mushms who were involved in dialogue seemed more committed than 
Christians, though the Christians were present m greater numbers (if this impression is 
correct). Among commentators on the Qur’an, there has often been a behef that the 
‘inclusive’ verses were ‘abrogated’ by the ‘exclusive’ ones. This was the view of Sayyid 
Qutb, one of the most influential writers of the twentieth-century Islamic resmgence, 
whose view is described by Issa BouUata (1995: 50) as foUows:
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The specificity and the distinctiveness of the Muslim community are very 
important matters in the thought system of Sayyid Qutb. To him, the teachings 
of the Qur’an divide humanity into Islam and JahUiyya (pre-Islamic era), and 
there is nothing in between. According to him, since the Qur’an is God’s last 
true message to humanity, other scriptural communities are subsumed under 
Islam. Then beliefs and practices are only vahdated by what the Qui’an 
teaches, not by what they claim then scriptmes teach. Sayyid Qutb 
understands the implementation of the Shari'a of the Qur’an to be the hallmark 
of Muslim specificity and distinctiveness, and a dutifiil acceptance of God’s 
governance (Hakimiyya) over humanity, which he sees as the only governance 
that ensmes justice, peace, and salvation. Thus, any rehgious plmahsm that 
equates other rehgions with Islam tampers, in his view, with its specificity and 
distinctiveness and is unacceptable because it aUows laxity in the fuU 
implementation of the Shari'a. To him, inteifaith relations are possible only if 
the supremacy of Islam and that of its Shari'a are recognized; it would be best 
if ah humankind would recognize Islam as then rehgion and its Shari'a as theh 
law and way of life.
Although such a reading of the Qur’an is clearly negative in its view of inter- 
rehgious dialogue (except as a means of dawa or jihad), it does show how the reading of 
the text has an impact on practice. Farid Esack (1997: 163) completely disagrees with 
Qutb’s reading on this issue (though he agrees on the importance of Qur’anic praxis), 
and with the specific apphcation of naskh (abrogation). He writes:
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Criticism of the abrogation theoi’y, regardmg God reneging on a promise or 
causing a past generation to suffer for the intransigence or disbehef of a present 
generation, is clear. Fmtheimore..., the supposedly abrogating text [Ali ‘Imran 
3:85, cited above] is no less inclusive than ... \Al Baqarah 2:62, also cited 
above], which is supposed to have been abrogated.... Wliat is significant about 
this opinion is that Ibn ‘Abbas and ‘a group among the exegetes’ actually held 
the opinion that this verse, at an earlier stage, did offer salvation to groups 
outside the community of Muslims. Ibn ‘Abbas is one of the earhest 
commentators of the Qm ’an. It was only much later, when the exegetes had 
recomse to more sophisticated exegetical devices, that alternatives to this 
theoiy became possible in order to secure exclusion fiom salvation for the 
Other.
From om point of view, however, what is important is not only the theological 
doctrines and diversities which exist, but also the way in which, and the extent to which, 
they influence the ordinary believer of either religion. Tliis is the issue which has been 
discussed in the sections on the sociological and ethnographic routes, and it is here that 
all thr ee routes merge.
9.5. Comparative evaluation
One way in which this can be considered is by adopting John Renard’s five 
evaluative criteria, which were developed in order to evaluate a number of Vatican 
documents on Muslim-Christian dialogue. They are: establishment of the need for 
dialogue; educative value; stimulus to reflection; stimulus to action; and reahsm about
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the possibihties of dialogue. We shall ask to what extent they are characteristic of 
dialogue in the United Kingdom and France.
The need for dialogue has been established in France by the challenge of laïcité, and 
to a significant extent in the United Kingdom by the effects of secularisation on issues 
like abortion or religious education. Social issues, such as disciimination against 
Muslims, and their economic status, have also been of concern for Christians, and 
dialogue has been seen as necessary if they are to confi ant such issues.
Dialogue in France has had an educative value, both as a result of discussion within 
the fnnnns of dialogue, and as a result of the publicisation of dialogue thr ough public 
lectures, participation in cultural events, and so on. hr the United Kingdom, as I have 
suggested, dialogue tends to be more private, so it does not in itself have much of an 
educative impact on the wider society. Events like the interfaith pilgrimage do have 
educative value for participants, and academic dialogue, such as the Centre for the Study 
of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations in Birmingham, has an educative impact on the 
academic hterature, and, to a limited extent, on media discourse. However, according to 
Robert, Bhmingham is about the most institutional example of dialogue in the United 
Kingdom, and its primary focus is not on dialogue ia the United Kingdom context, but 
on international issues.
Of course, dialogue has an educative value for participants, and tliis is the case hr 
both countries. Participants learn about each other, and each other’s faiths, but they can 
also learn about then own. The example of different strands of Clrristianity learning 
about each other has been cited in this chapter. Another example, given by Robert, is of 
a Christian who was interested in Buddhism, wonder ed why there was no meditation in 
fChristianity, then discovered that there was. In this way, participants’ own faiths can 
become more relevant to them.
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Stimulus to reflection is provided through dialogue in both countries, and has 
attained some prominence in the United Kingdom because of the pubhc role of the 
church (for example, Prince Charles’s desiie to become the ‘Defender of Faith’, rather 
than ‘Defender of the Faith’). As far as reflection by participants in dialogue is 
concerned, this is impossible to evaluate, though I was impressed with the reflection 
which was demonstrated by Ibrahim’s comment (cited in Chapter 6) about the Qur’an 
being the Word of God written, Jesus Christ being the Word of God made flesh. This 
insight seems to have come fiom his education in Sufism, but to have been distilled 
thr ough his participation in dialogue with Christians.
The only real example of stimulus to action that I have found emergmg fiom 
Muslim-Christian dialogue was fiom the five resolutions on the equilibrium of society, 
cited in Guy Lep outre’s document, fiom the Hautmont group’s weekend of 1989. Other 
than this, there is a danger of dialogue taking place hr a ‘safe’ enclosed sjrace, where 
people will deplore certain problems of society, but, having left the place of dialogue, 
wül continue with ‘life as normal’. This seems especially problematic in the United 
Kingdom, because informal and theoretical dialogue is, hr these terms, particularly ‘safe’.
On the other hand, reahsm about the possibihties of dialogue seems to have 
mcreased in both cotmtries, because participants are more confident and wUhng to 
participate in dialogue without expecting to convert or to be converted. The emphasis of 
the Hautmont group on respect for differences seems to be the most reahstic; some 
groups nr the United Kingdom and France tahc about the celebration of difference, which 
is more attractive than plausible. On this point I see no difference between the United 
Kingdom and France.
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9.6. Conclusion
Although it is not reahstic to make a quasi-quantitative statement which makes a 
strictly comparative evaluation of dialogue in both countries, it is possible to point to 
certain quahtative differences, as I have done in this chapter, hi a few words, as I wiote 
at the beginning of the chapter, dialogue in the United Kingdom is more theoretical, 
informal and multilateral, whereas dialogue in France is more practical, formal and 
bilateral. The conclusion we can draw ffom this chapter is somewhat paradoxical. On 
the one hand, the dynamics and significance of Muslim-Christian dialogue, particularly 
when viewed in the context of the dialectic of Orientahsm and Muslim identities, are 
strongly influenced by the state pohty of laïcité or estabhshment. On the other hand, 
there are many similarities in attitude and theology, and there is a gieater diversity within 
each country than between them. This paradox can be resolved if we conclude, in 
keeping with the material which I have presented, that the differences between the 
United Kingdom and France are to do with the differing social and pohtical contexts, and 
the degree and nature of secularisation, not theological views about dialogue, and that 
these contexts are also the contexts in which Muslim identities are constmcted in 
response to Western Orientalist representations of Islam.
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10. Conclusion
10.1. Addressing the hypotheses
This conclusion shows how the hypotheses of this work have been addi’essed, how 
the questions have been answered, what comparisons have been made, and it proposes 
dhections for future research. This thesis has addressed thr ee hypotheses; that Islam is 
perceived as homogeneous; that it is in fact diverse; and that there is a causal relationship 
between the perception and the reahty. The perception of homogeneity has been 
constructed through centuries of Orientalist discourses, which perpetuated a stereotype 
of exoticism and then fanaticism. It has been constructed through Islamophobic 
discourses and practices, and through media stereotypes of exoticism, fanaticism and 
delinquency. These perceptions of homogeneity have been investigated in detaü in Part I 
of this thesis, and the findings are expounded in section 10.2, below.
The diverse reahty is investigated in Fait II, particularly Chapter 6. There, it is 
shown that different mosques and organisations aiticxdate diverse meanings of Islam, as 
do individuals. Islam can be articulated as a set of behefs or practices, as an mtemal 
reahty, as the property of a particular national or cultural gioup, as an identity which 
distinguishes the Muslim fiom the suirounding society, or as an identity which valorises 
the Muslim in all areas of his or her social life. Diversity exists in ah these areas, and 
(others. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 show that there is a diversity of attitudes towards national 
identities, the pohtics of integration or multiculturahsm, education, the wearing of the
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hijab (which also illustrates that there are different ways of reading the Qur’an), and 
people of other religions.
Each of these principles—that Islam is perceived in homogeneous teims, and that it 
is diverse—is well estahhshed, but there is original emphical evidence in this thesis, and 
there is a hnk between the two principles which is not so well estahhshed. It is the 
assertion of a causal relationship between the homogeneous perception and the diverse 
reahty which is one of the original contributions of this thesis, identified in section 1.6, 
and this necessitates more in-depth coiroboration. It is possible to begin this 
coiToboration with reference to ideas in existing hteratme, but these ideas need to be 
synthesised and apphed in an original way, and here they are combined with tlie empirical 
contributions of this thesis. There are five ways in which this coiroboration can be 
achieved.
The first is Laroui’s notion of complimentarity. Tliis has aheady been discussed at 
length in this thesis, but it is such a pivotal point that it is worth repeating the passage 
fiom Islam et modernité where Laroui explains the dynamic of comphmentarity in the 
history of relations between Islam and the West:
... le fait de complimentarité a présidé aux choix qu’ont fait au corns d’un 
millénaire Arabes et Européens dans des domaines aussi variés que la théologie 
(tiinitaiisme contre unitarisme), la métaphysique (immanence contre 
transcendence), l’esthétique (figuration contre abstraction), l’art militaire 
(infanterie contre cavalerie), l’architecture (maison ouverte contre maison 
fermée), rubanisme (rues orthogonales contre rues concentriques); je ne cite 
( pas le costume, la toilette, la cuisine, la maintien que chacun peut encore 
détecter du premier coup d’œil.... A quoi est due cette différence...? II me
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semble que la raison profonde est un a priori qui fait partie de la conscience 
culturelle européenne. Si fart occidental est évolution, développement, 
diversification, fa it musulman, par contraste méthodologique, doit être 
stabilité, répétition, monotonie (Laroui 1990: 156, 160).^ ®^
By extension, because the West is diverse, the Orient must be perceived as 
homogeneous, and Islam, being a part of the homogeneous Orient, must itself be 
perceived as homogeneous. Here it is the reahty of the diversity of the West, rather than 
that of the diversity of Islam, which bears a causal relationship to the perception of 
Muslim homogeneity, but it estabhshes the principle that causal relationships can and do 
exist between perceptions of homogeneity and diverse reahties.
The second corroboration enables us to bridge the remaining gap, and it is the 
apphcation of the principle of negative dialectics to Orientahst representations and 
resistance to Orientahsm through the construction of Muslim identities. There remains a 
perception that Muslim and Western values are radicaUy incompatible, which is 
consohdated when Mushms are perceived as rejecting Western culture and values, or 
when ‘assimilated’ Mushms are perceived as having accepted the superiority of Western 
cultur e and values, or when a combined Muslim-Westem identity is seen as contradictory 
and irrational. The negative dialectic means that Orientahsm and resistance to 
Orientahsm are in a situation of mutual antagonism, which makes them increasingly 
different and polarised. When this polarisation occurs, they are constituted in opposition
‘... the dynamic of complementarity has presided over the choices which Arabs and Europeans have 
made for the past millennium, in domains as varied as theology (trinitarianism versus unitarianism), 
metaphysics (immanence versus transcendence), aesthetics (figuration versus abstraction), military 
^strategies (infantry versus cavalry), architecture (the open house versus the closed house), urban 
planning (orthogonal streets versus concentric streets); I have not cited clothing, washing, or food, 
which everyone can detect immediately.... What is the cause of this difference...? It seems to me that, 
deep down, the reason is an a priori which is a part of European cultural consciousness. If Western art 
is evolution, development, diversification, Muslim art, by methodological contrast, must be stability, 
repetition, monotony’.
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to each other, which means that, increasingly, they reinforce each other. Tliey do this 
when Muslims and ‘non-Muslim’ Westerners look at each other, and define what is 
essential about then own identities, cultures and practices as what differentiates them 
fi om the Other. As a result, they seek new and different foims of expressing Orientahsm 
and resistance to Orientahsm, which also leads to a fiagmentation of then discourses. 
For example, the West is increasingly distinguisliing itself fiom the Islamic world on the 
basis of state judicial systems and respect for human rights, which is a different 
stereotype of Muslims fiom the one of the fundamentalist teiTorist who works against, 
rather than thr ough, the state. This fi agmentation of discour ses is a factor in the creation 
of diversity.
The third way of cornoborating a causal relationship between the perception of 
homogeneity and the reality of diversity is to adapt Taguieff s vicious cncle of racism 
and anti-racism. As I indicated in the introduction to this thesis, and in the chapter on 
Islamophobia (section 3.4), Taguieff s distinction between a racisme hétérophobe and a 
racisme hétérophile is reflected by a distinction between xenophobic and xenophrle 
approaches to Orientalism, as Al-Azmeh (1996: 4, 28, 89) imphes. According to 
Taguieff, there is a heterophobic racism, characterised by a hatred of the racially-defined 
Other, which is opposed by a heterophile antfiacism, characterised by an appreciation of 
the Other. In reaction to this, a heterophile racism emerges, which also appreciates the 
Other—so much does it appreciate the Other that it seeks to maintain the Otherness of 
the Other and avoid any mixing between Self and Other. This is stih racism. It, in turn, 
is opposed by a heterophobic antiracism which rejects the idea of difference in favour' of 
universahty (Taguieff 1987: 38 e/ passim), something which is particularly relevant to 
(France because the assimilationist ideal is seen as a guarantee of universal equahty and 
human rights within the French nation. Although there is a danger of this perspective
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being adopted to justify an Islamophobic backlash against Muslims who insist on the 
specificity of then religion, culture and values, it does illustrate that the diversity of 
Orientalist discomses—which promotes the perception of Muslim homogeneity— 
produces a diversity of Muslim responses, and, by extension, of Muslim identities.
Since I have mentioned Al-Azmeh, the fomth corroboration is taken fiom his work. 
The point he makes is that some Muslims view Islam as homogeneous. Tliere is ‘an 
objective comphcity between exoticism and the rhetoric of identity and authenticity’ (Al- 
Azmeh 1996: 28), and this kind of rhetoric is propagated by some Muslims, particularly, 
m Al-Azmeh’s discourse, the ‘neo-Afghanists’. In other words, Muslims who insist that 
Islam should be believed and practised in a particular way, and who condemn or criticise 
the diversity which exists, are partly responsible for the perception of homogeneity which 
exists in Orientahst discom se. Fmtheimore, such Muslims exist because of the diversity 
of Islam. This is not to blame Mushms for the existence and substance of Orientahst 
representations of them, but I am also concerned not to reduce Mushms to the role of 
passive victims in the whole process, because this undeimines then humanity as active 
agents who constitute then own essence.
Finahy, I cite the empirical content of this thesis, which demonstrates that the 
diversity of Islam is actively constituted by Mushms, but that it is also brought about by 
cncumstances, and that Muslim identities mediate active constitution and circumstances. 
For example, the identity which is imphcit in an Islam de France demands a conscious 
decision to allow Islam to become more diverse, but this is only possible due to the 
circumstance of being in France. For another example, where one’s identity is influenced 
by migration, this mediates the activity of holding to a particular set of rehgious behefs, 
(or of changing one’s interpretation of those behefs, and the material conditions of 
Muslim migration to Western Europe in the second half of the twentieth century.
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Examples of this process include the different attitudes to Islam and Muslim culture 
which are present in different generations of Muslims in Western Europe, decisions 
regarding wealing of the hijab, and attitudes to inter-rehgious dialogue.
10.2. Answering the questions
At this point, it is possible to outline and expound the answers to the fbm central 
questions of this thesis. The questions were:
(i) What perceptions exist of a West-Islam duahsm, homogeneity of Islam, and 
homogeneity of the West?
(n) How are they expressed?
(hi) What are their causes and effects?
(iv) What dissenting voices exist, how are they expressed, and what are their 
causes and effects?
As we have looked at empirical case studies of Muslim identities in the United 
Kingdom and France, we have understood these questions in a more concrete way. At 
the end of Chapter 5, I summarised some preliminaiy answers to these questions, and 
other answers have been given throughout the thesis. I wish to expound these answers 
now.
hi answer to the first question, I explained that these perceptions were found in 
newspaper articles, interviews with Muslim leaders and ordinaiy Muslims, academic 
■material, and many other places. Indeed, Said (1995) has pointed to these perceptions 
existing as a comprehensive Western discomse, which in another context he describes as
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‘imperialist liegemony over the entire gamut of European cultme’ (Said 1992: 68), so it 
is not suiprising that they are present in many dififerent places.
What is more surprising, perhaps even paradoxical, is that the perception of 
homogeneity is articulated, or exjjressed, in difierent ways. By this I do not mean that it 
is expressed in different language, though, in answer to the second question, it is 
expressed in everyday language, in discourses aimed at a wider pubhc, and m non- 
linguistic discourses and symbols. In answer to the fiist and second questions, the 
perception of homogeneity is expressed from veiy different perspectives, hi the media 
material cited in Chapter 4, there were tangible perceptions of Islam as exotic (compared 
with an imphcit normahty of the West) or fanatical (compared with Western moderation 
and intellect), hi this way, the perception of homogeneity has changed over time. 
However, there are different perceptions in the present day. Islam is perceived as 
foreign, the rehgion of the immigrant, winch becomes a challenge for Western society. 
This is one reason why there is a perception of Muslims as inner-city delinquents, and it 
has been shown that then ‘ciimes’ are often given more pubhcity than equivalent 
‘dimes’ by ‘non-Muslim’, ‘white’, ‘Western Europeans’. Islam is also perceived as 
foreign in that it is a pohtical issue elsewhere, and this is connected with discourses of 
Muslim terrorism. Where such discourses are exjiressed, a strong connection is drawn 
between the rehgion and the tenorism, which is not done to the same extent in other 
cases (for example, it is not deduced from IRA operations that there is a strong 
connection between CathoHcism and tenorism).
It may also be surprising that the perceptions refened to in the first question are 
sometimes articulated by Muslims themselves, hi Chapter 3, a Mushm apologist was 
? cited, who claimed that Islam was able to view Western civilisation ‘from a height’ which 
made it seem ‘naiTow and empty’, with a ghtter which was ‘false and imreaT (Nadwi
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1983: 20). As one would expect from a theologian or apologist, Muslims were defined 
according to a single a priori understanding of Islam, wliich he referred to as ‘the 
Guidance and Message’, and winch excludes a conception of Islam as diverse. 
According to Al-Azmeh (1996), such discour se is imphcit in the concepts of an authentic 
Mushm identity, which imphes homogeneity and therefore excludes diversity, and of a 
cultural drfrerentiahsm (an example of what I have caUed a West-Islam duahsm) which 
creates ‘a fetishism of the collective self as a socio-pohtical imperative’ (Al-Azmeh 1996:
7).
The causes and effects of such perceptions are found in history and in the present 
day. Historicahy, the causes are found in Oiientahst and colonial discourses, the 
histories of Christianity and Islam, the crusades, post-war labour migration to Western 
Eruope, and the elaboration of philosophies of integration, mrrlticulturahsm and 
assimilation. In the present day, the effects of these perceptions can be seen in the 
growth of Islamophobia, in debates about the hijab, and in other arenas. These effects 
impinge dhectly on the everyday fives of Muslims and ‘non-Muslims’ in the United 
Kingdom and France (and other countries), on the political sitrrations of these countries, 
and on the questions of who and what people identify themselves with. Muslim identities 
and cultmal differentiafism may be causes of Al-Azmeh’s ‘fetishism of the collective 
self, but they are also effects of Orientalist discourses and of the historical interactions 
between Islam and the West. As I insisted in section 10.1, the diversity of Islam is 
actively constituted by Muslims, but it is also brought about by chcumstances, aird 
Muslim identities mediate active constitution and chcumstances. They mediate because 
they are a cause as well as an effect, that is, they create perceptions as well as respond to 
[them.
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A negative understanding of this would be that Muslim identities are part of a 
vicious circle. This would undermine my claim, made in section 5.1, that a critique of 
Orientahsm is not possible if we neglect or disparage Muslim identities. That is why the 
dissenting voices, refened to in the fourth question, are so important. These dissenting 
voices were found in the ideas of Esack, Rahman, Arkoun, Laroui and Al-Azmeh, and in 
echoes of their voices among the everyday actors of Islam in Western Europe, such as 
Jean, who beheved that Islam and Christianity were compatible, and that the right to 
assimilate was more generous than the right to be different. Esack (1997), in particular, 
points the way forward with his insistence on a grounded pluraUsm, which includes a 
practical struggle for social justice, a basis for inter-rehgious dialogue, and an 
underruining of the West-Islam duahsm. Such a dissenting voice can emanate from 
Muslims and ‘non-Muslims’. It can emanate from Muslims who assert a Western 
identity as well as (but not mstead of) a Muslim identity. It can emanate from Mushms 
who are critical of the West, but who recognise their own role as active agents in the 
West, or hr the process of encounter between the West and Islam. It can emanate fr om a 
Muslim woman who declines to wear the hijab^ without criticising those who do wear it. 
It can also emanate from a Western jomnahst who contributes to the critique of 
Islamophobia, and it can emanate from Mushms, Christians, people of all rehgions and 
people of no rehgion, when they enter into dialogue with one another.
10.3. Comparisons and contributions
hr this conclusion, I have aUuded to the contributions which are made by this thesis 
f (these contributions are outlined in section 1.6, and discussed in some detail in the 
hterature review in section 1.7). Most importantly, the dialectical relationship between
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the diversity of Islam and the Oiientahst stereotype of homogeneity is imphcit in the 
argument, expressed above, that Mushm identities mediate the active constitution of 
diversity and the circumstances which create diversity—they do so by simultaneously 
creating perceptions of homogeneity, responding to perceptions of homogeneity, and 
through the dissenting voices which undeimme the West-Islam duahsm, struggle for 
social justice, and participate in inter-rehgious dialogue.
However, one contribution has not really been mentioned in this conclusion, and 
that is the fifth contribution, which emphasises the context of a direct British-French 
comparison. Indeed, this thesis has identified 33 contrasts between the United Kingdom 
and France, and these are summarised hr Table 10.1. These should not be understood in 
an empiricist way, which is why many of the contrasts focus on perceptions and 
meanings rather than social facts. It should be emphasised that there are also similarities 
between the United Kingdom and France, such as a history of coloniaUsm and migration, 
a degree of secularisation, discourses of racism and anti-Muslim sentiment, and some 
conflict. However, the purpose of this discussion is to elucidate the findings and 
contributions of this thesis in a more concrete way, and the use of empirical examples of 
contrast between the United Kingdom and France makes this possible. For the purposes 
of the following discussion, these points are grouped into five categories, viz. 
representations of the West, contextual representations of Islam, rehgions encounters, 
the diversity of Islam, and the signifiers of tension.
Fhstly, the contrasting representations of the West which are found in the United 
Kingdom and France have constituted an important part of the context for the arguments 
which are contained m this thesis. In Chapters 1 and 7, it was argued that an ideal type 
[ distinction points to different models of the nation in the United Kingdom and France, 
although this was clearly distinguished from the reahties of practice and impacts on the
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Point of contrast France United Kingdom
Renresentations of the W est
Model o f the state Unitary nation state ‘Multi-national’ state
Philosophy of integration Assimilation Multiculturalism
Caricatured attitudes to integration Wants people to integrate and 
appreciate French culture
Wants to avoid people trespassing 
and interrupting afternoon tea
Dominant paradigm Intégration Race relations
Contextual renresentations of 
Islam
Islam in public discourses Important Less important
Consequences for research Availability of data Less availability of data
Main region or culture associated 
with Muslim migration
North Africa South Asia
Discourse about Muslims and 
national cultures
Centrality of Algeria Diversity of the Muslim world
Orientalist perspectives Freudian domination of sexual 
symbols over Oriental society
Idleness explained by sensuality, 
explained by climate and religion
Mission civilisatrice Missionaries
Colonial failure Colonial success
Cultural capital Political and geographical power
Culture explained religion Religion explained culture
Religions encounters
Characteristics o f Muslim- 
Christian dialogue
Formal Informal
Practical Theoretical
Bilateral Multilateral
Open Restricted
Awareness of need for dialogue Strong Weak
Relationship between dialogue and 
social action
Dialogue as stimulus to social 
action
Dialogue divorced from social 
action
Characteristics o f Christianity Catholic predominance Multi-denominational
The religious and the secular Laïcité Established church
Secularisation of political structure Secularisation as a social process 
or change of mentalités
The diversity of Islam
Basis of diversity in mosques Attitudes to intégration Languages
Perceived domination of mosques Moroccan Pakistani
The signifiers of tension
Important perceived flashpoint Affaire du foulard Rushdie affair
Contentious issues in schools Laïcité and the hijab Muslim schools, RE, PE, sex 
education, halal food
Term for perceived Islamic 
extremism
Intégrisme Fundamentalism
Representations of Islam Islam algame Islamophobia
Stereotypes of terrorism and 
delinquency
Amalgamated Separated
Perceived approach to Islam Closed, more diflrcult to be a 
Muslim
Open, easier to be a Muslim
Relationship with political racism Extreme right démonisation of 
Muslims
Racism in political mainstream, 
focuses on a different Other
Perceived basis of racism Skin colour Behaviour
Accent Skin colour
Table 10.1; Contrasts between France and the United Kingdom
lives of Muslims. It was also argued that there is a logical progression from these 
models to different theories of integration. The existence of a multi-national state in the 
United Kingdom has meant that there has been a de facto multiculturahsm for centuries, 
which goes some way towards explaining why the politics of multiculturahsm seem to be 
more ‘obviously’ appropriate, hi France, however, the process of nation building after 
the revolution of 1789 involved the construction of a unitaiy nation state, unitary m that 
it unites concepts such as nation, state, citizenship and language. Thus, the pohcy of 
assimilation is ingrained into the ethos of French repubhcanism, and so it has the 
appearance, to its supporters, of being more enhghtened.
The specificities of interaction between France or the United Kingdom on the one 
hand, and Islam or Muslims on the other, cannot be situated solely in the liistorical 
development of the West. There has been a long histoiy of interaction between the West 
and Islam, significantly thiough coloniahsm and post-war labour migration, and this 
histoiy has taken different forms in the United Kingdom and France. This is why I diaw 
a connection between the importance and character of Islam in public discourses, and the 
histoiy of Orientahsm and coloniahsm. The French combination of colonial failure and 
cultural capital led to a discourse in which culture explained rehgion. In other words, 
rehgion was the problematic to be explained, while culture was the explanation, so was 
not in need of any explanation itself. Thus, Islam qua rehgion has a more important 
place in pubhc discomses in France than it does in the United Kingdom. In contrast, the 
United Kingdom’s combination of colonial success with pohtical and geographical power 
led to an opposite discomse, in which rehgion explained culture. Thus, culture was hi 
need of explanation, rather than rehgion. So, Islam qua rehgion has a less important 
■place in pubhc discourse, while the multicultural model ensures an emphasis on the 
problematic of culture, or of Islam qua culture.
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The third category, rehgious encounters, unites the issues of Muslim-Chiistian 
dialogue and the contextual elements of secularisation or laïcité. These are united in my 
analysis, and this is one of the contributions of the thesis. I refer to secularisation and 
laïcité as contextual elements because they constitute the context of debate, and are not 
issues, like the affaire du foulard, which have led to high-profile conflict. While the 
estabhshment status of the Chur ch of England has always been contested, it is not an 
issue of significant conflict or even debate at the present time, so we can say that it is a 
contextual issue. As a result, secularisation has not had a significant impact on the 
pohtical structur e of the United Kingdom, whhe the juridical nature of French laïcité is a 
fimdamental aspect of French repubhcanism, as it is understood by many people. Laïcité 
is not itself an issue of debate and controversy, it is the understanding, interpretation and 
expression of laïcité which is an issue. Some of these expressions constitute a reason for 
the differences in Mushm-Christian dialogue. Laïcité constitutes a common chahenge to 
Mushms and Christians in France, so there is a strong awareness of the need for 
dialogue. This in turn affects the ethos of dialogue; there is a stronger organisation, 
which facihtates open, bilateral dialogue, but inevitably leads to a greater formahty. On 
the other hand, the lower profile of secularisation in the United Kingdom weakens 
awareness of the need for dialogue, which necessitates a greater consideration of the 
theory of dialogue, and the inclusion of a plurahty of rehgions. Because of the weak 
awareness of the need for inter-rehgious dialogue, it is surrounded by some taboos. As a 
result, it tends to be more restricted, which means that participants must be invited, or 
that meetings are not widely pubhcised, but also that informal dialogue, between 
neighbours, friends and coUeagues, takes on a greater significance.
The diversity of Islam has already been discussed extensively in this conclusion, but 
there are two concrete points of contrast which are identified in Table 10.1. In France,
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attitudes to intégration constitute the most manifest diversity between mosques, while in 
the United Kingdom, this role is filled by the diversity of languages. In France, the 
mosques are perceived to be dominated, or led, by Muslims of Moroccan origin (despite 
the gr eater number of Mushms of Algerian origin), whhe in the United Kingdom, the 
same perception exists about Mushms of Pakistani origin. These points further our 
rmderstanding of the diversity of Islam, one of the contributions of the thesis. They are 
also relevant to a consideration of Mushm identities, as they hlustrate the extent to which 
Islam can be conflated with nationahty, so that someone who does not belong to the 
national group is not readhy accepted as Mushm. Furthermore, it shows that Islam is 
diverse in the Urrited Kingdom and France, and that this diversity frequently cuts across 
nation state bormdaries.
FinaUy, the signifiers of tension, as I have cahed them, do not so much point to 
important structural differences between the United Kingdom and France, as to 
differences in how the underlying structure has manifested itself For example, there are 
issues of contention between Mushms and the pohtical society of both countries, but the 
issues which have come to prominence have been different. In France, it has been the 
affaire du foulard. In the United Kingdom, it has been the Rushdie affair. In both 
countries, contention has frequently arisen in the educational sphere, hr France, this has 
been expressed in debate about laïcité and the hijab. hr the United Kingdom, concern 
has been expressed on the issues of Muslim schools, the nature of rehgious education, 
mixed classes in physical education, the teaching of sex education, and the provision of 
halal food. In both countries, there is racism and rehgious prejudice, hr France, this is 
expressed through the Front National, whhe a ‘toned down’ racism exists in the pohtical 
mainstream of the Urrited Kingdom, but, because it focuses on a differerrt Other
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(principally people of African-Caribbean origin), a different but overlapping discourse of 
Islamophobia has been identified.
10.4. Directions for future research
This leads conveniently to the possible dhections for future wMch I wish to propose, 
since these include comparative research and focused investigation of Islamophobia. 
Such proposals must be made in the context of the available literature, not just this 
thesis. The hteratme review in section 1.7 identified certain ‘gaps’ which have been 
fiiUed by this thesis, but other writers have of course addressed issues which I have not. 
So we must ask where this thesis should be situated within the available Hteratme.
I have consciously situated this thesis at the points of contact between different sub- 
discipUnes, theoretical concerns and fields of inquiry. It is situated at the meeting point 
between the sociology of rehgion and the sociology of migration, it combines theories of 
identity with the critique of Orientahsm, it considers Mushm identities in the United 
Kingdom and in France, and it does so in tandem with the stereotypes of Islam which 
exist in these countries, hi section 1.7,1 suggested that the sociology of rehgion needed 
to take a more inter-disciplinary approach, as weh as recognise the fact of rehgious 
change, and take account of the subjective reahties of rehgion to the behever. This thesis 
has combined the sociology of rehgion with the sociology of migration, while dr awing on 
anthropological approaches to the study of rehgion, and works of theology and rehgious 
studies which highhght the diversity of Islam. It is to be hoped that futme research wül 
seek out other disciplines and sub-disciplines which can be combined with the sociology 
I of rehgion, so that the inter-disciplinary approach can be extended.
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The sociology of migration is a particularly relevant area of contemporary 
sociology, because the discipline is having to grapple with the questions of globahsation. 
It is no longer possible for a sociologist to hve in ignorance of what happens in other 
countries, as there is an interconnectedness and interdependency between nation states. 
This awareness has underpinned this thesis, which is why I have compared the United 
Kingdom and France within the context of the West as a whole. As I said in the 
literature review, there are very few genuinely comparative studies, but the ground has 
certainly been prepared for them (by, for example, Nielsen 1995b). So far, many of the 
works which are comparative (for example, Lapeyionnie 1993; Husbands 1995; 
Wieviorka, ed., 1997) have focused on the specific issue of the integration problematic, 
or a variation thereof. This thesis has made a broader comparison between the United 
Kingdom and France, but it is still a dhect comparison, and it is to be hoped that fiiture 
research will include comparative investigations of Mushms in these and other countries.
The critique of Orientahsm has certainly not reached its conclusion, and it is to be 
hoped that future researchers wih develop it further. I have pointed out, following Said, 
that Orientahsm has been a comprehensive Western discourse, so there are plenty of 
possibihties for research. I have focused on Orieirtahsm as it apphes to media discourses, 
and articulations of Islamophobia. There is a need for further research in these areas, 
particularly Islamophobia, which so far has attracted very httle analytical research. There 
is also a need for research into the effects of Orientahsm and Islamophobia on other 
Western discomses, for example educational discourses, and for this research to be 
carried out in a wider comparative perspective,
hr the review of hterature in section 1.7, I exirressed the view that the diversity of 
[Islam is a rapidly growing area at the centre of studies of Islam. Works on theological 
differences and ‘sectarian influences’ (for example Robinson 1988; Andrews 1993b; ICing
319
1994; Geaves 1996) have been valuable, as have studies of conversion to Islam (for 
example Telhine 1991; Kose 1996; Bourque 1998). The studies of conversion to Islam 
should alert us to the fact that Islam is culturally as well as theologically diverse—it 
encompasses Western Europeans as well as people from predominantly Muslim 
coimtiies. This thesis has drawn attention to a ‘diversity of diversity’, demonstrating that 
there is a diversity of Islamic theology, Mushm cultures, Mushm identities, national 
identities, rehgious experiences, attitudes to ‘non-Mushms’ and dialogue with other 
rehgions, pohtical concerns and social chcumstances. This hst is by no means 
comprehensive, and further research may be able to further our understanding of this 
‘diversity of diversity’ of Islam and Mushm identities, by discovering other items which 
can be added to the hst, and examining them hr depth.
To summarise, my proposals for future research are as foUows. I propose that the 
sociology of rehgion take a more inter-disciplinary approach, seekhig out other 
disciplines and sub-disciplines with which it can be combined. I propose that more 
international comparative research be carried out, recognising the interconnectedness of 
nation states in sociological analysis. I propose that the critique of Orientahsm be 
developed further, particularly by investigating the diverse forums in which Orientahsm 
and Islamophobia are articulated. I propose that these investigations should also include 
international comparative research. And finaUy, I propose that friture research and 
reflection attempt to imderstand the different ways in which Islam and Muslim identities 
are diverse.
It must be emphasised that these are proposals, or suggestions, for sociological 
research on Islam and its relations with the West, and that the temptation to make 
[predictions about future research, and future chcumstances for research, must be 
avoided. Important events which have mfluenced Western perceptions of Islam, and, as
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a result, Muslim identities, have been unpredictable. The Ir anian revolution, the Rushdie 
affair, and the affaire du foulard were never predicted untü they were on the verge of 
happening, and predictions which have been made have not yet happened. If I were to 
make one prediction, at least in the cunent sociological climate, is would be for a growth 
of inter-disciplinary research. However, even tliis prediction must be avoided. The same 
prediction was made in 1961, by more than one person (Watt 1961: ix; van 
Nieuwenhuijze 1961: 393), who suggested that Islamic studies and the sociology of 
Islam were converging, and that an inter-disciplinary approach to the study of Islam was 
a direction for the then immediate future. As Louis Althusser (1994: 279) put it, the 
future lasts a long time.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. School document against the hijab
Esquisse d’argumentaire proposé à grands traits par le groupe de réflexion issu de 
rassemblée de vendredi 27/09 à 17b30 (à propos du voile islamique ou liidjab).
(Cette contribution vise à respecter à la fois la clarté des principes de la République 
d’une part, et l’effort d’ouvertme et de la persuasion d’autre part.
Elle n’ignore pas la difirculté d’être compris des élèves; ex.: ainsi pour la notion de 
laïcité.)
La demande du retrait du hidjab n’est pas im acte raciste et Le P...iste comme on a 
pu l’entendre. Cette interprétation (notamment à l’encontre de notre collègue J.T.) est 
un contresens absolu.
Elle n’est pas l’expression d’une volonté d’exclusion (paradoxe apparent à 
démontrer).
Elle manifeste au contraire une volonté d’intégration dans la communauté nationale 
(ou civique) sans distinction de sexe, de religion....
Demander le retrait du hidjab dans l’établissement n ’est pas exiger le renoncement 
aux convictions religieuses: les élèves concernées conservent leru foi qui n’est pas mise 
en cause, qui est respectée; elles remettent le voüe à la sortie du lycée si elles le désirent; 
le service public (et la laïcité) préserve la hberté de conscience.
Le voile n’est pas une obligation coranique, contrairement à ce qui a pu être dit. 
Rappelons qu’il n’apparaissait pas dans nos établissements il y a 10 ans.
Importance du geste à l’entrée du lycée (laisser les signes ostentatoues non 
adéquats): l ’établissement scolaire n ’est pas un lieu comme un autre', on n’y entre pas 
comme accède à une galerie marchande ou mie place publique, il convient de respecter le 
[lieu et sa fonction, de même qu’on ne pénètre pas sans égards dans ime mosquée ou une 
église ou dans d’autres heux particuliers.
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(On peut d’ailleurs déplorer à nouveau le comportement de certains élèves dans les 
couloirs ou la corn" du lycée! bis repetita...)
La République (et le service public) permet Légalité de tous les citoyens; pour cela 
elle édicté des règles communes: la loi est la même pour tous; mais Légalité ne signifie 
pas Labsence de diversité: la coexistence est donc permise par le respect de ces règles. 
La laïcité évite la loi d’un groupe ou d’une religion dominante et permet donc l’existence 
des autres.
L’école française n’est pas l’école du catholicisme, même si son calendrier est en 
relation avec certaines fêtes religieuses. La laïcité assure même ime protection des 
convictions religieuses, elle est un rempart contre l’exclusion, le racisme (cf. actualité) et 
la persécution: en la mettant en cause on s’expose soi-meme à ces dangers.
Le voile comme discrimination sexuelle (bien qu’il puisse être vécu comme 
valorisant par certaines filles): infériorisation et instrumentalisation par les hommes, 
négation de leius prérogatives de citoyeimes.
(Le voüe comme discrimination religieuse: à l’égard de filles non voüées, à l’égard 
des non musulmans. Cependant le champ reügieux demeiue à la hsière de nos 
prérogatives). => voüe comme outü d ’autoexclusion.
La République ne peut permettre l ’éclatement de la Nation en communautés 
assujetties à leurs propres lois, qu’eUes soient rehgieuses, régionalistes voüe nationalistes 
ou autres; ce processus aboutirait logiquement à l’intolérance, l’exclusion, la 
ghettoïsation, l’affrontement....
Les élèves concernées doivent éviter de considérer l’école comme hostüe à leur 
confession. Elles sont chez elles dans le service public. EUes peuvent et doivent y 
entrer au même titre que les autres et contribuer à sa réussite.
Notre système d’enseignement n’est pas indifférent à la civilisation musulmane: ü 
l’enseigne (ex.: retour dans les programmes d’histoüe de 2°); ü a conscience d’avoir 
hérité de l’esprit de tolérance manifesté par le monde musulman lorsqu’il était plus 
tolérant et plus «civüisé» que l’Occident chrétien; ü bénéficie également de l’héritage 
culturel antique transmis et emiclii par ce même monde arabe à la même époque: 
coimaissances scientifiques (mathématiques, anatomie...) phüosophie etc...: certames 
oeuvres gréco-romaines ont amsi été sauvées de la disparition.
Le patrimoine culturel de la Nation s’est ainsi développé dans l’ouverture aux 
autres.
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Appendix 2. School document against the hijab: translation
Sketched outline of argument suggested by the study group set up in response to the 
meeting of Friday 27 September at 5.30 p.m. (on the subject of the Islamic veil or hijab).
(This contribution aims to respect the clarity of the principles of the Republic on the 
one hand, and the effort of openness and persuasion on the other.
It is not unaware of the difficulty which some pupüs will have in understanding it; 
e.g. the notion oîlaïcité.)
The request for the withdrawal of the hijab is not, as rumour has it, a racist and 
Lepenist act. That interpretation (with respect, notably, to our colleague J.T.) completely 
contradicts its meaning.
It does not express a deshe to exclude (apparent paradox to be refuted).
On the contrary, it shows a deshe for integration in the national (or civic) 
community, without distinction on the grounds of sex, rehgion....
Requesting that the hijab be removed within the estabhshment does not mean 
demanding that religious convictions be renounced: the puphs concerned keep then 
faith, which is not cahed into question, but respected; they put the veh back on as they 
leave school, if they so wish; the pubhc sector (and the piinciple of laïcité) preserves 
fi'eedom of conscience.
The veil is not a Qm’anic obhgation, contrary to what may have been said. 
Remember that it was not seen in our schools ten years ago.
The importance of gestures at the school entrance (leaving inappropriate 
ostentatious signs behind): the educational establishment is not a place like any other, 
one does not enter it as one enters a shopping mah or a pubhc square, it is important to 
respect the place and its function, just as one does not enter a mosque or a chmch or 
other special places without respect.
(Besides, once again we can deplore the behaviour of certain puphs in the school 
comdors or playground! to repeat once more....)
The Repubhc (and the pubhc sector) facihtates the equahty of ah citizens; to that 
end it makes common laws: the law is the same for eveiyone; but equahty does not entail 
the absence of diversity: therefore, co-existence is made possible by respecting the rules. 
Laïcité avoids the law of one dominant group or rehgion, and therefore enables others to 
exist.
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French schools do not come under the aegis of CathoHcism, even if then calendar is 
linked to certain rehgious festivals. Laïcité even ensures protection for rehgious behefs, it 
is a bulwark against exclusion, racism (cf. cunent affahs) and persecution; in questioning 
it, one exposes oneself to these dangers.
The veh as sex discrimination (even though it gives some ghis a feeling of value); 
infériorisation and manipulation by men, negation of then prerogatives as citizens.
(The veh as rehgious discrimination: with respect to ghis who are not vehed, with 
respect to non-Muslims. Yet the rehgious field remains on the edge of our prerogatives). 
=> the veh as a tool o f self-exclusion.
The Republic cannot allow the Nation to break up into communities subject to then 
own laws, whether they are rehgious, regionahst or even nationahst or otherwise; such a 
process leads logicahy to intolerance, exclusion, ghettoïsation, confrontation....
The puphs concerned must avoid seeing the school as hosthe to then confession. 
They also are a part o f the public sector. They can and must enter on the same terms as 
the others and contribute to its success.
Om education system is not indifferent to Muslim civiHsation: it teaches it (e.g. in 
the second year [for puphs aged approximately 16] history syUabus); it is aware of having 
inherited the sphit of tolerance displayed by the Mushm world when it was more tolerant 
and more ‘civihsed’ than the Christian West; equally, it benefits from the classical 
cultural heritage transmitted and emiched by the same Arab world during the same 
period of history: scientific knowledge (mathematics, anatomy...), phhosophy etc...: it is 
because of this that certain Greek and Roman works have been saved from 
disappearance.
The cultural heritage of the Nation has thus developed through an openness to 
others.
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Appendix 3. Extract from fieldwork notes at the Halaqah cir cle in Glasgow
Friday 3rd November 1995
This was the jfrist meeting of the Muslim study gr oup that I have been to. On 
Thursday, I went to the Islamic book centre, which is at the Carrington Street mosque, 
and asked if there were any groups or courses which would enable me to learn about 
Islam. The man I spoke to, who was behind the counter, told me that there is a group 
which meets on Fridays at 7.00 p.m., to which ‘non-Muslims’ and ‘new Muslims’ also 
go, where everyone gets together and talks. I explained about my research, that I am 
studying Islam..., but that I want to ensure that what I say is fan. The man said that this 
would be fine....
The door was locked, and I had to buzz a few times before I got hr. I thought this 
was a httle bit strange for a rehgious budding.... I was actuaUy early, so was able to 
notice that the women turned up on time, to go to their separate group. One of them 
was Farida, a Tm’kish postgraduate student in mathematics who I have known for a 
couple of years. She was a bit surprised to see me there, so I explained in the few 
seconds we had that I was there to find out about Islam, but there seemed to be 
something inappropriate about a man and a woman having a conversation inside the 
mosque, so we didn’t ready get to talk. The women went downstahs into the 
basement..., whde the men went upstahs for the ‘Enghsh speaking circle’. There was 
also an Arabic speakmg chcle for men..., at the same time and in another part of the 
mosque....
I met a man by the name of Ah, who showed me to the room where the meeting was 
to be. He seemed to be one of the group leaders, and told me what they would be doing. 
The men, he noted, were lazier than the women, and usuahy arrived later. We discussed 
a bit about Islam and the Qur’an—-he gave me some helpful hints about reading the 
Qur’an. Others graduahy arrived, and we talked a bit. People were mterested hr whaf I 
was doing, and were very welcoming.
The study was firom Sm*ah 25, verses 61-77 (Al-Furqan, ‘The Criterion’). Nearly
everyone who was there read the text, those who could in Arabic (some in a very musical 
I . .way), others in Enghsh. So we read the text, I would think, about ten to fifteen times. A 
few people were jottmg down notes, often in Arabic (a number of the people there had 
Arabic as then first language—some were fiom Egypt, one from Saudi Arabia) and on
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the back of an envelope. I had thought that Mushms had an extremely reverential 
attitude towards the physical book itself, but they were shelved like ordinary books and 
people often used them as something to lean on while taking notes. After the fifth 
reading, some went downstahs to join ‘the brothers’ for the prayer, while others, who 
had already done so or who were non-Muslims, stayed upstahs. We chatted again for a 
few minutes, then the readings continued.
Akbar was responsible for leading, so he made a number of points about the text. 
Some of the points he made had great rehgious significance for the Mushms who were 
there.... For example, the day is for working and for enjoying the dayhght which is a gift 
of Ahah, and the night is for resting (verses 61-2). On the other hand, the prayers which 
are said in the mosque are only an external part of Islam—the ‘real Islam’ is what is done 
in private, when Mushms can take their time over their prayers or say them quickly to get 
them out of the way, and at night, when those ‘who spend the night hi adoration of then 
Lord, prostrate and standing..., say: “Om Lord! Avert us fiom the wrath of heU, for its 
wrath is indeed an afthction grievous” (verses 64-5). One of the best things that one can 
do in this hfe is to find a good wife, one who wih keep her husband on the paths of Islam 
(verse 74). One point which Akbar made, which was picked up on afterwards by a few 
people was fiom verses 63 and 68: ‘And the seivants of (Ahah) most Giacious are those 
who walk on the earth hi humhity, and when the ignorant address them, they say, 
“Peace”..., nor slay such life as Ahah has made sacred, except for just cause’. Peter, one 
of the non-Muslims who was there compared this to the attitudes of some of the 
‘fundamentahsts’ who kill hi the name of Islam, and others remarked that there are 
Muslims who do not understand tliis verse—even to take the hfe of an animal unlawfuhy, 
or to commit suicide, is against the principles of Islam, which prescribes tolerance even 
towards those who are intolerant of the Muslim’s pohit of view...
Afterwards, there was tea, cakes and peanuts, and a time for eveiyone to introduce 
themselves (and for me to explain what I was doing to the whole gi'oup). A few people 
had come from a distance, for example Aziz from Dumfries and someone else from 
Stranraer. A lot of people were fr om, or then parents were fr om, Pakistan, Kashmir or 
Egypt, with others fr om Saudi Aiabia, Libya, Scotland and England. People began to 
talk individually over tea—one man [Yusuf] who was particularly anxious to make me
Ifeel welcome started explaining more about the Qm ’an to me, that it was important to 
read it in the ‘first person’ (what does it say to me?), how he had done that and become a 
Mushm three years ago, though he did the prayers before, and how important it was to
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search for the truth, which was to be found in the Qur’an (he said this pointing to the 
Arabic script). He beheved that that was the reason for my being there—it was part of 
my own subconscious search for truth which leads people to the Qur’an. I must admit 
that this made me a bit uncomfortable—Ah told him to take things more gradually—but 
it shows that there is an openness there....
Before leaving, I had a chance to speak briefly with a man who I assume was a 
Scottish convert to Islam [Andrew], who left with a white woman who was wearing a 
headscarf, though I know that he is unmarried. I also spoke to Mahk, who had been at 
the group for a few months, and who was very enthusiastic: Tt’s the tmth, know what I 
mean?’, he said....
Friday 10th November 1995
After the Qur’an recitation, while most people were downstairs praying, I asked 
Akbar a few questions.... He had aheady prayed in the mosque before coming, which 
was why he did not join everyone else. I wondered why people were praying at different 
times, as I thought the five daily prayers were all at specified times. He told me that this 
is the case for the first four, but the fifth can be fi'om any time between sunset and 
midnight...
I asked Akbar about the different mosques, remarking that I was a bit confiised by 
aU the different names, like Barelwi, Deobandi etc. He said that there is not such a big 
difference—any Muslim can, in theoiy, pray in any mosque, though some (the Shi’as in 
particular) effectively reseive then mosques for the members of their own ‘sects’ (this 
was the word he used). I also asked about the Arabic Qur’an recitations, why some of 
them, when reading, almost seemed to be singing. He said that there is a proper way of 
reciting the Qur’an, which involves the use of certain tones, but it is not supposed to 
involve singing. For example, in the time of Muhammad, Allah-u akhbar was 
pronounced with an elongation of the ‘al’ sound, and a rise in tone for the ‘bar’ soimd; 
now, it is often sung by the muezzins fiom the minarets (as seen on television), but this is 
not correct.
[When I airived] I was left to find my own way upstairs, and forgot to take my 
shoes off until halfway up the stairs. I quickly went downstairs again and took them off 
before anyone saw me. Again, I was greeted very waimly with everyone saying ‘a/- 
salaam alaikum\ On the way upstahs, I passed a woman who had been on the
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telephone. She was weaiing a headscarf, and I noticed her looking away fiom me and 
standing out of the way as we passed. It would be unfair to say that women in Islam are 
more subordinate in Islam than in other social groups, but the form of subordination of 
women in Islam seems to be highly specific, putting a great deal of emphasis on symbols.
The study this week was fi:om Surah 26, verses 1-9 {Ash-Shu ’am, ‘The Poets’), and 
Tariq was leading. I will repeat a couple of the points which he made. First, verse 1 is 
simply the Arabic letters Ta, Sin, Mim. Tariq was anxious to point out that this surah, as 
many others, begins with such letters, and that, although there are many interpretations 
of them, it is generally agieed that only Allah knows then meaning... Second, verses 6- 
8: ‘They have indeed rejected (the Message): so they will know soon (enough) the truth 
of what they mocked at! Do they not look at the earth—how many noble things of all 
kinds We have produced therein? Verily, in this is a Sign: but most of them do not 
believe.’ These verses, as expounded by Tariq, showed the conviction of the Muslims 
there, they believe that Islam is the Tmth, and that the natmal world proves this. ..
Over tea, I chatted with a few people, some of them offeiing to lend me books 
which would help me with my research. One of them was Mahk, who told me about his 
job, his pilgiimage to Mecca, about the Christians he had met. Yusuf was busy trymg to 
convert me again, but this gave me the chance to ask more questions....
Friday 24th November
I met a couple of new (to me) people this evening. One was Edward, a fairly old 
Scotsman who was obviously a convert to Islam, though I think he must have been a 
Muslim for some time. He is clearly quite eccentric—he has a long grey beard, a similar 
colour of teeth, and he hves with his cats. He always seemed to have something to say, 
not always serious, much to the exasperation of Ah. While others were downstahs for 
the prayer, we spoke a bit. He seemed to find it quite fimny that I should consider 
Mushms a social group, which was clearly the case smce I am a sociologist studying 
Mushms. He pointed out with great dehght that Mushms were terrible timekeepers. 
How they ever managed to travel the world, he said, he would never know ...
Aziz was leading ... part of the programme, and he talked about the Fladith, how it 
was compiled, and its authoritative role hi the constitution of Islam. He was anxious to 
show that the four thousand authoritative Hadith were genuine representations of the 
Prophet, his teaching and his hfe.... This was a reduction from some two hundred
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thousand, so only the most sme ones were accepted, according to the criteria of haimony 
with the Qur’an and the trustworthiness of those who transmitted them (which had to be 
of an extremely high standard, much higher than that which is regarded as necessary for a 
Muslim).
This sparked off quite a controversy between those who saw the Hadith as a 
necessary foundation of Islam, alongside the Qur’an, and those, like Andrew, who saw 
the Qur’an as being ‘entire and complete’—the Hadith being no more than a useful 
historical window on the life of the Pr ophet. Tliis subject comprised much of the small 
group discussions over tea and cakes afterwards, and provided a useful insight into this 
area of disagreement between Muslims. Yet they seemed able to disagree in a friendly, 
though no less fervent, way.
Friday 1st December
I arrived this evening with Peter, the Christian and architect who has been going 
along to find out more about Islam. He has told me that he is concerned about the 
situation in Bosnia, and that was the major catalyst which got him interested in Islam. 
We were the first ones there, even though we were one or two minutes late. So much 
for Yusuf’s theory that Muslims should be the best time keepers in the world, we said. 
Edward’s theory seemed to have more bearing on reality....
Aziz continued his discussion of the Hadith fi om last week, this time looking at the 
night jomuey of Muhammad to the ‘far mosque’ in Jerusalem. This miracle was not an 
attraction, but a test for the faithful, since there had been no witnesses of this night 
jomuey to Jerusalem and back except Muhammad himself and the Archbishop of 
Jemsalem, who was the guardian of this mosque and had pmposefuUy left the door open 
for the expected prophet to enter. Some people tried to use this story to discredit 
Muhammad, and, to an extent, they succeeded, since some of the Muslims converted 
away from Islam at this time. But those who were left were the real faithful, even 
though this alleged miracle was not to be a tenet of faith for the Muslims, to beheve m it 
was not obligatory.
Part of this talk concerned the reduction hi the number of prayers from fifty to five. 
^According to this stoi*y, when Moses was given his mission by God, the number of 
prayers to be performed each day was set at fifty, but Moses pointed out that this was 
umuaUstic and managed to get it reduced, a bit at a time, to five. He could have gone
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lower, but felt too ashamed to do so. So the number of prayers was (and is) set at five as 
a duty, fifty for reward, but to someone who does five prayers, it will be credited to him 
as fifty. I pointed out that this seemed contraiy to the spirit of Islam: isn’t Islam 
supposed to be about submission to God rather than bargaining with God? A hvely 
discussion ensued, some people argued that there was no question of bargaining here, 
since fifty was still the standard; others said that bargaining with God was perfectly 
consistent with the spirit of Islam, since it was recognising Allah as mercifiil. [Aziz told 
me that he had wondered about this as well.]
The issue of the holy land and Jerusalem kept coming up. Ali pointed out that it 
was controlled by Canaanite tribes, then the Jews..., then the ‘Romans/Christians’, then 
the Muslims. ‘Now it looks as if the Muslims have lost it again, maybe they sinned or 
something’, he said.
Afterwards, I chatted with Aziz and Selwyn. I talked to Aziz about his travels: he 
was born in Egypt, trained as an anaesthetist, manned an Iiish woman who was working 
in Egypt, went to live hi Iieland..., then Saudi Arabia and Britain. He lived hi London 
before he lived in Dumdfties (where he is now), and while we were talking about 
languages (Arabic, English, French), he told me a stoiy about his arrival hi London and 
problem with the word ‘toilet’. Coming fiom Egypt, he pronounced it more like the 
French foilettes’ (Egypt was under French as well as British colonial rule). Selwyn told 
me about his conversion to Islam three years ago, his Chiistian upbringhig and problems 
with the doctrines of the tiinity and the deity of Christ, so he was attracted by the 
Qur’anic references to ‘Jesus, son of Maiy’. Becommg a Mushm has led to change in his 
lifestyle, but he considers himself much like anyone else except for not gohig out to the 
pub on Friday evenings, which he doesn’t really miss anyway, and he has problems with 
boss at work because of his (sometimes ‘vulgar’) humour.
Friday 15th December
Malik gave me a book this evening, entitled The Choice [by Ahmed Deedat], which 
was about Chiistianity and Islam, ushig some of the prophesies in the Old Testament to 
prove that Muhammad was the one who was to come, the greatest of the prophets, even
Ithe Paraclete. Malik said that it was veiy good, though Ah said that it was quite a 
combative book. It is well wiitten, but there are some places where its demoHtion of 
Cluistianity is based on very tenuous interpretations of the bibhcal texts and the behefs of
331
CMstians. But it provides some insights into the conviction of Muslims that Islam is the 
truth, and that this claim is backed up by pre-Qur’anic evidence from God’s other books, 
as well as from history and nature....
The special topic was on the subject of jihad m Islam. I suppose there were three 
main pomts here. First, that jihad  is not identical to war, or holy war—it also means 
effort to defend and propagate Islam, Second, jihad does sometimes involve military 
action. lAmà, jihad, in whatever form necessary, is the duty of Muslims, and to neglect 
it is to invite trouble. Though it was pointed out a few times that jihad is not identical to 
war, it was the military aspect that was at the centre of discussion. No civilisation has 
been achieved without war, to hope for a peacefrd world is naïve, jihad  is neither war 
nor peace, but jihad. Muslims have a duty to defend each other, but the fact they do not 
shows they are not one ummah. Otheiivise Bosnian Muslims would be able to count on 
the (military) support of other Mushms in nearby countries, like Turkey. These are some 
of the things that were pointed out.
Once more, the history of Islam came into the discussion. Not only is it necessary 
to do jihad  for the right reasons, it is also necessary to do it hi the right way. During the 
crusades, the Christian armies took Jerusalem with a great deal of slaughter, of men, 
women and children. The Muslim armies killed only a few. At the time of Muhammad, 
the Muslims would send ultimatums to other states: they could either accept Islam, allow 
Mushm preachers to come and teU them about Islam, or war. hi one case, war went 
ahead without the other state being given this choice, and when this was drawn to 
Muhammad’s attention, he ordered Ms army to withdraw, and then gave them the choice. 
They accepted Islam because they were amazed at tMs code, and wanted to foUow the 
same rehgion. When the Mushm heartlands were invaded by other powers, the invaders 
often ended up turning to Islam, and tMs is (aUegedly) a case unique in Mstory. They 
often teU these stories to encourage one another....
Friday 12th January 1996
We were stih on Surah 26, though we are reaching the end, and verses 176-191.... 
There was a bit of a discussion about the importance of the Mstorical details in the 
interpretation of the Qur’amc passage. The man who was leading said that it was not 
appropriate to go into detail where tMs was not geimane to the argument of the surah, 
but another (older) man there [Washn] said that tMs coidd make the Qur’an very dry,
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quoting the words from the passage (verse 181): ‘Give just measure, and cause no loss 
(to others by fraud)’. Most people laughed at this.
Another interesting point [Wasim] made was that he was talking to his ‘Christian 
friends’, and they said that it was the worst people who went to church, so they didn’t, 
and they wanted to know if it was the same in the mosque. His answer was that they 
should go to church, since the attitudes of other people was UTelevant—what mattered 
was their own obedience to Allah, as they understood it ...
Afterwards, I had a good chat with Mustapha, fr om Mamitius, whose first language 
is French (though we talked in Enghsh), and who has hved in Grenoble as well. He 
actuahy lives in Bniningham just now, but he is in Glasgow for a few months working 
with Ah (who is an engineer). We discussed a lot of the differences between the 
situations of Mushms in Britain and France. We agreed on the significance of the 
a55/m/7«//o«/multicultm'ahsm distinction, though he thought that the British approach 
was much more open, while I argued that there was a danger of a kind of segregation 
between the different communities in such a situation. Interestingly, he thought that I 
may come to discover that, looking at how Mushms ‘fit in’ to Western society....
Friday 19th January
I ariived late this evening, while everyone was downstahs praying. Once we got 
restarted, Ah did the tafseer, standing in for someone else. Then Akbar gave a talk 
about Ramadhan. I notice that his speech is httered with various Arabic expressions, 
particularly insh’Allah. ‘We are approaching, insh’Allah, a great month’, he began. I 
found out a few things about Ramadhan which I hadn’t known: it was the month when 
the Qm’an was revealed to Muhammad, and it was the month of one of the major battles 
between the Mushms and the pagan tribes. The fast of Ramadhan was instituted while 
Muhammad was in Medina, I think it was the twelfth year of the Hijra.
Peter said that he wanted to do the fast ‘as a Muslim, even though I’m not a 
Muslim’. The response to this was not particularly favourable. Akbar and Ah were both 
insistent that the fast had to be done with the right motivation, otherwise there could be 
no reward, and if it was done by a non-Muslim who did not beheve the shahada and 
'^foUow the Qur’an, it would not be acceptable to Ahah at ah. But Peter didn’t seem to 
want to take no for an answer....
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Friday 23rd Februaty 1996
The actual Halaqah was cancelled tonight. Ah and a few others stayed upstairs to 
plan for the Eid celebration at Shawlands Academy on Sunday. The rest of us went 
downstahs for a leaving party for a Bosnian Mushm [Ahja] who was leaving to go back 
to Bosnia. We had some rice and a Pakistani cuny-like dish, although it seemed to me 
that there was more bone than meat. One man made a short speech, wishing him weh 
and saying that they would visit him insh 'Allah in Bosnia. He suggested that he should 
convert the other peoples in Bosnia to Islam, then there would be no problems—the 
response was: ‘They are bad people, I don’t want them to become Muslim.’
I chatted for a while with Yusuf  ^who I hadn’t had a conversation with for a while. 
He was trying to persuade me that Islam made everything in life secure and satisfying, 
that it made it possible to control one’s life. I chatted a bit with Akbar as well, and 
found out that he is the Imam for students at Strathclyde University. He said I should 
come and find him sometime, look at the Islamic books there, and come for the Friday 
prayer so that I can listen to the talk....
[Note: People’s names in this appendix have been changed to the pseudonyms in Table 
1.2 .]
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Appendix 4. Extract from fieldwork notes at the Grouve Islam o-Chrétien
27.09.96 Tonight’s meeting of the Groupe Islamo-Chrétien was the first afl;er a 
summer break. Of course, it was the first for me, so I arrived not knowing anybody 
(except for Guy Lepoutre). People shook hands, then the meeting began with some 
introductions—“of people who weren’t generally known, including me. During this time, 
the subject of Algeria came up, due to one Cathohc priest who had been there for ten 
years, and the assassination of the Bishop of Oran. One Muslim woman had been in the 
quartier when it happened, so hadn’t heard any details (ironically), but was able to testify 
that the town stood still for the fimeral.
One member who had died was mentioned, and some matters arising. They have 
been searching for Muslim responsables in France, and haven’t got very far. Having said 
that, I spoke to Pierre afl;er’wards, who is involved in Médi@tions (sic), and he told me 
about the emergence of a Cormcil of Mosques in Dunkirk. He saw this as a dialogue 
interislamique  ^ because it was bringing the mosques of different nationalities (Tunisian, 
Algerian, Moroccan, West Afiican, Turkish) together.
Then, it was mentioned that the Muslims in the north of France had warTnly 
welcomed John Paul H (who visited France this week and last), and they had sent a 
donation of 2,000 French firancs towards the cost of the visit.
The situation in Palestine came up (fighting began in the last couple of days afi;er the 
Israehs opened a tunnel under the Dome of the Rock); Muslims and Christians alike felt 
that the Israehs had pushed things to the limit, and it was surprising that there hadn’t 
been a reaction before.
The meeting at Assisi, of the Pope and other rehgious leaders, was mentioned in 
connection with an inter-rehgious event on 27 October, involving support for the sans 
papiers in Lille who used the hall for a base, with each rehgion present carrying out their 
own prayers. This wiU be in a Protestant-owned hah (the Salle de la solidarité).
An Iranian film which is on was advertised.
Then they talked about the theme for the weekend conference next year (22-23 
March 1997). Seven subjects were discussed, each of which gave rise to some 
discussion.
I 1. The first was 'Deux grandes fè tes\ which would involve looking at Eid ul-Fitr, 
Eid ul-Adha, Christmas and Easter. The rehgious and sphitual meanings, as weh as the 
practices and problems hr practising (e.g. the sacrifice of Eid ul-Adha) were issues which
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people talked about. The question of whether Christmas really has a religious meaning 
for many people also arose. Most people thought this could be a good subject, though 
some people thought later that it was less important than some urgent pohtical issues, 
others that it could be combined with some other topics.
2. 'Dignité de l ’être humain’ seemed quite heavy at first, but it was linked with 
some political issues, for example the sans papiers who seem to be denied their dignity. 
Others thought this was grormd they had already covered.
3. 'De l ’immigration à l ’intégration’ was very unpopular, because Pierre and some 
Muslims felt this was a sujet passé: Muslims are already French and therefore not in need 
of integration, was the line which seemed to meet with general approval.
4. 'La prière dans nos traditions’ was generally popidar and uncontroversial, I 
think.
5. 'Dialoguer’ was an interesting one. Some thought we should ask: why dialogue? 
Others felt this was something which had to be hved and wasn’t for theoretical 
discussion. One Muslim man pointed out that it’s only a minority who dialogue, as 
evidenced by the numbers present (about 2 0 ).
6 . 'Sens de la morf was proposed by Arsha (a Muslim woman), and she had 
proposed it before. She meant not orrly issues of the afterlife (someone noted Protestant- 
Catholic nuances on this subject), but also practicahties of bmial, hospital treatment etc. 
The Muslim man mentioned above insisted that this could be combined with fêtes 
because death marked the passing Jftom one fife to another and could be celebrated with 
music. Other Muslims were less sm e. Guy Lep outre wanted to know if espérance had a 
meaning for Muslims, but the Muslims were not too sure.
7. Finally, 'acceuil de l ’étranger’, which became 'acceuil de l ’autre’: the 
importance of the notion of welcome in Christianity was evoked, and the question of 
how it apphed to Muslims was discussed. Muslims said that it was not so important qua 
concept in Islam, just something that is done. Arsha said ‘it’s just natural for us’. The 
choice of étranger or autre produced some argument.
[Note: People’s names in this appendbc have been changed to the pseudonyms in Table 
1. 1.]
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Appendix 5. Nostra A etate
Paul, Bishop
Servant of the Servants of God together with the Fathers of the Sacred for 
everlasting memory
[Nostra Aetate]
Declaration on the relation of the Church to non-Christian rehgions
hr om time, when day by day mankind rs being drawn closer together, and the ties 
between different peoples are becoming stronger, the Church examines more closely her 
relationship to non-Christian rehgions. In her tasks of promoting unity and love among 
men, indeed among nations, she considers above ah in this declaration what men have hr 
common and what draws them to fehowship.
One is the community of ah peoples, one their origin, for God made the whole 
human race to live over the face of the earth (1). One also is their final goal, God. His 
providence, His manifestations of goodness. His saving design extend to ah men (2), 
rmth that time when the elect wih be united hr the Holy City, the city ablaze with the 
glory of God, where the nations wih walk in His hght (3).
Men expect fi om the various religions answers to the unsolved riddles of the human 
condition, which today, even as in former times, deeply sth the hearts of men: What is 
man? What is the meaning, the aim of our life? What is moral good, what sin? Whence 
suffering and what pmpose does it serve? Which is the road to true happiness? What 
are death, judgement and retribution after death? What, finahy is the ultimate 
inexpressible mystery which encompasses our existence: whence do we come, and where 
are we going?
2. From ancient times down to the present, there is foimd among various peoples a 
certain perception of that hidden power which hovers over the course of things aird over 
the events of human history; at times some indeed have come to the recognition off a 
Supreme Being, or even of a Father. This perception and recognition penetrates then 
fives with a profound religious sense,
Rehgions, however, that are bound up with an advanced culture have struggled to 
^answer the same questions by means of more refined concepts and a more developed 
language. Thus in Hinduism, men contemplate the divine mystery and express it thr ough 
an inexhaustible abundance of myths and through searcliing plifiosophical inquiry. They
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seek fieedom from the anguish of our human condition either thr ough ascetic practices 
or profound meditation or a flight to God with love and trust. Again, Buddhism, in its 
various forms, realises the radical insufficiency of this changeable world; it teaches a way 
by which men, in a devout and confident spirit, may be able either to acquire the state of 
perfect hberation, or attain, by then own efforts or through higher help, supreme 
illumination. Likewise, other religions foimd everywhere try to counter the restlessness 
of the human heart, each hr its own maimer, by proposing ‘ways’, comprising teachings, 
rules of life, and sacred rites.
The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these rehgions. She 
regards with sincere reverence those ways of conduct and of life, those precepts and 
teachings which, though differing in many aspects fiom the ones she holds and sets forth, 
nonetheless often reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men. Indeed, she 
proclaims, and ever must proclaim Christ, ‘the way the truth, and the hfe’ (John 14: 6 ), 
in whom men may find the fidlness of rehgious life, in whom God has reconciled ah 
things to Himself (4).
The Chmch therefore, exhorts her sons, that through dialogue and cohaboration 
with the fohowers of other rehgions, carried out with pradence and love and hr witness 
to the Christian faith and hfe, they recognise, preserve and promote the good things, 
sphitual and moral, as weh as the socio-cultural values found among these men.
3. The Church regards with esteem also the Muslims. They adore the one God, 
hving and subsistmg in HimseU  ^ merciful and ah-powerfiil, the Creator of heaven and 
earth (5), who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His 
inscrntable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes great pleasure 
in linking itself, submitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they 
revere Him as a prophet. They also honour Mary, His virgin mother; at times they even 
cah on her with devotion. In addition, they await the day of judgement when God wih 
render their deserts to ah those who have been raised up from the dead. Finahy, they 
value the moral life and worship God especiahy thiough prayer, almsgiving and fasting. '
Since in the course of centmies not a few quarrels and hosthities have arisen 
between Christians and Muslims, this Sacred Synod urges ah to forget the past and to 
work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as weh as to promote together 
for the benefit of ah mankind social justice and moral welfare, as weh as peace and 
freedom.
338
4. As the Sacred Synod searches into the mystery of the Church, it remembers the 
bond that spiritually ties the people of the New Covenant to Abraham’s stock.
Thus the Church of Christ acknowledges that, according to God’s saving design, the 
begirmings of her faith and her election are found aheady among the Patriarchs, Moses 
and the prophets. She professes that all who beheve in Christ—Abraham’s sons 
according to faith (6 )—are included in the same Patriarch’s call, and likewise that the 
salvation of the Church is mysteriously foreshadowed by the chosen people’s exodus 
from the land of bondage. The Church, therefore, cannot forget that she received the 
revelation of the Old Testament thr ough the people with whom God in His iaex^rressible 
mercy concluded the Ancient Covenant. Nor can she forget that she draws sustenance 
fr om the root of that well-cultivated olive tree onto which have been grafted the wüd 
shoots, the Gentiles (7). Indeed, the Church beheves that by His cross Christ Om Peace 
reconciled Jews and Gentiles, making both one in Ifrmself (8).
The Church keeps ever m mind the words of the Apostle about his kinsmen: ‘There 
is the sonship and the glory and the covenants and the law and the worship and the 
promises; theirs are the fathers and from them is the Christ according to the flesh’ 
(Romans 8 : 4-5), the Son of the Virgin Mary. She also recalls that the Apostles, the 
Chmch’s main-stay and pillars, as well as most of the early disciples who proclaimed 
Christ’s Gospel to the world, sprang from the Jewish people.
As Holy Scripture testifies, Jerusalem did not recognise the time of her visitation
(9), nor did the Jews, in large number, accept the Gospel; indeed not a few opposed its 
spreading (10). Nevertheless God holds the Jews most dear for the sake of their Fathers; 
He does not repent of the gifts He makes or of the calls He issues—such is the witness of 
the Apostle (11). hr company with the Prophets and the same Apostle, the Chiuch 
awaits that day, known to God alone, on which all peoples will address the Lord m a 
single voice and ‘serve him shoulder to shoulder’ (Sophonias 3: 9) (12).
Since the sphitual patrimony common to Christians and Jews is thus so great, this 
Sacred Synod wants to foster and recommend that mutual understanding and respect 
which is the fruit, above all, of bibhcal and theological studies as well as fraternal 
dialogues.
True, the Jewish authorities and those who followed then lead pressed for the death 
of Christ (13); stül, what happened in His passion cannot be charged against all the Jews, 
without distinction, then ahve, nor agahist the Jews of today. Although the Church is the 
new People of God, the Jews should not be presented as rejected or accursed by God, as
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if this followed from the Holy Scriptures. All should see to it, then, that in catechetical 
work or in the preaching of the Word of God they do not teach anything that does not 
conform to the tmth of the Gospel and the spirit of Christ.
Furthermore, in her rejection of every persecution against any man, the Church, 
mindfid of the patrimony she shares with the Jews and moved not by pohtical reasons but 
by the Gospel’s spiritual love, decries hatred, persecutions, displays of anti-Semitism, 
dfrected against Jews at any time and by anyone.
Besides, as the Chmch has always held and holds now, Christ underwent His 
passion and death fr eely, because of the sins of men and out of infinite love, in order that 
all may reach salvation. It is, therefore, the burden of the Church’s preaching to 
proclaim the cross of Christ as the sign of God’s aÜ-embracing love and as the fountain 
fr om which every grace flows.
5. We cannot truly call on God, the Father of all, if we refuse to treat in a brotherly 
way any man, created as he is in the image of God. Man’s relation to God the Father 
and his relation to men his brothers are so linked together that Scripture says: ‘He who 
does not love does not know God’ (1 John 4: 8 ).
No foundation therefore remains for any theory or practice that leads to 
discrimination between man and the man or people and people, so far as their human 
dignity and the rights flowing fr om it are concerned.
The Church reproves, as foreign to the mdnd of Christ, any discrimination against 
men or harassment of them because of their race, colour, condition of life, or religion. 
On the contrary, following in the footsteps of the holy Apostles Peter and Paul, this 
Sacred Synod ardently implores the Christian faithful to ‘maintain good fellowship 
among the nations’ (1 Peter 2: 12), and, if possible to hve for then part in peace with aU 
men (14), so that they many truly be sons of the Father who is in heaven (15).
The entire text and all the individual elements which have been set forth hr this 
Declaration have pleased the Fathers. And by the Apostohc power conferred on us by 
Christ, we, together with the Venerable Fathers, in the Holy Spirit, approve, decree and 
enact them; and we order that what has been thus enacted in Council be promulgated, to 
the glory of God.
Rome, at St. Peter’s, 28 October, 1965.
I, Paul, Bishop of the Cathohc Church.
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There follow the signatures of the Fathers.
Footnotes:
(1) Cf. Acts 17: 26
(2) Cf Wisdom 8 : 1; Acts 14: 17; Romans 2: 6-7; 1 Timothy 2: 4.
(3) Cf. Apocalypse 21: 23f.
(4) Cf. 2 Corinthians 5: 18-19.
(5) Cf. St. Gregory VII, Letter XXI to Anzir (Nacir), Ring of Mauritania (PL 148, col. 
450 f.)
(6 ) Cf Galatians 3: 7.
(7) Cf. Romans 11: 17-24.
(8) Cf. Ephesians 2 : 14-16.
(9) Cf. Luke 19: 44.
(10) Cf. Romans 11: 28.
(11) Cf Romans 11: 28-29; cf Dogmatic Constitution, Lumen Gentium (Light of 
Nations), AAS, 55 (1965), p. 2 0 .
(12) Cf. Isaiah 6 6 : 23; Psalm 65: 4: Romans 11: 11-32.
(13) Cf. John 19: 6 .
(14) Cf. Romans 12: 18.
(15) Cf. Matthew 5: 45.
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Appendix 6. Extract from Karl Barth (1956; 425-6)
We can expect this hidden neighbour, who stands outside the visible Church, just 
because there is a visible Church. We are obviously referred to him by at least some of 
the statements made in Scripture about the Gentiles. The Gentries, with their worship of 
false gods, are the dark background before which the redemptive dealings of God with 
His people and Church take place. They are also the object of the Church’s mission and 
proclamation. As those who are one day to be assembled on Mount Zion, they are the 
content of one of the prophesies of the last days. But in individual figures whom we 
must not overlook, they also have a present place in the redemptive history attested by 
the Bible. They are strangers, and yet as such adherents; strangers who as such have 
some very important and decisive things to say to the children of the household; 
strangers who fiom the most unexpected distances come right into the apparently closed 
cncle of the divine election and calhng and carry out a kind of commission, fulfil and 
office for which there is no name, but the content of which is quite obviously a service 
which they have to render. We can think of the Balaam, Numbers 22-24, who is to curse 
Israel, but instead he must irr esistibly bless. We can think of the harlot Rahab who, 
according to Joshua 2:12, ‘had mercy’ on the Israehte spies, and who was therefore 
justified by her works according to James 2:25, and saved by her faith according to 
Hebrews 11:31. We can think of the Moabitess Ruth and her loyalty to the humihated 
Israehtess Naomi, a loyalty which has no less reward than that she is made the ancestress 
of David and given prominence as such in Matthew 1:5. We can think of the co­
operation of Hiram, King of Tyre, in the building of Solomon’s temple (1 Kings 5:15f). 
We can think of the sayings and gifts of the Queen of Sheba (1 Kings 10 : If). We can 
think of the Syrian captain Naaman (2 Kings 5: If). We can think of the wonderful role 
ascribed to the Persian king Cyrus, not only hr Deutero-Isaiah but also in the book of 
Ezra. And in the New Testament we can think of the wise men who came with then 
offerings fiom the East (Matthew 2: If); of the centurion of Capernaum, who, according 
to Matthew 8 : lOf, had such a faith as Jesus had not foimd hr Israel, and led him to speak 
of the many who shall come fiom the East, fiom the West and shall sit down with 
Abraham and Isaac and Jacob; of the Syro-Phoenecian woman (Mark 7:24f. ); of the 
centmion at the cross with his messiarric confession (Mark 15:39); of the centurion 
Cornelius at Cæsarea, in whose house Peter learns that ‘hr every natron he that feareth 
Irim and worketh righteousness, is acceptable to him’ (Acts 10:35). That these biblical
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figures must be regarded as in any way the representatives of a general revelation is 
excluded by the context of all these passages. The most remarkable of them all is the 
Melchisedek, King of Salem, and a ‘priest of the most high God’, who brings bread and 
wine to Abraham, and blesses him and receives from him a tithe (Genesis 14:18f). He 
reappears in the royal Psalm 110:4, again mysteriously as the representative of an 
otherwise unmentioned priestly order, by wliich even the Elect of Yahweh seems to be 
measmed. According to Hebrews 5:6f, 6 :2 0 , 7:If, he is the type of Jesus Christ 
Himself and of Khs supreme and definitive high priesthood. It is therefore not merely 
legitimate but obhgatoiy to regard the figure of Melchisedek as the hermeneutic key to 
this whole succession. It is not on the basis of a natmal knowledge of God and a 
relationship with God that aU these strangers play then striking role. What happens is 
that in them Jesus Christ proclaims HhnselP to be the great Samaritan: as it were, in a 
second and outer circle of His revelation, which by its very nature can only be hinted at. 
It must be noted that no independent significance can be ascribed to any of the 
revelations as we can call them in a wider sense. There is no Melchisedek apart fiom 
Abraham, just as there is no Abraham apart fiom Jesus Christ. They have no Word of 
God to preach. They are not witnesses of the resmrection. They have no fiill power to 
summon to the love of God. fir this they dififer permanently and fimdamentally fiom the 
prophets and apostles, as does then function fiom that of the Church. Their witness is a 
confirmatory and not a basic witness. But granted that there are prophets and apostles, 
granted there is a people of God and a Church, granted that God is aheady loved, they 
have the authority and the power to summon those who love God to the praise of God 
which is meet and acceptable to Him. If we know the incarnation of the eternal Word 
and the glorification of humanity in Him, we carmot pass by any man, without being 
asked whether in his humanity he does not have this mission to us, he does not become 
to us this compassionate neighbour .
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Glossary of Muslim terms
‘asr: afternoon prayer, prayed when the shadow of an object is the same length as the 
object’s height (though this can vary outside a certain latitude of the Earth’s surface) 
Ahl al-Kitab\ people of the book, principally Christians and Jews 
al haq\ the truth, or the Tmth
d<ma\ invitation to Islam, sometimes understood more negatively as propaganda 
hadith (plural: ahadith): tradition or saying of the Prophet and his companions 
hajj: the pilgrimage to Mecca, the fifth pillar of Islam 
halak permitted, opposite of haram (q.v.) 
haram: forbidden, opposite of halal (q.v.)
ibadat. worship, obedience, worship thi ough obedience to the pillars of Islam 
Imam', in Sunni Islam, someone who leads prayers or teaches in a mosque; in Shi’a 
Islam, one of the successors to the Prophet; the Ismailis are led by the ‘living Imam’, 
at present Piince Aga Khan TV, who claims succession thiough the hue of Shi’a 
Imams 
iman: faith
Injil'. the Gospel; the book beheved by Muslims to have been revealed to the Prophet 
Issa (Jesus)
jam t mosque in which the khutba (q.v.) is preached (Maghrebian Arabic term) 
jihad: effort or struggle, the great jihad is the stmggle to control one’s ‘baser 
instincts’, the lesser jihad  may involve holy war
khutba: sermon preached in a mosque at the jummah (Friday noon) prayer 
madrassah: Islamic or Qur’anic school, in Britain it is normally used for teaching 
Islam to children outside of school horn s 
masjid: mosque
maslak (plural: masalik): path or way, a discrete school of Islamic thought and 
practice with some kind of central organisation
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pir: a spiritual leader or guide of a Sufi order
shahada: witness, the first pillar of Islam, the statement ashadu anna la~ilaha ilia 
Allah (I bear witness that there is no god but Ahah)
Sheikh: leader of a Sufi order, teacher, saint, descendent of the Prophet 
tariqa: path or way, apphed mainly to a Sufi order
ummah: community, tribe or nation, specifically the imagined or aspired community 
of all the world’s Muslims
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Glossary of French terms
• affaire du foulard, headscarf affah, also referred to as affaire du voile (affair of the 
veil)
• assimilation', the concept of assimilation into a single French nation and culture
• Beurs'. the immediate descendants of migrants fi om North Afiica to France; the teim, 
coined by the actors themselves, is a verlan (slang inversion) of the word Arabe 
(Arab)
• Front National', extreme right-whig and anti-immigiation party in France, led, at the 
time of wilting, by Jean-Marie Le Pen
• FILMS'. Flabitations à Loyer Modéré (low rent housing); council fiats
® intégrisme', often used in the same sense as ‘fiindamentahsm’ in Enghsh, strictly
refers to a late nineteenth-century movement hr Spanish Catholicism
• Islamologie'. the academic study of Islam and of Muslims, arguably more social 
scientific in its approach than is Islamic studies
• laïcité', a secular system estabhshed by law
• sans papiers'. Hterally ‘without papers’, refers to people who were legally resident hi 
France until a change in the residence laws made then presence illegal
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